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Abstract
This study evaluates, through history and analysis, the value o f extradition as a 
method of combating international tenorism during the past two decades, from the 
perspective o f the U. S. experience. Through the adoption of an integi'ated 
homework, a case study approach is applied with the intention of illuminating major 
themes and issues relevant to state response and terrorist extradition, while exposing 
several underlying themes about the political relationship between extradition and 
tenoiism. Historical analysis demonstrates that current methods of rendering fugitive 
terrorists are not just the simple application of international mles, but an evolving 
process of law. Alternatives to the use of extradition are also examined, with 
particular reference to state sponsored terrorism, their impact on extradition, the 
prospects for military retaliation, and the potential for alternatives such as an 
International Criminal Court. The evolving nature of teiTorist extradition is examined 
in concert with the changing nature of teiTorism itself, and how ultimately this 
influences not only the law, but also law enforcement. By utilising such an approach, 
the study seeks to extricate the fundamental issues behind U.S. extradition policy, and 
ultimately the useffilness of extradition as a tool against terrorism.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Context, Scope, and Framework for Discussion
From the point o f view o f our government - o f any democratic government - there are 
always two objectives: to save the lives o f citizens and, at the same time, not to lose 
credibility or independence or stability. The task is harder than it seems. The 
government must act in a context o f intense domestic political pressure to "do 
something": must avoid directing anger against any sizable segment o f the 
population, a step that in the long run creates instability and encourages support for  
violent opposition; and must deal with the fears that its responses are sure to create 
among any people wise enough to know that government is most dangerous when it 
claims to be fighting dangerous enemies. Often, it must at the same time worry about 
its international relations with both enemies and allies. Its decisions are influenced 
by bureaucratic competition among law enforcement and intelligence agencies at 
federal and local levels, each o f whom may think it htows best how to prevent further 
violence and how to bring perpetrators to justice. In such a complicated game, even 
a government that plays its cards perfectly may not have a winning hand. ^
1.1 Introduction
It is the intention of this work to introduce, discuss, and evaluate thi*ough 
empirical case study analysis, the value of extradition as a method of combating 
international terrorism. While acknowledged that this is a unique problem in many 
areas of the world,^ this discussion frames the perspective o f the American experience 
with ten'orist extradition. Regardless of the geographic focus, however, the task at 
hand not an easy one. Extradition encompasses aspects of both the legal process, and 
of political will. The extent to which either one or both take part in compliance to 
international nouns of law is very difficult to measure. It is not a new concept; the 
influence of politics on legal decision-making has always been a part of the system.
1j
 ^ Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America A Commoiisense Strategy for A Democratic Society, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. xi-xii.
 ^Extradition between France and Spain regarding members o f  ETA for example, or between the Irish Republic j
and Great Britain. See; B.W. Warner, “Extradition Law and Practice in the Crucible o f  Ulster, Ireland and Great i
Britain: A Metamorphosis?”, Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart eds. Contemporary Research on Terrorism, {
(Aberdeen University Press, 1987 ). |
1 I
Terrorism is not new subject matter; there is much written and discussed on terrorism, 
especially in its relationship to law. Nevertheless, an examination of the political 
relationship between extradition and tenorism, and a discussion of the key issues and 
problems that surround the adoption and implementation of its legal character, is 
worthy of study.
1.1.1 Nature and Scope o f  the Issue
This is not a study of the legal analysis of extradition, nor should it be classified 
as a study in international law, but rather international relations. Tliis is a study of 
extradition as a process, and as a tool. It explores the legal and political nexus of the 
relationship between extradition and tenorism, and measures its application as an 
effective combatant to tenorism. While the nature of extradition does have legal 
properties, its implementation and success often depends largely on the political 
influences that sunound it.
Extradition operates on both international and domestic levels, allowing the 
transfer of alleged criminal fugitives between states thorough bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements, which are predetennined or arranged on an ad hoc basis. The process 
of extradition, however, is implemented and decided upon in the courts. There is a 
voluminous amount of case law available on extradition cases in general, but they are 
not the focal point of study. Ten'orist extradition will be the focus of discussion, for 
two reasons; first, because it is an interesting aspect of extradition case law, and 
second, the political aspect of extradition law provides the best example in which to 
measure political influence.
Terrorism adds a unique perspective to the question of extradition due to the 
inherent inability to differentiate it from other definable threats of violence or crime. 
The existing international framework of law does not and cannot adequately deal with 
terrorism, due to these definitional challenges. The United Nations, the centre of 
international law, has tried and failed in their efforts to achieve an overall 
condemnation of tenorism - as member states on both the Security Council and 
General Assembly, have repeatedly wavered on the semantics of it's definition.^ The 
individual efforts of western liberal democracies towards domestic and international 
teiTorism, however, has proven slightly more effective, and in some cases even 
successful. It remains a perpetual challenge, to mount an effective response towards 
terrorism especially in a democratic context, and as noted by Paul Wilkinson,
‘"One obvious but extremely important factor is the inherent civil rights and 
freedoms o f the liberal states which terrorist organizations can exploit. Freedom o f 
movement both between and within liberal states, freedom o f association, and 
freedom from totalitarian style police surveillance and control, are all rightly highly 
valued by citizens o f Western liberal states. Yet they can be all too easily taken 
advantage o f by terrorists. They can slip quickly across frontiers if  police interest 
becomes too close.
The legal challenge inherent in extradition, ostensibly, is that there exists no one 
comprehensive international criminal system. Whether or not an offence qualifies as a 
crime is more a question of empirical study than it is absolute fact; and there are 
instances when a crime committed in one state does not constitute a crime in another. 
Still some crimes are so reprehensible that they are considered prosecutable wherever 
the perpetrator is found. Nevertheless, there are no hard and fast rules that apply to all
^ Only in the mid to late 1980’s did the UlSI begin to make progress toward a condemnation o f  teirorism. See: 
Seymore Maxwell Finger, "The United Nations and Teirorism", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., (Ed.), International 
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls; (New York: St. Martins Press), 1990, pp. 259-61.
States in these circumstances. Issues of jurisdiction are also prevalent, as are issues of
rendition other than extradition, where extradition overlaps into other fields o f law.
There are occasions that give rise to the ability to sunender fugitives through methods
that do not include extradition, but are nonetheless legal, effective, alternatives that
work outside the boundaries o f the tedious process of extradition. These concepts are
given a substantial amount o f detailed attention later on in the discussion, as are other
alternatives to the legal process.^
As noted by Geoff Gilbert,
"[pjart o f the problem of extradition is in dying to achieve the correct balance 
between allowing a free flow o f fugitive criminals to states where they may be 
prosecuted for their crimes, and in safeguarding the fugitive from oppressive 
punishment or from persecution on account o f his personal characteristics, beliefs, 
or opinions.
In fonnulating the theory, implementation and practice of extradition law, one cannot 
divorce the legal process from the politics of international relations that encumber it. 
Embedded in every request for extradition, there lies an element o f foreign policy, and 
often this is the dominant factor in the outcome of an extradition case. This is 
especially tme when taking into account the special circumstance of terrorism; an 
illustration, such as the Lockerbie case, best illuminates this. Lockerbie remains 
perhaps the single best example of the political relationsliip between extradition and 
ten*orism to date.
^ Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London: MacMillian, 1979), p. 103.
 ^ Discussions prevalent in both Chapters 6 and 7.
 ^G eoff Gilbert, Aspects o f  Extradition Law, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 4.
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1.1.2 The Lockerbie Example
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am flight 103 from London to New York exploded 
at 31,000 feet over Lockerbie in southern Scotland, killing all 259 on board and 11 
people on the gi'ound7 Subsequent investigations concluded that a bomb in the planes 
cargo hold caused the explosion. The case was closely linked with the French 
investigation into UTA flight 772 from Brazzaville to Paris that exploded over Niger a 
year later,^ with strong suspicion of Libyan involvement.^
Following a three year investigation, the Lord Advocate, Scotland’s chief law 
officer, obtained a warrant for the arrest of two Libyan intelligence agents, Abdel 
Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi, and Al-Amin Khalifa Fimah, pending charges^^ of 
conspiracy, murder, and contravention of the Aviation Security Act of 1982. The U.S. 
courts followed with an indictment containing similar accusations.
The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom issued a demand 
for extradition of the two Libyan officials** based on Article 7 of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which provides the
 ^ See: “Fast Facts on Lockerbie”, BBC News, Online Network, August 24, 1998, at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englisli/lockerbie/newsid 156000/1566062.stm
 ^ UTA Flight 772 exploded over Niger September 19, 1989. See: Paul Wilkinson, The Lessons o f  Lockerbie, 
Conflict Studies #226, (Research Institute for the Study o f  Conflict and Terrorism), December 1989.
^On October 30, 1991 a French examining magistrate issued anest warrants against six Libyan officials for their 
alleged involvement in the UTA bombing.
*** For a list and discussion o f  these charges see: http://www.law.gla.ac.uk/lockerbie/index.cfin
* * The demand states: “The British and American Governments today declare that the Government o f Libya 
must:
suirender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept complete responsibility for the actions o f  Libyan 
officials;
disclose all it knows o f  this crime, including the names o f all those responsible, and allow full access to all 
witnesses, documents and other material evidence, including all the remaining timers; 
pay appropriate compensation 
W e expect Libya to comply in full.”
basis of obligation for prosecution against those who commit aircraft sabotage. Libya 
refused these demands under the same c o n v e n t i o n ,  *2 citing that Libya is under no 
obligation to extradite its own nationals. In response, the U.N. Security Council 
issued two resolutions; Resolution 731 on January 21, 1992*4 requesting the surrender 
for trial of the suspects, which was refused by Libya, followed by Resolution 748 on 
March 31, 1992.*^ The latter was an actual demand for Libya to renounce terrorism 
and ‘surrender’, not extradite, the two suspects al-Megrahi and Fhimah. The 
resolution gave two weeks for full compliance, at which point a range of sanctions 
would be, and eventually were, imposed on Libya. After 18 months, when the two
See: U.N. doc. A/46/827;S/23308, Ann.
*  ^Libya did not, until Januaiy 18, 1992, invoke the Montreal Convention as the basis o f  its refusal to surrender 
the suspects. In a letter to the United States, Libya argued: “out o f  respect for the principle o f  ascendance o f  the 
rule o f  law and in implementation o f the Libyan Code o f Criminal Proeedure. ..as soon as the charges were made, 
Libya immediately exercised its jurisdiction over the two alleged offenders in accordance with its obligation under 
article 5, paragraph 2, o f  the Montreal Convention by adopting certain measures to ascertain their presence and 
taking immediate steps to institute a preliminary enquiry. It notified States.. .that the suspects were in custody...
As a State party to the Convention and in accordance with paragraph 2 o f  article 5, w e took such measures as 
might be necessary to establish our jurisdiction over any o f  the offences... because the alleged offender in the case  
was present in our territoiy.
Moreover, article 7 o f  the Convention stipulates that the Contracting Party in the territory o f  which the alleged 
offender is found shall, i f  it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the puipose o f  
prosecution and that those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case o f  any ordinary 
offence o f  a serious nature under the law o f  that state.”
See: U.N. doc S/23441, Ann
*^  Because Libya had begun it’s own investigation and had initiated proceedings, legally they not obligated to 
extradite nationals against whom proceedings have already been instituted. See; Cherif M. Bassiouni and Edward 
M. W ise, eds. Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1995), p. 58. For additional 
discussion in detail on the extradition requests, the U.N. conventions and potential implications, see: Alfred P. 
Rubin, “Libya, Lockerbie and the Law”, Diplom acy & Statecraft, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 1-19.
*4 For a summary in greater detail o f  UN Security Council Resolutions which pertain to the Lockerbie case see: 
University o f  G lasgow School o f  Law, Loclcerbie Trial Briefing Site, at
http://www.law.gla.ac.uk/lockerbia/index.cfm under “Summaiy: Security Council Resolutions”, and “Challenges 
to the Resolutions”.
* ^  Ibid.
Libyans were still not handed over, the sanctions were extended and tightened by the 
Security Council in Resolution 883 on November 11, 1993.*^
After nearly seven years of failure to obtain the custody of the two Libyans 
indicted for the bombing, the U.S. and the U.K. were prepared to drop their 
insistence*^ that the two men be tried in either the U.S. or the U.K. Instead, they were 
prepared to participate in the unorthodox suggestion of transplanting the Scottish 
court that would have the jurisdiction to try them, to a neural venue at The Hague. *^
On April 20, 1998, during a meeting with a representative of the victims of the 
December 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103, Libya’s revolutionary leader, 
Momar El-Gadhafi promised to surrender two alleged members of his national 
intelligence service, both of whom are suspected in the bombing incident. One year 
later, Gadhafi made good on his promise and handed the suspects over to the United 
Nations Legal Chief, and the suspects were extradited to The Hague in The 
Netherlands.*^ The two men, Abdel Basel Ali Mohamed al Megrahi, and Lamen 
Khalifa Fhimah, were extradited to Scottish jurisdiction at Camp Zeist, a former 
American airbase, outside Utrecht, Netherlands, a location agreed upon by British and 
Dutch govermnents as the most suitable for trial. It was here where they were
1*6 Ibid. !
[
*^  Associated Press, “U.S. Compromises in Lockerbie Bombing”, New York Times, August 24, 1998; Associated  
Press, “U.S. OK’s Libyan’s Trial at Hauge”, the New York Times, August 24, 1998.
*^  Associated Press, “U.S., U.K. Back International Trial o f  Lockerbie Suspects”, Los Angeles Times, August 24,
1998; see also: “Anglo-U.S. agreement on Lockerbie trial”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/lockerbie/newsid 157000/157536.stm and “Lockerbie trial: euphoria and 
reserve”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/lockerbie/newsid 157000/157412.stm . For Scottish press views on 
decision see: “Cook looks to world leaders in quest for Lockerbie justice”. The Scotsman, August 25, 1998; and 
“Trial would be a Scottish affair but Scots would pay the price”, The Scotsman, August 25, 1998.
*^  See: "Chronology o f  the Lockerbie Case", A ssociated Press - Lockerbie Report Archives, Lockerbie Trial 
Briefing Site, http://www.law.gla.ac.uk/lockerbie/index.cfm.
eventually aiTaigned and tried under Scots law for murder, conspiracy to commit 
murder, and violation of international aviation laws.^o
In February 2001, Abdel al-Megrahi was convicted, unanimously by the court, of 
murder in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. The other defendant, Lamen Khalifa 
Fhima, however, was acquitted.^* The Scottish judges in their ruling acknowledged 
the weakness of the prosecution case, and evidence; however, they concluded the sum 
total of the evidence was sufficient to establish Megi'ahi’s guilt.^^
Lockerbie remains one of the worst terrorist attacks in the History of the United 
States, and the worst cases of mass murder in Britain since in modem history. The 
effects of Lockerbie were to be more profound and long-tenn. After nearly eleven 
years of legal dispute, UN sanctions, and diplomatic stalemate that followed since the 
bombing occurred, the U.K. had the opportunity to adjudicate one of the most 
notorious if  not the most publicized acts of terrorism to date. There were massive 
political undertones in order for this to actually take place, which took the form of a 
series o f trade-offs. For the United States, the extradition of the two men depicts a 
sense of diplomatic and political "victory" for their hard-line stance on terrorism and 
their sanctions policy toward Libya, which has spanned a better part of two decades. 
For Libya, the hand-over of the suspects provided the opportunity to rejoin the
A s o f this writing the ti ial is cuirently undem ay. This is the first instance where a Scottish criminal court has 
convened abroad, the first time in Scottish legal history where charges this severe will be heard without a jury, and 
is anticipated to be the largest i f  not the most expensive trial in Scottish legal history.
For the full 82 page court opinion (Case No. 1475/99) in PDF file format see: 
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/download/lockerbiejudgement.pdf
Ibid at pp. 81-82; see also: Howard Schneider, “Gaddafi Dissects Lockerbie D ecision”, The Washington Post, 
February 6, 2001, p. A14.
international mainstream and participate in a booming global e c o n o m y ,^ 3 now that 
sanctions are eased with the release of the suspects. The years as an international 
pariah appeared to be ending for Gadhafi, a reputation he had done much to court. 
For the families of the Lockerbie victims, the trial outcome provided a sense of 
closure for some. Whether or not victory is a legitimate claim remains to be seen. In 
addition, there have been several legal avenues left yet to explore, such as potential 
compensation to the victim’s families; the appeal by Megrahi still pending; and the 
potential for fuither criminal investigation to see who else may have been involved. 
However, it can not be plausibly denied that there was in fact some form  of 
retribution, some shard of justice served: this was not an incident that went totally 
unpunished, ignored, or forgotten like so many have in the past. The accused were 
extradited, tried, and one was convicted. There was something done, and something 
is, and always will be, better than nothing at all.
The example of Lockerbie is meant to demonstrate the heart of what this thesis is 
about, the political relationship between extradition and terrorism. The problem, 
simply stated, is the potential to uphold the rule of law and defeat teiTorisni is often 
undermined by political will, which weakens the existing treaties and conventions 
established to address and resolve the very issue. Despite the broad array o f legal 
agi'eenients available, there remains the lure to default to alternatives outside of 
extradition, in order to avoid the political tiappings of the fonnal process. These 
alternatives, however, by their very nature are by default political. There remains.
Two interesting articles regarding Libya’s enthusiasm to rejoin the world economy and desire to end sanctions, 
see; Adam Zagorin, “Why Libya Wants In”, Time, March 27, 2000; and Andrew Coclcbum, “Libya, An End To  
Isolation?”, National Geographic, November 2000.
then, a need to assess more cogently, the value of extradition as a method of 
combating teiTorism.
1.2 A Brief Historical Overview
Extradition as a practice can trace its roots back to the thirteenth centuiy. There 
is evidence that a treaty of extradition existed in 1280 B.C. between Rameses II the of 
Pharaoh Egypt and the Hittite King Hattusili III detailing a provision relating to the 
return of fugitive offenders between various provinces,^^ concluded after the Hittite’s 
attempt to invade and conquer Egypt.^s During the time of the Roman Empire, 
however, this likely meant that fugitive offenders were enemies of the state, and not 
technically criminals, but perhaps the first political asylum seekers.
It is, in fact, in this aspect that extradition laws have changed over the centuries, 
which is the aspect concerning political asylum.
Extradition itself is largely a development from the theory of asylum, its 
beginnings emanating from the time of the ancient Greeks, where asylum was granted 
freely to everyone, not just to political o f fe n d e r s .^ ^  This differed greatly from the 
Middle Ages, where the sole purpose of extradition was to hunt down political 
fugitives that fled to other jurisdictions in order to escape punishment.^^ This was 
very much a sign of the times, as monarchs all shared one common interest, which
^■^Peter Sutherland, The Developm ent o f  International Law o f  Extradition, Saint Louis University Law Journal, 
Vol. 28:33, 1984.
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Practice o f  Extradition from  Antiquity to Modern France and the United States: 
a b r ie f  H istory, Boston College o f  International and Comparative Law Review, Vol IV, No. 1, 1981.
Blakesley, PRACTICE at note 4.
Ian Shearer, Extradition in International Law, (Manchester University Press) 1971, p. 166.
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was to punish, or execute, those individuals who sought to overthiow their regimes, 
and extradition of this age was almost completely, entirely, political. The example of 
the first British treaty of extradition between William of Scotland and Henry II of 
England in 1174 is particularly poignant as it concluded the suiTender of felons that 
fled between the two countries. The treaty was unique as it allowed the provision of 
trial by the couits in the asylum state as an alternative to surrender. From this time in 
1174 until Scotland assimilated into the Union in 1707, a continuous stream of 
extradition between the two countries was readily apparent.^^ The 1303 Treaty o f 
Paris, between Edward II of England and Phillippe le Bel of France, accomplished 
much of the same. Political in nature, its main purpose was to return political enemies 
of the respective sovereigns.^9
Even up into the late seventeenth century, the majority of most major extradition 
agreements remained political, the most dramatic example being that of Louis XIV 
and his Edict of Nantes, disallowing emigration. As a result, o f his order many of the 
inhabitants from the City o f  Gex fled. Louis demanded of the magistrates to order the 
return of the fugitives, which the Magistrates did, but most of the deserters still did 
not return. Louis demanded again their return to the Magistrates under fear of penalty 
if  they did not return, essentially ordering citizens to deliver expatriates to the crown 
under fear of punishment.^^
Modem extradition first made its historical debut in early in the 18"' centuiy, in 
the treaty between France and Holland 1736, which applied to the extradition of
Paul O ’Higgins, The History o f  Extradition in British Practice, 1174-1794, The Indian Y earbook o f  
International Affairs. 78:108, 1964, p. 80-81.
Ibid at note 5, p. 48.
Ibid.
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individuals charged with committing ‘common c r i m e s ’ .3 1 France continued an
uncontested role in the development o f modem extradition thi'oughout the 18“' and 
19* centuries, which would include bilateral treaties with all o f their neighbours 
except for Great B r ita in .3 2  The basis for modern procedural characteristics of 
extradition were developed largely during the latter half of this time period, including 
the use of the political offence exception, which acted as a proscriptive limitation to 
extradition.
While France was the comparatively stronger in teims of influence in modern 
extradition law, the judicial decisions, or case law decisions, of the United States were 
equally important in the fomiation of modern extradition law. The foundation of this 
demonstrated in one of the first treaties between the United States and Great Britain, 
also know as The Jay Treaty o f  1794;^^ and again between the United States and 
France, which was the first to include the political offence c la u s e .3 4  These were 
largely predicated on the basic tenants of extradition law as developed by the French,
31 Shearer, EXTRADITION p. 8.
32 Blakesley, PRACTICE p. 51.
33Aiticle 27 reads:
“It is further agreed that His Majesty and the United States on mutual requisitions, by them respectively, or by 
their respective Ministers or officers authorized to make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons who, being 
charged with murder or forgeiy, committed within tlie jurisdiction o f  either, shall seek an asylum within any o f  the 
countries o f other, provided that this shall only be done on such evidence o f  criminality as, according to the laws 
o f  the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and 
commitment for trial, i f  the offence had there been committed. The expense o f  such apprehension and delivery 
shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the requisition and receive the fugitive.”
For a copy o f  the Jay Treaty see: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/dir)lomacv/iav.htm
34 The Convention for the Surrender o f Criminals: 1843, Article V states:
“The provisions o f  the present Convention shall not be applied in any manner to the crimes enumerated in the 
second article, committed anterior to the date thereof, nor to any crime or offence o f  a purely political character.” 
For the complete text o f  the Convention, see: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/fr-1843 .htm
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and ultimately set the trend for the development of extradition law in the United 
States.
The prominent historical debate in the U.S. centred on whether or not the 
extradition of fugitives in the absence of an existing treaty obligation was a 
requirement. The U.S. v. Robins, i n  1799 was the first such case to consider this 
aspect, but it was not until 1840 in Holmes v. Jennison^^ when the Supreme Court 
ruled that that no obligation to extradite a fugitive exists outside o f that which was 
imposed by treaty law. The court reasoned that if  extradition occurred outside the 
obligation imposed by treaty, it is because of the commonality and the discretion of 
the two govermnents that were party to that agieement.37 This sentiment remained 
true in U.S. case law through the 20* century. The 1947 case of the Soviet national 
accused of embezzlement did not lend to extradition to the Soviet Union. The U.S. 
referred the Soviet government to the fact that established principles of international 
law do not account for extradition outside of treaty law.38
Though it may be an established principle of U.S. case law to refuse extradition 
in the absence of treaty obligation, it does not prevent the U.S. from requesting 
extradition from countries in the absence of treaty obligation.
35 27 Federal Cases 825 (1799), No. 16, 175)
3  ^Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14. Pet) 540 (1840)
37 U.S. V. /(awfcAer, 119, U.S. 407 (1866)
38 Blakesley, PRACTICE p. 58
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1.2.1 Extradition as a Process
How does extradition happen? It is not a self-executing principle, but one that is 
bom out of process. Extradition is treaty governed and regulated between countries 
using bi-lateral diplomatic treaties. Certain states witli close diplomatic ties, for 
example, will have specialized agreements suited to their own particular situation. 
Examples of this include the United Kingdom and Ireland,39 Australia and New 
Zealand, or the U.S. and Canada. Within the language of the treaty are the 
specifications of certain acts that are extraditable crimes. Also within the scope of the 
treaty, are the procedures and safeguards that stipulate the extradition relationship.^^ 
The first step in any extradition request is to inform the proper authorities, 
usually the central govemmenf s law enforceiuent authorities in the requested state of 
the fugitive’s presence. The method for achieving this is in the language of the treaty, 
and takes the form of diplomatic channels requesting the issuance of a warrant for the 
sunender of the fugitive; or the requesting state may submit an application for a 
warrant of arrest directly to a judge. In the case of the former, the request must be 
backed by sufficient evidence to convince the govermiient of the requested state’s 
judiciary and criminal investigations branch that extradition is appropriate. In the 
case of the latter, the judge is obligated to keep the branch of govermiient which has 
jurisdiction over these matters informed of the outcome of the proceedings.
39 For reference see: Paul O ’Higgins, HISTORY.
40 For further discussion see: G eoff Gilbert, ASPECTS.
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Once the fugitive is aiTested, the presiding judicial officer may either set or deny 
bail,41 and a writ of habeas corpus can only be filed after prolonged detention and if 
no charges have been filed.
The judicial phase is the extradition hearing,42 which does not detemiine guilt or 
innocence, but rather the susceptibility of the fugitives surrender. After a hearing and 
if necessary, the appeal, the courts determine whether the fugitive will be surrendered. 
Assuming the fugitive is to be surrendered, the matter is left to the executive branch to 
render a final decision on the case before signing the authorization, or extradition 
order.43
There is, in addition, the issue of political offence, for which no uniform 
substantive procedure is established. Because the political offence exception makes 
the subject ‘nonextraditable’, it places an additional burden on the court to prove the 
relativity of the political nature of the crime, to the criminal act committed. 
Historically, as discussed above, political offences have been dealt with as either 
relative offences, committed in connection with a political act; or purely political 
offences. However, if  the nexus between the crime committed, and the political act 
are sufficiently close, then the offence is judged as a relatively political offence. This 
issue will be dealt with at some length later on in the study. However, it is important 
to introduce here the concept of how political offence can affect the outcome of 
extradition, even though the crime may appear to be a criminal act. The charge of
4^  See: Steven Lubet and Morris Czackes, The Role o f  the Am encan Judiciary in the Extradition o f  P olitical 
Terrorists, The Journal o f  Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 71, No. 3, 1980.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid at note 20, p. 206.
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political offence obviates the need for any factual determination, as political offences 
are never extraditable/^
One final point that affects process of extradition and the decision to render a 
fugitive to the requested state is the issue of double criminality/5 The essence of this 
concept is very simple; the fugitive should not be returned to the requested state 
unless the act committed is prosecutable in both the requesting state and the asylum 
state.
1.2.2 Multilateral Agreements
In addition to bilateral agreements, there exist several multilateral agieements in 
the form of conventions; many of these are referenced tliroughout the work, in 
paiticular in the case studies in which they are directly applicable. However, it should 
be mentioned up front that multilateral conventions also play a role in the evolution of 
extradition, and an equally important role in the evolution of the process.
While efforts made through the United Nations to deal with the problem of 
terrorism, usually as they apply to specific acts, for example: hijacking, piracy, or the 
protection of diplomats, present inherent problems. The most obvious difficulty is 
enforceability of these agreements, as evidenced in the Lockerbie discussion above; 
there is little that can be done to enforce these measures, other than the possibility of 
sanctions, which also must be a multilateral effort. There is always the obstacle of 
member states sympathetic to the cause of the terrorist organization, in particular
44 Ibid  at note 23, p. 207
45 pqj. greater in-depth handling o f  this issue see: Gilbert, ASPECTS pp. 47-54;
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those groups that puiport to operate with the goal of achieving self-detemiination. In 
contrast, bilateral agieements are not as prone to this o b s t a c l e / 6
There have been recent attempts to bring a gieater convergence in matters of 
criminal codes that deal with identifying terrorist offences. The International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,4? for example, passed 
in December 1999, compensates for the existing multilateral agreements that do not 
address the issue. The Resolution calls for greater international cooperation among 
States in “devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing 
of terrorism, as well as for its suppression thiough the prosecution and punishment of 
its peipetrators.”48
The issue of convergence is a poignant example o f how states are able to 
necessitate changes in national law through the ratification of these international 
conventions. It is the standard bearer as to how the politics of extradition are 
changing within the international community through changes in the convergence of 
laws which govern these types of matters. The easing of laws, the increase in 
cooperation, are what lead to the success of extradition cases, and which are widely 
discussed in many of the international conventions which deal with specific matters 
involving extradition. However, while these conventions are good, they are not good 
enough. Domestic laws also need to change if  compliance to international law is to be
46 See: L.C. Green, Terrorism and the Courts, Manitoba Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1981
47 For Convention see: http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm
48 Ibid at Preamble.
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carried out. This is not an ‘either-or’ case; changes on both the international and 
domestic levels must be sought in order to make p r o g r e s s . 49
Multilateral agreements can greatly help by encouraging a convergence in the 
criminal codes of states to deal with teiTorist crimes. Extradition is far more likely to 
work as a tool of combating terrorism if there is an increase in international agieement 
on establishing extradition procedures and safeguards. The Council of Europe and 
the European Union have negotiated useful conventions in order to bring about a 
greater convergence in these matters. Perhaps the most illustrative example are the 
measures put forward by The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, which has 
come out in favour of stepping up police and judicial cooperation thioughout the 
European continent to allow for more effective measures in fighting teiTorism. The 
Council has adopted a recommendation which prioritises improving the effectiveness 
of the two European Conventions which deal with tenorism. The 1977 European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorisnrio would broaden the definition of 
criminal offences of a terrorist nature to include “preparatory acts” (preparation of 
attacks, membership to associations, and financing or provision of logistics). In 
addition, there would be revisions to “Article 18”, which prevents states from 
extraditing fugitives on grounds of political offence.^i The second recommendation 
would apply to the 1957 European Convention on Extradition,52 and would call for
49 Jeffrey B. Gaynes, Bringing The Terrorist To Justice: A Dom estic Law Approach, Cornell Journal o f  
International Law. Vol. 11, 1978, p. 73.
5® See: European Convention on the Suppression o f  Terrorism, Strasbourg 27.1.1977 at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/treatv/en/Treaties/Html/090.htni
5^  Combating Terrorism: Assembly calls fo r  greater po lice  and jud icia l cooperation Europe-wide, September 23, 
1999, Council o f  Europe web site: h ttp ://p ress.coe .m t/cp /99 /478a(99).h tm
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revisions to be applied concerning the definition of a political offence, and to simplify 
extradition proceedings with specific measures put in place to prevent the abuse of the 
right of asylum.53 Convergence of law on these matters not only strengthens the 
possibility of extradition of fugitive terrorists, but also increases, significantly, the 
prospects for international cooperation on teiTorism matters.
1.2.3 A lternative M ethods o f  Rendition other than Extradition
This is an area of cmcial importance, which was introduced above, and will be 
discussed at much gieater lengths later on in the study. Chapter 6 deals exclusively 
with the topic area that focuses on what methods are available to states if  extradition 
is not an option, noting that this is often prevalent with states that act as sponsors of 
terrorism. However, even with states where extradition is a possibility, there remains 
the practice o f other forms of cooperation that do not involve the courts or the 
executive branches, rather they transpire on lower levels of cooperation, between 
governmental agencies such as between law enforcement. The practice of rendition, 
discussed in Chapter 7,54 jg such a case, where a fugitive is sun'endered by means 
agreed to by both states. Rendition can be a willing arrangement, or as discussed 
further on, can also be coerced. Moreover, not all means of rendition ai e regarded as 
legal by the state from whence a person is sought. The U.S. use o f its concept of 
extrateiTitorial jurisdiction leading to seizure of a suspect may be viewed as abduction 
by the state from where the suspect is seized. Consider the case o f Fawaz Younis.
52 See: European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13.XII.1957 at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/EN/Treaties/Html/024.htm
53 EUROPEAN CONVENTION.
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Middle Eastern terrorists hijacked a Royal Jordanian airliner in 1985 with two 
Americans aboard. There were no fatalities, although several passengers and crew 
members were badly beaten and the airliner was blown up on the ground in Beimt, 
and the brains behind the operation, Fawaz Younis, o f the Lebanese Amal militia, 
escaped.55 Two years later, Younis was lured to a luxury yacht off Cypms into 
international waters and captured by U.S. agents, brought back to the United States for 
trial, and convicted in what Time magazine called "the most important test yet of the 
nation's attempt to apply law and order to international teiTorism."56 On October 4, 
1989, Fawaz Younis was sentenced to 30 years in prison for the commandeering of 
the Jordani an j etliner. 57
Although not a U.S. example, there is one other very poignant example of this 
type of state response concerning the illegal rendition of fugitive criminals, which is 
the May 1960 abduction and tiial of Adolph Eichmann.
Adolph Eichmann was accused of participating as a principal architect and the 
principal executor and personally responsible for carrying out Hitler’s Final Solution, 
which would include the genocide of six million European Jews.^8 May 1960, 
Adolph Eichmann was abducted in Argentina by Israeli Mossad agents59 and brought 
to Israel for trial. The Argentinean government protested and brought a complaint
54 See Chapter 7.4 Extradition - v .  -  Rendition.
55 See: Lany C. Johnson, The Fall o f  Terrorism, at: http://www.securitvmanagement.eom/librarv/000338.html; 
AFIO Intelligence Notes Issue 4 1 ,2 6  October 1998, at: http://www.afio.com/sections/wins/1998/notes41 .html
56 Salon newsreel at: http://www.salon.com/news/1998/12/11 news2.html
57 Associated Press Reports, October 4, 1999.
58 Isser Harel, The House on Garibaldi Street. (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
39 Ibid.
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against Israel in the United Nations Security Council for violating international law, 
which the Council upheld under the principle of territorial integrity/o The Council 
insisted on appropriate reparations be made to Argentina, to which the Israeli’s 
responded by offering a full public apology. Argentina accepted, and that was 
ultimately considered full reparation.^i Eichmann was tried in Israel for Genocide and 
War Crimes against Humanity before a specially convened court in Jemsalem.32 The 
legal position taken on this is even though such an extreme exercise in extra-territorial 
jurisdiction transpires; the actual claim of the country involved to try the individual 
obtained depends on the extent to which its own courts will affirm their jurisdiction.63 
Since most common law courts will not question the manner in which the accused is 
brought before them, even though it may be clear that the government, tlnough the use 
o f its Agents, have breached international law using methods to secure the accused 
individual.34 On December 2, 1961, Eichmann was found guilty and sentenced to 
death. Eichmann was executed on May 31, 1962, and is historically, the only 
execution ever to be canied out in Israel’s history.65
The point here is that rendition does not always entail an amicable relationship 
between two states. As will be discussed further on in Chapter 7, this alternative
69 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, Law and Foreign Policy. Second Edition. (New York: The Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1979), p. 270.
61 IW.
62 Isser Harel, GARIBALDI STREET, p. 285
63 L.C. Green, International Crimes and the Legal P rocess, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 
29, October 1980, p. 574.
64 Ibid. See also: L.C. Green, Legal A spects o f  the Eichmann Trial, Tulane Law Review, vol. 37, 1963.
65 IW.
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method of extradition does have an impact on the integrity of the law, and the 
effectiveness of the use of extradition as a useM  international tool.
There remain other options, such as exclusion, or deportation; and as will be 
evidenced in discussion further on, are options often in a final attempt to invoke the 
law and prevent fugitives fiom escaping. These alternative methods are not employed 
as prospects for working outside the boundaries of the law, but rather to avoid the 
fomial obligation of extiadition, and all the nuisances that accompany it.
1.3 Objectives
Beyond the general introduction of the problem, the study is conducted on three 
levels with the objective of developing the discussion of the political relationship 
between extradition and terrorism.66
First, it develops a fr amework for analysis, which will allow empirical evidence 
to be applied to the principles of law and international relations. It accomplishes this 
on two levels: 1) by arguing for an integrated framework and 2) providing a path of 
argumentation for study. In taking into account the pui*pose of the study on a whole, 
development of this framework is o f particular importance, because it creates the 
context for the way extradition and teiTorism needs to be thought about. As 
previously discussed, extradition is not a pure legal issue; the methods by which it is
66 The structure discussed in this section is consistent with, and closely related to the Controlled Comparison: 
Design and Implementation study configuration used in Alexander George’s method o f  structured, focused  
comparison. It addresses the task o f  using heuristic cases studies as building blocks for development, and 
distinguishes three phases o f  study different from, but yet closely resemble, the three phases outlined in George’s 
work which are as follows:
Phase 1 the design and structure o f  the study are foimulated.
Phase 2 the individual case studies are carried out in accord with the design.
Phase 3 the investigator draws upon results o f  the case studies in order to assess, reformulate, or elaborate the 
initial theory stated in Phase 1.
See: Alexander L. George, Case Studies and Theory Development: The M ethod o f  Structured, Focused  
Comparison, in Theory and Policy. (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 54.
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used invoke strong political undertones. A framework then, must take into account 
both legal and political aspects which allow for a cross disciplinary study with the 
ability to understand the empirical evidence in the context in which it occurs. There is 
a considerable amount of time spent on this aspect, which is unavoidable. It should be 
understood from the very start, however, that this is not a study of theory. It is a study 
of extradition. While there is a generous amount of cross-disciplinary discussion, on 
the complex relationship between international law and international policies, the 
purpose is to provide a conceptual framework for thinking that will consider what 
does not work, as well as what does. This provides the peg for the remainder o f the 
empirical discussion.
The second level will discuss case studies^? involving the U.S. and relevant to the 
topic of extradition and terrorism, by identifying the major issues and problems faced 
by the U.S. authorities and the problem of state response regarding terrorist 
extradition. This is broken into four topic areas: international cooperation, the politics 
of cooperation, alternatives for traditional bilateral interstate extradition, and the 
evolution of teiTorist extradition. Each of these is discussed in more detail in the 
Chapter Outline section of this c h a p t e r .68 The objective is to examine empirically the 
overt issues and challenges faced by the relationship between extradition and 
terrorism.
The third level, will dissect the underlying themes that are the essence of the 
study, or ‘sub themes’ that are not mentioned outright, but which bring out the 
fundamental issues behind U.S. extradition policy. These four main questions, or
67 See George’s discussion on heuristic case studies and building block approaches to the construction and 
development o f  theoiy. Ibid. p. 52.
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themes, which are discussed at length in Chapter 8, are introduced and identified here
as:
• What is the political relationship between extradition and terrorism?
• What are the key issues and problems surrounding the adoption and 
implementation of U.S. extradition treaties?
• What are appropriate alternative responses to international teiTorism, where 
extradition is not a possibility?
• How valuable is extradition as a tool in combating terrorism?
These thiee levels, which endeavour to ‘develop, discuss, and dissect’, when braided 
together, argue for the strength of extradition as a useful and valuable tool in 
combating international terrorism.
1.4 Chapter Outline
This chapter introduces the topic and an overview of the discussion. It outlines 
the objectives of the work and the primary research questions that will be addressed 
throughout. Further, it provides a conceptual definition of terms, which are referred to 
tlu'oughout the study, as well as a brief introduction of the existing literature on this 
subject area.
Chapter Two will provide a theoretical framework that will allow an empirical 
discussion to be applied to a cross-disciplinary study. A description of traditional 
methods of thinking about international relations and its applicability to international 
law will be addressed. Following this, an examination of the limitations of these 
models will be discussed. Finally, the criteria for an integrated study that will provide
68 Refer to Chapter 1.4 Chapter Outline
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the template for empirical analysis will be established. This will create the basis for 
the application of a new paradigm.
Chapter Three will act in tandem with Chapter Two, by completing the 
theoretical model and framework for analysis. It seeks to establish a template for 
extradition and tenorism, which will be applied and discussed using an integrated 
argument. This chapter seeks to expand the argument for a constiuctivist model of 
analysis that was introduced in Chapter 2, and to define much of the key terminology 
referred to throughout the work. It addresses the rules, law and norms debate in the 
context of a constructivist model as well as how the regime debate can be reconciled 
within this framework. Further, it establishes how this is applied to the study of 
extradition and terrorism, both historically and practically. The roles of international 
agreements are introduced here in terms of how they create a case for compliance. 
Finally, Chapter 3 will introduce and explain the criteria for case selection, around 
which the remainder of the work is centred. In sum, it seeks to accomplish the 
'method and approach' requirement of the study.
Chapter Four examines the role of international co-operation towards punishing 
tenorism using the Achille Lauro case example. This is the most complex of all the 
case study examples because it encompasses so many different facets within the one 
incident. How states justify their decision making process is corollary to the level of 
international co-operation and compliance. This chapter focuses not only on these 
two factors, but also on how the web of events affected the prospects for co-operation 
and compliance and ultimately extradition in the context of a terrorism incident. 
Arguably, all case examples do this too much of the same extent. However, the 
Achille Lauro provides with much greater clarity, insight into how state’s response is
25
measured against existing instruments which provide and promote international co­
operation.
Chapter Five will discuss and examine thiough use of case example, domestic 
political circumstances which affect international terrorist extradition and compliance. 
Chapter Five, the TWA hijacking and extradition of Mohamed Hamadei, brings to 
light one of the classic problems in international relations, which is the influence of 
politics over decision making, and how compliance is affected by this. Specifically, 
the example is applied to allied states, where co-operation on diplomatic and political 
levels are normally conducive to one another.
Chapter Six examines the options available to states in dealing with incidents of 
international terrorism which are severely limited when it involves states who are 
sponsors of teiTorism. It takes into account what alternative measures that become 
available as a potential response to tenorism other than the use of extradition, such as 
the use of military force, sanctions, and deportation. The highly charged topic of a 
potential International Criminal Court is also introduced and discussed.
Chapter Seven examines how the relationship between extradition and terrorism 
has evolved, if  at all, through several recent case study examples; the World Trade 
Center bombing and the two separate extradition cases that resulted from it. The 
African embassy bombings and the recent extradition and trial of the accused 
suspects, and the Mir Aimal Kansi case, accused of the CIA shootings, rendered and 
returned to the U.S. for trial.
What this final example targets is neither the lull details or the specifics of the 
cases, nor the specific laws or treaties that influenced the outcome, but rather, what 
lessons has history taught us from dealing with these types of incidents? How has it
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affected or influenced the way extradition is dealt with in temis of compliance? In 
other words, what is different now? Moreover, how have we come to this point? The 
lessons of history invoked either by accident or by deliberate action, do say something 
about the way the global community has either; learned to come together to defuse the 
problem, or at least found a way of avoiding creating an international incident. By 
assessing these themes, the thesis identifies and demonstrates new trends in co­
operation, or the process and in international law.
Chapter Eight concludes the study by distilling the major themes and issues 
raised throughout the study, and discusses the underlying issues which are prevalent 
throughout the study, but not overtly discussed. This is the summation argument for 
the work, which in its final assessment, will comment on the value of extradition as a 
tool for combating international tenorism.
1,5 Definition of Terms
No statesman or scholar to date has been able to effectively define terrorism into 
a concise or precise definition; this work will not be so brazen as to attempt to remedy 
that here. Terrorism, will adhere to Schmidt and Jongmann’s definition as:
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method o f  repeat violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, fo r  idiosyncratic, criminal, or 
political reasons, whereby — in contrast to assassination — the direct targets o f  
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims o f  violence are 
chosen randomly (targets o f  opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic 
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat -  and 
violence based communication processes between terrorist (organisatioit), 
(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audierice(s)), turnmg it into a target o f  terror, a target o f  demands, or target o f  
attentiorî, dependmg on whether intimidation, coercion, or propagarida is primarily 
sought. "69
69 A lex P. Schmidt and Albert Jongmann, Political Terrorism; A new Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data 
Bases, Theories, and Literature 2nd Edition (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988) p.28.
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While the tenu ‘terrorism’ does apply to both domestic and international violence, it 
will apply here specifically to international political teiTorism.
Extradition will be adhered to in the same manner as defined by the Public
International Law Textbook,
A criminal may seek refuge in a State which has no jurisdictional competence to try 
him, or is unwilling to try him, in respect o f  offences committed by him within the 
territory o f  another State. International law, therefore, allows the State in which a 
suspected or convicted criminal has sought refuge to extradite him by surrendering 
him to the State exercising jurisdictiorral competence to try him. 70
The veiy principle of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, commonly used to refer to the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute, is the language contained in many of the 
international treaties aimed at securing international cooperation in an attempt to curb 
very specific types of criminal behaviour, is the context in which this definition is 
discussed. This is not designed to be a study in the legal analysis of extradition, and it 
is acknowledged of course that there exist many aspects of extradition law; however, 
this study does not examine to any great detail the many aspects of extradition.
The matter of rendition is discussed several times in the study, specifically in 
Chapter 7 and again in Chapter 8, as an alternative to extradition. For the purpose of 
discussion it will adhere to Cherif Bassiouni’s definition as occumng when the 
official of the state of refiige “acts outside the framework of a foimal process or 
without authority to facilitate the abduction or cause the surrender of the fugitive.”71
79 Robert MacLean, ed. Public International Law Textbook, 16th Edition, (London: HLT), 1994, p. 116.
7^  Cherif M. Bassiouni, International Terrorism and Political Crimes. (Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 
1975), p. 352.
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The matters of deportation and exclusion as discussed in Chapter 7, will adhere to
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Agency definitions as:
• Deportation -  the fonnal removal of an alien from the United States when the 
alien has been found removable for violating the immigration laws.
Deportation is ordered by an immigration judge without any punishment being 
imposed or contemplated.^^
Exclusion -  the formal term for denial of an alien’s entry into the United 
States. The decision to exclude is made by an immigration judge after an 
exclusion hearing. 73
Although these are U.S.-centric definitions, the same definitional concept would apply 
to just about any other state. Deportation from the U.S., the U.K., or China, is still 
deportation. The difference, ostensibly, would be the procedure by which deportation 
would take place, for example before an immigration judge, the time of allowable 
detention, rights of asylum, etc. However, these are matters of immigiation, and not 
wholly applicable to the discussion. The aspect of interest here is how rendition, 
deportation, exclusion, may be employed as viable alternatives to extradition, and how 
they are potentially used in cases involving fugitive ten'orists.
i. 6 Method and Approach
This study is an empirical investigation of the usefulness o f extradition as a tool 
against international terrorism, from the perspective of the U.S. experience. A variety
72 For definitions see INS web site at: http://www.ins.usdog.gov/graphics/glossary.htm
73 Ibid. Note: This definition was prior to the Illegal Immigration Refonn and Immigrant Responsibility Act o f  
1996. After April 1, 1997, the process o f  adjudicating inadmissibility may take place in either an expedited
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of research strategies ranging from historical and comparative analysis, and based on a 
case study approach, are used to examine, the role of extradition as a tool in 
combating terrorism and how that role has evolved over the past two decades.
Much of this study is historical in character, and justifiably so. As observed by 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, “history is the great laboratory within which international 
action o c c u r s ” . 74  Although many other works have been written using the same 
historical case studies suiweyed in this work, the use of the historical experience is 
still appropriate. Previous examinations o f these case studies focus on either the legal 
extradition aspect or the political tenorist aspect of the issue, but not both. The 
subject matter has not been exposed to a cross-disciplinary examination with the 
specific goal of evaluating extradition as a meaningful tool in combating teiTorism. 
One of the major aims of the study is to provide an evolution of terrorist extradition, 
from the U.S. perspective as it has evolved from a decade and a half ago to the 
present, with the goal of examining the political relationship between extradition and 
terrorism. This includes how capturing ten'orists has changed from the early 1980’s 
when the problem came to the forefr ont of U.S. policy, to present day, and signalling 
how the law of extradition is used and how this use has changed. The value added by 
historical analysis supports this evaluation of the changing use of extradition for 
assessing its value as a tool for combating t e n o r i s m . 7 5
removal process or in removal proceedings before an immigration judge. The process has been changed, but the 
definitional concept has not.
74 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff acknowledge Morton Kaplan’s praise o f  history as: “There is one respect in which a 
science o f  international politics must always be indebted to history.. .” See: James E. Dougherty and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories o f  International Relations: A  Comprehensive Survey. 3^ '^  Edition. (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1990), p. 15.
75 Alexander George offers a greater discussion on the importance o f history in the case study approach, noting 
that “even if  people agree on the correct lessons to be drawn from a particular historical case, they often misapply
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The use of a case study approach was employed for the following reasons; first, 
the subject matter naturally lends itself to this type of analysis since the selection of 
cases is a relatively obvious method of dealing with the subject matter. Second, using 
a case study method allows the work to examine the context of the political 
relationship between extradition and teiTorism, as case studies tend to be context 
specific. This is important aspect of case study analysis since the context of state 
response is often as context specific as the threat in which it counters. Finally, a case 
study approach is a practical and efficient structure and demonstrates the evolution of 
how extradition cases involving fugitive terrorists has developed and changed over 
time.
Numerous theoretical approaches appeared, upon initial examination, to provide a 
suitable backdrop relevant to this type of cross-disciplinary case study analysis and 
subject matter, however, no one single theoretical approach confomis exactly. The 
challenge was to provide an integrated theory, one which would provide for a 
historical case study analysis to seiwe as a point of departure. As discussed in great 
detail in Chapters Two and Three, traditional methods of international relations 
thinking are limited in their scope on a practical level insofar as their applicability 
toward the study of extradition and tenorism. Since two full chapters are dedicated to 
the development of this model, and the reasons for employing this approach, there 
will not be a great deal of detail or discussion now; except to say that this study will 
employ the use of an approach grounded in tenants of a rational choice model. The 
theoretical base used as a cornerstone for study utilises a constructivist argument.
those lessons to a new situation that differs from the past one in important respects”, See: Alexander L. George.- 
CASE STUDIES
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which will provide a common ground for both the use of international law and 
international relations; and at the same time allow for the analysis of the domestic 
decision making of states. This not only provides a point of departure for case study 
analysis, but also offers a practical lens to examine the political relationship between 
extradition and terrorism, and its effectiveness as a tool of international law.
i. 7 Literature Review
There is an exhaustive amount of literature, which focus on the topics o f 
international law, international relations, and the maniage between disciplines, 
extradition law, extradition case studies involving tenorism, and terrorism as a stand­
alone topic. However, no one work combines all these elements and observes them 
from the U.S. experience, with an emphasis on examining the political relationship 
between extradition and terrorism. In fact, to date, no academic, legal, or policy 
expert has published a study on the political influence of extradition in cases dealing 
with international ten'orists. Consequently, this void in material has influenced not 
only the impetus for study, but the methodological approach used in this study as 
well.
Much of the available literature on extradition speaks from a purely procedural 
aspect. Geoff Gilbert's Aspects of Extradition Law?^  for example, examines the main 
themes of international extradition law from a procedural aspect, in order to reveal 
conflicts between different legal systems, and examine the potential for remedy of 
those procedures. Bassiouni and Wise’s Aut Dedere Aut Judicare The Duty to
76 Gilbert, Aspects o f  Extradition Law, (Dordrecht; Martinus-Nijhoff Publishers), 1991.
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Extradite or Prosecute in International Law/?  is virtually self-explanatoiy in 
discussion of its content, addressing obligation in tenns of treaty agreement and rule 
of law. John Bassett Moore’s A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition?^ 
does much of the same by discussing basic procedural aspects of extradition as does 
Samuel Spear’s Law of Extradition: International and Inter-State.?^  In tenns of a 
history and general understanding of extradition, I. Shearer’s Extradition in 
International L aw / o  spends considerable time on this subject area compared to other 
works. None of these works, however, spend any considerable amount of time on the 
topic of tenorism, or tenorist extradition. Perhaps the most useful work, which dealt 
with the subject matter of extradition as well as that of terrorism, was John Murphy’s 
Punishing International Criminals/1 and Murphy’s other work Legal Aspects of 
International T e n o r i s m / 2  which provide some of the most useful insight and analysis 
regarding the topic o f tenorist extradition. In addition, Alona Evans and John 
Murphy’s collaborative work Legal Aspects of International Terrorism,83 despite its 
date o f publication, 1978, nevertheless offers some of the most exceptional discussion 
of the issues surrounding terrorism and the law.
?? M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare -  The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in 
International Law. (Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff, 1995).
?8 John Bassett Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition. (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1997)
?9 Samuel Spear, Law o f  Extradition: International and Inter-State, (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1983)
89 Ian Shearer, Extradition in International Law, (Manchester University Press, 1971).
8^  John Murphy, Punishing International Criminals, (Rowman & Allanheld, 1986 ),
82 John Muiphy, ed. Legal Aspects o f  International Terrorism, (Villanova, 1984).
83 Alona E. Evans and John Murphy eds, Legal Aspects o f  International Terrorism, (Lexington, MA, Lexington 
Books, 1978).
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It appears impossible to discuss this subject matter without involving the works 
of Cherif M. Bassiouni, who appears cited in every single work on the subject matter. 
His most relevant applicable work, besides the aforementioned Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare, and numerous law review works, International TeiTorism and Political 
C r i m e s , 84 is both useful and applicable as a reference of primaiy literature.
The inescapable scholaiship applicable to the terrorism aspect of this study, or 
any study on ten'orism: Paul Wilkinson’s Terrorism and the Liberal State;^  ^ Grant 
Wardlaw’s Political Terrorism Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures;^  ^ Charles 
Kegley, International Ten’orism Characteristics, Causes, Controls;^ ? and Walter 
Laquer’s The Age of Terrorismes are the cornerstones of any student of terrorism. 
One of the interesting more recent works, which deals with U.S. counter-terrorism 
efforts and policy initiatives, which was highly influential, is Philip Heymami’s 
Terrorism and America, A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society.S9 
Heymann’s work is not a study of terrorism on balance, but of the U.S. experience 
with terrorism, and includes many of the case studies included in this survey. While 
there is no allusion to extradition, Heyniann does examine from the U.S. perspective, 
many of the topic areas that are addressed in this work as well, such as the importance
84 Cherif M. Bassiouni, International Tenorism and Political Crimes, (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 
1975).
85 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London: McMillian, 1977, revised edition, 1986).
8^ Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism Theoiy, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, (Cambridge University Press, 
1989).
8  ^ Charles W. Kegley Jr., International Terrorism Characteristics, Causes, Contiols, (St. Martins Press, 1990).
88 Walter Laqueur, The Age o f  TeiTorism, (London: Little Brown, 1987).
8^ Phillip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America, A  Commonsense Strategy For A Democratic Society, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998).
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of international cooperation, state-sponsored terrorism and retaliation, and the use of 
the criminal justice system. However, the work is also largely geared towards the use 
of intelligence and U.S. foreign policy as counter-teiTorism strategy, and does not 
wholly look toward the use of the law as a specific tool.
The scholarship that has influenced much of the theoretical discussion centres on 
is that of Friedrich V. Kratochwil’s Rules, Nonns, and Decisions.^ o Kratochwil 
examines the reasoning process in which nonns play a central and decisive role in 
guiding decisions; and bases his argument on the classical thinkers of international 
law, thus making it an excellent work for the creation of an analytical model for a 
cross-disciplinary study of both international relations and international law.
Companion works that helped develop this framework of thinking, such as 
Anthony Arend’s International Rules,^  ^ which provides an excellent discussion of the 
most prominent approaches to international relations and international law using legal 
ml es. Focusing on rules specifically, it addresses the fundamental nature of their role, 
origin and purpose in politics, providing a solid foundation for interdisciplinary study 
and further research. This is also prominent in Arend’s latest work. Legal Rules and 
International Society.^  ^ However, Arend’s works follow a Taw as a hody of m les’ 
argument, which, as discussed further in Chapter 3, does not fît the requirement of the 
study to employ law to choose between nouns in a given context. This requires a Taw 
as a process’ argument. The more useful guide toward developing this strategy was
Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions -  On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs, (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
9* Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, Robert D. Vander Lugt, International Rules Approaches fi'om 
International Law and International Relations. (Oxford University Press, 1996).
92 Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society, (Oxford Univereity Press, 1999).
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Roslyn Higgins Problem and P r o c e s s ,93  where the key issues in the rules-process 
debate in international law are introduced and discussed at length. Higgins sheds light 
on the mles-process debate; and while not completely contradicting her 
contemporaries such as Arend and Beck; she places greater emphasis on the Taw as a 
process’ argument rather than the Taw as a body of mles’ explanation.
There were additional works which were influential in fonnulating a framework 
of thinking, but as individual works did not discuss the topic as a whole, rather offered 
ancillaiy pieces of what became the methodological approach used here. Louis 
Henkin’s How Nations Behave^^  is one such work which examines a similar benefit 
o f using empirical evidence and its reflections on international law’s impact on 
international relations. However, while it is a case approach encompassing law and 
foreign policy, it is not exclusive to the study of either extradition or terrorism.
An additional work that brought a rounding-out of the legal/political framework 
for analysis was Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, New S o v e r e i g n t y ;^^ an 
extremely important work differentiating models for analysis as they apply to the use 
of treaty nonns. The Chayes discuss the use of the enforcement -  vs. -  managerial 
models of treaty compliance, the levels of compliance, the role of the state actor and 
it’s standing in the international system, and the evolution of norms and regimes 
through the use of dialogue. Chayes uses empirical discussion to elaborate on treaty 
agieements and the effects of enforcement or sanctions on compliance. The use of the
95 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process -  International Law and How W e Use It, (Oxford University Press, 
1995).
94 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave -  Law and Foreign Policy, Second Edition, (Council On Foreign 
Relations, 1979).
95 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The N ew  Sovereignty Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, (London: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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Chayes work is expanded upon more extensively in Chapter 3, in the discussion of 
compliance.
Two final influential works were Thomas Franck’s Power of Legitimacv 
Amongst Nations^^  and Fairness in International Law and Institutions which were 
both instrumental in completing the basis of thought for creating the h amework. Both 
of Franck’s works speak to the changing nature of international society, the renewed 
emphasis on the emergence of rules and the perception of their legitimacy that 
encourage compliance. However, neither of these works speaks to extradition, or 
teiTorism, and were useful only insofar as influencing the understanding o f legal, 
historical, political, and philosophical thieads o f legal rules in an international society.
International legal scholarship is plentiful. Many basic texts in this discipline 
were suiweyed in order to gain an understanding and appreciation of the legal thought 
process and where commonality existed as a point of departure for an interdisciplinary 
discussion. Oppenheim’s International Law,9s and J.L. Brierly’s Outlook for 
International Law^^  are both key basic texts which discuss the nature of law and its 
interaction with the stmcture of international society. Despite their time of 
publication -  the subject matter remains valid. More current works, such as Shaw’s 
International Lawd^ Q Akehurst’s Modem Introduction to International LawJ^^ and
9  ^Thomas M. Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy Am ong Nations, (Oxford University Press, 1990).
92 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1995).
98 Lasa Oppenheim, International Law, (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1920).
99 J.L. Brierly, Outlook for International Law, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1944).
100 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 1994).
9^1 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised Edition, (Routledge, 
1997).
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MacLean’s International Law Textbook^Q^  ^\\ provide additional discussion on the 
topic o f international law with significantly greater clarity, considerably more detail 
and with a wider range of references than earlier works. The greater readability of 
later works also includes discussion of legal applicability to current modern crises. 
The Shaw book for example, refers to the crisis in Kuwait, and provides modem 
reference examples of the applicability of international law and its principles. This is 
decidedly more helpfiü in gaining a basic philosophy of understanding about the 
workings of international law.
Aside from the major texts, which allow for a depth of understanding of the 
subject matter in detail, much of the supplementary work is derived from journals 
involving discussion of theory, cross-disciplinary prospects for analysis, in-depth case 
study analysis, and subject-specific debate. In particular. International Organizations 
special edition on “International Regimes” was extraordinarily helpful, as was the 
Harvard Research in International Lawl^^ These are but two examples of specialized 
publications shorter than the basic text but voluminous in terms of wealth of 
infomiation. Literally, dozens upon dozens of journal articles have been written 
regarding the specifics of extradition; extradition and terrorism; case studies in 
terrorist extradition; etc. These proved very helpful in developing the case arguments 
as well as providing a background for research and endless source material. 
Academic joumals that pertain to the specifics of theoretical debate were plentiflil as 
well. It was not difficult to find an author with an opinion on the subject matter, the
^92 Robert Mac Lean, Public International Law Textbook, 16th Edition, (HLT Publications, 1994).
H arvard Research in International Law Project^ 29 American Journal o f  International Law 15. 21 Supp. 
1935.
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challenge was in creating a framework for analysis that could discuss these opinions 
within a wider context.
Periodical and newspaper articles forai a large body of material specifically as 
they relate to individual case studies and related issues. Ten'orist attacks, especially 
some of the more dramatic attacks against U.S. citizens or establishments, such as 
Lockerbie, the Achille Lauro^ or TWA 847, garner a considerable amount o f media 
attention. Newspaper accounts, while vaiying drastically in quality and reliability, do 
offer a reconstruction of the context of the event, and the political atmosphere 
surrounding the case. Media accounts of the events are almost identical in terms of 
their ability to account for the factual details of the events. However, their ability to 
read into the political aspects of the events, or the legal proceedings following the 
events, are inconsistent, weak, and at times, depending on the publication, factually 
incorrect. Wliile periodical articles offer slightly more accurate political analysis. 
Western media, most notably U.S. media, still cannot escape the sensationalism 
spurred by a teiTorism event.
The use of the Internet, a relatively new angle of research, was useful for locating 
treaties and international agreements, providing a virtual wealth of legal library 
research which in years past would have required a substantially gi'eater amount of 
time to acquire. The Internet is not, however, an accurate source of analysis, or 
politically related material. Much of what is found by way of analysis toward specific 
instances, or cases, are extremely biased, inconsistent, and often factually incorrect. 
Alternatively, there is much historical data to be located on many of the news sites, 
which offer chronologies, or access to earlier news stories.
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The greatest contribution, however, to the work in terms of data collection, was 
derived from personal interviews, personal involvement, and off the record “Chatham 
House Rules” conversation. Through my employment opportunity at The Scowcroft 
Group, I had the benefit not only of access to the Former U.S. National Security 
Advisor to two U.S. Presidents, General Brent Scowcroft, but many of the former 
members of the U.S. National Security Council, former Senior Level U.S. Department 
o f State personnel, foimer Senior U.S. Military, and former White House staff. This 
offered formidable data not only in tenns of institutional knowledge of the empirical 
events themselves, but challenged my thinking toward U.S. foreign policy, 
international law, and the international community on balance, in a way that text and 
journals never could.
To my added benefit as well, other avenues of employment opportunity brought 
me to the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, where I was 
afforded the opportunity to consult senior U.S. policy advisors as well as several law 
enforcement officials from a variety of agencies. This proved invaluable in terms of 
information, understanding, and in formulating many of the arguments within the case 
studies. Many of my law enforcement contacts and interviews were law enforcement 
Agents whom had worked with terTorisrn task-forces and had first hand knowledge of 
investigations; or had been a part of those investigations, which were directly 
pertinent to this study.
I am certain not every doctoral candidate has the privilege of access to these 
sources. It is recognized that these opportunities were in fact a privilege, and that 
much of the information which was afforded to me, especially from the law 
enforcement angle, is restricted. I have been made keenly aware that much of the
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infomiation that was attained by me while holding a clearance in a law enforcement- 
sensitive environment, and those materials labelled as ‘classified’, cannot be used in 
any way in this work, and they are not used at all. Nevertheless, the conceptual 
knowledge derived from it, as well as the discussions which followed, have proven to 
be invaluable to this study on several levels. First, it has filled in the cracks, and 
enabled a greater, more comprehensive understanding of the topic, allowing for a 
more solid foundation on which the subject is examined. Second, the information 
gleaned has provided for a greater sophistication about the topic, more than any other 
source could provide. Finally, and perhaps most important, they have removed the 
veil o f appearance created by mainstream media accounts, and ‘cleansed’ source 
material. Thus, these interviews have provided for a much more genuine 
understanding of the role and effectiveness of extradition, the key issues and problems 
which hinder it, the alternatives to it, and most significantly, the factors which 
influence it.
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Chapter Two
International Law and International Relations: A Theoretical Framework for a 
Cross-Disciplinary Study
7  fin d  that the distinction between political scientist and lawyers is another mental 
construct that may or may not have significance in the world o f  ideas; you have 
really to decide whether the distinctions we are drawing have so many exceptions 
and lack o f  generalities that they are simply part o f  our habitual struggle fo r  the 
intellectual dominance o f  a certain discipline that purports to be a complete 
explanation. What I  come down to is fairly simple fo r  those familiar with 
'WordPerfect'. As regards lawyers, things happen in the legal order that are not 
wholly comprehensible with any system that I  have seen lawyers develop; as regards 
political scientists, things happen that rational actors would not do i f  any single 
political science theory really possessed the dominance it asserts. What you have in 
the real world is something that cries out fo r  somebody to press 'Reveal Codes.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework which will 
allow for empirical evidence to be applied to the principles of law and international 
relations. Whereas previous attempts have been made to reconcile the two disciplines, 
which follow a tendency to polarise rather than unite. This framework is an 
endeavour to integrate both disciplines, a bi-focal lens, under which specifically the 
extradition process to cases of international terrorism will be examined. The contents 
o f this chapter are best explained as following the primary rule of evidence in legal 
thought: 'in order to effectively argue your case, you must first introduce to dismiss 
the evidence which is most harmful to your argument'. Adopting this logic, makes it 
possible to dispel the previous cross-disciplinary arguments which fail to accurately 
provide for effective interdisciplinary collaboration toward extradition and terrorism.
Previous theories of international relations which provide a suitable backdrop for 
collaboration are addressed briefly in this chapter, and work toward a single theory
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compatible with the legal and domestic issues which invariably arise as part of this 
study. The application of international law as a primary factor toward a mutual 
understanding is not the focus. While the aim is to inter-relate the two, the thesis is 
predicated on international relations concepts which share the common playing field 
o f international law, and therefore must be argued from that vantage point. It is 
intentional that certain long-standing and respected theories are expelled for the 
purpose of this argument. However, it is not the intention of the work to assume that 
all previous theories of law and international relations are profitless toward a cross- 
disciplinaiy understanding. The specifics of the study are more complex requiring a 
postulate with greater breadth and manoeuvrability. One which will concentrate and 
account for deeper issues which are prevalent to the examination o f extradition and 
international terrorism, such as, the analysis of state’s internal decision making 
processes, or the degree to which international law is internalised by the state. 
Secondly, the state’s decision to comply, or not, to international law, or a measure of 
the degree of compliance. These two 'sub-issues' create the inherent problem in the 
success and enforcement of extradition. The use of an integrated theoiy, one which 
will provide for analysis on a domestic as well as international level, seiwes as a point 
of departure for which empirical evidence can be applied.
 ^ Remarks made by Alfred P. Rubin, Professor o f  International Law, The Fletcher School o f  Law and Diplomacy, 
at the American Society o f  International Law Proceedings 86th Annual Meeting, April 1-4, 1992. Hereinafter; 
ASIL PROCEEDINGS.
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2.1 Introduction
'The end o f the Cold War has removed obstacles to making new law and has mooted 
old controversies as to existing law.... [f] or the first time we can, it is hoped, address 
festering problems such as international terrorism. '2
The principles of extradition as phr ased by the term aut dedre aut judicare, to 
extradite, or submit to judicial authority for trial, creates the problem for states in that 
its implied obligation aims at securing a form of international co-operation. Rooted in 
the Grotian idea of 'goodwill', it implies a societal agr eement of common values, of 
shared interests, of mutual goals.5 It is a voluntary legal agreement, a contract, 
binding upon consent by member states. Extradition assumes the contracting parties 
share a common desire to fulfil the tenns of the contract. Legally, this makes perfect 
sense. Politically, is considerably more complicated. In order to accept the argument, 
one must first accept that a state’s interest is definable; that this interest is generated 
for the betterment of an international society and not the anarchical self interest 
professed by conventional wisdom; that states have a general interest in upholding 
international law in all cases, not just those that suit their own needs; that society will 
enforce the parameters of international law, and that they have a general interest in 
doing so. As history has proven, this is not the case. And in no place is it better 
exemplified than by the application of extradition to cases involving wanted terrorists.
The obligation to extradite is a theoretical one. Scores of legal materials have 
been produced to define the legal notion of obligation, and in the strictest sense.
2 Louis Henkin, International Law: From The Old World Order To The New, Ibid.
5 '[S]o by mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws should originate as between all states, or a great 
many states; and it is apparent that the law thus originating had in view the advantage, not o f  particular states, but 
o f  the great society o f  states.' Hugo Grotious Prolegom ena  No. 17, De Jure Belli A c Pacis, reprinted in Robert J. 
Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt eds.. International Rules, Approaches from International 
Law and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1996, p. 42.
44
1
extradition is a legal problem. It is the execution of extradition, the decision for states 
to co-operate and comply to an unenforceable, voluntary legal agreement, which 
forces the issue into the arena of international relations. Several theoretical attempts 
have been made to explain co-operation in international relations, all of them limited 
in scope. It is necessary to bear in mind that theory is only an attempt to explain 
action. For eveiy action, there is explicable theory. For every argument, there is an 
appropriate 'framework for analysis'. This work does not purport to be any exception. 
This work does seek to depart from the conventional realist assumptions of 
international relations theory which posit strict limits to the prospects of co-operation 
with international law.
Conventional realist theorists, such as Carr, Morgenthau, and Kennan limit their 
cross-disciplinary focus of law and international relations by placing law in opposition 
to power.4 Leading neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, sought a structural model, 
anarchic in nature, devoid of the constraints of law altogether.^ Other thinkers 
emphasized the role of the type of government and leadership of states in shaping the 
international politics, and largely ignoring the role of international law. Others rely on 
Institutionalism or Liberalism as possible paradigms, but traditional postulates cannot 
wholly account for international behaviour and domestic decision making, jointly; nor 
does each give an accurate account of the politics of the international system. These 
are necessary conditions if  the appropriate theoretical framework is to be applied to
4 'The Realist paradigm establishes a polarity between law and power, opposing one to the other as the respective 
emblems o f the domestic versus the international realm, normative aspiration versus positive description, co­
operation versus conflict, soft versus hard, idealist versus realist.' See: Anne-Marie Burley, Law and the L iberal 
Paradigm  in International Relations Theory, ASIL PROCEEDINGS.
5 This alludes to Kenneth Waltz's answer to Realism, known as 'structural realism' or 'neo-realism'. Neo-realism  
will not be addressed since it makes no attempt to be compatible with international law. For discussions on N eo­
realism see: Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, (Reading: Addison-W esley, 1979).
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the study of extradition and terrorism. Extradition is not a self executing principle, it 
requires decision making on behalf of one or more contracted parties. Terrorism is a 
mode of violence or phenomena to the international system. Both are concepts which 
imply combined legal/political system, a system that seeks to beget an overall social 
order. A theoretical foundation which fundamentally lacks the basics for co-operation 
between law and politics clearly poses an obstacle to this system. There is a need 
then, for an alternative paradigm which will account for the role of behavioural norms, 
and highlight the dichotomy between domestic decision making and international 
order.
The first part of this chapter will describe the traditional methods of thinking 
about international relations, and their applicability to international law.
The second part will examine the limitations of these models on the theoretical 
level and on a practical level insofar as Üieir applicability toward the study of 
extradition and terrorism.
The third part works toward the criteria for an integiated study. One which will 
provide a suitable template for the empirical case study application of extradition and 
international terrorism.
2.2 The Realist Paradigm - Revisited
The post W.W.II emergence of Political Realism was a by-product of the time 
period. The founders of political realism based it’s premise on their war-time 
observations and the failings of Woodrow Wilson's internationalism.^ Relations
 ^Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' advocated the international system should not be based on balance o f  
power, but ethnic se lf determination. Security should not depend on military alliance but collective security.
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between states is based on a power modeF, a Hobbesean tradition of 'war against all'.^ 
A 'realistic' representation o f international politics claims to view the world as it is and 
not as it 'ought' to be. Realism puiports a state centred model in which the state 
becomes a rational unitary actor. Anarchy, the struggle for power and self interest in 
an unchanging international system, shape and define the political nonn.9 There is no 
hannony of interests between states. There is no altering behavioural norms. 
Mankind is intrinsically evil, power-seeking, requiring safeguard mechanisms such as 
a balance of power^^ to regulate behaviour. Realism does not subscribe to a moral or 
philosophical order, nor does the realist believe that either one holds a place in their 
application to politics. 'Lessons o f history', and political practice define a foreign 
policy based on strength, influence, and coercive diplomacy, and clearly delineated 
fi'om domestic politics.
Power politics, within this model serves diametrically opposed to the idea of 
l a w .  12 Arguably realist concepts and the recognition of power politics, provided the
Diplomacy not conducted secretly but on the basis o f  open arrangements. See: Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 19.
2 'Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and 
the modes o f  acquiring, maintaining, and demonsti ating it detennine the techniques o f  political action'; Hans 
Morganthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1946), p.43
8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
9 'The utopian, who believes that democracy is not based on force, refuses to look these unwelcome facts in the 
face.' See: E.H. Carr, The Nature o f  Politics , The Twenty Years' Crisis, (London: MacMillian, 1981).
Reprinted in: Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi eds.. International Relations TheoiY, Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism, (New York: MacMillian, 1993), p.563.
See: Kissinger, DIPLOMACY, pp. 17-21.
 ^* Morgenthau makes the distinction between 'power' and 'political power': 'When we speak o f  power, we mean 
man's control oyer the minds and actions o f  other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations o f  
control among the holders o f  public authority and between the latter and the people at large.' Hans J. Morganthau, 
Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief Edition, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 30.
^2 See: George F. Kennan, American Diplom acy, (Uniyersity o f  Chicago Press, 1985), p.99. 'This legalistic 
approach to international relations is faulty in its assumptions concerning the possibility o f  sanctions against
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very groundwork for lawmaking institutions such as the United Nations, law has no 
real function here except for that provided by a 'moralistic' approach. This is in total 
contrast to the influential Kantian ideal that security rests within a united body bound 
by a common interest, a 'peace tlirough law',i5 utopian image suggesting a universal 
value system based on common morality. This holds no relevance to the 
decentralised , 14 u n en forceab le!5 nature of international law. The international lawyer, 
then, is left to establish some fonn of relevance within international law.*<^
2.2.1 Legal Response to Realism - Prospects fo r  a Cross-Discipline
Post-war foreign policy by and large ignored legal scholarship. Efforts to 
respond to the realist debate ultimately reshaped the function of international law by 
reformulating law's primary pui*pose. By reconceptualizing the role of international 
law, legal thinking sought to provide a new relationship between law and politics. 
This shift of emphasis from the rule of law, to the process by which it ought to 
provide a more active policy role, was the engine behind the challengers to Realist 
thinking.
offences and violations. In general, it looks to collective action to provide such sanction against the bad behaviour 
o f  states. In doing so, it forgets the limitations on the effectiveness o f  militaiy coalition.'
15 See: Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1966).
14 'The decentralized nature o f  international law is the inevitable result o f the decentralized structure o f  
international society' See: Morganthau, POLITICS, p. 255. See also: J.L. Brierly, The Outlook for International 
Law, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1944).
15 Morganthau address the issue o f  enforceability in international law as: 'According to this principle , the victim, 
and nobody but the victim o f  a violation o f the law has the right to enforce the law against the violator. Nobody 
at all has the obligation  to enforce it. There can be no more primitive and no weaker system o f law enforcement 
than this; for it delivers the enforcement o f  the law to the vicissitudes o f the distribution o f  power between the 
violator o f  the law and the victim o f  the violation. It makes it easy for the strong both to violate the law and to 
enforce it, and consequently puts the rights o f  the weak in jeopardy.' Ibid. at 266.
48
The first such response was that of the McDougal-Lasswell, or 'New Haven 
School' approach. 12 This framework, defines law by empirical observation and social 
reality . 18 The elimination of the distinction between law and politics thiough this 
approach reconfigures law as a political process. The political process defined 
analytically by value analysis, 19 although recognising that no common value system 
exists in an international system. This is law as an expressive realisation of values 
rather than legal restraint of behaviour.20 This methodology develops a prescriptive 
framework based on the legitimacy of international law and it's effect on legal rules.
Subsequent legal scholarship uses the fimdamental concepts of this framework. 
Emphasis on the necessity of legal expression in a political and social value system 
remains constant. Although the rejection of a common value system changes on this 
second tier of legal response to realist thinking.21 This shift towards a more idealist
See: Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann eds., The Relevance o f  International Law, 1968 Festschrift in 
honour o f  the 65th birthday o f  Leo Gross, professor o f international law, Fletcher School o f  Law and Diplomacy.
2^ Myers S. M cDougal, the fomier president o f  the American Society o f International Law and Yale Professor o f  
Law. Harold D. Lasswell, also a Yale Professor o f Law and Political Science, and fonner president o f  the 
American Political Science Association. The two conoborated on what was viewed as the first truly 
interdisciplinary approach, alias - the M cDougal-Lasswell approach, or 'New Haven School' o f  thought. See: 
Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. M cDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the 
Public Interest, 52 Yale Law Journal 203, 1943
8^ Social reality here, is referred to as a 'World Social Process', as defined by M cDougal-Lasswell as: "participants 
in the world social process are acting individually in their own behalf and in concert with others with whom they 
share symbols o f  common identity and ways o f  life o f  varying degrees o f  elaboration. ...the fundamental goal 
stays ever the same, the maximization o f  values within the limits o f  capability." See: M yies S. McDougal and 
Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and A ppraisal o f  D iverse Systems o f  Public O r d e r , reprinted in Robert J. 
Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt, International Rules Approaches from International Law  
and International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 118.
9^ For further references on 'value analysis' and the N ew Haven approach, see: Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, 
International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda , 87 The American Journal o f  International Law 
205, 1993, at note 17.
20 The N ew  Haven Approach works toward a 'Universal Order o f  Human Dignity' which is understood as: "refers 
to a social process in which values are widely and not narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than 
coercion, is emphasized as the predominant modality o f  power." See: Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. 
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal o f  D iverse Systems o f  Public Order, reprinted in Robert J. Beck, 
Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt, INTERNATIONAL RULES, p. 123
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thought process stemmed from reason that the post-war world was also a nuclear 
world. The idea o f no common system of values seemed implausible. International 
law could not be perceived as a process based only on societal need, but on global 
ideology as well. International law, then serves as a model providing for the interests 
o f a world community, as opposed to serving just the actors within the s y s t e m .22 The 
change is reflective of a more 'systemic' m o d e l . 25
The final recasting of international law is a 'causal' model on a more practical 
level. The emphasis is still 'law as a process', but the shift is from a 'political' to 'legal' 
process, or stated another way, it is the measure of influence the international legal 
process, law, and lawyers have on international a f f a i r s . 2 4  This version is dependent on 
empirical evidence rather than the rehashing of scholarly thought, relying on 
pragmatic examination of legal nonns which help fonnulate the decision making 
process. Specifically, the function, nature, and influence of law, it's limitations, and 
expectations of how nations behave.25
2 * For discussion o f  this scholarship in full see: Richard A. Falk, The Status o f  Law in International Society, 
(Princeton University Press, 1970).
22 See: Richard A. Falk, The Relevance o f  P olitical Context to the Nature and Functioning o f  International Law: 
An Intermediate View, in Earl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann eds., The Relevance o f  International Law. 
(Irvington Publishers, 1968).
25 For a discussion on systems theoiy see: Systemic Theories o f  Politics and International Relations, Definition, 
Nature, and Approaches to Systems T heory, in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending 
Theories o f International Relations, A  Comprehensive Survey, Third Edition, (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 
pp. 136-175; John J. Wei tin an. Systems Tlieoi-y in International Relations, A  Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy, 
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973). For a discussion o f  systems theory and it's applicability to norms see: 
Falk, STATUS, at note 21. For an opposing view  see: Rosalyn Higgins, Integration o f  Authority and Control: 
Trends in Literature o f  International Law and International Relations in W. Michael Reisinan and Burns H. 
Weston eds.. Toward World Order and Human Dignity, Essays in Honor o f  Myers S. McDougal, (Foundation 
Press, 1976).
24 See: Abraham Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich and Andreas Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: Materials For 
and Introductory Course, (Aspen Law & Business, 1968).
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2.3 Regimes
One of the greater challengers to post-war Realist thinking emphasised the 
importance of fomial institutions through reconceptionalizing international 
organisations, which played a significant role in the post-war period. Realist 
arguments had juxtaposed these institutions as a part o f U.S. dominance, which was 
on a perceived decline during the 1970's.26 The challenge to political science theorists 
was the need to explain the continued dominance of both institutions, and U.S. 
hegemony. This became the trajectory for Regime theorists whose focus lies within 
the ability for state actors to provide collective action and shape expectations tlirough 
agreed 'principles, nonns, rules, and decision making p rocedures '.22 Regimes thus 
become the set of rules inclusive of social practices. Regime theorists provide a 
'rationalist' model, arguing the value of institutions as serving a functional purpose in 
international relations through the participation of states. It posits that institutions 
create the condition for increased co-operation and negotiation between states by 
facilitating links between agreed nonns.28 Increased co-operation in turn increases the 
possibility for compliance, for legitimising standards of behaviour, and enforcement
25 Louis Henkin discusses this at great length. See: Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign 
Policy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
2^ '[T]he early 1970's, many theorists, reflecting current concerns, overreacted to the traditional theories o f  
Realism. There was widespread repugnance to the Vietnam War, and détente seemed to reduce the importance o f  
the nuclear competition. At the same time, international trade grew more rapidly than world product.
Transnational corporations not only developed patterns o f  international production, but in som e instances played 
dramatic political roles as well. All this occurred against a backdrop o f  declining U.S. economic 
predominance...futurologists such as Hennan Kahn predicted the imminent arrival o f  a multipolar international 
system. On top o f  all this came the oil crisis o f  1973.’ Joseph S. Nye, Neorealism and Neoliberalism , World 
Politics, p. 236. See also: Herman Kahn and B. Bmce-Briggs, Things to Come, (New York: Macmillian, 1972).
22 See: Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1983. See also: Stephan 
Haggard and Beth Simmons, Theories o f  International Regimes, International Organization , vol. 49, no. 491,
1987; Oran Young, International Regimes: Toward a New Theory o f  Institutions, World Politics, vol. 39, no.
104, 1986.
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in a decentralised system.29 Wliat regime analysis seeks to accomplish, is the 
reconciliation between realist and idealist traditions.
2.3.1 Legal Response
The Cold War view of institutions was a 'peace through law' analogy. Regime 
response to this idea is flatly rejected on the grounds that govermnents are not 
subordinate to institutions, rather, it is institutions which empower governments.^^ 
The regime approach re-invents international law by allowing for an overlap of 
thinking between political scientists and international lawyers, through the emphasis 
o f agi'eed rules which shape the political process. Regime thinking represents a shift 
in emphasis from law and politics in opposition, to law and politics becoming nearly 
indistinguishable, thereby bringing the two disciplines closer together. This is 
accomplished by allowing for proponents of international law, to become a part of the 
domestic political process of states. Creating a 'web' of interconnecting bureaucracy, 
infomiation sharing, and communication, facilitates gi*eater potential for compliance 
to international law through a fostering of common standards.
2,4 Institutionalism - A Second Approach
The re-birth of political theory as a rational choice model laid the foundation for 
additional approaches of political integration, and shaiply contrasting the traditional
28 See: Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
(Princeton: Princeton Uniyersity Press), 1984, p. 10
29 Ibid. p. 244-245  
50 IWd p. 244
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realist-idealist debate. Institutions^^ are defined here as 'a general pattern or 
categorisation of activity or to a particular human-constructed aiTangement, formally 
or informally o r g a n i s e d ' . 5 2  The theoretical belief subscribed to by Institutionalists, 
logically enough, is that world politics at any given time is largely institutionalised.^^ 
Taken as such. Institutionalism represents more of a framework for analysis than 
analysis itself. As such it provides additional opportunity for expansion into the roles 
provided by nonns and state behaviour. The shift of emphasis here is the potential of 
institutions to reshape participants of the system and their interests, in other words, an 
'intersubjective'54 dimension, which is contingent upon a shared understanding with 
international law.55
2.4.1 Legal Response
As outlined by Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,56 prospects for interdisciplinaiy 
collaboration occur on four levels; regime distinction,52 organisational design,58 
compliance,59 and ethics.4o
5  ^ Distinction between Institutionalism, Liberalism, and Neo-Liberal Institutionalism.
52 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, International Studies Quarterly, no. 32, 1988, 
p.383.
55 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, (W estyiew Press, 1989), p. vii.
54 See; Friedrich ICiatochwil and John Ruggie, International Organization: A State o f  the A rt on an A rt o f  the 
State , International Organization, no. 40, 1986, pp. 763-770.
55 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, DUAL AGENDA, p. 222.
5 6 l ^ , p p .  222-224.
52 For additional discussion see: Keohane, INSTITUTIONS.
58 For additional discussion see; Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, International Organization: a state  
o f  the art o r an art o f  the state, 40 International Organization, 1986, pp. 753-54.
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The distinction between 'legal' and 'non-legal' regimes arises from the expansive 
definition of institutions. Either 'regime' could potentially have a different impact on 
the state, but neither one necessarily arising from the conventional sources o f 
international law.^i Therefore a collaboration should take into account issues which 
affect both disciplines, such as informal agreements. Institutional structures, allow a 
fomm for collaboration between international relations theory and institutional 
practice, by addressing problems of equal interest. Compliance, such as treaty 
compliance, is rooted in the basics of regime architecture.^^ The ability to 'measure' 
compliance, and to delineate the incentives for compliance, are of equal interest to 
either disciplines. Ethics, a renewal o f the 'moralist' debate, is generally a secondary 
issue, but nevertheless an area of mutual concern to both disciplines.
2.5 The Liberal Claim - A Possible Paradigm
There remains an additional paradigm which will allow for the potential 
collaboration of law and politics, and which forces the 'rethinking' of the realist and 
rationalist models. This final paradigm is Liberalism.
The frmdamentals of liberalism concern low level forms of co-operation in areas 
not so politically dominated, such as economic co-operation. This was the key to a
59 For additional discussion see: Franck's discussion on Legitimacy and Social Contract in Thomas M. Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 25-41; Burley, DUAL  
AGENDA, at notes 91 and 92.
4® For discussion see: Franck's discussion on Fairness in International Law, Ibid., pp. 3-22.
4* See explanation and example given in: Slaughter Burley, DUAL AGENDA at note 83, International Court o f  
Justice, Statue Article No. 38, referring to court instructions which distinguish convention rules from customaiy 
law.
42 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty Comnliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 1.
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more integiated society. By desegregating co-operation to a domestic level, it's 
possible to attain similar interests between states. In segmenting out smaller interests, 
or integrating the smaller pieces of the puzzle, the larger picture in turn becomes more 
manageable. In sum, it is a 'concern for liberty'.^^
Liberal advocates base their thinking on the following set o f assumptions. First, 
the state is not a unitary actor. This differs entirely from Realist assumption placing 
the state as the starting point for policy. The Liberal model shifts this emphasis to a 
domestic level by placing segments of domestic society as the start for international 
politics. Second, the state is not a rational actor. Again differing fi'om the 'power 
model' of realist politics towards foreign policy decision making, a 'winner take all' 
strategy. The liberal model seeks to provide smaller, more efficient 'coalitions', than 
mass scale foreign policy. Third, non state actors are important. Individuals or 
groups who promote their own interests, are functional members o f society and can 
affect international relations. Fourth, the expansion of the foreign policy agenda: 
international relations and foreign policy issues are far more extensive than solely the 
national security issue, and seek to include economic and social issues as part of the 
debate.
2.5.1 Legal Response
The emphasis which seiwes as the point of departure for Liberal thinking is 
placed on the domestic level. Private individuals, not states, are the fimdamental 
actors in politics. State policies and agendas which define the states agenda are all set
45 'While admitting the diversity o f Liberal theories, they argue that the core o f  Liberalism is a concern for 
liberty.' Joseph S. Nye, NEOREALISM.
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by individuals. Their interests, beliefs, identities, will set the national and 
international standards.44 It is only appropriate then, that prospects for inter­
disciplinary collaboration in legal response concentrates on the importance of 
domestic constitutional law as both an indicator in emerging societal patterns, and a 
component of international behaviour.45 Liberalism recognises private international 
law as a potential field of collaboration, a relatively 'untouched' area in public 
international law. Prospects for Liberal co-operation fall on a more 'horizontal' scale 
as opposed to the tiaditional vertical model advocated by traditional theories. By re­
focusing international law and internalising it toward a more manageable functioning 
domestic model, there remains as well the likelihood of a more enforceable model.
2.6 Limitations for Collaboration
The main approaches inti'oduced present only half the picture. There remains the 
necessity to examine the limitations of these models. Doing so satisfies two 
requirements; first, it seeks to draw the distinction of the common ground on which 
lawyers and political scientists can most productively collaborate. Second, it creates 
in itself the argument for an alternative paradigm.
2.6.1 Realism
Limitations in the realist argument lie within the political model's pursuit of 
'relevance' in international law. Relevance must hold some forai of practicality.
44 Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community: A  Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach , Journal o f  Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, December 1993, p. 483. See also: Andrew 
Moravcsik, Liberalism and International Relations Theory, Harvard University, CFIA Working Paper No. 92-b.
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Simple re-fonnulation of law from utopian ideal to theoretical policy model, whilst it 
provides some prospect for interdisciplinary study, does little more than re-invent the 
wheel. The argument implied here is that realism's meaning is tacit. The nature of 
international rules are not. But international rules do not automatically constitute 
international law. International law is a normative system, not a system of rules,^^ 
which means on some level it is possible to emphasise a common good or the 
international system would be devoid of order altogether. International law, while not 
always effective at settling disputes, is always present. Realism's power model 
assumes that law cannot be part of a real political system, only a theoretical one. 
Various responses to this assumption maintain the one thiead of commonalty; that 
international law is reflective of authority, which stands in contradistinction with the 
realist model of power. Not tme. At no time can one exist without the other/? If 
authority stands alone, then what is it authoritative of? If the international system is 
truly a state of anarchy, then what guidelines have detennined that? For international 
law to try and remove the distinction of 'law as counterpoised to politics' it had to 
accept that distinction in the first place.^s
Several other limitations are imposed by the realist / positivist cross-disciplinaiy 
model. First, it is an unstable framework. Law tries too hard to become policy, in
45 See: Burley, DUAL AGENDA p. 228.
46 See: Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. I
4 7 lW d ,p p . 2-12
48 For critical discussion o f realism's useful contribution to world politics see: Robert O. Keohane, Theory o f  
World Politics: Structural Realism and B eyo n d , in Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations 
Theory, Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, Second Edition, (New York: MacMillian, 1993), pp. 186-227.
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doing so loses the role it tries to create for i t s e lf /9  Second, it is not a practical 
argument. By this I mean it does not account for the changing nature of the 
international system. Nor does it account for becoming anything more than a sanction 
based model driven by thieat, an 'obey or else' typology, which carries considerably 
less weight now than it did fifty years ago. Third, it doesn't attempt to explain 
anything. At least not anything new. The non-compliance of states in the wake of 
self-interest, and international law's inability to enforce compliance, offers little by 
way of analysis to the study of extradition and ten orism.
The realist argument for the success of extradition is the case for international co­
operation, when examined from the realist understanding maintains that states, not 
individuals, are the principal actors involved in detennining the outcome of an 
extradition agreement. States pursue their own vital interests, which are founded upon 
power and security, and are motivated to pursue their own self interests when 
concluding requests for extradition.
It further assumes that states are anarchical by nature, and tend to overlook values 
bound to a common good in the wake of self interest, which ultimately, leans towards 
difficulty in international co-operation and creates problems for enforcement, since in 
the absence of a legitimate authority, states in an anarchic system are not bound to 
adhere to international law. This is upheld by the notion of sovereignty, the 
predominant belief that states are free to act in their own self interest and for their own 
survival. The modern realist paradigm depicts the primary obligation of states as the 
advancement of their own 'national interest', characterised by the inherent mistrust of
49 An argument carried as well by 'New Stream' legal thinkers. See for example: David Kennedy, A N ew  Stream  
o f  International Law Scholarship, W isconsin International Law Journal, vol. 7, 1988
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international organisations and international law to defend these interests. This 
supports the realist notion that states are disinclined to cooperate unless they stand to 
receive the maximum benefit.
Tenorist extradition in a realist paradigm becomes problematic when states agree 
that certain acts of terrorism oppose the moral fibre of society, but international 
agreements designated to combat it are not necessarily adhered to if  the consequences 
prove adverse to state's interest. The implied contract between states bound by the 
common interest in suppressing terrorism operates within the realm of morality, 
creating an imperfect obligation.
Again, this adds no new insight to the workings of the international system, nor 
does it prove a useful model for the overall scope of the project which relies on the 
states decision making process as well as the extent to which international law was 
internalised domestically, and, the levels to which states comply with international 
law. Realism does not provide a useful tool for analysis.
2.6.2 Regimes
Regimes provide an effective point of departure for cross-disciplinary study, in 
that they seek to provide a rational choice approach drawing on techniques from both 
law and politics. Within a rational choice fi'amework, greater possibilities exist for 
co-operation by creating an interactive environment among states facilitating linkage 
for regime co-operation.^® Regimes promote greater compliance with international 
agreements by establishing standards o f behaviour and monitoring this behaviour by
5® Keohane, AFTER HEGEMONY.
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creating 'decentralised enforcement founded on principle of reciprocity'.^^ This is a 
rationalist view which directly challenges traditions of realism by opening the 
possibility for co-operation in 'low' political areas, such as economic or social 
arrangements, as well as 'high' political areas like security, a primary concern of the 
traditional realist thought. Regime theorists reject a 'peace through law' concept by 
promoting the idea o f 'self help' through encouraging govermnents to pursue interests 
tlii'ough co-operation. The problem is while both politics and law create a favourable 
arrangement; regime theory assumes an interdisciplinary model based on existing ties 
between the two disciplines. However, if  regimes are to be defined as "sets of implicit 
or explicit p r i n c i p l e s , ^ ^  nonns,^^ r u l e s , ^ ^  and decision-making^^ procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations,"^® then 
several definitional limitations are imposed. Fritz Kiatchowil outlines the four major 
problems with the definition of regimes and their usefulness in analysing international 
relations.5^ These are; the convergence of two or more criteria causing their 
distinctive contribution to be lost.^^ The distinction between all criteria, which
51 Ibid.
52 Defined as: 'beliefs o f  fact, causation, and rectitude.' Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in Stephen Krasner, ed. International Regimes, International 
Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring 1982, p. 186.
55 Standards o f  behaviour are defined in terms of'rights and obligations', Ibid.
54 Defined as prescriptions for action, Ibid.
55 Defined as practices for making and implementing collective action., Ibid.
5® Kiasner, CAUSES, p. 186.
52 Friedrich V. ICi'atochwil, Rules, N om is, and Decisions, On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 46
58 Stephen Krasner, CAUSES, p. 1-21. See also: Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 19.
6 0
eliminates the uniting factor,59 their prescriptive strength, to be lost,®® and the lack of 
criteria differentiating nouns, which causes the concept to be lost. Finally, there is 
also the misleading nature o f regimes claiming to successfully unite expectations and 
norms, which results in co-operation being lost.®* These limitations imply an unstable 
framework, as well as an inconclusive one. Criticism implies, further, that regimes 
are part of a non-ordered system.®^ Which is very different from it's artificial creation 
designed to bring order.
The model is further limited by the application of international law. Regime 
theory makes no attempt to unite 'mles' and 'law' in a formalised sense. Rather, it 
focuses on institutions which facilitate co-operation by empowering govermnents to 
pursue their own interests.®^
This could partially apply to a study of extradition and terrorism, largely because 
extradition agreements are 'agency driven' fonns of legal annngement. Extradition in 
itself could be considered a regime. Regime theory has a large breadth of 
manoeuvrability. By definition, regimes could focus from the very narrow and 
explicit, such as a particular international agreements, to broader more general aspects 
such as decision making procedures.®^ However, this application is flawed based on
59 Haggard & Simmons; THEORIES, p. 492-3. 
®® Ibid- p. 496
®^  'Regimes are examples o f  cooperative behaviour, and facilitate co-operation, but co-operation can take place in I
the absence o f  established regimes.' Haggard & Simmons: THEORIES, p. 495. i
®2 Ernst B. Haas, Words can hurt you; or who said what to whom about regimes in ICrasner, REGIMES, p. 211. 
®5 Keohane, HEGEMONY p. 244.
®4 Susan Strange, Cave! hie dragones: a critique o f regime analysis, in Krasner, REGIMES.
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what regime theory purports. Regime arguments present a 'general theory' for 
explanation and prediction of political behaviour. No theory can do this.
2.6.3 Institutionalists
The emphasis on institutions as a potential framework for co-operation and 
collaboration between the two disciplines is lacking. First, it's not really a 'theoiy'. 
Institutionalists do not seek to 'explain the world', which they don't, but to explain 
only parts of it. It is largely a descriptive model. This creates a problem for 
international law, since law remains a nonnative system. Wliat remains 'ideal' for 
states may be impossible to reconcile in reality.
Second, it remains a rationalist approach through which shared beliefs act as a 
focal point for convergence.®^ This assumes a conscious effort on behalf o f state 
actors who share a common set of beliefs, social norms, and/or expectations. While 
appropriate for a study on say European Integration, it remains impractical for the 
study of terrorism.
Third, there is a shift in emphasis back toward the 'state centric' approach.®® In 
doing so Institutionalism camiot wholly explain relations between states or on the 
laws which regulate these relations.®^
When applied to extradition and terrorism, this model is impractical. The 
extradition of teiTorist A to country B might constitute what should occur, but what if  
it doesn't? What if  it doesn't because the focal point of convergence between the two
®5 Geoffrey Garrett and Bariy R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European 
Community's Internal Market in Ideas, Interests, and Institutions, (Cambridge University Press), p. 176
®® Robert Keohane, INSTITUTIONS, p. 8.
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countries is not the belief that 'teiTorism is bad'? What if country A doesn't recognise 
the act as a tenorist act? Now assume there is no way o f analysing the law which 
would apply to extradition anyhow.®^
The institutionalist model provides more o f a set o f questions than a framework 
for analysis. It provides useful groundwork in that they help facilitate co-operation, 
but there is no room within the model for the application of theory to practice. Nor 
does it provide a suitable background for empirical research. Instead, it asserts an 
epistemological approach with little or no room for interpretation.
2.6.4 Liberal Models
At first glance, there appear to be several advantages to utilizing a Liberal model 
of analysis. Since Liberal models advance from a very different platform than other 
models, it will naturally open the possibilities to furthering interdisciplinary research. 
The de-emphasis of the sovereign state stressing its practical limitations in the modern 
world; the importance of non-state actors as members of society; and the shift o f 
emphasis to domestic society, potentially offer new insights to international law.
Insofar as international law is concerned, the domestic emphasis, acts as a useful 
legal tool in that it allows domestic law to stand analogous with international law.®9 
This paves the way for presciiption as opposed to description, a necessity for any
®2 See: BURLEY, p. 225.
®8 Liberalism relies on proponents o f  realist tradition and tenets o f  liberal thought. To develop this arguments, 
states must be considered anarchical and continuously face mixed interests, such as those presented by a Prisoners 
Dilemma Model. See: Grieco, Anarchy and the limits o f  co-operation: a realist critique o f  the newest liberal 
institutionalism, International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 492-95.
®9 See Anne-Marie Burley, the champion o f Liberal thought, who points out; 'The Liberal paradigm casts a veiy  
different perspective on supranational law. It is possible that a division o f  states into liberal and nonliberal states 
will help us identify the conditions under which international law can be enforced like domestic law, by domestic
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empirical study. It also allows for the issue of compliance to be examined from a 
domestic perspective, vis a vis, the internalisation of international law.
The most obvious deficiency is that Liberal models are not widely applicable, 
largely because they do not purport anything beyond an eclectic, utopian, fr amework. 
There is no useful practicality to this model. Beyond offering potential cross- 
disciplinary insight and potential collaborative foundations, on a philosophical level. 
Liberal models offer little by way of real-world applicability,^® and as noted by 
Wilkinson, “liberal political thought lacks the systemic chai acter of an ideology."?^ 
Second, Liberal models do not purport to accomplish any more than their Realist- 
Institutionalist cousins. They do not offer potentially more accurate descriptions of 
state behaviour, nor are they more successful in explaining or predicting the empirical 
phenomena to the international system. They offer little more than an additional 
exercise in description.?^
In temis of the application of terrorism to this paradigm, it would prove to be an 
impractical model of analysis. Terrorists in many cases?^ are non-state actors; they 
work outside the parameters of the state. However, because they are non-state actors 
does not elevate them to a legitimate status; nor does it stand to reason that a regime
courts. The hypothesis here is that liberal states are ideologically and institutionally best suited for judicial 
enforcement o f international norms; the exemplar is the European Community.' ASIL PROCEEDINGS , p. 184.
?® Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, DUAL AGENDA, p. 227.
?^  Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State. (London: MacMillian, 1979), p. 4.
?  ^ Ibid. p. 228.
?5 Instances o f  state sponsored terrorism will not be discussed in terms o f  a theoretieal model.
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legitimately opposed by force or rebellion can be regarded as a liberal dem ocracy.?^  
Terrorism is a fundamental conti adiction to the ideology of the liberal state.?^
A second difficulty in the application of terrorism to a Liberal model, lies in the 
dichotomy of the liberal tradition. The individual / libertarian elements of these 
models fail in the areas of law and authority.?® Liberal models concern themselves 
with the establishment of liberal state, and not issues of authority, political obligation, 
or order.?? There is no war in a liberal model. A true liberal democracy is free from 
violence. Liberal models stmggle with issues such as safeguards against violence 
which would potentially undennine authority, peace, and security.?^ It would appear 
that the single greatest limitation in the application of a liberal paradigm to the study 
of terrorism is the liability the liberal model places on itself.
2.7 The Argument for a Constructivist Model
Existing presently in international relations are several models which possess the 
components for a cross disciplinary study. But these conclusionary models prove 
anaemic in their ability to account for a comprehensible working theory for analysis. 
Demonstrating that international law and international relations provide a common 
ground for theoretical framework, and a backdrop for empirical application, serves as 
only half the argument. The remainder, is to examine the domestic decision making
?4 Wilkinson, LIBERAL STATE, p. 39.
?5 Ibid. at p. 77 
?® Ibid. at p. 4.
?? Ibid. at p. 5 
?8 Ibid.
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model of states: the degi'ee to which they internalise international law, and resolve to 
adhere, or not, to extradition agreements. And, the levels of compliance to which 
states execute these agieements.
Extradition is not law'. It is a mle, concerning the behaviour of states in the 
international system. Compliance is a norm which affects the co-operative efforts of 
treaty adherence. Terrorism breaks from standard social norais presenting a 
behavioural phenomenon to the international system. International relations is the 
study of the state of behaviour - law is a matter of empirical fact.?® It is necessary for 
legal reasoning to become a practical model for the purpose of examining and 
interpreting legal iioiins thiough factual presentation, rather than an objective model 
with detenninant conclusions. For this reason, a constructivist model of research 
design is necessary.
2 .7.1 The Constructivist Argument
The main argument for the use of a constructivist theory is the contention held 
that the political and legal system is not becoming 'less regulated'. Just the opposite. 
With every new incident, development, accomplishment, there follows a myriad of 
new regulatory attempts. Characterised by persuasion, coercion, bargaining, and 
appeals to common standards, all in the absence of a superior authority.^® It is 
impossible to explain the international system through the use of conventional theory 
which purports a concrete international order. Rather, it is necessary to adopt a
?9 Echoed by Ten y Nardin, Legal Positivism  as a Theory o f  International S o c ie ty , in Michael Lori aux, éd., Law  
and Moral Action in World Politics, (Minnesota University Press, 2000).
®^ See: Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory o f  International Law, European 
Journal o f  International Law , vol. 2, no. 66, 1991, p. 90.
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framework which will draw in these aspects into a interactive, managerial model, as 
opposed to a systemic, sanction based one.
Constmctivism argues against both the anarchical components of realism, and the 
domestic parallel of liberalism. It does not purport to be a conclusionary model, nor 
does it rely solely on one method of argumentation for analysis. Constructivism is a 
social theory, not a political one.8^  The thrust of the constmctivist argument relies on 
the use of language as governed by rules, which analyse the function of norms.82 This 
is accomplished by employing components of 'speech-act theoiy’83 to understand the 
underlying implied logic. Speech-act theory distinguishes between thiee aspects of a 
statement: the action of a word,^ if s normative component,85 and if s impact on those 
it is conveyed to.^ ® This is relevant for assessing the success of communication as an
81 See: Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 
27.
82 '[EJffective communication takes place when the prepositional content o f the m essage matched empirical 
reality. All other messages were either metaphysical or nonsense. Consequently, since normative statements 
containing such words as 'ought', 'must', etc., provided no match with objects o f  the outer world, they could only 
refer to certain mental or emotional states o f  the speaker such as to his/her preference or values. On this basis 
language could be neatly divided into two mutually exclusive sets of'is' and 'ought' statements. Debates about 
normative concerns outside o f  the goal-means context o f  instrumental rationality, therefore, had to be considered 
useless because o f  their lack of'reference". See: Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions On the 
Conditions o f  Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 7-8
85 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. (Cambridge, MA; Haiward University Press, 1962), theory o f  
speech acts is the linguistic influence o f  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961). 
Kratochwil makes reference to this. See: Ib id ., p. 7. See also; Iain Scobbie, Towards The Elimination O f  
International Law: Some Radical Scepticism About Sceptical Radicalism, British Yearbook o f  International Law,
1990, p.353 at note 62.
84 Kratochwil gives an example; '[T]he word 'riding' stands for an action, it functions differently from promising 
or claiming', Kratochwil, RULES, p. 7.
85 '[WJhen w e authorize or appoint, forbid, grade, or praise, since such actions would not make much sense if  
there were no underlying nonns which provided the meaning for these actions. Similarly, when I make a contract, 
or promise. I..have to refer to the rules and norms.' Ibid.
8® '...speech-act theory and the theory o f  communicative action allow us to analyze the problem o f  the conditions 
o f  effective communication in a new and illuminating way.'. Ibid.
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important part of our social world in the discourse of social reality.^? In other words, 
it emphasises the context in which a statement is made.^s
Applied to state action constmctivism defends an institutional argument which 
provides its framework for analysis. State action is inteipreted as a subjective or 
causal model, where actions are realised and interpreted by other states.^® Rules then 
become part of a communication between states as an indication of intention.®® This 
restricts legal reasoning to the specific aim of decision making, based on specific 
topics®* which become the base o f a practical legal argument, specific to legal 
order s. ®2
Law as applied to the constmctivist argument, seeks to establish the validity of 
legal nouns, by rejecting the notion that law is a system of mles. That legal mles and 
norms do not possess a common characteristic, nor can they be treated simply as 
institutional mles. For law to be realistic, then the style of legal reasoning must be 
emphasised with regard to international rules.®  ^ Constmctivism contends that: law is
8? Ibid.. p. 29.
88 Scobbie, ELIMINATION, p. 353. 
8® Ibid. p. 354.
®® Ibid. See; Kratochwil, RULES, p. 56, where he discusses state perception and action: '[Gjuidence for decision­
making in analogous situations, compliance with these unspoken rules will be unproblematic only when the 
perception o f  a common interest is sufficiently strong...However, i f  states perceive the situation as one o f  
resembling a prisoner's dilemma, rules and norms, which attempt to shore up the cooperative solution, w ill be 
under pressure.'
®* 'There is still another, though interconnected, aspect o f  practical reasoning that makes the classical rhetorical 
tradition relevant to law. If it is hue that one o f  the major issues in legal arguments is the discovery o f  appropriate 
starting-points for arguments and the assignment o f  'weight' to competing value-considerations, then the process 
o f  finding premises has to be subjected to close scrutiny.' Kratochwil, RULES p. 41.
®2 '[Wjhile 'practical arguments' within a discourse o f  grievances are potentially interminable, since each party can 
challenge the arguments o f  the opponent, more specialized techniques are necessary in order to lend 
persuasiveness to the finality o f  an authoritative decision. In law, these specialized techniques are based on 
certain topoi that are specific to legal orders. Their function is largely to justify exclusions and thus to limit the 
range o f  relevant facts and proofs.' Kratochwil, RULES p. 39.
apart from all other nonnative systems; that previous sanction based theories are 
inadequate; that language is the root of mle detenninacy since it is interpretative 
decision which goes beyond established mles to mould the law, and that it must be 
duty imposing. That law as a system of rules is inadequate, instead; law is a 
deductive system of norms.®^ Therefore, law is distinguishable fr om other noimative 
disciplines by the uniqueness of its decision-making style.
Constructivism tries to explain what all traditional theories of international 
relations seek to explain - state behaviour.®^ However, what this work tries to 
examine is state behaviour on a domestic level, in an attempt to deal with an 
international problem, with the use of international rules. What I am trying to show 
is: under what conditions do states comply with international rules? Why do they 
create agreements? Why do they agree to comply with these agreements? The 
constructivist approach allows for is the most useful aspects of conventional theory to 
be applied in an unconventional manner. Which is appropriately useful since it is 
being applied to a veiy unconventional problem -teiTorism.
Constmctivism is grounded in a rational choice model, and allows for specific 
topics to be the starting place for discussion, as opposed to the 'systemic-deductive' 
character of previous models which rely on a 'path dependent' system for legal 
argument.®® It allows for the investigation of circumstances in which 'reasons' serve
®5 Ibid. pp. 186-88.
®4 'If the constraints for legal decision-making do not lie in the type o f norms, such constraints can still lie in the 
way nonns are u s e d , ie, in the decision-making style  which distinguishes legal from other modes o f  decision- 
making.' Ibid. p. 193-4.
®5See: Finnemore, NATIONAL INTERESTS, p. 24-33.
®® Scobbie, ELIMINATION, p. 357.
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as justification for rule adherence.®? It is an all encompassing theoiy of 
communication, yet requires a greater, more detailed discussion, which will define the 
parameters by which an empirical case study evaluation will take place.
®? Carty, TRENDS, p. 87.
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Chapter Three
Rules, Law, and Norms: The Evolution of the Extradition Regime
'The central problem, then, for regime theorists and international lawyers is to 
establish that laws and norms exercise a compliance pull o f their own, at least 
partially independent o f the power and interests which underpinned them and which 
were often responsible for their creation. To avoid empty tautology it is necessary to 
show not only that rules exist and that they are created and obeyed primarily out o f 
self interest or expediency, but also that they are followed even in cases when a 
state's self-interest seems to suggest otherwise.
This chapter is designed to act in tandem with the preceding section providing a 
complete theoretical model and framework for analysis by which the study of 
extradition and international teiTorism will take place. Previous discussion accounts 
for the application of a new paradigm, one that transcends traditional schools of 
thought and accounts for a cross-disciplinary study toward law and international 
relations. This discussion will continue that paradigm and define the parameters by 
which case selection, discussion and analysis shall take place. The contents of this 
chapter are largely descriptive. They have to be in order to define and explain the 
path o f argumentation which is adopted as a framework for analysis. Whilst this 
strategy is useful for the purpose of this fi'amework, it is not used as, nor is it meant to 
be, an exhaustive account for all aspects of extradition or terrorism. No fr amework 
could accomplish this. What it seeks to accomplish, is a template by which the 
extradition of suspected terrorists can be applied and discussed through the use of an 
integi'ated argument.
* Andrew Huirell, International Society and the Study o f  Regimes: A Reflective Approach  , Robert J. Beck, 
Anthony Clark Arend, Robert D. Vander Lugt, International Rules Approaches from International Law and 
International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 208-209.
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Central to this strategy is the use of regimes as the starting point for a model of 
co-operation. Predicated on tenets of realist thought, regime discussion seeks to 
reconcile the law and nonns versus power and interest debate.^ However, this is not 
what is to be examined. It is compliance, and the process by which decisions are 
made which is the focus, and it is here that regime theory falls short of the mark. Not 
all decisions made by states are made in the best interest of states. Such as in cases 
concerning extradition. Often decisions are made for the benefit o f the system. Such 
as in cases concerning extradition of teiTorists. Extradition is not an aimless exercise, 
nor is it a means to an end,5 but part of both a legal and political process within 
international society. This is not to say that extradition cannot be considered as a 
regime, but it simply camiot be examined by the traditional definition of a regime, in 
my view this strengthens the argument for constructivism.
The aim is to provide an evolutionary account of the extradition regime tlirough 
the theoretical lens of constmctivism. In doing so, it will open several other points of 
discussion which must be provided as explanation for key terminology used as the 
basic building blocks for analysis.
The first part of this chapter will address the 'mles, law and nouns' debate, it's 
definition and applicability toward the use of a constmctivist model.
The second part will discuss in-depth, regime usefulness and the benefits of a 
rational choice model within the constmctivist argument. Further, how this can be 
applied to the study of extradition and terrorism, both historically and practically.
2 See: Andrew Hurrell's discussion, Ibid. 206-207.
5 Bassiouni discusses exactly this point, see: M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. W ise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, 
The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law, (Dordrecht: Martinus N ijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 26.
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The third part will examine the role of international agi eements in the extradition 
regime, and the case they create for compliance. In addition, compliance will be 
examined through the use of a managerial model - contrary to it's traditional sanction 
driven archetype.
3,1 International Rules and International Law
What is the difference between rules and law? This question requires 
investigation of two further areas: First, what is meant by international mles?
Second, what is the nature of international law? In order to guide the answer, it is 
necessary to understand the frame of reference from which this is to be discussed, and 
to identify what is assumed as 'standard'.
First, 'rules' must be placed in a normative context perpetuating the idea that mles 
and norms are intersubjective by nature, and the operating system they are used is an 
international society. Second, is the understanding asserted by Kratochwil that 'mles 
and nonns are problem-solving devices for dealing with the recuiTent issues of social 
life: conflict and co-operation.'4 Further to these ideas is the perception that norms 
can define the boundaries of conflict; that within these boundaries, mles can create a 
co-operative enviromrient based on the goals of given actors; and that through norms 
disagreements on these goals can be negotiated co-operatively tlirough the use of 
additional actor s. 5 This perpetuates the notion of a managerial or 'co-operative' social
4 Ki'atochwil explains further, 'rules and norms link individual autonomy to sociality. On the one hand they leave 
each actor free to decide for him self/herself which goals to pursue - even to break the rules - while on the other 
hand they .safeguard the conditions o f  social coexistence,' Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 
On the conditions o f  practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 69-70.
5 Kaatochwil's 'three ordering functions' perceived as existing in the 'universe o f  norms'. Kr atochwil, RULES, p. 
70. For discussion o f  the distinguishing attributes of'commands' in international law see John Austin's definition;
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model reflective of constructivist concepts, and opposing a sanction driven model 
grounded more so in traditional concepts of coexistence defined by power.
Finally, the entire normative category created from the emergence of the 
intersubjectivity between rules and norms is placed from the vantage point of a 
rational choice model. While this is discussed in greater length further on, it is 
important to bear in mind thioughout that the parameters defined here are viewed 
through the theoretical lens of constructivist thinking, a concept grounded in rational 
choice assumptions.
3.1.1 Rules
Rules in general seek to define limits. To control outcome by creating pre­
emptive measures. Rules do not necessarily equal law. They are not to be confused 
with commands.® Rules may vary in scope, nature, interpretation, and are virtually 
limitless in teims of discretion.? They are not situation specific but 'delineate classes 
o f events by specifying the set of circumstances in which they are applicable,'^ or the 
context in which they are applied. Consider for example 'the speed limit is 55mph on 
the motoi-way'. This is established as measure of safety, to create some foiin o f order 
on a busy road where many people are travelling. It identifies a potential form of 
danger whereby exceeding the speed limit could potentially cause an accident. It also
'A command is distinguished from other signification's o f desire, but by the style in which the desire is signified, 
but by the power and the puipose o f  the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be 
disregarded.' John Austin, A P ositivist Conception o f  Law  adapted from The Province o f  Jurisprudence 
Determined. Lectures I and VI, 1832, in Joel Feinberg, Hyman Gross eds.. Philosophy o f  Law, Third Edition, 
(Belmont, California; Wadsworth, 1986), p. 27
® For discussion between rules, commands, and 'instruction-type' rules, see: ICiatochwil, RULES , p. 73 
? Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 21.
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creates a limit as to what is allowed. If  you're travelling at 65mph, you're breaking the 
rule. If a policeman were to stop you, he could legally impose a sanction upon you 
for speeding - or he could let you go. But what if  the vehicle you were driving was an 
ambulance, and it was necessary for you to break the speed limit to get to the scene of 
an accident. You would still be breaking the speed limit 'rule', but you would be 
doing so within a given set of circumstances which are applicable in a different 
context.
Also of some consideration is the delineation between tacit and explicit rules. 
Rules define the norm when they are articulated in an explicit mamier, unlike the 
habitual or customary nature of tacit rules. This is not to say that 'rules' need to be 
explicit in order for 'practice' to exist. Take for example the practice of table manners. 
Most people in every form of society have at one stage or another taken part in a 
formal meal, but not everyone is so well schooled as to know 'which fork to use'. If  
you are told specifically 'you must use the small fork for salad', then it is made clear to 
you what the 'rules of etiquette' are. You will not be arrested for using the wrong fork, 
there is no fonnal enforcement mechanism in place for this. But the rule is merely the 
manner by which social interaction maintains its fluency.
There are also several classes of rules which affect the social system of 
international society. Professor Anthony Arend distinguishes five of these rule 'types' 
which exist at the international level: legal mles, moral rules, descriptive rules, rules 
of etiquette, and mles of the game.® Each of these are distinctive in teiins of the
8 Kratochwil, RULES, p. 72.
® Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Politics. A Constructivist Approach, Paper prepared for 
The Georgetown Constructivism Project A Workshop on International Relations Theoiy and International Law, 
June 13-14, 1997.
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obligation they create, the societal relationship they foster, and the limits o f their 
enforceability.
A moral rule, Arend asserts 'is one that obliges the actor to behave in a particular 
way.' 'A moral rule', he continues, 'says that a person must do something or, 
conversely, must not do something.'*® The obligation created here is an imperfect one. 
There is no process which can create a 'moral mle'. There may be certain moral mles 
which are regarded as 'binding' across a societal spectmm, such as to keep one's 
promise. But there is no system per se, outside that of a theocratic* * one, which can 
enforce such a mle. This should not be confused, however, with an international 
agreement, which would be regarded under laws of contract and enforceable under 
legal mles.
Descriptive mles generalise about patterns of behaviour for a 'group' of people, 
within a specified set of circumstances. Similar to the notion of custom. *2 For 
example: 'it is common practice for students of St. Andrews University to walk along 
the pier eveiy Sunday.' There is no rule to make them behave this way, they are not 
obligated to do so. The fact that every Sunday, students walk along the pier, does not 
imply obligation either. Although one could conclude from observing students every 
Sunday that such an obligation does exist. The importance of descriptive mles, is in
*® Ibid., p. 4
* * The Catholic church for example, can impose sanctionaiy measures upon it's followers for breaking the rules o f  
the church, For example, a couple can not marry in a Catholic church if  one o f them has been previously 
divorced, since the Catholic church as a rule does not recognise divorce.
*2 Sources o f law included that of'customary practice'.
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their delineation from legal rules. Or, to convince the observer that 'practice' does not 
dictate the 'ru le'. *5
Rules of etiquette are social rules mandating specific types of behaviour. They 
are not required mles thiough moral, legal, or political means, but they nevertheless 
require a sense of o b l ig a t io n ,*4 such as rules of protocol. 'It is proper to bow before 
the Queen.' This is not a binding mle. If such protocol is not canied out, it would 
seem a little excessive to enact legal enforcement. The act o f 'bowing' is merely 
proper etiquette.
Rules of the game,*® are comprised of tacit understandings in the international 
system, characterised by 'bounds of mutual expectations'.*® Such formal 
understandings have been the basis for balance of power/sovereign equality post-war 
international relations. Post WWII 'spheres of influence' and the rebuilding of Europe 
were predicated upon the gentlemen's agieement ensuing from the Yalta Conference 
in 1945. No fomial treaty was ever established, yet the very notion of a 'gi'eat power' 
and the issues of 'security driven politics' were the outgrowth of such 'rules' agieed 
upon by war time leaders. For the next fifty years, all sides continued to accept this 
notion, yet no legal obligation was ever established.
*5 Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society, (Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 17. 
Hereinafter, RULES AND SOCIETY.
*4 IW . p. 14
*5 For discussion on'rules o f  the gam e'see: Kratochwil, RULES, pp. 81-88. Also; Arend, RULES AND  
SOCIETY, Ibid. pp. 15-17.
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3.1.2 Legal Rules and International Law
The greatest distinction to be made here is between ‘mles’ as discussed above, 
and the concept of international ‘legal rules’, or international law. Legal mles are 
characterised by their perception as legally binding. That they are obligatoiy to those 
whom the law is meant to be applied. That states obey mles because they ought to 
obey mles.
This rationale drawn from positivist thinking,*? suggests a 'pure law' approach*8 
devoid of any moral overtones.*® Law is regarded as a noimative 'science', consisting 
of mles which define patters of behaviour. These mles, (or norms) are predicated on 
previous mles and nonns, and work towards a basic 'systemic noiin'.^® This becomes 
the template for all mles to be held against, making them 'legal mles'.2* The system is
*® Kj-atochwil, p. 82.
*? The legal positivists broke from the traditional natural law and divine law thinkers which were based on the 
belief that there existed fundamental principles o f justice and order. Scholars o f  divine law, held the belief that 
this order was only known to God, whereas natural law thinkers believed that law could be understood through 
reason. For further reading on natural law see: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in Feinberg,
PHILOSOPHY, pp. 11-24. For further reading on divine law see: Cicero, De Res Publica
* 8 'The norm which represents the reason for the validity o f  another nonn is called, as w e have said, the 'higher' 
norm. But the search for the reason o f  a norm's validity cannot go on indefinitely in search for the cause o f  an 
effect. It must end with a norm which, as the last and highest, is presupposed. It must be presupposed  because it 
cannot be 'poisted,' that is to say: created, by an authority whose competence would have to rest on a still higher 
norm. This final norm's validity cannot be derived from higher norm, the reason for its validity cannot be 
questioned.' Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory o f  Law, in Feinberg, PHILOSOPHY, pp. 38-39. See also M.N. Shaw, 
International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 45.
*® Arend discusses the difference between moral and legal rules in stating ' [wjhile moral rules may serve to 
provide the basis for fonnulating legal rules and while many legal rules reflect the substance o f  moral rules, legal 
rules are not automatically deducible from moral rules....[Mjoral rules—which may indeed play a critical role in 
behavior—give rise to a different kind o f  obligation. The create an obligation that is owed to something beyond 
the body poltic. With legal rules, there is a perception that the obligation to abide by the m les is precisely an 
obligation owed to the body politic.' Arend, LEGAL RULES, p. 6.
2® Shaw, LAW, p. 46. Although seeded in positivist thought, the concept of'system ic practice' is also prevalent in 
constructivism when applied to structures which are reproduced or transformed by practice. For discussion see; 
Alexander Wendt, Identity and Structural Change in International Politics, in Y osef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil 
eds.. The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp.47-64.
2* Or, in M alcolm Shaw's tenns; '[a] rule becomes a legal rule if  it is accordance with a previous (and higher) 
legal rule' Ibid. p 46
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predicated, however, on extra-legal concepts such as custom^^ which become 
problematic when placed onto the spectmm of international law. The practise of 
states which obey mles because they have always obeyed rules does not explain why 
custom is binding. Nor does it allow for the continued progression of international 
law, but ultimately creates a tautological argument.25 Traditional positivist thinking 
also defines international law as ’primitive' since it lacks a central governing authority 
and enforcement m ech an ism s.24 From this international law stands not as a means of 
co-operation, but is characterised as a method of s e l f  h elp .25
Legal mles impose a sense of obligation. Moral overtones such as the promise to 
fulfil agreements, pose this understanding of obligation on a legal level. The principle 
of pacta sunt servanda , or 'agreements are to be kept' is a basic legal principle, and 
arguably one that makes international relations possible.^® But there are no criteria in 
which to demarcate a 'legal' obligation from a 'moral' obligation, or even if  the two 
should in fact be separate. The positivist argument maintains law is 'a set of mles that 
are created by political authorities', thus allowing it to become enforceable thiough the 
political process it was created by.2? But this does not account for a 'moral sense of 
obligation'.?^ Enforcement mechanisms such as sanction,2® although not a mandatory
22 'States should behave as they customarily behave.' Kelsen 'Pure theory o f  law'
25 Shaw, LAW, p. 47.
24 See: Kenneth W. Thompson, Revision o f  Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations The Struggle for 
Power and Peace, Brief Edition, (London: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993).
25 Ibid.
2® See: Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, Law and Foreign Policy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979), p. 19.
2? Arend, RULES AND SOCIETY, p. 11.
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characteristic of a legal mle,5® becomes the decisive characteristic of legal mles and 
nonns. Ultimately this is the defining characteristic of a 'legal mle'.5* It's inherent 
weakness, however, is that the notion of sanction does not properly account for 
perceptions of legitimacy. A rule is legitimate only if it is perceived by those to 
whom it applies as legitimate.52 It cannot be binding upon those who have not 
consented for it to be binding.55 And compliance cannot be enforced without the 
perception of violation.
Given this understanding of international 'rules', what then is meant by the nature 
of international 'law'? Two opposing schools of thought are dominant here: law as a 
body of rules, and law as a process. Hedley Bull addresses this debate by 
contemplating both arguments. International law, he defines, ' may be regarded as a 
body of mles which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations
28 Kratochwil elaborates on this point: 'Positivism appears to avoid the embairassment o f  such an insufficient 
demarcation by substituting an external characteristic as a criterion for that o f  the 'internal' pressure by which 
actors experience the obligatoiy force o f  prescriptions. The qualitative test of'what counts as law' recedes when a 
form al criterion is introduced. Law is now understood as the 'command' o f  the sovereign and is thus clearly 
distinguishable from other prescriptions, be they morals, taste, or even edicts and statutes o f  private associations.';
Ki'atochwil, RULES, p. 187. See also; John Austin, The Province o f  Jurisprudence, Feinberg, PHILOSOPHY, 
pp. 26-37.
29 'Legal norms are either those that share a particular characteristic, such as, for example, an attached sanction, 
or they are those norms which are part o f  a particular system o f  rules. In the first case each single rule can be 
independently examined and its legal character can be established by ascertaining the sanction as a component o f  
the norm in question.'; Kratochwil, RULES, p. 186
5® 'Although judges are bound by the "law" it can be shown that not all "legal" rules are characterised by 
sanctions, or form part o f  a deductive hierarchical system o f  nonns.'; Ibid.
5* See discussion by Kratochwil, RULES, p. 188. I
j
52 For further discussion on legitimacy, social contract and the rule o f law, see Tliomas Franck who asserts: j
'When it is asserted that a m le or its application is legitimate, two things are implied: that it is a rule made or j
applied in accordance with right process, and therefore that it ought to promote voluntary compliance by those to j
whom it is addressed. It is deserving o f  validation.' Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and ]
Institutions, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 25-46. For discussion on the broad theory o f  legitimacy see:
Martin Wight, Systems o f States, Hedley Bull ed., (Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 153-173.
55 For discussion on the role o f  consent in international law see: Lasa Oppenheim, International Law, (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1920).
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with one another and is considered to have the status of law.'54 Which essentially
defines law as 'rules'. However, in terms of the 'process' debate, the influence o f law
on world politics is a recognised part of social reality.^® Bull argues to this point:
'[i]t may be conceded, furthermore, that the actual social process o f legal decision­
making, in the international as in the municipal setting, is not a 'pure' process o f the 
application o f existing legal rules, but reflects the influence o f a variety o f factors 
'extraneous' to legal rides themselves, such as the social, moral and political outlook 
o f the judges, legal advisors and legal scholars. Moreover, there is a proper place in 
legal decision-maldng for social, moral and political principles that do not derive 
from the law itself.
The contention that international law is a 'body of rules' is based on rejecting the 
tenets of 'Natural' and 'Positivist' traditions. Instead, lies the belief that international 
legal rules are binding because states regard them as such, and support the notion of 
sanction as an appropriate response to their violation.^? As defined by Arend, 
international law is 'a set of binding mles that seek to regulate the behaviour of 
international actors by confening rights and duties.'^s This argument is founded on 
several observations; first and foremost, is the rejection of law as a process. While 
law may be developed and changed through process, it does not undertake the 
definition of a process. To do so would ignore the presence of specific 'mles' that 
could be detemiined at a given point in time.5® Second, is the belief that legal mles
54 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, A Study o f  Order in World Politics, (New York: Columbia Uniyersity 
Press, 1977), p. 127.
55 IWd. p. 128.
5® Ibid.
5? Anthony Clark Arend, Toward an Understanding o f  International Legal Rules, in Robert J. Beck, Anthony C. 
Arend, Robert D. Vander Lugt eds., INTERNATIONAL RULES, p. 291
58 IW . p. 290.
5® Ibid. See also: David Kennedy, A New Stream o f  International Law Scholarship, W isconsin International Law 
Journal, vol. 7, 1988.
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are binding in international law because they are viewed as obligatory and 
international actors are required to follow themri® Third, international law consists of 
mles which grant both rights to states, yet also pose duties to states as wellri* The 
embodiment of both these factors detennines the course o f action a state will impose, 
(either prescription or proscription). Fourth, law as a body of rules applies to 
international actors; 'peoples', individuals, international organisations, and not just 
'states'.42
Conversely, the view of law as a process criticises this argument. Adherents of 
'law as process' scholarship such as Rosalyn H iggins,45 argue that law represents more 
than just 'mles'. By assuming that law is mles alone, one disregards the additional 
social factors which are a part o f law.44 That mles cannot reflect only 'accumulated 
past decisions', else law would be unable to meet the challenge of a changing political 
system .45 The 'find and apply' method of rules ignores the essential decision making 
element, and assumes that mles apply regardless of context. This is not the case. 
International law 'is a continuing process of authoritative decisions',4® not the 
mechanistic application of neutral rules. The view of law as a body of rules, does not 
account for the role of the decision maker in a social or contextual sense. Law
4® Ibid. p. 290-91.
4* Ibid. p. 292.
42 Arend, UNDERSTANDING, p. 292.
45 This section only deals with iterations o f  Higgins' argument. For the full discussion o f  law as process and not 
rules see: Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process, International Law and How W e U se It, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995), pp. 2-16.
44 IW . p. 2.
45 Ibid. p. 3.
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requires choices to be made between nonns in a given context. This is not to say the 
process is a means to an end, and does not abrogate law as a strict policy science.^? 
While the 'process' argument recognises ambiguity can direct legal decision making 
toward a policy-oriented choice, there remains a sense of duty and obligation toward 
the validity of legal claim.48 Common interest does serve some purpose here. 
Whether it enlists it to prevent certain actions either permanently or on a single given 
occasion, it can adversely affect the outcome of the policy makers, interest. Legal 
decision making is event driven. This is not accounted for by stating that law is a set 
of neutral rules.
In addition to this reasoning, Ronald Dworkin^® makes a further distinction 
between the application of rules and legal 'principles'.®® Principles add a dimension of 
specificity to legal decision making on a case by case basis. Rules do not share this 
characteristic. Decision making then, places mles dependent on specific principles, 
eliminating the idea of mles as 'static'.®*
The core of the 'process' argument, and the definitional engine which will drive 
the basis of further discussion, is based on marriage of process and principle, and
4® Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, International Criminal Law 
Quarterly, yol. 17, no. 58, 1968, p. 59.
4? Fritz Kratochwil recognises this notion in his discussion o f  international law as an authoritatiye approximation 
toward a public order o f  human dignity in stating; 'It is precisely for this reason that law, in the conyentional 
understanding o f the temi, is primarily not concerned only with providing guidance toward predetermined ends 
but also with the legitimacy or illegitimacy o f  the means. It is this specificity which distinguishes law from policy  
as well as from moral principles.' Kratochwil, RULES, p. 197.
48 IWd. pp. 6-7.
49 See: Ronald Dworkin, Is Law a System o f  Rule, Ronald Dworkin ed., The Philosophy o f  Law, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1977).
®®'Standards'of behaviour. See: Krasner, REGIMES, p. 186.
® * Kratochwil, RULES, pp. 193-194.
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follows the view of Fritz Kratochwil.^^ The law is not a static-sanction driven set o f 
rules and nomis. Law cannot be decided by statutes, treaties and codes. Nor is it a 
process of'claim s and counterclaims'. Rather, it is a choice process grounded in the 
use o f  norms characterised by principle. It is a decision making process tlirough the 
use of reasoning, which 'can only be ascertained through the perfomiance of rule- 
application to a controversy and the appraisal of the reasons offered in defence o f a 
decision.'^^
5.2 The Role and Function o f  Norms
To claim that states are goal oriented would be an accurate assertion.^'^ This 
notion along with the concept of states in terest,dom inated  post-war international 
relations and championed tenets of realist thought. 6^ However, in the state’s effort to 
achieve their goals, there is every likelihood that one state's pursuit will interfere with 
that of another goal-pursuing state. The potential for conflict and confrontation are in 
many instances avoided thi ough the use of communication. And ultimately tlirough 
the use of language, states are enabled to pursue their goals.^^
5 2 l ^ . , p p .  181-211.
53 Ibid., p. 18.
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World o f  Our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations, (Columbia, South Carolina: University o f  South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 69-70.
55 For discussion o f states interest and the use o f  norms see: Friedrich Kratochwil, On the notion o f  interest' in 
international relations, International Organization, vol. 36, I, Winter 1982.; W. David Clinton, National 
Interest: Normative Foundations, Review o f  Politics, vol. 4,4, 1986.; Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International 
Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, Yale Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 14:335, 1989.
5*^  See; Hans Morganthau, In Defence o f  the National Interest, (New York: Knopf, 1951); Hans Morganthau, 
Kenneth W. Thompson Ed., Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief Ed., (New York; 
McGraw-Hill, 1993).
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Criteria for the fi*amework utilised in the examination of nouns are Ki'atochwil's, 
and similar concepts as applied by Austin, Onuf, and Franck. The research design 
adopted here is a constructivist argument. Which, as stated previously, relies on 
tenets of speech act theory.58 Functionally, this divides a statement into tlnee integral 
parts: action, normative components, and impact. In order for communication to be 
'successftil', such statements must be situation-specific, or dependent on the context in 
which the statement was made.
The action of a statement perfoims in a specific capacity, such as 'warning'. This 
is different from the 'proper' definitional use of an 'action' word, such as running, 
walking or sleeping. These are 'referred' actions that behave descriptively and 
therefore independently, as opposed to 'warning', 'claiming' or 'threatening'59 which 
require perfoiinance of the action and not just r e f e i T a l . ^ o
Normative components provide meaning for action. To 'authorise' is an action, 
but would carry little meaning without a normative component to provide its 
significance. It is this reference to norms which provide the constitutive agent that 
makes nouns relevant.<^*
52 'We demand, warn, threaten, claim, criticize, assert, consent, suggest, apologize, pressure, persuade, praise, 
grade, promise, forbid, appoint, authorize, contract, or even bet, in order to further our goals.' Kratochwil, 
RULES, p. 7.
58 Refer to discussion in Chapter 2. See also, John Austin, How to Do Things with Words. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1962). H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
5^ Kiatochwil makes special reference to nonns and the term 'threatening' as a speech act, 'thereby suggested that 
threatening is a norm-governed activity. Threats seem to be particularly characteristic o f  international relations, 
and their link to coercion and violence makes it appear that threats, stand in opposition to norms, law, and order. 
Promises and threats, however, might actually have much more in common than is assumed in this conventional 
dichotomy. The effectiveness o f  both might depend on certain common normative understandings.'; Kratochwil, 
RULES, pp. 8-9. and discussed further in Chapt. 2, pp. 45-68.
60 Kratochwil, RULES, p. 7,28-9
61 Ibid.
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The impact of a statement, stems from the analysis of both aspects in tandem. 
Where conventional analysis fails is that it takes into account only the meaning to 
which the content referred, or that 'effective communication takes place when the 
prepositional content of the message matched empirical reality.'62 From this
traditional language analysis was divided between what 'is' and what 'ought', and 
ignoring noiinative concerns since there was no frame of reference which it could be 
adhered to. What speech act theory provides is the distinction between the 
'locutionary' aspect of a statement, the 'illocutionary' force it provides, and its 
'peiiocutionary' effect.63 As a result, it is possible for actors to establish foiins of 
obligation,64 but actors must resort to norms 65 in order to do so.66
Kiatochwil outlines three assumptions toward the use of norms as a research 
strategy, which this work will adopt as well. First, norms shape decisions in terms of 
a public choice approach. This means that, the base for analysis rests on the 
contention that state actors are distinct, and predisposed to survive in a system 
governed by their own self interest. They make choices based on the Icnowledge that 
they are a part of this system, and their decisions will affect future interactions with
62 Ibid. See also: Jürgen Habemias, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. ('Frankfurt: Shurkamp, 1981)
63 Ibid. p .8. Kratochwil re-enforces this point in rejecting 'classical logic' and epistemological implications: 1
'Thus while classic logic assumed that communication among actors is possible on the basis o f  propositional |
content, which, in turn, is safeguarded by certain truth functions, the discussion o f  speech acts showed that such a i|
conception o f  language is inadequate. Truth and falsity are appropriate criteria only when applied to propositions. j
Neither the illocutionaiy nor the perlocutionary effect o f  speech acts can thereby be analyzed. However, since |
promising, contracting, asserting, etc., are important parts o f  our socia l world, w e cannot simply exclude these |
aspects from out theorizing about social reality.' RULES, p. 29 i
64 Kratochwil obsei-ves on this point: 'The binding character o f  contracts, as mutual promises, depends for its 
validity not on the 'reliance' which one o f  the contracting parties might have placed on the promise o f  the other, 
but on the institution o f  the contract itself. perlocutionary QÎÏQcXhxsX the illocutionary  force o f  the mutual
promises establishes the binding character o f  contracts.', RULES, p. 28. |
65 'Norms, therefore, more than assertions, are dependent upon the success o f  communicative action, i.e., their | 
perlocutionaiy effect.', RULES, p. 34.
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other actors. The function of nouns then, must be to reduce the complexity o f these 
choices by acting as guidance devices which delineate 'the factors that a decision­
maker has to take into account.'6?
Second, norms are not only guidance devices for choice, but explain why a 
particular type of behaviour takes place. This is mainly dependent on context, and 
specific aspects of a situation which require nonns to be invoked. Self-interest then, 
is not a viable option, as it makes no reference to nonns.
Third, it is through a reasoning process, a process of deliberation and 
interpretation, that choices are influenced. This requires a model of practical legal 
reasoning toward decision making. Traditional rational choice models which are 
typically used to analyse decision making, fail to account for any reasoning process. 
Rational models are predisposed to concern themselves with preferences, and priority 
of preferences, which are dependent on the weight of a claim. They tend to ignore 
aspects of language and social interaction.
Reasoning with rales and nonns cannot be measured in terms of an arbitrary 
process, but must depart from classical models of rational action, and be examined in 
tenns of criteria in the form of a practical model. When legal reasoning is placed 
within this context, it is possible to analyse the change in discourse of legal 
argumentation. It is the legal reasoning process which is to be examined here, and 
rules and norms are regarded as the nucleus of legal reasoning. Despite difference in 
opinion with respect to the outcome of legal decision-making, the legal reasoning 
process provides commonalty which can be examined, and agreed upon, from all
66 IW ., pp. 30-34.
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sides. The importance of nonns must ti anscend traditional debates and account for 
their influence on decision-making and creation of social order in a system governed 
by self-interest. For this purpose the constructivist model relies on tenets of rational 
choice as posed by the traditional debate on regim es.68
3,3 Regime Evolution
'Regimes' are social stmctures. They establish 'recognised patterns of behaviour 
around which expectations converge'.^^ They appear as either fonnal agreements or 
infoiinal understandings, through either implicit or explicit arrangements. Regimes 
themselves, however, are not 'arrangements' which constantly change concurrently 
with shifts in power and interest. They are not functions, although they seek to fulfil 
specific functions. They are not agi'eements, although their purpose is to facilitate 
agreements.
Regimes act as the intervening variable between basic causal factors, and 
behavioural outcome. Regimes are not epiphenemonal - they are man made. They 
are not ends in themselves, nor are they a 'means to an end', but stmctures which 
guide conduct. They provide a rational choice model from which to pursue angles of 
co-operation through the use of both law and politics by emphasising rules and 
principles as links toward agreed noiTns.20
62 Ibid. p. 10 
68 i m .  p. 45.
6^ Oran R. Young, Regime dynamics: the rise and fa l l  o f  international regimes , ICiasner, REGIMES, p. 277 See  
also: Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Hedley Bull, 
The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
26 See: Ernst B. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes, World Politics vol. 32, 1980.
'International regimes'll involve those activities which are of interest to members 
of the international system. These activities are not actions which take place on a 
domestic plane, but extend the boundaries by falling outside the jurisdiction of 
sovereign states.22 They are actions which cut across the international lines, or which 
involve interests of two or more state actors. International regimes engage sovereign 
states as their focal point, although actions implemented by international regimes veiy 
often employ non-state entities.23 International regimes defined, are distinctly divided 
sets of rules,24 norms, and decision making procedures which confine themselves to a 
given area of international relations.25
The core problem regime theory seeks to solve is the potential for co-operation 
between two sovereign states competing for power and influence in an anarchical 
system. Arguments drawn in criticism of this, revisit the law and norms versus power 
and interest debate, claiming regime theory only reworks the power politics idiom .26 
Problematic in international law within this fi'amework is the duality between the 
practice of legal rules (reinforcement of state sovereignty) and its very definition 
(constraints upon sovereignty) . 22 But if rules and norms are reflective only of state’s 
interest, then it is state’s interest only which mandates compliance, leaving rules and
21 For a more thorough discussion on International Regimes see; Oran R. Young, International Regimes: 
Problem s o f  Concept Formation, World Politics, vol. 32, 1980.
22 For example, high seas fishing, deep seabed mining, exchange rates.
23 See Oran Young's discussion in Kiusner, REGIMES.
24 Inclusive o f  explicit' rules, informal understandings, convergent expectations, see: Krasner, REGIMES
25 Krasner, REGIMES, p. 186
26 Hurrell, SOCIETY, p. 207.
22 Ian Clark, The Hierarchy o f  States, Refonn and Resistance in the International Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 25.
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noims as fonnal exercise and empty of meaning. The problem that remains for 
regime theorists, then, is to show that inles and nonns exercise a 'compliance puli' 
independent of the power politics responsible for their creation. Fuither, to show that 
rules and nonns are followed conversely to state’s interest. The central question, 
however, which unites both international relations theorists and international lawyers 
despite this fundamental differences is: how useful are regimes?
3.3.1 Benefits o f  a Rational Choice Model
Patterns of international relations cannot be entirely explained in terms of 
regimes any more than they can be analysed in tenns of power. Human action and 
interaction is essentially mle governed,^^ which presupposes that decision-making is 
largely guided by mles and nonns which become part of a deliberation process. It is 
the focus of this decision making process though, which constructivist thinking seeks 
to depart from traditional rational choice behaviour.2^  Utilising the regime debate as a 
point of departure^® allows for nonns to be examined separately from assumptions 
imposed by realism or legal analysis.81
28 Kratochwil, RULES p. 43
2  ^ '[T]he question o f  how rules and nonns guide choices, particularly in cases in which several independent actors 
have to com e to a joint decision, can be posed in a new way. Rules and nonns mold decisions via the reasoning 
process (deliberation). This process departs - especially in the cases o f  groups - in significant ways from the ]
model o f  instrumentally rational action.' Ibid.
86 Kratochwil writes on the utilisation o f  regimes as a starting point for debate'...it is clear that we have to
overcome the conventional conceptual limitations which impeded more than helped traditional analysis Such a
strategy appeals to be useful because the focus on regimes provides an approach to the function o f  norms in 
international relations without involving itself in the quagmire o f  realist assumptions, or in the often arcane 
squabbles o f  legal analysis.' Ibid. pp. 45-46.
8 1 'International lawyers have long acknowledged the existence o f  international regimes, but account for their 
legality by mere incoiporation into the international legal order. International Relations scholars, who discovered 
international regimes only recently and without much awareness o f  lawyers' concerns, have assiduously avoided 
calling them legal. Both groups miss the central feature o f  regimes: They are sets o f  rules, a substantial number 
o f  which (especially those giving the regime its scope and coherence) are legal rules. Both groups miss this point
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Two main issues arise from the traditional rational choice approach which need 
to be addressed thiough a 'constructivist' lens. First is the question o f regime 
change.82 Regimes are not temporary anangements which fluctuate with shifts in 
power or short-term interest,83 they are designed to facilitate agreements. 4^ jt is 
nonns which provide the defining principles of regimes, not their 'rule' and 'decision 
making' components.85 Changes in regimes represent a change in norms toward a 
given issue,86 not changes in rules or decision making which reflect changes within 
the regime and not the regime itself.82
This focus on regime change obscures the usefulness of regimes, making them 
little more than reflections of power, and providing an ambiguous understanding for 
the way nonns affect decision making.88
because o f  their joint attachment to legal positivism, which accords or denies legality to rules by the set and not 
rule by rule.' See: Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World o f  Our Making, Rules and Rule in Social Theoiw and 
International Relations. (Columbia, South Carolina: University o f  South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 145.
82 For discussion on theoretical approaches to regime change and variance see: Stephan Haggard and Beth A. 
Simmons, Theories o f  international regimes. International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 498- 
500.
83 The distinction between 'regimes' and 'arrangements' is made here: 'Agreements are ad  hoc, often 'one-shot' 
anangements. The puipose o f  regimes 'implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate co-operation, but a 
form o f  co-operation that is more than the following o f  short-run se lf interest.' Robert Jervis, Security Regimes , 
in Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 
'International Regimes', International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, spring 1982, p. 357. See also: Krasner, 
REGIMES, p. 187.
84 Krasner, REGIMES, p. 187.
85 'A fundamental distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and 
procedures on the other. Principles and nonns provide the basic defining characteristics o f  a regime. There may 
be many rules and decision-making procedures that are consistent with the same principles and norms.' Ibid.
86 "Y/hen norms and principles are abandoned, there is either a change to a new regime or a disappearance o f  
regimes from a given issue-area.' Kaasner, p. 188 See; Charles Lipson, The transformation o f  trade: the sources 
and effects o f  regime change , in IGasner, REGIMES, pp. 417-422.
82 Krasner, REGIMES.
88 A s Kiatochwil points out: 'What remains unclear is why actors follow  m les in the first place and why even 
hegmons find it often necessaiy to resort to norms rather than to direct imperative control based on their 'power'.' 
Kratochwil, RULES, p. 46. See also: Kratochwil, The Force o f  Prescriptions, International Organization, 38, 
(1984), 685-708.
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Second, is the notion of regime strength. Regimes become weakened when the 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures which comprise the regime 
are inconsistently observed. This also implies that the basic nomis which initially 
establish the regime are challenged on a fundamental level, since regimes are 
dependent on nomiative understandings. Decision-making which draws from the 
inconsistent application of mles and principles, undermine the actual practice of the 
regime's intention. When the component parts of a regime are conflicting - the regime 
is effectively weakened.^^
The textbook example of such regime limitation appears specifically in security 
r e g i m e s , 6^ however, cracial to this reasoning are assumptions of interest and co­
operation. Robert Jervis convincingly argues security and regime wealoiess,^* by 
providing that regimes can only exist under specific c o n d i t i o n s . ^2 Further, he argues 
that regimes may only exist when established nonns can provide specific types of co­
operation, under specific c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 3^ ^nd that there is in fact a distinction to be 
made between short tenn and long terai interest when facilitating co-operation within 
a r e g i m e . 4^ Furthennore, he argues that there must be evidence of this c o - o p e r a t i o n . ^ ^
8^ Such is the case with decision making and security regimes, see: Robert Jervis, Security regimes, in Krasner, 
REGIMES, pp. 357-362.
^6 Ki'atochwil's discussion on Robert Jervis, 'Robert Jervis maintains that the incentives in the field o f  security are 
likely to defeat the establishment o f  security regimes, and that the obstacles to maintaining them are also 
particularly severe...'security regimes' can only com e into existence under veiy  unusual circumstances...a security 
regime exists only when the established norms facilitate not only co-operation but a co-operative stance o f  a 
particu lar  kind.' Kratochwil, RULES, p. 47.
See: Jervis, SECURITY.
^2 Jervis, SECURITY; Lipson TRANSFORMATION.
93 Jervis, SECURITY.
94 Ibid.
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Since the focus here is not on interest but nonns, to assume that interest alone can 
explain co-operation leaves the argument to invariably resort back to a power model, 
leaving nonns and regimes as epiphenomenal.96 This is not the force of the argument. 
It is nonns which provide the pillars for a constructivist model, and allow for 
solutions to form through the use of a socially integrated model. Specifically, the 
internalisation of these norms, and how decision making 'bridges the gap among 
actors who know very little, or virtually nothing, about each other'.9?
A rational choice model is a useful approach toward a study of nonns since it 
provides a model from which norms and social interaction may be approached. The 
distinction to be made, however, is that the teleological structure present in 
conventional models is abandoned. In order to provide a clear understanding of how 
nonns work, the variance between implicit (or tacit), and explicit rules toward norms, 
principles and co m p lia n ce ,98 must become the point of examination.
3.3.2 Extradition as a Regime
Extradition serves as a rich illustration for the study of norms in decision-making. 
Specifically since extradition is by all fonnal definitions an international rule, it 
allows for the transfer o f fugitive criminals from one sovereign state to another, 
through a process of international agreem en ts.99 These agreements may be standing
95 Ibid., pp. 361-62.
96 Kratochwil, RULES, p. 48 
92 Ibid.
98 Ibid., pp. 52-56.
99 For basic texts defining extradition and it's fundamental principles, see: Ian Shearer, Extradition in 
International Law, (Manchester University Press), 1971; G eoff Gilbert, Aspects o f  Extradition Law, (Dordrecht:
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treaty agreements or ad hoc anangements; nevertheless, they are international 
creations executed by domestic legislation. Extradition is a social relationship 
between states in the international system, dependent on the crucial acceptance of 
nonnative understandings of what constitutes a criminal act.i^o When extradition 
fails, it is often because one actor did not share this common understanding of what 
constitutes a criminal act, or because what constitutes a criminal act in one state is not 
necessaiily understood as criminal behaviour in another, or that states did not 
somehow share the belief that there is a common interest in extraditing the 
crim inal. 161 The establishment of norms predicated on a common understanding 
becomes important, if  for no other reason other than to ensure it's success.
Martinus N ijhoff Publishers, 1991); John Muiphy, Punishing International Criminals, (Rowman & Allanheld, 
1986). For a more in-depth understanding see: M. Clierif Bassiouni and Edward M. W ise, Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare. The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law. (Dordrecht: Martinus N ijhoff Publishers,
1995).
166 'Extradition is itself a development from the theory o f  asylum. In the ancient Greek city states we have been 
told that asylum was granted to everyone, whether his offence might be described as political or otherwise. In the 
Middle Ages the primaiy puipose o f  extradition treaties was in fact to provide for the punishment o f  political 
offenders who became fugitives and sought to escape punishment by fleeing to other jurisdictions. It was 
understandable that this should be the case, for whilst absolute monarchs might well war with one another, they 
maintained a common interest in securing by treaty the anest and punishment...of those who sought to overthrow 
their regimes.' Peter Sutherland, The Developm ent o f  International Law o f  Extradition, St. Louis University Law 
Journal, vol. 28:33, 1984, p. 33. See also: J. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, (Klewer 
Academic Publishers, 1992); I. Shearer, EXTRADITION; Paul O'Higgins, The H istory o f  Extradition in British 
Practice I I7 4 -1 194, Indian Yearbook o f  International Affairs, vol. 13, 1964.
161 Cherif Bassiouni proposes a conceptual framework for extradition based on five interlocking principles: 1) the 
recognition o f  national interest o f  states who are parties to the extradition; 2) existence o f  an international duty to 
preserve/maintain world public order; 3) effective application o f  minimum standards o f  fairness and justice to the 
relator in the extradition process; 4) collective duty on behalf o f  all states to combat criminality; 5) the balance o f  
all these factors within the judicial framework o f  the Rule o f  Law. This is based on the rationale that: there exists 
a sense o f  duty to preserve and maintain world public order which in theoiy, does not destroy national 
sovereignty. That the enforcement o f  extradition is a matter o f  concern on behalf o f  the world community. That 
mutual assistance reinforces effectiveness. That adherence to the Rule o f  Law is the only safeguard for the 
guaranteed survival o f  mankind. In the 'real world', however, the balancing act between these factors and 
rationale, is generally naive. See: M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ideologically M otivated Offences and the P olitical 
Offences Exception in Extradition - A Proposed Juridical Standard F or An Unruly Problem , DePaul Law 
Review, vol. XIX, no. 2, Winter 1969. pp. 222-223. Also: M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition in the 
American Practice and World Public Order, Tennessee Law Review, vol. 36, no. I, 1968.
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Consider for example, the problem of political offence, i62 Broadly interpreted, 
political offence in extradition implies two definitional categories J  63 it can imply a 
'pure political offence', 164 which is bereft of the common crime elements65 Or, it can 
refer to a 'relative political offence', in which the common criminal element is implicit 
in, or connected to, a political act.i66 The latter definition creates the problem for 
noims and decision-making. If a crime is not entirely criminal, yet not entirely 
political, then there is no consensus to what constitutes a political crime.'6? This is 
best exemplified when applied to cases involving the extradition of wanted terrorists.
3.3.3 Terrorism and Political Offence
The earlier challenges terrorism168 posed to states stemmed largely from the 
international community's difficulty in unilaterally defining it;i69 but this is certainly
•62 The 'right to asylum' was considered to be part o f  extradition's crude beginnings. The Roman tradition o f  
surrendering o f offenders o f ambassadorial privileges, which could suirender Romans to Romans was based on 
the ancient city-state Greco-Roman set-up. Common fear o f  retaliation between hostile Greece and Rome was 
considered to be the crudest beginnings o f  modern political offence. See: Bemabe Africa, Political Offences in 
Exti-adition, (Manila, Benipayo Press, 1926), pp. 4-5.
163 'Plainly a matter o f  significance in defining whether a particular crime is o f  a political character is the issue 
whether the definition should be objective or subjective, or alternatively whether the definition should combine 
elements o f  both. If a crime were to be defined as political merely because the motivation o f  the actor was to 
bring about a political end, for example the overthrow o f  a regime, such a definition would bring within its ambit 
many acts that would be universally condemned by the civilised community. Alternatively, the objective test, 
which would be related to the consequences o f  the act rather than the motivation o f  its author, could itself create 
unfair results.' Sutherland, DEVELOPMENT, p. 35.
•64 Pure political offences are not considered to be extraditable offences - they are 'directed solely against the 
political order'. Shearer, EXTRADITION, p. 185.
•65 An exhaustive concept in French and Belgian literature. See: Lora L. Deere, Political Offences in the Law  
and Practice o f  Extradition, The American Journal o f  International Law, vol. 27, 1933, p. 248 at note 7.
•66 The distinguishing factor between the politcial crime and the common crime is 'the fact that the former only 
affects the political organization o f  the state, the proper rights o f  the state, while the latter exclusively affects 
rights other than those o f  the state.'
•62 See: Deere, POLITICAL OFFENCE, Supra note 30; Catherine N icols Currin, Extradition Reform and the 
Statutory Definition o f  P olitical Offence , Virginia Journal o f  International Law, vol. 24, no. 2, 1984.
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not so today. There is a widely shared perception in the international state system o f 
what teiTorism is, and as discussed earlier in Chapter 1, that it is important to 
cooperate to combat it.'^6 However, many of the laws initially designed to combat 
teiTorism, ultimately served as a means of legitimising it. Certainly there are nations 
who regard terrorism as a legitimate method of warfare,!•• and of internal repression 
and control, thereby making many of the laws already in place, such as extradition, 
unable to effectively deter those who rely on violence to advance their cause. This is 
particularly the case in politically motivated terrorism,^2 since it allows the fugitive 
terrorist to justify his actions by linking them, however tenuously, to a political cause 
or ideal,! 13 albeit the political offence exception is a prevailing feature in almost all 
extradition treaties, there remains no clear-cut definition of what political offence is.
•68 The term 'terrorism' understood colloquially as it stems from the 'Jacobin Reign o f  Ten or' during the French 
Revolution. See: G. Lewis & C. Lucas, Beyond Teiror, Essays in French Regional and Social History, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uniyersity Press, 1983).
•69 'The term 'terrorism' has no precise or widely accepted definition. If it were a mere matter o f  description, 
establishing a definition would be simple: Terrorism is violence or the threat o f  violence calculated to create an 
atmosphere o f  fear and alatm - in a word, to teiTorise - and thereby bring about some social or political 
change...The difficulty in defining terrorism has led to the cliché that one man's teiTorist is another man's freedom  
fighter. This phrase implies that there can be no objective definition o f  terrorism, that there are no universal 
standards o f  conduct in conflict.' Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War, in C.W. 
K egley Jr., International Terrorism, Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1990), 
p. 28-29. See: Report o f  the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supplement No. 28, 
U.N. Document A /9028, 1973.
• !6 Chapter 1.2.2.
• • • Such as States which view  violence as a legitimate part o f  a liberation movement. See: Comments by N. 
Kittrie, Terrorism and P olitical Crimes in International Law, American Society o f  International Legal Practice, 
87, 1973, p. 104-5.
• !2 Political tenorism as defined by Wilkinson, 'may be briefly defined as coercive intimidation. It is the 
systematic use o f  murder and destruction and the threat o f  murder and destruction in order to terrorise individuals, 
groups, eommunities or governments into conceding to the tenorist's political demands.' Paul Wilkinson, 
Tenorism and the Liberal State. (London: MacMillian, 1977), p. 49.
••3 Political terrorism itself, may be broken down into it's constituent parts as well, between political teiTor and 
political ten'orism. The former, allows for extreme, indiscriminate, and usually isolated acts, which are 
unorganised and difficult to predict or control. W hile the latter, is indicative o f  a policy o f  orgainsed terror on 
behalf o f  a state, movement, or group o f  individuals, which holds some form o f  organisation or structure, as well 
as som e kind o f  ideology. See: Grant Wardlaw, Political Ten orism, Theoiy, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 13.; Wilkinson, TERRORISM.
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Generally, political offence is recognised to have two levels of meaning. * First 
is the idea of a 'pure political offence', which stands for acts committed entirely 
against the state and devoid of any real criminal element, such as treason, espionage, 
or rebellion. These stand as primarily crimes against the state, and seek no real 
personal gain on behalf of the individual, but rather to further a political ideal. The 
second, is where a criminal act is a result of a political motivation, rendering the crime 
'political'. These crimes tend to be more 'criminal' than 'political' in nature, and not 
surprisingly, occur more frequently than the former, creating much of the ambiguity 
for this idea of political offence in extradition. The delicate issue becomes, to what 
degree is the criminal act and the political motivation connected, and if the act is 
deemed political, does it hence become unextraditable. • • 5
This is illustrated historically tlii'ough the chionology of legal decisions which 
serve as the foundation for political offence. The benchmark case for deteiinining 
political offence. In re C astionif^  adjudicated in 1891. Angelo Castioni, held 
responsible for the murder of a member o f the Swiss Canton, Luigi Rossi, during an 
uprising over the Swiss Federal Council's refiisal to call a referendum to the 
constitution. As a result, the group seized the town arsenal, taking the guards hostage 
and marching toward the palace. Upon entering the palace, Castioni shot and killed a 
State Council member. Castioni fled to England, charged by the Swiss government 
for murder, and who sought his extradition. The British courts mled that 'fugitive
• 4^ See, e.g., Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offence Exception in the Suppression o f  Terrorism, 
Indiana Law Journal, vol. 67:3, 1992, pp. 773-8.
’ 5^ Bradley Larschan, Extradition, The Political Offence Exception And Terrorism: An Overview O f The Three 
Principle Theories o f  Law, Boston University International Law Journal, yol. 4:231, p.250-251.
• ‘6 } Q B 149, 1891.
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criminals are not to be suiTendered for extradition crimes, if  those crimes were 
incidental to and formed a part o f political disturbances.'! *2 in addition, they observed 
that 'an act of this description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in 
furtherance of a political rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and 
lamented, as even cmel and against all reason.'!
Three years later, the British courts were challenged again with the case which 
would re-defme the parameters of political offence - In re Meunier, 1894.Ü9 Meunier 
was a self proclaimed anarchist, who bombed a Paris café killing two persons, then 
fled to England where he claimed his acts were political. The British courts rejected 
this claim on the giounds that his crimes were not of political character since there 
was in fact, no uprising. !20 That the crimes of an anarchist, were in fact, crimes 
against all forms of government, not part of a political uprising, and therefore not o f 
political character.
The modern inteipretation, and the effect these precedent cases have had on 
international terrorism, show that original interpretation has changed little. This was 
exemplified in the 1979 case o f In re McMullend^^ McMullen alleged was a British 
Aimy deserter who joined the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republic Army (PIRA), 
and was charged with the bombing of British Amiy barracks in 1974. Apprehended
! !2 Dissenting opinion o f  Justice Hawkins, I Q.B. 164-66. See also Regina v. Governor o f  Brixton Prison  - Ex 
P arte Kolczynski, I Q.B. 540, 1955.
! !8 Hawkins dissent at 167.
Ü 9 2 Q .B .4 1 5 , 1894.
!26 Justice Cave observed: 'In order to constitute an offence o f  a political character, there must be two or more 
parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government o f  their own choice on the other, and that, i f  the 
offence is committed by one side or the other in pursuance o f  that object, it is a political offence, othei-wise not.' 2 
Q.B. 419.
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in the United States five years later, Great Britain sought his extradition under the 
U.S."U.K. Extradition Treaty, where McMullen charged his extradition was sought for 
offences of a political nature. The Magistrate ruled in favour of McMullen claiming 
that there was at the time of the bombing, a political insuiTection occuiTing in 
Northern Ireland, and that McMullen's actions were part of that incident. !22
That same year, the Magistrate had rejected the political offence defence in Abu 
EainM^ Eain was charged with killing two Jewish males and wounding over thirty 
others, when he detonated an exploding device in a trash bin in a commercial market 
place in Israel. Wlien apprehended in Chicago, Israel sought his extradition under the 
U.S.-Israeli Extradition Treaty, which Eain protested claiming that his acts foimed 
part of a political offence. His claims were denied by the U.S. court who ruled the 
acts were of an indiscriminate nature and not aimed toward a political objective, !24 
The degree to which political offence affects extradition extends far beyond the 
parameters of extradition law itself in teims of it's scope and its usefulness. If it is to 
retain any importance in extradition law, then it must assess the nature of the act, and 
the context in which it is committed,!25 in order to balance 'the protection of human 
rights with the need to preserve international public order. '! 26
!2! Magistrate No. 3-78-1099, May 1979.
!22 The magistrate ruled that McMullen 'acted as a member o f  PIRA...his activities were directed by PIRA 
and...the bombing was a crime incidental to and formed part o f a political disturbance'.
!23 Mag. No. 79 M 175, December 1979.
!24 The magistrate ruling was that the 'random and indiscriminate placing o f an explosive near a bus stop on a 
public street in a trash bin diffuses any theoiy that the target was a military one or justified by any militaiy 
necessity...com m ission o f  these alleged offences is so remote from the political objective that it could not 
reasonably have been believed by the offender to have a direct political effect on the government o f  Israel; nor 
was it directed at the government o f  Israel.'
!25 See comments by Justice Sprizzo as per In re Doherty, in G eoff Gilbert, ASPECTS, p. 133.
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If  we are to consider exti'adition as a constmctivist 'regime', then several factors 
must be in place. First, there must be established rules and norms. Rules must meet 
certain criteria. They must be legitimate. *2? They must be stated indicating their 
circumstance and range of application, and they must be applicable to all.^28 They 
must empower, and they must do so as part o f a larger normative context. *29 Norms 
alternatively, must be understood in the context they are presented. Commitments 
must be expressed either explicitly tlnough mles, or implicitly through customary 
binding obligation. Extradition is an engineered agi’eement. The agreeing parties 
create the mle. The mle is understood as legitimate. This is an explicit 
understanding. A more tacit understanding, while binding under international law, is 
considerably more difficult since custom, declarations, and 'unspoken mles', are never 
specifically defined. Thus the mle loses its communicative function.
Second, mles must be justified in proper context. States expect extradition 
agreements to be fulfilled, that is the mle, but this is not a 'given'. What may appear 
as an 'acceptable' request for extradition, may not be applicable in a given normative 
context. For example, a state is not under any obligation to extradite a fiigitive who 
may face the death penalty in the requesting s t a t e . C a p i t a l  punishment is not a 
generally accepted norm. Nor is a state required to surrender one of it's own
•26 i w .  p. 139.
122 Kratochwil, RULES, p. 53
128 ’Commands' are 'situation specific' whereas 'rules' are applicable to all. Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 ^  provision inherent in several model international agreements, and bilateral interstate extradition treaties. 
The death penality provision and the potential effect on extradition will be discussed later on in Chapter 7.
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c i t iz e n s .  131 Rights of citizenship are generally accepted behaviour, regardless of what 
is 'expected'.
Third, is the deliberation between rules and norms. There exists the question 
whether rules are in fact 'rules' or merely tacit norms. Are states obligated to extradite 
in the absence of an extradition treaty because it is implied that the asylum state 
shares the similar interests of the requesting state? Wliat if  extradition has been 
canied out before between these two states without the benefit o f an extradition 
treaty? Does this now imply that this is the mle, or does it merely imply a tacit nonn. 
How is it possible to construe the difference? It would seem appropriate to argue that 
the particular circumstance would have to be viewed within the given context of the 
request. However, if  a regime is to be based on a tacit understanding, as well as 
explicit mles, then there must be an accepted 'margin of eiTor' in terms of compliance 
if  we are to insure the survival of the regime. i32 Fritz Kratochwil demonstrates this 
point in tenns of dispute resolution as 'no mle in itself can specify all possible ranges 
of application, disputes are bound to arise concerning "the meaning" of crucial tenns 
or the relevant characterisation o f a particular action.'^33 The focus invariably resorts 
back to a decision making process where judgements are based on actors mutual 
expectations. Rule guidance resorts to a system of 'unspoken mles' whose compliance 
is based on a perception of a common interest.
•31 For example, Article 6 o f  the European Convention on Extradition, December 13, 1957, Eur. T.S. No. 24, 359 
U.N.T.S. 276, provides '[i]f the requested party does not extradite its national, it shall at the request o f  the 
requesting party submit the case to its competent authorities in order that proceedings may be taken..,' See also: 
The Inter-American Convention on Extradition, December 26, 1933, Article (2); United Nations Model Treaty on 
Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. Doc. A /R es/45/116, (1991). For articles pertaining to forms o f  co-operation 
in criminal matters see:
•32 See: Young, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, pp. 342-46 
133 Ki'atochwil, RULES, p. 57.
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3.4 International Agreements
Regimes provide for an explanation of co-operation in that they claim states obey 
the rules embodied within regimes because of the overall benefit provided. It is not 
the 'regime' specifically which remains the focus of importance in the international 
system, but mles and n o n n s • 34, Rules expressly providing the basis for obligation. In 
the broader context of the legal system, it is the relationship between mles and 
international relations which exercise a compliance pull, founded on notions of mutual 
interest and co-operation. Specifically, law represents the acceptance of obligation 
based on the existence o f these mutual interests. The basis for such obligation is 
found predominantly in international agreements, or treaties.
Within the general context, 'treaty' is the standard terminology covering most all 
fonns of international arrangements and contractual agi'eements, such as those found 
in conventions, pacts, declarations, charters and protocols.•35 Treaties establish mles 
which are meant to be 'binding' upon States in both new and previously established 
areas of international law, and consistent with the Viemia Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. •36 Predicated on the basis of the Convention, qualifying attributes of a treaty
•34 See discussion on the importance o f  norms, Ibid. pp. 16-17, and 23.
135 pqj. discussion see: Peter Malanczuk, ed., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh 
Revised Edition, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 36-39.
•36 The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, codified 27 Januaiy 1980, applies to treaties made after the 
date o f  it's entry into force. Treaties are defined in terms o f  the Convention in Article 2(1 )(a) as "treaty' means an 
international agreement concluded between States in written fonn and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instnjraents and whatever its particular designation.' 
Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, Chapter 7 in Ian Brownlie, Ed., Basic Documents in International 
Law. Third Edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 351. For discussion on treaties see: Robert MacLean, 
ed.. Public International Law Textbook. 16th Edition. (London: HLT Publications, 1994) Chapt. 13. See also: 
Linda A. Malone, International Law. (Larchmont, N ew  York: Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc., 1995), pp. 4-28.
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must meet certain criteria, First, it should be a written instrument between two or 
more parties, Second, those parties must be endowed with international 
personality. >39 Third, the agreement must be governed by international law,^4o and 
finally, it should be intended to create legal obligations^
Treaties governing criminal conduct incorporate the tenn aut dedere aut judicare, 
which refers to the alternative obligation to extradite or place criminal offenders 
before (your own) judicial authorities, where the state may even ultimately decide that 
there is insufficient evidence to mount a prosecution. This is created as a safety 
measure, to ensure that the process of criminal law is not undennined by those who 
use borders as a means of asylum. In essence, it requires a state to either extradite a 
fugitive who has connnitted an international offence to be tried, or to retain them for 
the puipose of trial. ^ 42 Extradition treaties seek to close the loophole by implying the 
obligation, that state's are treaty-bound to adopt either one or the other. • 43
•37 MacLean, TEXTBOOK, p. 202.
• 38 'Eveiy treaty and eveiy international agreement entered into by any Member o f  the United Nations after the 
present Charter com es into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 
No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the 
provisions o f  paragraph 1 o f  this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ o f  the United 
Nations', United Nations Charter, Chapter XVI. M iscellaneous Provisions, Article 102 (1) and (2); in Brownlie, 
DOCUMENTS, p. 31.
•39 Treaties are only concluded between recognised States, under customary international law as provided in 
Article 3 o f  the Vienna Convention, 'International agreements not within the scope o f  the present Convention', but 
does not preclude the binding force o f such agreements. Article 6 o f the Convention provides 'Every State 
possesses capacity to conclude treaties.' However, this does not preclude Federal States, or territories outside the 
scope o f  the Convention fr om treaty-making powers. See: Brownlie, DOCUMENTS, pp. 352-53; and MacLean, 
TEXTBOOK, p. 203.
•46 A s per the International Law Commission Fourth Special Rapporteur, 1962, '...the Commission was clear that 
it ought to confine the notion o f  an 'international agreement' for the puipose o f  the law o f treaties to one, the 
whole formation and execution o f  which (as well as the obligation to execute) is governed by international law.' 
MacLean, TEXTBOOK, p. 205.
•4  ^ This provision is not included in the Vienna Convention, but follows provisions set out by the Law 
Commission Report. See, Ibid. pp. 205-6.
•42 Bassiouni and Wise, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE, p. 3.
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Historically, the idea is attributed to Grotius,^44 whose contention was all states 
have a duty to extradite or punish in all aspects where a state suffers injury, for 
ordinary crimes as well as international offences. This is symbolised by the maxim 
aut dedere aut punire, to extradite or punish, which is predicated in the natural law 
belief of states natural right to exact punishment. However, states must do either one 
or the other. This duty is attributed to the belief that all states have a common interest 
in suppressing crime. The assumption of a common social and moral imperatives 
which compel states to co-operate for the common good of society, or the hypothesis 
of Civitas M aximaS^
Reprehensible offences in the eyes of the international community on a whole, 
such as crimes involving international teiTorism, represent a common concern to all 
states. A system of prosecution through an international criminal court, is not yet in 
place, but this is soon to change. The concept for an International Criminal Court is 
fast becoming a reality. The Rome conference in 1998, countries from around the 
world voted 120 to 7 to establish the first permanent standing court with power to 
prosecute war crimes, much like the recent events in Rwanda, Cambodia, and the 
former Y u g o s l a v i a .  ^46 The long term implications for such a court are many, and will 
be discussed further on in the study in Chapters Six and Eight.‘4? However, the 
prospects such a court has for terrorism could eventually lead not only to a unified
•43 It does not, however, give preference as to which one the state should consider. See; Ibid., at note 2.
•44 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac P ads. Book 11, chapter XXL
•45 Bassiouni and W ise, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE, pp. 22,28-30.
•46 John Goshko, ‘U.S. Lobbies on War Crimes Court’, The Washington Post, Februaiy 26, 1999.
•47 See Chapter 6.4.2; and Chapter 8.5.
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definition of terrorism, but toward an international forum for trying temorists; similar 
to the tribunal for the Lockerbie suspects examined in Chapter 1J48 Until this time, 
however, the burden is placed upon states to uphold the law. Failure to extradite, or 
bring offenders to justice, only frustrates the system of public world order. With 
respect to the obligation of civitas maxima, it remains an imperfect obligation. Albeit 
explicit treaty agreements which tend to override the customary tacit understandings, 
have given way toward the acceptance of aut dedere aut judicare as a generally 
accepted nonn. Still, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare must go beyond 
peremptory norms as problems of international terrorism remain of paramount 
importance to world order - or the concept o f jus cogens.
Extradition as an obligation, relies not solely on customary practice of states, but 
on 'nonnative utterances' as well. In particular, what a state says as well as what it 
d oes. • 49 Wliat states regard as law becomes equally as important as the mles which 
guide their conduct. Speech, in this case, can only clarify such p r a c t i c e s , I n  this 
way, it is possible to reconcile 'treaty law' and 'mles of international law' in tenns of 
what defines a generally accepted nonn.
5.5 Compliance
This work is predicated on the notion that the world has become increasingly 
regulated. As such, sanction based models of co-operation are largely ineffective
•48 Refer to case study in Chapter 1.1.2 
•49 Akehurst, MODERN INTRODUCTION.
•56 Such as the distinction between lex lata  and lex ferenda. 'A rule asserted to be law may not actually coincide 
with the behavior o f  states. This assertion may not even intended as a statement o f existing law. Thus, a 
provision in a multilateral treaty does not necessarily represent current state practice. In the long run, such
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methods of assessing international co-operation. If adherence to international law and 
political decision making are to be examined in terms of compliance, they must be 
done within the context of a decision making model. One that can examine levels of 
compliance among actors where obligation is assumed and adherence is 
unenforceable. Thus, the use of a managerial model, such as the one set forth by 
Abraham and Antonia C hayes,'5 i is  best suited for this use.
Co-operation within a rational choice model is largely treaty-centred, and 
provides the source of nomiative obligation within an international structure. 
Arguably, treaties are the basic components of the regime itself, and rely on 
agreements, either formal, customary or tacit, as part of their fundamental structure. 
Traditional debates have long centred on these agreements and the extent to which 
customaiy and tacit understandings have influenced legal obligation and constraint. 
Still, political arguments fall short of acknowledging that these agreements, or 
treaties, are founded on fonnal tenets of international law.
The effort to provide treaties with 'staying power', has traditionally relied on 
coercive power as a method of enforcement - or - sanctions. This method becomes 
inherently deficient in tenns of cost, since sanctions are commonly economic or 
military, and prove anaemic in their ability to provide some form of change, thereby 
cost outweighing the benefit provided. Because sanctions are largely a 'response' to 
treaty violation, they are ill-planned, unreliable, and carry high political cost. 
Furthennore, there remains the notion of legitimacy. If only the weak are compelled
statements become general international law only if  accepted as binding in practice.' Bassiouni and W ise, AUT  
DEDERE AUT JUDICARE, p. 47.
151 Fmther discussion is centered on the discussion and model asserted by Chayes & Chayes, as outlined in the 
first section A Theory o f  Compliance in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The N ew  Sovereignty,
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to comply, then the system of enforcement invariably falls toward the legitimacy 
'question'.
What becomes the necessary focus, is a model which relies on a general 'problem 
solving' approach as opposed to a sanction driven one. This is key, if  the argument 
made is 'states follow mles even when it is not in their best interest to do so'. 
Compliance then, is the measure to which states have internalised international law 
and incorporated it within their decision making process. This is exercised thiough 
the communication actors share between each other, through either normative 
utterances or judicial rhetoric, but which follow the very tenets of a constructivist 
argument.
As a mle, states only follow the laws to which they have consented to. In order 
to understand why states do not comply to these agreements, it would follow only 
logically to understand why they do. As outlined by Chayes, thiee assumptions 
follow to this directive: efficiency, interests, and nonns. • 52
The first, is an economic model, weighing the balance of 'cost' o f non- 
compliance in governmental resource tenns, with the 'benefit' of merely adhering to 
the treaty. In sum, it is cheaper to comply, than to deviate.
Treaties are a consensual agreement between parties. Presumably, actors enter 
into these agreements initially, with some degree of 'self-interest'. Before agreements 
are actually concluded there exists a negotiation period where actors are provided the 
opportunity to express their interests and define the parameters of the agi eement. This 
is not to say, that all parties are in total agreement upon entering into a treaty, but
Compliance With International RegulatoiT Agreements, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 
1-28.
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what exists is a representation of a broad spectrum of interests providing the basis for 
co-operation. Treaties are adaptable to these interests, even after they've been entered 
into force. They are not a static body of terms which appear unchanging to the 
inevitably changing system.
The assumption follows that treaties are to be obeyed, the very definition o f the 
term pacta sunt sei'vanda. However, it is just that - an assumption. It is a common 
understanding that the law is meant to be obeyed, that obligation is binding, that 
compliance is the outgrowth of this. Such behaviour is regarded as the universal 
nonn. Nomis guide behaviour, they create the basis for decision making analysis, it is 
in itself a 'reason for action'. Therefore, by observance of nonns state’s 'help define 
the methods and tenns of the continuing international discourse in which states seek 
to justify their actions.'
It is not the states, however, which decide extradition, but generally the courts 
which make the decision. It is not conect to assume, and as evidenced in discussion 
in Chapter’s O n e ,• 53 Five,^54 and Eight,•55 that courts especially in democratic 
countries, are controlled by the government. This simply is not the case. However, if  
for example an occun ence such as in the case of the Achille Lauro, which is discussed 
exclusively in Chapter 4,^ 56 the government were to bypass the courts, and render a 
decision, it would appear largely to the assessment of what the ‘trade-off for such a
•52 Ibid.. pp. 4-9.
•53 Refer to discussion o f  Extradition as a Process in Chapter 1.2.1 
•54 Refer to the Hamadei case in Chapter 5.3.
•55 Refer to the four IRA cases in the discussion o f  Political offence in Chapter 8.2.1. 
•56 See discussion under Importance o f  Cooperation in Chapter 4.4.1.
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decision would be. In the case of the Achille Laitro, it was Italy’s good relations with 
their Arab neighbours, which propelled the decision for ‘non-compliance’. However, 
there remain circumstances where such lines are not as visible and it becomes 
necessary to delineate the difference between 'non-compliance' and 'incomplete 
compliance'. Chayes examines three such instances; ambiguity, limitations on state 
capacity, and temporal d i m e n s i o n s . W h i l e  all are relevant to the issue of non- 
compliance, the most relevant of the three to this particular study, is the issue of 
ambiguity.
By design, most treaties are not specific in tenns range of dispute. The flaw is 
not in the actual design, but in terminology since it is virtually impossible to draft a 
treaty which covers all ranges of possibility within every given context of a situation. 
Specific fomiulas for this would be incalculable. Instead, there exists a range of 
interpretation within a given area where states adopt it's meaning. This is not to 
ignore the possibility that states use ambiguity to their advantage. Often working 
within the 'paiameters of ambiguity' falls to greater advantage, as opposed to 
following the 'letter of the law' which may prove to be more restrictive. But it is 
'language' nevertheless, which becomes the focus.
Is there, then a way of measuring the degree of compliance? Compliance is by 
nature unquantifiable, therefore a scientific approach is virtually impossible. 
However, there are 'acceptable limits' of compliance which are in fact determinable. 
In order for this to be achieved, it must be an ongoing process, with changing 
parameters which react to the perspectives and interests of the international system.
157 Chayes, SOVEREIGNTY, pp. 10-17.
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Compliance must be a 'sophisticated strategy'*58 which entails all aspects and ranges 
of possibility within the players which comprise a system. It must be a managerial 
model, which draws it's actors into a 'web-like' model where compliance is 
advantageous, not only then for the state, but the overall system.
3,6 Conclusions
The research design inherent in this framework argues against traditional realist 
notions of law and politics and the international system as a power model. Instead it 
defines a structure which is based on an interwoven process between two disciplines 
founded in tenets of social theory, defined by nonns, and analysed by decision making 
in the context in which it occurs. This path of reasoning is intended to lead into 
empirical investigation which will provide the means by which prescriptive action can 
take place.
What is to be gleaned from this strategy is that there is a difference between rules 
and law, and for the purpose o f this study, the distinction is made between these legal 
rules and the process by which they are employed. Law, as defined by this study, is a 
continuing process o f authoritative decisions, not the mechanistic application of rules. 
That law is a choice process, grounded in the use of norms characterized by principle, 
and executed tlirough a reasoning process. That nouns matter in this reasoning 
process, and play a significant role in shaping decisions. Norms reduce the 
complexity of choice by acting as guidance devices fo r  choice, but depend largely on 
context to do so. Such reasoning cannot be examined through traditional classical
158 ibW, pp. 22-28
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models, but a more practical one, which accounts for the change in discource o f legal 
argumentation. This is important if it is to account for normative influences on 
decision making, which is prevalent in this study.
This method is giounded in a belief system of rational choice, and employed 
through the use of a regime-based or ‘constmctivisf approach. The usefulness of this 
approach is based on the ability for the examination of nouns to be separate from the 
traditional assumptions imposed by rational choice models. Regime change, and 
regime strength, then, may be deteiinined through a change in the normative 
components toward a given issue; or, the inconsistent observation of these norms, 
which in turn weaken the regime. In sum, a rational choice model, with a level of 
variance towards mles, nonns, principles and compliance.
Extradition provides rich illustration for such a model. Extradition is a legal 
concept, realised historically through tenets of traditional legal thought. It is an 
international agieement, earned out through a process of domestic legislation, ifs 
success contingent upon state's perception of international obligation and legitimacy. 
However, 'rules' governing the extradition 'process' are not exacted thiough any one 
system, since they are executed by a situation specific decision making process. 
Compliance to extradition then, can only be measured in tenns of the states and the 
system in which it affects.
This becomes especially poignant in the case of international terrorism. The 
directive of aut dedere ant judicare inherent in treaty terminology, creates the basis of 
obligation for states to comply. As history has shown, this is not always the case. For 
extradition to become an effective detenent against terrorism, depends on it's success. 
An examination of extradition's success or failure, lies in the analysis of the decision
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making process, which under traditional models, falls under notions of self-interest, 
sovereignty, and jurisdiction. Given all these factors are in fac t a part of exti*adition's 
failure to succeed in terrorism cases, they are not the only reason, and should not 
provide the sole focal point for investigation. Other factors play a part as well; the 
challenge of political offence, the impact of the courts, and the alternative options in 
lieu of extradition, are all participating factors. In sum, what is required is an 
empirical investigation of these factors which influence the choice by which 
extradition takes place, and which will lead toward a clearer understanding of 
effectiveness of extradition as a tool against international tenorism.
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Chapter Four
The Achille Lauro: International Co-operation in Punishing Terrorists
'The events o f  the past 24 hours reinforce the determination o f  all those who share 
the privileges o f  freedom and liberty to join together in countering the scourge o f  
international terrorism....[tjhese young Americans sent a message to terrorists 
everywhere, a message, "You can run but you can't hide,
4,1 Introduction
Prior to the events of the Achille Laura., the U.S. administration had struggled in 
their response to terrorism. Previous events targeting American citizens had left a 
zealous U.S. administration committed to fighting teiTorisni, almost impotent in their 
ability to thwart attacks against their own citizens on foreign soil. The Achille Lauro 
changed this. It signified a crucial turning point for the Reagan administration, and 
appeared to strengthen U.S. resolve to fight teiTorism. It also showed exactly how far 
the U.S. was willing to go to accomplish this, even if  it meant a response which 
tugged at the constraints of international law. For the United States, Achille Lauro 
signified a needed victory against teiTorism, which had plagued the current 
administration from the very beginning.
Reagan had entered office in the midst of a hostage crisis, wliich followed on the 
heels of the previous Carter administration's failed attempt at a hostage-rescue, 
embaiTassing an ill-prepared U.S. military.^ When Reagan took office, fighting 
terrorism was a priority for his administration. Yet, fiom the early part of his term in 
office, nearly a half dozen terrorist attacks occurred on U.S. citizens. By the time
 ^ Transcript o f  White House News Conference on the Hijacking, New York Times, October 12, 1985.
 ^ Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), pp. 79-81.
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Reagan left office at the end of his tenure in 1989, he left behind a less than 
spectacular record in dealing with terrorism. Over 550 Americans had been killed in 
terrorist attacks, fifty-seven Americans had been held hostage in Beirut, six were still 
there when he left office, and an embarrassing 'arms for hostages' deal with Iran had 
damaged our international credibility.^ Still, the impression was that Reagan had a 
'good reputation' in fighting teiTorism.^ This was largely due to the forceful, and 
sometimes cavalier attitude Reagan took in his approach. This was especially evident 
in the Achille Lauro.
The tmth is, the Achille Lauro was not a real victory. The mastennind of the 
operation was never apprehended or punished. The U.S. never got their 'day in court'. 
And, in the meantime the U.S. had managed to infuriate and embanass two very 
valuable allies.5 Regardless of the dramatic military attempt to apprehend the 
teiTorists; irrespective of the patriotic rhetoric which followed it; and despite all 
attempts to appear victorious; the case winds down to an extradition request and 
compliance to international law. It was dependent on co-operation which was 
intemipted by a clash of priorities on behalf of the players involved.
The Achille Lauro is significant because it demonstrates three things. First, from 
the tangle of events, it does provide some insight as to how states choose between 
alternatives, and the justification they present for their actions. From this decision 
making process, two things become aparant: the prospects for international co­
operation, and the level of compliance to international law.
3 ibid. p. 224.
 ^International Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, pp. 611
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Second, from the Achille Lauro arise some very important questions about states 
policy, especially in dealing with terrorism. How states respond and how that 
reconciles with international law, are very much a part of the personality of the state. 
This is an area which will be re-addressed in other cases tlu'oughout the study as well, 
but which builds on the events of the Achille Lauro.
Finally, the Achille Lauro makes a rather bold statement on the prevention and 
punislnnent of teiTorists. This is one instance when actions lived up to rhetoric, and 
while not an entirely successful outcome, it still provides a strong, and somewhat 
controversial, alternative in preventing and punishing terrorism. This is another area 
which will be explored throughout the study as well, but is very prominent in this 
particular case.
While it is well established that this is a study on extradition, and ifs 
effectiveness in dealing with international teiTorism, that is not the only area which is 
explored here. The difficult thing about the Achille Lauro, is that it’s not just a pure 
extradition case. Many components overlap creating a web of events which affect 
decision making, and ultimately affect compliance. The purpose of using this 
particular case study is to demonstrate the possibilities for international co-operation 
toward the capture and punishment of international terrorists. Extradition is an 
integral part of this. What makes the Achille Lauro interesting is how the sequence of 
events affects the prospects for co-operation, and the limits of unilateral action when 
dealing with international teiTorist.
5 James Buxton and Tony Walker, 'Achille Lauro affair sours relations for three nations', The Times, October 14, 
1985.
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The first part of this chapter will discuss the prospects for international co­
operation with regard to terrorism on a broad scale, and how international law has 
responded to meet this challenge. This also includes a discussion on jurisdiction, a 
relevant, and applicable aspect of international co-operation. The puipose is to 
provide a suitable backdrop by which to apply the case study.
The second part will examine the Achille Lauro case - the problems it presents to 
the punishment of teiTorists, how this hinders international law, and the measures 
states are willing to take to protect their own citizens. Also, it provides some insight 
to the political workings behind states decision making and how this in turn effects 
international co-operation.
The third part, provides an in-depth analysis to the legal mechanisms which were 
already in place to respond to exactly this type of incident. These legal mechanisms 
are meant to be the instmments by which international co-operation takes place. 
When they are 'mis-interpreted', or worse, ignored - then it undermines their capacity 
to help to bring terrorists to justice.
This chapter seeks not only to provide an integiated discussion by which 
compliance to international law is tested, but to establish certain principles which lay 
much of the groundwork for the following chapters. For the Achille Lauro not only 
provides a new plateau for state's response - but leaves a clear indicator in the 
evolution of the extradition regime.
4.2 Prospects for International Co-Operation
While the international community appears to acknowledge the importance of co­
operation against teiTorist offences, sensitivity toward the political implications on the
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issue of terrorism, have a tendency to provide for just the opposite.^ Yet without the 
prospect of international co-operation, there would be very little to talk about in tenns 
of how the problem of terrorism is to be addressed internationally, regardless of 
whether rhetoric falls short of practical expectations.
The history of international co-operation, against terrorism through multilateral 
agi eements begins with the 1937 League of Nations agi'eement on the Convention for 
the Suppression of Tenorism, calling for the establishment of a world criminal court. 
Despite early international efforts brought to bear on the problem of terrorism, the 
issue was not addressed as a part of an agenda until 1972, after the Black September 
organisation launched an attack on Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich, 
when the issue of tenorism was brought to the world stage. However, subsequent 
efforts to address the problem on an international level, were fruitless in their attempts 
to produce a working definition of terrorism.^ The issue was, and still is to some 
extent, whether or not acts of terrorism can be considered as separate from its causes. 
Since in many cases the professed motivation for political violence, or terrorism, is 
political oppression, then it is probably illogical to think of terrorism and its causes as 
two separate issues. However, as the tlu'eat of ten'orism increased and became more 
prevalent, pressure mounted to deal with terrorism as a crime and not as part o f an 
ambiguous problem.
The international community’s response was mounted in the form of counter 
terrorist conventions establishing a hamework for international co-operation among
 ^Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and Interrrational Co-oper'atiorr, a paper prepared for the Institute for East-West 
Security Studies, pp. 21-22.
7 The Americans took initiative with the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment o f  Certain Acts o f  
International Terrorism, and was rejected by the international community.
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States. These conventions don't prohibit 'terrorism' per se, but specific acts which are 
collectively deemed by the international community as criminal offences. Acts 
against civil aviation^ or internationally protected persons^, or against hostage 
taking, manage to delineate the specific criminal act from terrorism on whole. ^  
These agreements require states to extradite alleged offenders, or submit their cases to 
appropriate authorities for prosecution. Their intent is to promote greater co-operation 
through the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of teiTorists, but more often 
than not, fall short in their implementation. Part of the difficulty, is in trying to get a 
significant number of actors to agree on a specific point of issue. As Martha 
Crenshaw notes; "[gjiven the universal scope of the U.N. treaties, as well as the 
controversaility of terrorism, it is not surprising that international treaties are often 
ineffective because of undersubscription and reluctant implementation." '  ^ John F. 
Murphy supports this notion when he acknowledged in his 1986 law review 
publication noting: "[t]he effectiveness of these global conventions as anti terrorist 
measures is questionable. Even if  fully implemented, the limited and piecemeal
 ^The Convention for the Suppression o f  Unlawful Acts Against the Safety o f Civil Aviation, September 23, 1971, 
974 U.N.T.S. 177, International Legal Materials 1151. (The Montieal Convention)
 ^Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, December 14, 1973. 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 13 International Legal Materials 41 (1974). (The 
N ew  York Convention)
International Convention Against the Taking o f  Hostages, December 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 46), at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), International Legal Materials 1456 (1979). (The 
Hostages Convention)
 ^  ^ Thomas M. Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy Am ong Nations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 
69-71.
Crenshaw, CO-OPERATION, p. 24.
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solutions of these conventions would be of little use in combating the many 
manifestations of terrorism."
One of the causes for this may be that United Nations conventions against 
terrorism have largely presented themselves as an ad hoc by-product of crisis - not as 
a pre-empetory measure. As a result, it leaves reasonable doubt as to the strength of 
the international community’s resolve against terrorism. Especially when political 
will and national sovereignty, in many cases, undermine their promissory obligation 
when these measures are relied upon. Traditionally, and historically, international co­
operation through legal means has proven to be 'perverse' in it's inability to agree, and 
exhibits more of a lack o f consensus rather than forwai*d progress toward tighter unity 
against t e r r o r i s m . As Professor Paul Wilkinson pointedly notes: "[t]he United
Nations has proved a broken reed on the whole subject of tenorism. It has proved as 
useless in countering terrorism as the League of Nations before it." ^ 5
The outgrowth of the gieater 'institutional' inadequacies, was the creation of 
smaller, separate, models on a regional basis. The Organisation of American States, 
for example, reacted by establishing an act protecting diplomatic p erso n s. <^5 The
John F. Murphy, The Future o f  M ultilateralism and Efforts to Combat International Terrorism, Columbia 
Journal o f  Transnational Law, vol. 35, 1986, p. 44.
Judge Abraham Soafer, Terrorism and the Law, Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, (1986), pp. 901-922.
5^ Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State. (London: MacMillian, 1979), p. 284. W hile historically this 
is valid, since the I990’s there has been a significant change in UN response to terrorism, such as for example, 
through the use o f  UN peacekeeping m issions and humanitarian intei-vention. See: Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism 
Versus Democracy, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pg. 89.
The 1971 Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts o f  Terrorism Taking the Form o f  Crimes Against Persons 
and Related Extortion That are o f  International Significance. This was superseded by the 1973 United Nations 
Convention on Protected Persons.
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Council of Europe and the European communities established several regional 
agreements in an attempt to suppress terrorism and restrict the use of political offence, 
but this effort was largely unsatisfactory since states were slow to ratify these 
measures, and have a poor record in enforcing them.
As a result, networks of less fomial co-operation have been the method that states 
ultimately resort to. Diplomatic co-ordination, or diplomatic exchanges for example, 
at summits or various high-level meetings. While meetings or summits are not 
binding under international law, and neither are the statements which result from 
them, they provide an unstmctured forum by which to exchange views among state 
leaders, thereby creating meaningful co-operation. This method has trickled down to 
the lower levels as well. Networks of infoimal government operate on a more local 
level; Europe's "Trevi" system for example, links various Ministries of Justice and 
includes measures which pools information thereby improving communication 
amongst European police forces. The General Assembly of the International Criminal 
Police Organisation, or Interpol, is another example of linkage among police forces. 
Recently, all 178 members have committed themselves to more sharing of 
information specifically relating to teiTorism.^®
Bilateral co-operation also provides a strong alternative when dealing with 
terrorism. Through the use of treaties in areas such as extiadition and mutual 
assistance, or even through ad hoc bilateral assistance, states can extract a significant 
amount of co-operation. Treaties have been particularly helpful in the area of aviation
'7 The 1997 European Convention on the Suppression o f  Terrorism and the Dublin Agreement which applies the 
convention to all member states o f  Western Europe.
See: Inteipol W ebsite at: http://members.tripod.com/icpo-vad/icpo-inf.html
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security, for example, such as in the early 1970’s when aircraft hijacking from the 
United States to Cuba was especially abundantd^ The US and Cuba signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding, which would allow for the return o f the hijacked 
aircraft and the extradition or prosecution of the hijackers. This was an exceptional, 
considering the vast political differences between the two countries, but provided a 
clear example of how a distinctive action can be mutually objectionable, even to states 
with opposing ideologies. While it is significantly easier to address problems such as 
co-operation with terrorism through bilateral avenues, and even less strenuous when 
dealing with like-minded states who share similar attitudes toward teiTorism. It still 
remains a profound achievement within the international community to bring to the 
table those countries who don't think alike, or whose attitudes differ regarding 
terrorism, especially when such countries could potentially provide aid to teiTorist 
organisations, or provide sanctuary for a terrorist. It becomes an even more poignant 
mark of achievement when these states can be convinced to join in such collective 
measures.
The bottom line is that co-operation is necessary, not only to create a unified 
interest, but to agree on basic standards of behaviour that states expect from each 
other. This is especially true in cases of international terrorism. International law on 
its own cannot and does not create international order, but the execution of it does. 
This should not be interpreted as international co-operation being dependent on the 
institutional constraints law presents either, but it does depend largely to some degree 
on the behavioural norms these constraints facilitate. Having said that, co-operation
Robert Holden, The Contagiousness o f  Aircraft Hijacking, Indiana University, 
http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~surette/hijacking.html
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also means that to some degi'ee situations will arise where states must be willing to 
alter their stance for the benefit of other states. This is usually easier said than done. 
There must be incentive. There must be pre-determined guidelines for co-operation, 
and there must be no doubt that the penalty for non-co-operation will be considerably 
outweigh the costs of co-operation. In short, there must exist a good reason to want to 
play ball. While terrorism may seem as good a reason as any, there are several 
recurrent difficulties: first, the limitations the degree to which a state is willing to co­
operate. And second, how far requesting states attempt to pursue broad claims of 
power, or jurisdiction. As will be discussed, these were both factors which severely 
hindered the successful outcome of the Achille Lauro case.
4,3 Jurisdiction
'Jurisdiction cannot be about sovereignty fo r  its own sake; and nor is international
law value-free.
Most friendly nations are usually willing to co-operate by providing evidence or 
extraditing suspects providing the applicable statutes are in place; and, if  the extra­
territorial jurisdiction of a requesting state does not reach beyond the limitations 
imposed by international law. This in and of itself, however, is often a matter of great 
controversy. Recall for example, the case identified in Chapter 1 regarding the 
capture of Fawaz Yunis by U.S. Agents from a luxury yacht in international waters,2* 
and which will be addressed again in this chapter. Often U.S. efforts to exert
20 Roslyn Higgins, The Legal Basis o f  Jurisdiction, in Cecil J. Olmstead, ed., Extra-TeiTitorial Application o f  
Laws and Responses Thereto. (Exeter: Short Run Press, 1984), p. 14, hereinafter BASIS
21 See: Chapter 1.2.3 Alternative Methods o f  Rendition other than Extradition, on p. 20.
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extratenitorial jurisdiction have often confronted deep resentment and hostility fr om 
requested states. This will be examined further on in case studies in Chapters 7 and 8.
Nevertheless, customary international law provides several basis of jurisdiction 
on which states can apply their laws: territorial jurisdiction, nationality jurisdiction, 
protective jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction .22 
The concept of jurisdiction remains one of critical importance in international law, 
since it perfomis the function of 'allocating competence'. Or, as Justice Rosalyn 
Higgins recognises: '[t]here is no more important way to avoid conflict than by 
providing clear norms as to which state can exercise authority over whom, and in 
what circumstances. Without that allocation of competences, all is rancour and
chaos.'23
4.3.1 Universal Principle
Under universal jurisdiction, international law allows for the exercise of 
jurisdiction as it applies to certain types of offences within the international 
community. This means that, a state is permitted to apply its laws even if the act 
occurs outside its own territory, even if the offender is a non-national, and regardless 
o f whether nationals were harmed by the criminal act.24 While very few cases can 
actually be argued on this principle - meant to be applied only to those cases which 
present themselves as an attack upon international order - it exercises jurisdiction bom
22 See also: Patrick L. Donnelly, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts o f  Terrorism Committed Abroad: 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti tenorism Act o f  1986, 72 Cornell Law Review, March, 1987.
22 Roslyn Higgins, Problems and Process International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), p. 56.
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from universal treaties or acceptance under general international law.25 Piracy, 
slavery, torture, genocide, war crimes, are all examples of how or when universal 
jurisdiction might apply. The International Military Tribunal at Nureniburg, or the 
United Nations Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes in the Fonner Yugoslavia, are 
both cases where jurisdiction was seized as a result of violations of conventional laws 
relating to hostilities. Terrorism, however, would not necessarily be considered as 
'universal'. It is clear that the Montreal,26 Tokyo,^? Hague,28 and Hostage 
Conventions29 all lay the groundwork for jurisdiction by incorporating the principle 
aut dedere aut judicare establishing jurisdiction by every single signatory nation over 
both the offence and the offender. But jurisdiction is not 'universal' in the strictest 
sense, since these Conventions only cover specific crimes. As Rosalyn Higgins 
argues; "[a]ll that is 'universal' is the requirement that all states parties do whatever is 
necessary to be able to exercise jurisdiction should the relatively limited bases of 
jurisdiction arise in the circumstances... this is not treaty-based universal 
jurisdiction.''^^
2"^  The Draft Convention on Research in International Law o f  the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction with Respect 
to Crime, 29 American Journal o f  International Law, Supp. 1935, p. 573 , Herinafter, HARVARD RESEARCH. 
Ibid. pp. 56-57.
25 IW . p. 58.
25 Ibid, note 8.
27 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), September 
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
28 Convention for the Suppression o f  Unlawful Seizure o f  Aircraft (Hague Convention), December 16, 1970, 22 
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
2^ Ibid note 10.
20 Higgips, LAWS AND RESPONSES, p. 64.
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The classic example of universal jurisdiction is the Aldoph Eichmann case 
discussed earlier in Chapter 1. The Israeli Mossad abducted Eichmann from 
Argentina and brought him to Israel for triapi under a 1950 Israeli statue enacted to 
punish "crimes against the Jewish people" and "crimes against h u m a n i t y " 2 2  committed 
during World War II, part of Hitler’s 'final solution' campaign. Even though Israel as 
a state was not yet in existence. There was much protest as to the method by which 
Eichmann was brought to Israel for trial, but no objections were raised as to the right 
to do so. There existed a clear understanding under international law, of the universal 
jurisdiction to try and punish crimes against humanity.
4.3.2 Territorial Principle
One of the attributes of sovereignty is that states can prescribe the laws which 
apply to persons within their own territory.22 As one of the most basic principles of 
international law, this is relatively unchallenged. It remains the key starting point for 
criminal legislation. Arguably the very direction for penal law is 'towards the safety 
and social equilibrium of those who agree to place themselves and remain under the 
protection of a given sovereign.
21 U.N. Doc. 8 /4336(1960)
22 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave Law and Foreign Policy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 
p. 270 and at note 5.
22 HARVARD RESEARCH, p. 480. BASIS, p.5; Kegel and Seidl-Hohenveldern, On the Territoriality Principle  
in Public International Law, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 5, no. 245, Petei' 
Malanczuk, ed., Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised Edition, (London: 
Routledge Press), pp. 110-116, hereinafter LAW.
2'^  Bart DeSchutter, Problem s o f  Jurisdiction in the International Control and Repression o f  Terrorism, in M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism and Political Crimes, (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Press, 1975), 
pp. 381.
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When a crime is committed, states may claim jurisdiction over the offence within 
its territoiy, even if the offender is a non-national. This extension of jurisdiction over 
non-nationals, suggests a deviation in the exclusive nature of teiiitorial jurisdiction. It 
has been previously argued elsewhere,25 that nations have always possessed sole 
jurisdiction within their own territory. The exception being that nations also possess 
the right to bind their own nationals when they are in another states, or the 'nationality 
principle'.25 Extension of such jurisdiction suggests a component which lacks 
territorial character, this is not necessarily the case. States may only prescribe law 
within their own territory and cannot hold accountable those who reside outside its 
borders. The ability to impose laws to those living outside is unlikely, as is the ability 
to enforce.27 Territoriality, therefore, retains its character.28
43.3 Passive Personality
The passive personality principle peiinits a countiy to exercise jurisdiction over 
an act committed by an individual outside its temtoiy, because the offence haiiiied a 
national of the state claiming jurisdiction.29 It is based on the duty o f a state to protect 
its nationals abroad.^» Under the passive personality principle, the state asserting
25 See; Francis Mann, The Doctrine o f  Jurisdiction in International Law, Recueil des cours, (1964), p. 93
25 Under the nationality principle, '[a] state may prosecute its nationals for crimes committed anywhere in the 
world.'; Akehurst, LAW, p. 111.
27 Higgins, BASIS, pp. 7-8.
28 Ibid.
29 HARVARD RESEARCH, pp. 573-77.
See; The Lotus Case, Lord Finlay's dissenting opinion:
"The passing o f  such laws to affect aliens is defended on the ground that they are necessary for the 'protection' o f  
the national. Eveiy country has the right and the duty to protect its nationals when out o f  their own country. If
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jurisdiction is more concerned with the effect o f the crime, than where it occurs/' 
Subsequently, this makes it the most controversial as to whether or not it asserts a 
valid basis of jurisdiction under international law.
The precedent setting case for this principle is TheZomg^^ Case, when in August 
of 1926, the Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt and French vessel Lotus collided on the high 
seas42. This resulted in the sinking of the Turkish vessel, and loss of life for eight 
members of the Turkish crew.^^ When the Lotus sailed into port in Constantinople, 
the captain was arrested, charged, and convicted of manslaughter.^^ France protested 
the Turkish assertion of jurisdiction to the Pennanent Court o f International Justice, 5^ 
which found in favour of Turkey.''^ The collision and ifs subsequent effect on the 
Turkish vessel, was likened to an effect on Turkish territory.''^
Two caveats to this. First, ships, like embassies, are not national territory. By 
'likening' the collision to national territory, tends to blur jurisdictional intentions. 
Second, the event occurred on the high seas - not within the territory of another.
crimes are committed against them when abroad, it may insist on the offender being brought to justice." The 
Lotus Case P.C.I.J. Series A. no. 10 (1927)
This principle is also known as the 'effects doctrine'. For case precedent see: United States v. Aluminium  
Company o f  America (2nd Cir. 1945). The second circuit court held that "any state may impose liabilities, even 
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders 
which the state reprehends." See also: Christopher Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against 
Terrorism, 19 Connecticut Law Review 895-926, 1987.
42 PCIJ, series A, no. 10 (1927)
42 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 This occurred on September 15, 1926. Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Actually, out o f  the 12 judges, six found in favour o f  Turkey, and six found in favour o f France. It was the 
President o f  the Court who cast the tie breaking vote (pursuant to rules o f  a tied vote in the ICJ). Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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Therefore, while Lotus is considered the benchmark case for passive personality - it is 
not a true test for passive personality/9
Where this was relied upon again in recent application, was against the backdrop 
of a tenorism case, which is different from an ordinary 'torts' case or 'criminal' case/o 
In United States v. Yunis, w h i c h  was the case mentioned in Chapter 1 and earlier in 
this section, involving the U.S. prosecution of a Lebanese national for his involvement 
in the hijacking of a Jordanian airliner in the Middle East in June, 1985/2 the U.S. 
based it's jurisdiction on the passive personality principle, the only connection being 
the presence of U.S. nationals aboard the flight.53 This was accepted by the courts on 
the basis of the passive personality jurisdiction under international law,54 but it is 
again important to note that other states did not accept the legality of the means by 
which the U.S. exercised its extratenitorial jurisdiction in this case.
In a similar case, although never a jurisdictional issue before the courts, but 
which clearly relied upon the passive personality principle, was the U.S. based claim 
for an extradition request in the Achille Lauro hijacking - where a U.S. national was 
murdered during a hijacking of the Italian cmise liner off the Egyptian coast.^s The
49 Higgins, PROCESS, p. 66
5  ^ See: Restatement (Third) o f the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §402, comment g, which states: 
"[t]he principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as 
applied to teiTorist and other organised attacks on a state's national by reason o f  their nationality, or to 
assassination o f  a state's diplomatic representatives or other officials."
5' 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. November 30, 1989).
52 Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 899.
52 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 See; Briefing by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane on the Apprehension o f  the Achille Lauro 
Hijackers, October 11, 1985.
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U.S. argued that based on the passive personality principle, they maintain the right to 
extradite the offenders to the United States to stand trial.56 Although Italy refused the 
extradition request, it is clear that U.S. actions are illustrative of U.S. acceptance of 
the passive personality principle.^? This is a significant point as it became part of how 
the U.S. policy would respond to tenorism.
4,4 The Achille Lauro Case
When terrorists use foreign territory to target American citizens, response options
are severely limited. The United States has no authority to make arrests or conduct
investigations; as such behaviour is prohibited under international law. Yet there
arguably exists no gi*eater motivation, to any U.S. administration, than to capture and
punish those who have committed tenorist offences against U.S. citizens, and who
continue to elude justice. As Philip Heymann acknowledges:
"The trial o f  a terrorist must bring four things together in one place: an applicable 
statutory prohibition, a willingness to prosecute, the necessaty evidence, and the 
suspect. Terrorists can use the advantages o f  borders and easy transportation to 
assure that neither they (who may have fled  to a safe location) nor the evidence 
(which may be outside the United States) are within the United States, the only 
jurisdiction with great enthusiasm fo r  undertaking the rislzs o f  prosecuting acts by 
terrorists against American citizens.
56 Ibid.
57 The A chille Lauro affair was also referenced in U.S. v. Yunis , with regard to the passive personality principle.
681 F. Supp. 896, 900-03 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. November 30, 1989).
Following the A chille Lauro affair, the International Maritime Organisation adopted the Convention for the 
Suppression o f  Unlawful Acts against the Safety o f  Maritime Navigation, March 10, 1988. This convention 
allows jurisdiction over unlawful acts at sea, based on the floating ten'itoiy, territoriality, nationality, protective, 
and passive personality theories. See also: John G. McCarthy, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use In 
Combating International Terrorism, 13 Fordham International Law Journal, ( 1990), pp. 298-327, and at note 81. |
58 Philip B. Heyman, Terrorism and America A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society, (Cambridge, j
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), p. 47. Herinafter, COMMONSENSE. j
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The Achille Lauro demonstrates the many problems terrorism poses when 
teiTorist organisations use foreign tenitory for its operations, and how this hinders law 
enforcement. It introduces as well, the problems of prevention and the measures 
states, in this case, the United States, are willing to take to protect their citizens 
abroad. Also, it magnifies the difficulty in the arrest, trial, and punishment of those 
who commit these acts, which largely depends on international co-operation. When 
this hand is forced, and measures are implemented through the use of force or through 
military measures, which are expressly prohibited by international law, such actions 
have consequences. And such consequences will affect the international community 
on balance, and possible future prospects for co-operation. While this was certainly 
the case in the Achille Lauro, this is also a larger topic which will be the focus of 
study later on in the work.
Finally, the Achille Lauro highlights what is often overlooked - the challenge 
terrorism and law enforcement present to intelligence. The opportunities for 
intelligence gathering and the rules which govern them, become severely limited 
when the infomiation sought lies abroad. Success for the capture and punishment of 
terrorists often depend on international co-operation with respect to intelligence - 
equally if  not gi eater than co-operation in the realm of international law.
On October 7, 1985, a radio station in Gottenberg, Sweden picked up an 
emergency transmission fi'om the captain of the Italian cruise liner, the Achille Lauro, 
claiming the ship carrying some 400 passengers, had been hijacked off the coast of 
Egypt.59 The hijackers, who identified themselves as members of the Palestinian
59 For detailed reporting on the incident see: John Walcott, Rod Nordland, Theodore Stanger, Milan J. Kubic, 
Andrews Nagorski, John Barry and Susan Agrest, Special Report: ‘Getting Even’, Newsweek, October 21, 1985, 
pp. 20-32.
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Liberation Front (F L F )/o  demanded the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners held by 
Israel/* Otherwise, they would execute the passengers starting with the A m e r i c a n s / 2
This was not the first incident of its kind to the Reagan administration. A few 
months earlier, Palestinian terrorists hijacked TWA flight 847 in Greece and held 
passengers hostage in Beirut. During the incident, an American Navy diver was 
murdered, and the hijackers managed to escape.
Following the 1985 TWA 847 incident, the Reagan administration established a 
task force to study U.S. response to terrorism.62 The task force, spearheaded by then 
Vice President George Bush, incoiporated representatives from the FBI, CIA, State, 
Defense, and Transportation departments, was designed to 'expose and correct' 
weaknesses inherent in existing response measures, and hasten to realise the 
administrations 'swift and effective retribution' policy.^"* Part of the task force 
directive outlined a framework to deal specifically with terrorist threat, and which
69 The PLF is a splinter faction o f  the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, and was one o f the nine organisations 
which comprised the Palestinian resistance.
6* One o f  the prisoners included here was Samir Al-Qunaytiri, one o f four Palestinians who carried out a raid on 
Nahariyyah, a town on the northern coast o f  Israel in April 1979. Al-Qunaytiri captured and murdered Dani Haan 
and his 5 year old daughter while his w ife and newborn daughter - whom was accidentally suffocated by covering 
her mouth to quite her crying - hid in a back room. Two o f  the four Palestinians were shot and killed by Israeli 
soldiers, the other two were imprisoned. One was released in a previous prisoner exchange carried out between 
Israel and the Palestinians - the remaining prisoner, was Al-Qunaytiri, "the butcher o f  Nahariyyah". See; 
‘Hijackers Demands Outlined’, FIBIS, October 8, 1985. See Also: Christopher Dickey, ‘Italian Cruise Ship 
Seized o ff  Egypt With 450 Aboard, Release o f 50 Palestinians Asked; 28 Americans Cited As Passengers’ The 
Washington Post, October 8, 1985
62 ‘Hijackers Threaten To Kill Passengers’ translated from the Beirut Dom estic Service, FBIS, 8 October 1985.
62 The Task force was an offshoot o f  the Tenorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) - a government committee 
formed in 1983 - which was consequently unsuccessful. See: Oliver L. North, Under Fire. An American 
Stoi'vTN ew  York: Harper Collins Publishers), 1991, p. 197. All citations hereinafter which make reference to this 
work were confirmed by telephone interview with Col. North, October 14, 1997.
64 Marc A. Celmer, Tenorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies. (Washington D.C.: Mansell Publishing 
Limited), 1987, p. 25. See also: Edward A. Lynch, International Te/'/o/'A/n.' The Search for a P olicy, Terrorism: 
An International Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, 1987.
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provided a mandate to co-ordinate government response - 'pre-emptively if  possible, 
reactivity if  necessaiy'/^ This did not discount the use of military force/6
The U.S. Interagency crisis team was the Operational Sub-Group (CSG) under 
the National Security Council (NSC) and was headed by the deputy director of the 
NSC staff, Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter. The CSG would then make 
recommendations through the national security advisor, Robert McFarlane, to 
President Reagan. Under them, the Department of Defense Joint Special Operations 
Command had a specially trained, highly developed hostage rescue team - this was the 
division at the ready when the news of the Achille Lauro broke - and it was this 
hostage rescue team, along with a Navy SEAL team which were flown to Sicily under 
the command of General Carl Stiner, when the incident concluded.
These teams were created with one goal in mind - that the U.S. was not going to 
appear weak in dealing with terrorists. Previous incidents, the Iranian hostage crisis,67 
the Marine baiTacks bombing,68 the Berlin Discotheque,69 TWA 847,79 were not just 
attacks on American citizens, but on American political pride as well. There was a 
strong amount of detennination bom from this, and US policy became 'non- 
negotiable' when having to confront incidents of teiTorism against Americans, even if
65 North, UNDER FIRE.
66 Ibid. i
67 November 4, 1979 when guerrillas seized the U.S. embassy in Theran and held its inhabitants hostage for 444 j
days. j
1
68 October 23, 1983 when a truck filled with explosives crashed the gate o f  the Marine barracks in Lebanon !
killing 241 U.S. Marines. j
i
69 La Belle Discoteque bombed in 1986 killing U.S. 2 soldiers and injuring several off-duty GI’s. See: Terrorism |
Research Center, http://www.trc.com j
!
29 June 14, 1985 hijacking o f  TW A flight 847 and the murder o f Navy diver Robert Stetham. iI
it entailed a militaiy option. Which was the strongly favoured choice by the United 
States in the case of the Achille Lauro.
The Italian government, under Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, had reacted to the 
incident by organising itself as well, though with different priorities. The Italians, 
whose foreign policy entails close ties with both the Ai’ab states and the PLO, were 
more heavily intent on negotiation. Italy’s motivation was simple - solve the crisis 
and protect its citizens aboard the Achille Lauro, without instigating future retaliatory 
attacks against Italy or its citizens.
Unlike the US administration, Italy had no hard and fast plans for an attack of 
this type - in fact, the hijacking had caught them entirely by surprise. The Craxi 
government was relatively unprepared in tenns of 'doctrine' on how to handle an 
international event sparked by a terrorist incident. There was reason for this, Italy had 
never really been threatened or heen made a 'target' by Arab states.
The Italian strategy was two-fold. First was to maintain open and constant 
contact with all the parties involved to insure that there were no missed opportunities. 
Second, was to prevent the Americans from using force tlmough the use of diplomatic 
and legal argument. The liner was of Italian registry, and technically under the 
jurisdiction of Italy, which was fine as long as the situation was contained on the liner. 
But as we will see, this did not remain the case, and once the hijackers were 
disembarked, they became 'fair game' to U.S. intentions. The Italians had also 
prepared for a military option; this was not as an offensive measure, but as a defensive 
last resort. The underlying aim here was to maintain an integral part of Italy’s 
Mediterranean policy, which was to avoid damaging their good relations with the 
Arab nations and the PLO.
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Meanwhile, the first intelligence blunder had transpired. By Italian estimation, 
only a small fraction of the passengers were actually aboard the ship. The remainder 
had disembarked for a tour of the pyramids in Egypt. This was true. However, as the 
ship sailed in international waters from Egypt, its radio had been turned off, and U.S. 
and allied intelligence had lost the ship in the MediteiTanean. None of the American, 
British, or Italian allied reconnaissance aircraft could locate the ship, which created a 
huge intelligence vacuum. It wasn't until the Israelis, who had been monitoring the 
ships whereabouts, contacted the U.S. through diplomatic channels, that the U.S. 
authorities were able to relocate the vessel.
What was common to both the Italians and the Americans, irrespective of 
national priorities, was the question of who was actually responsible for the 
hijacking.'^i Again, this is where good intelligence can become extremely helpful. 
The Americans had two theories: first was that of the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR) in the U.S. State Department. Although the hijackers had identified 
themselves as PLF members,^^ this particular faction of the PLO had split into three 
splinter factions, only one of which was loyal to Arafat. The other two were 
extremely hostile to Arafat and his budding relations with the U.S., and were in turn 
supported by Syria and Libya respectively. The State Department’s belief was that 
the hijacking was an accident. Their theory was that Achille Lauro was not intended 
to be the target, but was seen as a means of transportation to get to the intended target 
in Israel, and cany out an attack, not specifically to target Americans.
David B. Ottaway and George C. W ilson, ‘U.S. Reacts With Caution, Appropriate Action Is Discussed Among 
Governemtns Involved’, Washington Post, October 9, 1985.
Associated Press, ‘Eccentric Force Claims Hijacking’, Washington Post, October 9, 1985.
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Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) rebuffed this theory, believing that PLO ties to Italy and Egypt were 
too important to the PLO for an 'Arafat-ffiendly' faction to cany-out such attacks. 
That this had to be a faction which acted with the support of Libya or Syria. Getting 
this right was extremely important. If this was in fact an 'Arafat-friendly' faction, then 
there was an increased possibility that negotiations would be successful, if  not, then 
there was little chance for their success. This would further detemiine how the U.S. 
would proceed.
Ultimately, the INR was correct. The hijackers were in fact discovered by a crew 
member quite accidentally, while they were cleaning their weapons. Once discovered, 
they had little choice but to react, and did so by taking the liner, and its passengers 
hostage. Their original mission was to disembark at the Israeli port of Ashdod, and 
cany out an attack in Israel.^^ This was detemiined by intelligence sources, mainly 
Israeli again, who intercepted communications which strongly indicated that this was 
a PLF faction headed by Abul Abbas, who carried strong loyalty to Arafat.^"^
The hijacking lasted two days, the liner cruising back and forth between Egypt 
and Syria, and during which time a disabled, wheelchair bound American passenger, 
Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered and thrown overboard.^^ This was unknown at first. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain Israeli concessions for a prisoner- 
hostage exchange, the hijackers settled for an agreement for safe conduct - a guarantee
W illiam Claiborne, ‘Israeli Port Called Goal o f  Gunmen’, Washington Post, October 9, 1985.
Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Israelis Say Tape Ties Top P.L.O. Aide to Ship Hijackers’, Mew York Times, October 
17, 1985; William Claiborne, ‘Israeli Text Quotes Order by Abbas, Jerusalem Says Talk With Hijackers Proves 
Control by PLO Leader’, Washington Post, October 17, 1985.
Christopher Dickey, ‘Pirated Ship Still at Sea; U.S. Deaths Unconfirmed’, Washington Post, October 9, 1985.
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for safety, negotiated by Egypt, and agieed upon by Italy, Great Britain, and 
Geiinany. The agreement for safe conduct concluded thiee points: it allowed free and 
safe passage to the hijackers, it prevented subsequent extradition or punishment, and it 
granted their custody to the PLO. This was an agreement the U.S. resisted, and that 
Italy consented to before knowing that the teiTorists had murdered an American 
passenger.
This was a politically expedient option, especially for Egyptian President 
Mubarak, who was already under fire from intense public outrage^^ over the 
preceeding months over an Israeli raid in Tunis which claimed the lives of several 
Egyptian c i t i z e n s . E g y p t  held diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as with the 
U.S., the only Arab country to do so. It was the second largest recipient of U.S. aid, 
and home to one of the largest CIA foreign offices.^^ For Mubarak to side with the 
Palestinians on this occasion would potentially save him from the admonitions o f his 
Arab neighbours, as well as Egyptian citizens of once again appearing as a U.S. 
'pawn'.
Once the hijackers suixendered to Egyptian officials, it was confirmed that an 
American citizen had been murdered,^^ but this was only after they were safely in 
Egyptian custody. What was intended to be a diplomatic triumph for Italy, was 
instead, a forum for bitter counter-attack from the United States following the public 
release of Klinghoffer's death. With this new piece of information, U.S. demands for
Christopher Dickey, ‘Surprising' U.S. Action Angers Egypt', Washington Post, October 12, 1985.
Kathryn Davies, ‘Tunis Victim's Funerals Spark Protest in Cairo’, The Guardian, August 10, 1985. ‘Tunisians 
Denounce U.S. Position On Raid - PLO Announces T oll’; A ssociated Press Writer, August 10, 1985;
‘Egypt's Problem’, The Guardian, October 12, 1985.
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custody and prosecution were inevitable. The United States immediately demanded 
the extradition of the hijackers from Egypt to the U.S. for trial. Egyptian President 
Honsi Mubarak attested that the hijackers had already left Egypt en route to Tunis 
where they would be returned to Arafat. This was a major clash in U.S. - Egyptian 
interests. Reagan wanted the terrorists brought to justice - Mubarak wanted to avoid 
problems with his Arab neighbours. By turning over the hijackers to the U.S., would 
prove highly unpopular in the Arab community; but, the hijackers had not left 
Egypt.^o Mubarak had only pretended not to know they were still in the country. 
Again, this was only a method to save face with his Arab neighbours, and to thwart 
any potential actions against Egyptian citizens. Once again Israeli intelligence 
sources, with their informal diplomatic contact with JSOC, had revealed to Colonel 
Oliver North thiough a military attaché in Washington, that the hijackers were still 
actually in Egypt. This was later confirmed through U.S. electronic surveillance.
The U.S. 'mission' at that point was purely a single focus; bring the teiTorists to 
justice, no matter what. Colonel North proposed to Admiral Poindexter a similar 
action to that of a WWII operation,^* when an intelligence source revealed that 
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the 'architect' behind the Peart Harbour attack, would be 
flying over the Upper Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. The U.S. sent up P-38 
fighter planes, and shot it down. The intention here was not to 'shoot down' the 
Egyptian aircraft, but to force it down. The intended destination, was the NATO base 
in Sigonella, Sicily.
Christopher Dickey, ‘Pirates Surrender Ship; 1 American Killed, Outraged U.S. Demands Egypt Prosecute 
Hijackers’, Washington Post, October 10, 1985.
Christopher Dickey, “Surprising’ U.S. Action Angers Egypt’, Washington Post, October 12, 1985.
137
Reagan approved the o p e r a t i o n , ^2 and within hours, General Stiner’s plane 
caiTying the Delta Force/hostage rescue and SEAL teams were dispatched for Sicily. 
Meanwhile, Rear Admiral David E. Jeremiah, on the carrier USS Saratoga, received 
orders to dispatch fighter aircraft and search for the Egyptian airliner canying the 
hijackers, their mastermind, Abul Abbas and another Arafat emissary, Hani Al- 
Hassan. This meant that their intelligence had to be absolutely accurate with respect 
to the aircraft's identification number. Also, this had to be done as covertly as 
possible, which meant the four F-14 Tomcat fighter jets were flying off the coast of 
Crete with their miming lights off, using a handheld flashlight to search for the 
aircraft's identification tags. They actually failed on the first try, intercepting General 
Stiners plane, but quickly recovered, and located the EgyptAir flight carrying the 
hijackers. When the F-14 turned on their mnning lights, they were just feet from the 
Egyptian airliner's wingtips, forcing him down to the Sigonella air base, where 
General Stiners aircraft and Delta Force troops were waiting.
4.4.1 The Importance o f  Co-operation
The message unfolding here is that 'co-operation matters'. By the 9th of October, 
all the hostages had been freed, so the attention was now on punishing those 
responsible. But there was no 'home field' advantage for the United States; this was
S ’ North, UNDER FIRE pp. 206-207
David Hoffman, 'Capture o f  Terrorists Began 6,000 M iles Away at Illinois Bakery’, Washington Post, October 
12, 1985.
Loren Jenkins, ‘U.S. Jets Intercept Hijackers' Plane, F14s Force Egyptian Aircraft to Land at Italian Base’, 
Washington Post, October 11, 1985; David Hoffman and Lou Canton, ‘U.S. Aims a 'Message' at Tenorist, White 
House Seeks to Limit Damage to Relations With Egypt’, Washington Post, October 11, 1985; George C. Wilson, 
‘Weinberger Tells How Hijackers Were Intercepted, Crew o f  Egyptian Airliner 'Accepted the Inevitable', Defense  
Secretary Says, Praising Naval Aviators’, Washington Post, October 11, 1985.
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an act which occurred abroad, which would inevitably depend on the co-operation of 
an ally. This relies on one thing, and one thing only, compliance to international law. 
The United States had already shown blatant disregard for this by pouncing on the 
Egyptian airliner and were about to trample on Italian sovereignty. The results of the 
incident would prove a reflection of this.
While the Italians had been notified by the U.S. that the Egyptian airliner was to 
land in Sigonella, they had not, however, been notified that General Stiner's plane and 
the accompanying two C-141 transport planes with heavily armed U.S. troops, would 
be arriving along with it. Nor were they expecting U.S. forces to surround the plane 
to forcibly remove Abbas and the hijackers, and place them on an awaiting aircraft for 
a flight back to the United States for trial.
When the U.S. troops emerged fi'om the transport aircraft to surround the 
Egyptian aircraft, they were immediately confronted by armed Italian soldiers and 
police, who surrounded the aircraft as well. The U.S. troops then positioned fuel 
tmcks to prevent the potential take-off of the Egyptian aircraft - the Italians responded 
by blocking the American's path with heavy machinery. And there was the stand-off. 
U.S. troops and their allied Italian counterparts, heavily aimed and nose-to-nose, 
while their respective commanders engaged in a shouting match.
President Reagan contacted Prime Minister Craxi, and agreed the American 
forces would 'stand down', allowing Italy to take custody of the hijackers and Abbas. 
But it was far from over. The Italians removed the hijackers, but Abbas and Hassan 
who were sent as emissaries for Amfat, claimed diplomatic immunity. Egypt, 
claiming the plane was on a government mission, insisted the aircraft enjoy 
diplomatic immunity as guaranteed by international law. The Craxi government had
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to take these claims seriously, if  it wanted to maintain good relations with his Arab 
neighbours, but more importantly, Egypt was holding the Achille Laiiro, it's 
passengers, and Italian crew 'hostage' in Port Said in Egypt. This was more of a 
bargaining chip, in the event the Italians should give in to U.S. pressure.
Italy then moved the Egyptian plane from Sigonella to Rome, the flight 
shadowed the entire way by General Stiner in a smaller, training jet. Consequently, 
the United States had not received pennission from the Italian government for that 
flight either. The Italian government protested - loudly - to the U.S. embassy, for it's 
further degradation of Italian sovereignty.
The United States, meanwhile, claiming a huge media victory over t e n ' o r i s m , ^ ^  
had requested the extradition of Abbas and the four hijackers.^^ Congress previously 
had passed an 'extraterritorial statute', making it a crime against the United States for 
taking a U.S. citizen hostage. The argument followed, that a state has a right to 
protect itself from foreign attack, and such attacks targeted Americans.
Under U.S. procedures, once a formal request for extradition has been made, the 
matter is then refen*ed to the judges in order to determine the viability of the case and 
the applicable ti'eaties. Following a judicial decision, the political arm of the 
requested government officially decides whether or not extradition will be allowed.^^ 
This is almost always the phase where political fears of retaliation and uncertainties 
about the foreign policy aspect, are masked behind legal technicalities and claims of
Lou Cannon, ‘President Basks in Praise - Hill Critics Join in Applauding 'Message to Terrorists', Washington 
P ost, October 12, 1985; Bernard Weintraub, ‘W e Want Justice' Reagan Declares - U.S. M essage to Terrorists, He 
Says Is 'You Can't Hide’, New York Times, October 12, 1985;
Howard Kurtz, ‘U.S. Officials Confident O f Power to Try Pirates, Extradition Pursued Under Italian Law’, 
Washington Post, October 11, 1985.
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'political offence exception'. This was not the case this time. Italy completely 
bypassed the legal stage, and Craxi immediately rejected the U.S. request for Abbas's 
extradition, claiming first, that the U.S. had 'insubstantial proof of Abbas's guilt. 
Second, that since the Egyptian aircraft was on a governmental mission, it enjoyed 
extraterritorial rights. And third, Abbas was caiTying an Iraqi diplomatic passport, 
and therefore enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
The Egyptian aircraft, still in Rome, had allowed the two envoys, Abbas and 
Hassan, to board a flight which was held for them, and fly to Yugoslavia, despite the 
U.S. government request for his detention.^? An infuriated U.S. government quickly 
turned the extradition request around to Yugoslavia, which quickly denied the 
request^^ to an already furious Reagan administration. Following Secretary o f State 
George Schultz’s public chastising of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government was 
quick to remind the U.S. of their own ongoing extradition request for Aurotvik, 
wanted for genocide and war crimes in Yugoslavia, and who was enjoying political 
immunity in the U.S. His extradition was subsequently arranged immediately.
In the end, three of the four hijackers were tried in an Italian court^^ and given 
stiff penalties. Abul Abbas, was tried in absentia, and received a life sentence. By the
Note: in many countries and many cases, however, this remains a purely judicial decision as will be seen and 
discussed later on in Chapter 8.
John M. Goshko and Lou Cannon, ‘PLO Leader Slips From U.S. Grasp in Italy, Reagan Administration 
Accepts Release With Disappointment’, Washington Post, October 13, 1985; Loren Jenkins, ‘U.S. Protests Abbas' 
Departure After Issue o f  Arrest Waixant’, Washington Post, October 13, 1985; Bernard Weintraub, ‘Italy Said to 
Free 2 P.L.O. Aides Despite U .S. Arrest Warrant, Leader o f  Faction Linked to Hijacking Is Said to Depart in 
Disguise’, Nevi> York Times, October 13, 1985.
Robert Timberg, ‘Yugoslavia Won't Yield Palestinian’, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1985.
Loren Jenkins, ‘Hijackers to be Tried by Italians’, Washington Post, October 12, 1985. See also: Philip Hager 
and Ronald Ostrow, ‘U.S. Can Legally Extradite 4  TeiTorists, Justice Dept. Says’, Los Angeles Times, October 12, 
1985; Howard Kurtz, ‘Extradition Prospects Unclear’, Washington Post, October 12, 1985; Lyle Denniston, ‘In
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end of 1996, however, all thi*ee hijackers had escaped from the Italian prison and 
remain at large. Abul Abbas, is cunently living in Lebanon.
4.4» 2 The Hijacker’s Legal Status
The seizure of the Achille Lauro was the stimulus for legislation prohibiting acts 
of terrorism against maritime targets. Previously no international legislation existed 
specifically prohibiting ten'orism only 'acts of piracy'. It should be clarified, that the 
Achille Lauro was in fact a case of teiTorism and not piracy. Under customary 
international law no finn definition of piracy exists,^® much as there is no 
authoritative definition of teiTorism. In the strictest sense piracy is defined as 'every 
unauthorised act of violence committed by a private vessel on the open sea against 
another vessel with intent to plunder.'^i The problem with this definition is that it 
fails to cover many acts which are deemed and tried as 'acts of piracy' but fall short in 
this very narrow definition. The more accurate and applicable definition covers all 
acts of 'violence against persons or goods committed on the open sea either by a 
private vessel against another vessel or by the mutinous crew or passengers against 
their own v e s s e l . ' ^ ^  The delineation between definitions is as important as the
U.S., 4 would face hostage taking trial’, The Baltimore Sun, October 12, 1985; Stuart Taylor Jr., ‘Italy More 
Likely Than U.S. to Try Suspects in Hijacking o f  Cruise V essel’, New York Times, October 12, 1985.
'There is no authoritative definition o f  international piracy, but it is o f  the essence o f  a piratical act to be an act 
o f  violence, committed at sea or any rate closely connected with the sea, by persons not acting under proper 
authority." J.L. Briefly, The Law o f  Nations An Introduction to the International Law o f  Peace, Sixth Edition, 
(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1928).
Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, P iracy and the IM O Convention on 
M aritime Safety, The American Journal o f  International Law, vol. 82, no. 269, April 1988, p. 273. See also: 
Oppenheim, International Law A Treatise, Third Edition, (New York: Longman Green & Co., 1920).
92 Halberstam, HIGH SEAS.
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separation between terrorism and piracy. Although both are prohibited under 
international law, each prescribes a different legal response on behalf of states.
In the case of the Achille Lauro, this delineation is made on the following 
criteria; first, the incident could not legitimately be classified as piracy principally 
because the hijackers did not act toward the advancement of 'private e n d s ' . T h e  
basic understanding behind a teiTorist act, is violence as a means toward a political 
end.94 The hijackers immediate end was the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. 
Their purpose, arguably, was in the interest of gaining a Palestinian homeland and 
was representative o f the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Clearly not a 
private end. Modern international law also provides the definition of piracy to include 
the 'boarding of a vessel from a previous vessel'^), or acts of one ship against another, 
which was not the case here either. Nor was the ship seized with the intention of 
making it a pirate ship, a criteria under Article 103 of the 1982 Law of the Sea
9  ^ As designated by Law o f  the Sea Convention, 1982, Article 101. See: Blakesley, JURISDICTION at note 38.
9^  ^See Grant Wardlaw who begins Chapter 1 by noting: “Groups with little or no direct political power have 
demonstrated repeatedly in recent years that by employing certain tactics, central to which is the use o f directed 
tenor, they can achieve effects on a target community which are out o f all proportion to their numerical or 
political power. Such tactics attract worldwide publicity, create widespread panic or apprehension and cause 
national governments to concede to the demands o f  small subgroups within society. These effects in themselves 
create a demand for an understanding o f  the use o f  terror for political ends.” Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 
Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Second Edition, (Cambridge University Press), 1990, p. 3.
9  ^The International Law Commission declared acts 'committed on board a ship by the crew or passengers and 
directed against the ship itself, or against persons or property on the ship, cannot be regarded as acts o f  piracy'. 
See: Summary o f  Replies from  Governments and Conclusions o f  the Special Rapporteur (1956), 2 Yearbook o f  
International Law Commission 18. U.N. Doc. A/CN .4/97/Add.l. to 3. in McGinley, IMPLICATIONS, p. 696 and 
at note 37. See also Oppenheim, LAW.
For arguments 'against' the two-ship requirement see: The Santa M aria Incident, (1961) where the Portuguese 
passenger vessel Santa M aria  was seized in the Atlantic on the high seas by armed men who had boarded it as 
passengers. One member o f  the crew was killed and others injured. The men were supporters o f  General 
Delgado, a political opponent o f  President Salazar o f  Portugal. The ship was handed over to Brazil and returned 
to Portugal, but the men were given political asylum by Brazil. D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on Internationa] 
Law, Fourth Edition. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), p. 407-408.
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C on ven tion .96 The hijacking occnned as a result of discovery, otherwise the 
Palestinian mission would have concluded in Israel without ever involving the Achille 
Lauro.
The other distinction which must be made here as well, is that the Palestinians 
were indeed hijackers and not belligerents.97 Belligerency applies to 'armed conflict' 
defined as hostilities which fall just short of an all out declaration of war, and refer to 
'any armed conflict beyond isolated and sporadic acts of violence between the armed 
forces of states.98 Tf the Palestinians and Israelis were engaged as such, then seizure 
of the Achille Lauro could be justifiable as a legitimate act of warfare applicable 
under the Geneva C onventions.99 Still, 'belligerent(s)' are 'rebels who have organised 
a government while they fight, so that their war is considered lawful by international 
s t a n d a r d s ' .  190 T h e  PLO, while organised as an entity, certainly does not concern itself
96 Law o f  the Sea Convention, December 10, 1982, Article 103: Definition o f  a p ira te  ship o r aircraft A  ship or 
aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the 
puipose o f  committing one o f  the acts refeixed to in article 101. The same applies i f  the ship or aircraft has been 
used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control o f the persons guilty o f that act. Article 101 
Defines piracy as consisting o f  the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts o f  violence or detention, or any act o f  depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
the passengers o f  a private ship or a private aircraft.
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction o f  any State;
(b) any act o f voluntaiy participation in the operation o f  a ship or o f  an aircraft with knowledge o f  facts making it 
a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act o f  inciting or o f  intentionally facilitating an act o f  described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Ian Brownlie ed., Basic Documents in International Law, Third Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983), 
p. 187.
92 It has been argued previously that the tenn 'political end' refers to 'acts by a revolutionaiy organisation that has 
not been recognised as belligerent by the offended state.' See: Halberstam: HIGH SEAS, p. 290 and at note 89.
9  ^ Linda A. Malone, International Law, (Larchmont, NY: Emanuel Law Outlines, inc., 1995), p. 138.
99 Under the Geneva Conventions Part IV: Civilian Population, Section 1 : General Protection Against Effects o f  
Hostilities, Chapter I: Basic Rule and Field Application, Article 48: In order to ensure respect for and protection 
o f  the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and militaiy objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives. Article 49: Definition o f  Attacks and Scope o f  
Application; 1. “Attacks” means acts o f  violence against the adversaiy, whether in offence or in defense.
See: http://www.deoxy.org/wc/wc-proto.htm
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with legitimate methods of warfare anymore than it considers the importance of 
international standards. In short, belligerent status is only awarded in accordance with 
specific criteria established by international law, which ultimately the PLO do not
meet. *91
It is debatable that the Palestinians qualify for combatant status under Geneva 
Protocols, ' 92 though under the Geneva requirements the PLO would have to have 
committed itself to abiding by international humanitarian law. The PLO had agreed 
to try and punish the hijackers once they had been released into PLO custody, which 
is in keeping with the requirements of international law. Regardless of whether or not
190 See: Oran's Legal Dictionai~v. West's Legal Directory Law Information Center, http://www.wld.com/cgi- 
bin/oran.cgi?uniqueid=664.
191 The case for belligerent status can only be attained by an entity who meets the following requirements: (1) 
the other party to the conflict must have recognised the entity as a belligerent; (2) the entity must have observed 
the laws o f  warfare; (3) the entity must have a properly commanded armed force; (4) the entity must have some 
semblance o f  government; (5) the entity must have control over som e portion o f  teiritory. Convention Article 49. 
For an alternative argument o f  the status o f  the PLO as belligerents see: O'Brien, The PLO  in International Law, 
Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 2, no. 349, 1984. Kassim, The Palestinian Liberation  
Organisation's Claim to Status: A Judicial Analysis Under International Law, Denver Journal o f  International 
Law and Policy, vol. 9, no. 1, 1980. For discussion o f  the legal status o f  the PLO see: Friedlander, Levine,
Kassim, Dialogue: The Legal Status o f  the PLO, Denver Journal o f International Law and Policy, vol. 10, no.
221, 1980. See also: Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affiar - Implications f o r  International Law,
Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 52, 1985 pp. 692-727.
102 Article 43 states:
1. The aimed forces o f  a Party to a conflict consist o f  all organised armed forces, groups and units 
which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct o f  its subordinates, even i f  that 
Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognised by an adverse Party. Such aimed  
forces shall be subject to an international disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance 
with the rules o f  international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members o f  the armed forces o f  a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 o f  the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities.
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the U.S. recognised the PLO as a legitimate entity, or the U.N. recognised them as a 
legitimate govermnent. In either event, recognition is not a requirement under the 
Protocols.
Even as 'assumed' combatants engaged in conflict against Israel and given the 
'right' under Article 43 to participate, they may then only participate against Israel, 
which was not the case in hijacking the cruise liner, regardless o f whether or not it 
was reactionary. The one clause consistent in all four  of the Geneva Protocols is 
Article 3/93 which expressly prohibits executions, the style in which Klinghoffer was 
killed, as well as murder and hostage taking. Although the passage makes reference 
to 'tenitorial limitations' and 'international conflicts', this does not necessarily negate 
the Palestinians eligibility. The Achille Lauro was seized in Egyptian waters,‘94 and 
therefore Egyptian territory, making Egypt bound by treaty, as they are signatories to
‘93 In the case o f armed conflict not o f  an international character occun ing in the territory o f  one o f  the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members o f  armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts 
are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- 
mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder o f  all kinds, mutilation, and cruel ti eatment and 
torture;
(b) taking o f  hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing o f  sentences and the carrying out o f  executions without previous judgement pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised  
peoples.
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the Geneva Convention. The requirement for an international conflict is a matter of 
opinion on how conflict in the Middle East is characterised. If  it is in fact viewed as 
an international conflict, then the taking of civilian hostages is still prohibited under 
the Conventions.‘95 As an 'internal' conflict, the Palestinian's actions are still in 
violation based on the U.S. as a 'victim' state of the PLO, which would then be viewed 
as an 'extension' of a state, and therefore in violation of Article 4 of the
Conventions.‘96
Ultimately, if  the hijackers qualify for such status, then Egypt‘9? and Italy‘98 as 
signatories to the Geneva Convention were bound by treaty to prosecute the hijackers 
as war criminals, if  not for terrorism.
4.5 Applicable Treaties
Even if  Egypt and Italy did not find fault under the Geneva Protocols, there were 
other existing tools of international law which were applicable. Relevant international
«
‘94 Newsweek, GETTING EVEN
‘95 Convention IV, The Protection o f  Civilians in Time o f  War, Article 34.
196 pgj.j. j General Provision under Article 4  o f  the Geneva Convention pertains direetly to who may be taken as 
prisoner. Article 4 Section A o f  the Convention states: Prisoners o f  war, in the sense o f  the present Convention, 
are persons belonging to one o f  the following categories, who have fallen into the power o f  the enemy:
Members o f the armed forces o f  a Party to the conflict, as well as members o f  militias or volunteer corps fom iing  
part o f  armed forces.
Members o f other militias and members o f other volunteer corps, including those o f organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the eonflict and operating in or outside their own teiritory, even if  this 
teiritory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance 
movements fulfil the following conditions:
That o f  being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
That o f  having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
That o f  caiTying arms openly
That o f  conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs o f war
Members o f  regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the 
Detaining Power.
Persons who accompany the anned forces without actually being members.
‘92 Egypt ratified the treaty on December 8, 1949. See: Geneva Protocols 
‘9^ Italy ratified the treaty (with reservation) on December 8, 1949. Ibid.
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agreements which pertain to the Achille Lauro incident are the U.S./Italian Extradition 
Treaty/99 the U.S./Yugoslavia Extradition T reaty /‘9 and the UN Convention Against 
the Taking of Hostages.
4.5.1 The UN Convention Against the Taking o f  Hostages
The Hostages Convention provides the legal framework necessary toward the 
'prosecution and punislmient of all acts of taking of hostages as manifestations of 
international ten'orism'“ 2
Inherent within the convention is the requirement to extradite or prosecute 
persons“ 3 within the state parties jurisdiction who take hostages. Similarly this 
applies to attempts and accomplices o f hostage t a k i n g / i m p o s i n g  the same 
obligation upon states “ 6 regardless of the jurisdiction of the a c t / ‘2 and irrespective of
‘99 Extradition Treaty Between the Government o f  the United States o f  America and the Government o f  the 
Republic o f  Italy, October 13, 1983, entered into force September 24, 1984. T.I.A.S. 10837. See: International 
TeiTorism: A  Compilation o f  Major Laws, Treaties. Agreements, and Executive Documents. Report Prepared for 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House o f  Representatives, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1987), p. 267-69. [Hereinafter cited as TERRORISM, REPORT]
‘ ‘9 Exti adition Treaty Between the Government o f  the United States o f  America and the Republic o f  Sei'via, 
October 25, 1901,32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406.
‘ ‘ ‘ UN Convention Against The Taking o f  Hostages, December 17, 1979. Entered into force for the U.S., 
Januaiy 6, 1985. Hereinafter cited as Hostages Convention'. See: TERRORISM, REPORT.
‘ ‘2 Hostages Convention, preamble: 'Being convinced  that it is urgently necessaiy to develop international co­
operation between States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention, prosecution and 
punishment o f  all acts o f  taking o f  hostages as manifestations o f  international terrorism. H ave agreed  as follows:'
‘ ‘5 Article 8
‘ Article 1
‘ ‘5 Article 1 - section 2- subsection a & b 
‘ ‘6 Article 2 & Article 3 
‘ ‘2 Article 5
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whether or not an extradition treaty exists. The only time this would not be the 
case, is if  an individual enjoys status under the Geneva Convention or the Additional 
Protocols,“ 9 in which case the Hostage Convention would be superseded.
4.5.2 The Italian-American Extradition Treaty
The U.S./Italian extradition treaty follows the modern international practice of 
reciprocal extradition, provided the circumstances o f the criminal offence are 
punishable by the laws of both contracting parties. Such criteria avoids having to 
identify within the treaty, specific crimes for extradition. The offender is then 
required to be extradited to the requesting state; the case has to be submitted to the 
judicial authorities of the requested state. ‘20 Specific to the treaty, an offence is 
extiaditable only if it is punishable by a minimum of one year’s deprivation of libeity. 
In the event the extradition request pertains to an individual who has already been 
sentenced, extradition is allowed only if a minimum of six months remains on the 
penalty still to be served. ‘21 Extradition applies in all cases where the penalty is more 
severe than the minimum requirement. ‘22 Since it is the behaviour rather than the 
specific criminal act which deteiinines how punishable or extraditable an incident is,
‘ Article 9 —  HC also SUPERSEDES any existing extradition treaty 
“ 9 Article 12
‘29 U.S. Italian Treaty o f Extradition, Article I.
‘2‘ Article II, paragraph I 
‘22 Ibid.
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there exists a wide margin of interpretation as to the degree of criminality of the 
specific action.‘23
Jurisdiction extends beyond the temtorial limits of the requesting state, provided 
the offender is a national of the requesting state.‘24 The requested state must extradite 
in such circumstances, regardless of whether or not its laws maintain the offence as 
punishable.‘25 Extradition cannot be denied because the person is a national of the 
requested party.‘26 The mandatory extradition of nationals distinguishes this from 
most other treaties in force, ‘22 which negate this option, suggesting the gieater interest 
on behalf of both parties lies in the prosecution of international criminals rather than 
state policy.‘28
Extradition may be refused on the following grounds: first, the request for which 
extradition is sought is for political offence, or for the punishment of a political 
o ffe n c e .‘29 The one caveat to this is the oveniding obligation imposed by multilateral 
international agreem en ts.‘29 Those offences with characteristics such as those which 
affect public safety, banned persons, or a particularly ruthless crimes, will be taken
‘23 Article II, paragraph II.
‘24 Article III
‘25 This provision was significant for Italy since Italian law allows for the prosecution o f  nationals irrespective o f  
where the offence was committed. See: Lt. Cm dr. Larry A. McCullough, JAGC, USN, International and  
D om estic Criminal Law Issues in the Achille Lauro Incident: A Functional Analysis, Naval Law Review, Winter 
1986, p. 65, and at note 90.
‘26 Article IV.
‘22 McCullough, DOMESTIC CRIMINAL LAW, p. 65 
‘28 Ibid. p. 66.
‘29 Article V, sec. I 
‘39 Article V, sec. 2.
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into account when assessing the weight of the extradition claim /31 Second, 
extradition will not be granted for military crimes which are not under ordinary 
criminal law /32 Third, extradition for 'double jeopardy' requests will not be granted. 
Persons convicted, acquitted, pardoned, or have served their sentence for the offence 
in question, will not be extradited to the requesting party.‘33 Nor will extradition be 
granted if the person sought is being prosecuted by the requested state for the same 
acts as the requesting state who seeks their extradition.‘34 Fourth, extradition will be 
denied when the statute of limitations for the offence committed or the penalty phase, 
has expired under the laws of the requesting state.‘35 Finally, extradition will not be 
granted when the offence committed is punishable by death. Until such time the 
requesting state can assure that the death sentence will not be carried out, extradition 
will be refused.‘36 This is in accordance with most all modem extradition treaties.
The actual procedure governing extradition must fall in accordance with Article 
X of the treaty. All requests for extradition must be made through diplomatic 
ch a n n e ls ,‘32 accompanied by evidence of the location and identity of the person 
so u g h t.‘38 All particulars including time and location of the o ffe n c e ,‘39 along with
‘3 ‘ Article V, sec. 2.
‘32 Article V, sec. 3
‘33 Article VI
‘34 Article VII
‘35 Article VIII
‘36 Article IX
‘32 Article X, section I
138 Article X, section 2(a)
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applicable laws, description, and identification of the offence must be disclosed.‘40 In 
addition, the legally prescribed punishment‘'“ and limitation for prosecution of the 
offence must be mentioned.‘42 When a request for the extiadition of persons not yet 
convicted, the above criteria apply.‘43 in addition, a certified aiTest warrant must be 
produced/'‘4 or a summary of the facts of the case to include relevant evidence, and a 
conclusive argument providing credible proof that the persons sought did in fact 
commit the offence. ‘45
Cases requiring considerable speed and urgency in order to prevent the likelihood 
of the person sought from fleeing, require the prompt conclusion of a formal request 
for extradition. In such circumstances, the requesting state can seek provisional arrest 
up to forty-five d a y s . ‘'‘6 No state, however, may prosecute for any crime not 
specifically mentioned in the extradition request.‘4? Nor may the party be 're­
extradited' to a third state. ‘48
4.53 The U.S.-Yugoslavia Extradition Agreement
39 Article X, section b 
49 Article X, section c 
4 ‘ Article X, section d
42 Article X, section e
43 Article X, section 3
44 Article X, section 3a
45 Article X, section 3b
46 Article XII, section 1
42 Article XVI, sections I, la  
48 Article XVI, section 2
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Extradition between the United States and Yugoslavia is governed by the 1901 
Agi'eement concluded between the US and (then) Servia in 1906/49 Unlike the treaty 
between the US and Italy, the agreement provides a list o f extraditable offences, 
among which include piracy, and murder/50 The agreement stresses that participation 
in any extraditable offence which may be tried as a felony in the United States, will 
constitute an extraditable crim e/5 ‘ Upon receipt of a fomial extradition request, the 
treaty provides for the arrest and detention of the person sought. In the event of a 
request for provisional ai*rest, the treaty mandates the iimnediate arrest and detention 
o f the person sought, for up to two months or until a foiinal request for extradition is 
r e c e i v e d . ‘ 52  The one exception to this is in cases where the demand for extradition is 
of a political character, in which case the requested state may deny extradition.‘53
4.6 Conclusion
States must rely on international co-operation through the methods presented and 
outlined in various treaties and conventions, if  they are to counteract the effects of 
terrorism and the advantage teiTorists gain by separating themselves from the 
jurisdiction where they have earned out their attack. The U.S. in this case, had 
established the legal groundwork long before the crisis had occurred, and therefore 
should have been able to rely on methods of international law enforcement and
‘49 Treaty o f  Extradition, October 25, 1901, United States-Servia, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406. 
‘59 US/Servia, Article II.
‘51 Ibid.
‘52 Ibid, Article IV.
‘53 Ibid, Article VI.
153
compliance to these methods, from Italy, Egypt and Yugoslavia. Similarly, Italy and 
Egypt should have counted on the U.S. working within the confines of international 
law; or resorting to diplomatic measures. In a perfect world, perhaps. However, as in 
any case which relies on international law, states retain the right to protect their own 
interest, and in the case of teiTorism, to protect their own citizens. But this should not 
have to rely on methods which act outside the parameters of international law, else 
states become no less lawless than the ten*orists themselves. Compliance is important. 
It maintains good relations between states, and in doing so creates stability, and social 
order. The only way this is achieved, is thiough co-operation and very rarely, if  at all, 
is it achieved through unilateral action. And very rarely, if  at all, will unilateral action 
be tolerated by a world superpower.
Wliat the Achille Lauro shows us, is that no state, perhaps especially the United 
States as the world’s only remaining superpower is wise to blatantly defy international 
law, and especially when dealing with its allies. In this particular case, the U.S. would 
have been better served by soliciting influence tlii’ough diplomatic or economic 
channels in order to evoke co-operation.
What the Achille Lauro also demonstrates is the difficulty that even allies with a 
common interest in suppressing teiTorism have in working together when vastly 
different interests are at stake. All of the parties in this case had very different 
priorities in seeking an end to the crisis. This hindered the ability for the crisis to play 
itself out to a more amicable end.
As a result of aggravating their allies, the U.S. enlisted neither assistance in 
capturing Abbas, nor sympathy for the loss of Klinghoffer's life. Wliile the four 
hijackers were captured, and three of the teiTorists ultimately were tried and jailed in
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Italy, the mastermind behind the attack went free. If law is to have an impact on
terrorism, it must punish terrorists. Minor victories against footsoldiers is harldy a
major triumph against teiTorism. It does the international community little good to
win skiimishes, and lose wars. As best commented upon by Brian Jenkins:
"In our single minded pursuit o f terrorists, a campaign that perhaps becomes too 
high on the list o f priorities, we run the danger o f combating terrorism the same way 
we fought the war in Vietnam — unmindful o f the collateral damage. There too we 
faced an elusive foe who did not fight by our rules. There too we sought a quick 
military victory.
In our euphoria over the successfid capture o f four terrorists, we would now like to 
believe that we have turned the tide against terrorism, that terrorists now will think 
twice before attacking Americans. It is far more likely that the war against terrorism 
will be a protracted contest, with dramatic victories on our side few and far between, 
and ultimately no final victory.
The Achille Lauro reveals the value of international co-operation; the ramifications of 
abandoning it altogether; the importance of international allies when fighting 
terrorism, and the legal issues which surface in its absence. What this case study also 
reveals beyond the initial issues of response, compliance, or the punishment of 
terrorists discussed in the beginning of this chapter; is the reinforcement of the idea 
that extradition is a process. Not a process defined on the merits of military strength 
or power, not a process defined by unilateral action, but one that is defined by a 
system; and this system functioning as a sum total of its parts, can feasibly seek to 
punish and potentially curtail acts of terrorism.
Still, it is worthy of examination and discussion, the potential for the system to 
break down even when all the desirable pieces appear to fall into place. The effects of 
this, often caused by the political influence or the political relationship to terrorist
‘54 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Aftermath o f  the Achille Lauro, RAND Document No. P-7163, October, 1985, p. 
1 .
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extradition, can potentially undermine co-operation, and affect compliance to 
international agreements; and which can hinder extradition.
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Chapter Five
Politics and Co-operation: TWA 847 and the Extradition o f Mohammed Hamadei
"This was the terrorism case to end all terrorism cases...[wje had this horrible 
crime, we had terrific evidence, we had an overarching American interest... We were 
ready.
5,1 Introduction
There are occasions when regardless of the amount of international co-operation, 
or evidence, and even if  the facts present a relatively clear-cut argument for 
extradition; does it necessarily dictate that extradition will ensue? In these 
ckcumstances other factors arise affecting the ability for states to honour existing 
international agreements. Such as, for example, tlie existence of political undertones 
which not only have the potential to extinguish the chances for tenorist extradition; 
but to potentially alter the over-all extent to which the tenorist is punished. This is 
similar to the discussion in Chapter 1, which surveys the Lockerbie example, and the 
political relationship between extradition and tenorism.^ Political influence has as 
strong affect on the outcome of tenorist extradition cases, especially if  there remains a 
fear of ftiture tenorist reprisals. Unlike the Achille Lauro example, which lacked the 
fundamental cohesion of basic co-operation, what this discussion examines is how 
compliance is affected by the circumstance of political influence, and how legal 
mechanisms currently in place are affected by this. A clear example which
* Remarks by Joseph diGeiiova, then U.S. attorney for the District o f  Columbia who was expected to try Hamadei. 
David M. Kennedy, Dr. Torsten Stein, Alfred P. Rubin, The Extradition o f  Mohammed Hamadei, 31 Harvard 
International Law Journal 1, Winter 1990, p. 6. Hereinafter, HAMADEI EXTRADITION
 ^ See: Chapter 1.1.2 The Lockerbie Example, Supra at p. 5
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demonstrates this point, is the case of TWA 847, and the subsequent U.S. extradition 
request for Mohammed Hamadei from West Geiinany.
The events o f TWA 847 signified an ending point in temis of tolerance for 
Reagan. The United States administration plagued with incidents up to, and 
including, this crisis -  would be dealt a crushing blow to their fight against teiTorism. 
TWA 847 was not just a teiTorism incident -  it was terrorism ‘event’. Over the course 
of seventeen days, the teiTorists received top headlines from eveiy news medium 
worldwide. This would not work in Reagan’s favour. Before the crisis was over, the 
U.S. would break the very mantra of it’s policy of ‘no concessions’ and once again, 
the terrorists would escape.
Two years following the incident, the ringleader, Mohammed AH Hamadei, was 
apprehended in West Geiinany. This created a new challenge for the administration. 
Finally, 'they caught one'. And what could have presented itself as the United States 
first opportunity for a teiTorist trial, ended up in the West German courts, due more to 
political influence than international co-operation.
Realistically, Hamadei could only be viewed as a 'test case' for the United States. 
Teii'orism had never been a problem on U.S. soil; still, over 30 percent of all 
international terrorism incidents were aimed at the U.S. or American citizens abroad.^ 
The Reagan administration made countering terrorism part of the foundation of their 
foreign policy, and strenuously argued that terrorists should be caught and tried no 
differently than common criminals as part of an international community effort to
 ^ Half o f  the worldwide international terrorist incidents in the 1980s were aimed at only 10 countries; one-third o f  
the total were targeted directly at the United States, The number o f  teiTorist acts has generally risen since official 
statistics were first compiled in 1968, with a trend toward bloodier incidents with more fatalities. Attacks caused 
20 fatalities in 1968 compared to 926 in 1985. Source: U.S. Department o f State, Patterns o f  Global Terrorism 
1987.
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thwart terrorism.^ This was not as enthusiastically received as the U.S. would have 
hoped, especially in Europe, where despite a similar value system, there was a general 
tendency toward ‘avoiding’ rather than ‘confronting’ terrorist aggiession.^
Reagan would supply that motivation by encouraging Congress to pass a number 
of statutes in 1984*5 and 19865', detailing specific terrorist acts as criminal acts, and 
which extend jurisdiction to include American citizens abroad. Still this required a 
substantial amount of international cooperation, which the administration soon 
realised, proved difficult.
The TWA 847 incident and the subsequent request for extradition of its ring­
leader, Mohammed Ali Hamadei, demonstrates three things. First, how states choose 
their method of strategy in dealing with a terrorist incident, in this case an airliner 
hijacking which became a gi'ound-level hostage incident. Second, the political aspect 
of decision making, which is what gives this case its depth. Co-operation among 
allied states whose political, economic, or diplomatic ties create a powerful force in 
international relations and a relatively strong case for compliance. But this differs 
from the formalities of international law, where compliance is dependent on the 
intricacies of the courts, as well as the political authority to enable it. Third, the
 ^N ew  York Times, April 15, 1986, and June 15, 1985 
 ^New York Times, April 17, 1986
 ^ Several significant bills were passed in 1984 which enable the U.S. to expand its jurisdiction over terrorists and 
enhance the U.S. role in the prosecution o f  terrorists. Such examples include: making it a federal offence to 
commit an act o f  violence against any passenger on a government or civilian aircraft; extending U.S. authority to 
prosecute any person who destroys a foreign aircraft outside the U.S.; legislation covering crimes against families 
o f  high-ranking officials; legislation for the U.S. to prosecute persons who travel or use transportation / 
communications facilities in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to murder for compensation; and the 
authority from Congress to reward any individual for information leading to the arrest and onviction o f  a person 
who committed terrorist acts against U.S. citizens or property.
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inteipretation and application of the law. This was a clear-cut incident, not nearly as 
ambiguous as the Achille Lauro was. There were cleanly defined legal parameters, 
which applied to exactly this type of incident. But the outcome was less reflective of 
the legality of the decision than the politics of co-operation.
The first part of this chapter will discuss the TWA 847 incident and the 
subsequent hostage crisis which followed. Congruous to this is a discussion of 
concessions, and the choices that are available to states in the context of a hostage 
taking incident.
The second part, examines the second half of the case itself -  the extradition of 
Hamadei. Specifically, the legal options that were available which would deteimine 
his extradition or trial, and the political factors, which became the tlmist of decision 
making.
The third part, reviews the legal options which were in place and which clearly 
adjudicate an incident such as this one. What this seeks to establish, is that there were 
clear-cut legal mechanism applicable to the case.
If the law had worked the way it was set out to, then Hamadei should have been 
extradited. The reasons behind why he was not - are why the Hamadei example is 
significant to the study of compliance, and how that in turn affects the strength o f the 
extradition regime.
 ^ The most significant piece o f  legislation passed in 1986 was a result o f  the Achille Lauro hijacking. The 
International Maritime Organization (IMG) acting on a U.S. initiative passed The Maratime Saftey Act, a measure 
to insure the protection o f  passengers and crews aboard ships.
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5.2 The Hamadei Case
”[T]he American people are not - 1 repeat not - going to tolerate intimidation, terror, 
and outright acts o f war against this nation and its people. And we're especially not 
going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection o f 
misfits, looney toons, and squalid criminals since the advent o f the Third Reich.
Hostage taking has some very clear advantages, especially to a politically violent 
'terrorist' group. One of the clear aims of terrorism is to call attention to a particular 
cause. This is greatly assisted by involving hostages.^ Now, you have something to 
call attention with, 'live bait' if you will, and for as long they remain, then so does the 
attention. Focused, inquisitive, immersed, attention, which is exactly what tlie 
media^o gave the TWA 847 incident for seventeen days.^i Hostage taking adds 
drama. For the state, in this case the U.S., the question is; when the lives o f ordinaiy 
citizens are at stake, how does a state choose between its responsibility to its citizens, 
and responsibility to its policies? For the terrorist, the objective is how to render the 
most powerful nation in the world - powerless. The drama then unfolds around the 
standoff. A hostage situation is not 'indefinite', but the idea is to force demands, then 
get away safely, within an allotted amount of time. The challenge for the state, is 
resist demands, rescue the victims, and emerge victorious against teiTorism. 
Unfortunately, it doesn't always work that way, and TWA 847 was not the exception.
® President Ronald Reagan's remarks to the American Bar Association, July 8, 1985.
 ^ See: Political Hostage-Taking as a N ew  Form o f  Crisis; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 'When Tenorists Take 
Hostages', New York Times, June 27, 1985.
**5 For more discussion on terrorism and the media see: M Tugwell, Teixorism and Propaganda: Problem and 
Response and R D Crelinsten, Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communications 
Structure, both in Paul Wilkinson and A M Steward eds. Contemporary Research On Teixorism, (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, 1987).
 ^* See: The Michigan State University Study discussing the amount o f  media coverage which was given to the 
TW A 847 incident, over som e 729 minutes over seventeen days: Tony Atwater, Terrorism and the News Media 
Research Project: Network Evening News Coverage o f  the TWA Hostage Crisis, Mass Communication and 
Society Division o f  the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Boston, MA, 1986
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On June 14, 1985, Trans World Airlines flight 847, en route from Cairo to Rome 
landed for a scheduled stop in Athens. Within minutes after the flight's departure, 
the plane carrying 153 passengers and crew, 100 of whom were American citizens, 
was taken over by two Lebanese members of the radical Shi'ite group Hezbollah, 
and forced to fly to B e i r u t .  Brandishing grenades and pistols, they demanded the 
release of 766 Shi'ite prisoners held in Israel, many of whom were captured during the 
recent Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. The two men, who would later be 
identified as Mohammed Ali Hamadei and Hasan Izzaldin, thi'eatened to kill all the 
passengers and blow up the plan if  their demands were not met.*^
Once in Beirut, the hijackers exchanged food and fuel for passengers, mostly 
women and children, then forced the pilot, Capt. John Testrake, to fly to Algeria 
where more passengers were released. The plane took off again for Beirut where the
The Boeing 727 had landed in Athens to take on additional passengers, among o f  which numbered several 
members o f  the Roman Catholic church, and two young Arab men in their early 20's, initially identified as Ahmed 
Gharbiyeh and Ali Youness, both Lebanese. The two had managed to smuggle on board two grenades and a 9- 
mm pistol undetected by wrapping them in fiberglass insulation.
A third member of the group, unable to board the flight, was captured later at Athens aiiport and 
identified as Ali Atweh, a 21 year old Lebanese caiTying a fake Moroccan passport. See: ‘Journey of 
Flight 847: A Logbook o f Tenor', N ew York Times, June 17, 1985.
The initial demands were to fly to Algeria, but the aircraft lacked fuel. After explaining this to the 
hijackers, tliey demanded Cairo, then Beirut. See: Ibid.
In June 1982, Israeli troops invaded Lebanon. By spring 1985, they began to withdraw to a security 
zone they had established in the southern part of Lebanon. During the withdrawal, tenorists attacked 
had increased on Israelis and their client force the SLA (Christian Southern Lebanese Army). As a 
result, Israeli troops detained people they suspected o f terrorist involvement in southern Lebanon in 
makeshift prisons inside Lebanon. As they continued to pull back, the prisoners were moved from the 
makeshift camps to Atlit prison in Israel. A large majority of these prisoners were Lebanese Shi'ites, 
and it was the Lebanese Shi'ite community which sought the release o f all o f the Atlit prisoners. See: 
Rodney A. Snyder, Negotiating With Terrorists: TWA Flight 847, Pew Case Studies in International 
Affairs, Case 333, (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Diplomacy), 1994, p. 1
'*5 Don Podesta, 'Hijackers Hold Americans on TWA Jet', Washington Post, June 15, 1985.
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hijackers made good use of the empty space by bringing on additional Amal militia, 5? 
before taking off, again, for Algiers.
The hijacking segment of the crisis lasted for two days, with the plane moving 
constantly between Beirut and Algeria. During its second stop in Beimt U.S. Navy 
diver, Robert Stethem was brutally beaten by one of the hijackers, Mohamed 
Hamadei. In front of a swarming international media*® he was shot in the head and 
his body thrown onto the tannac at Beirut airport as the plane was taking off, again, 
for Algeria.*^ On the aircraft's final landing in Beimt, all but 39 hostages were 
released,^® and the second phase of the incident began, the hostage crisis. The 
remaining 39 passengers were handed over to waiting Amal militiamen^’ who held 
them in various locations thi'oughout Beirut over a period of seventeen days.
TWA 847 was the second major hijacking incident for the Reagan administration. 
Only six months earlier, terrorist had seized a Kuwaiti airliner and forced it to fly to 
Iran.22 Once in Tehran, they tortured and killed two American passengers while
*2 A less radical faction o f  the Shi'a movement, founded in 1974 by Shi'a cleric Imam Musa al-Sadr who 
organized the 'Movement o f  the Undeiprivileged' to 'advance Shi'a interests and improve the community's lowly  
socio-econom ic conditions'. See; B m ce Hoffman, Shi'a Terrorism, The Conflict in Lebanon and the Hijacking o f  
TWA Flight 847, Rand Document P -7116, July 1985, p. 2.
*® This was without a doubt a huge media spectacular. The incident caught top headlines and television news 
broadcasts for weeks throughout the entire crisis. This kind o f  attention was exactly the intention o f  the terrorists, 
and arguably, o f  terrorism itself. State Department legal advisor comments to this effect, "The hijackers sought 
publicity, and they got it. The world was treated to a media extravaganza that gave irrisponsibility and 
tastelessness a new meaning." Abraham Sofaer, Fighting Terrorism Through Law, Department o f  State Bulletin, 
October 1985, p. 38.
'Arabs Seize U.S. Airliner; 1 Killed', Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1985; Robeit Fisk, 'Lebanese gunmen shoot 
passenger on hijacked plane', The London Times, June 15, 1985.
20 Michael Dobbs, 'Hijackers Release 64 in Algeria, Set New  Deadline', Washington Post, June 16, 1985.
2 ’ Joseph Berger, 'Days o f  Mideast Teixor: The Joruney o f  Flight 847', New York Times, June 22, 1985.
22 T 55 On A Jetliner Hijacked to Iran', N ew York Times, December 5, 1984; 'Hijackers In Iran Reported to Kill 
Two More On Jet', New York Times, December 7, 1984.
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demanding the release of seventeen Shi'ite prisoners from K u w a i t . 2 3  Although the 
aircraft lay stationaiy in Tehran for six days, no plans for a rescue attempt were 
made.24 Nor were there any attempts to rescue the half a dozen American hostages 
which had been taken during a series of kidnappings from December 1984 and June 
1985. At the time of the TWA 847 hijacking, the previous six months had left thiee 
Americans d e a d , 2 5  and five as h o s t a g e s ^ o  to terrorist incidents in the Middle East.
There were not a lot of options open to the U.S. during the TWA crisis. A rescue 
operation was almost impossible because the aircraft was in constant motion.2? In 
addition to which, the U.S. received almost no support from its allies. The prospect of 
militaiy action ostricised both Italy, who delayed granting pemiission for U.S. troops 
landing at Sigonella,2s and Algeria, who refused to tolerate any military action on 
Algerian soil. In fact the TWA flight was allowed to leave Algiers for Beirut once 
press speculation hinted that an American commando rescue team was heading for the
22 John Kohan, 'Honor Aboard Flight 221 - Gun-toting tenorists bring murder and mayhem to a hijacked Kuwaiti 
Airbus', Time, December 17, i 984.
24 Teixence Smith, 'The "Shultz Doctrine" is Rendered Moot In Iran', New York Times, December 16, 1985.
2  ^ One o f  these was CIA C hief o f  Station William Buckley, captured by the Islamic Jihad and subject to 
prolonged torture before he died on June 3, 1985 from torture and lack o f  medical treatment.
2  ^3 December 1984; Peter Kilburn, American University at Beirut
8 Januaiy 1985; Reverend Martin L. Jenco, Catholic R elief Service in Beirut 
16 March 1985; Teriy Anderson, Associated Press Correspondant
28 May 1985; David Jacobsen, American University at Beirut Hospital Director
9 June 1986; Thomas Sutherland, American University at Beirut.
22 Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, claims one possible reason the hijackers continuosly shuttled back and 
forth was because o f  the successful rescue operations conducted at Entebbe and Mogadishu - and to remain in one 
place for an extended period o f  time may be risky. In addition to which, media reports o f  U.S. Delta Force troops 
were ready to assemble and fly to the planes location. See; Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy. 
(Boston; Houghton M ifflin Company, 1991), p. 190. Hereinafter; DEMOCRACY.
2  ^ George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, My Years as Secretaiv o f State. (New York: Charles Scribner's and 
Sons, 1995), p. 655. Herinafter, TURMOIL.
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Mediterranean region.29 Algerian President Chadli Bendjedi was not only adamant 
about not wanting an American military presence on the ground, but neither did he 
want the embarrassment of declining U.S. troops on his temtory .20 Getting 'rid' o f the 
aircraft, was the easiest way out. The other Arab nations, not surprisingly, were not 
of any assistance at all.2* So Reagan's choices were to either ‘wait or see', which was 
umealistic, or to strike a deal for the hostages. Although it represented a break in U.S. 
policy, the latter was what the administration eventually opted for, which would also 
depend on the cooperation of the Israelis.
The Israeli govermnent was not entirely opposed to the release of the Shi'ite 
prisoners; in fact they were already in the process of releasing many of them on 
account of holding them under 'questionable' circu m stan ces .22 Some 300 prisoners 
had been released before the hijacking even took place.^2 Over time the rest would 
have eventually been freed. However, if  the United States was prepared to ask the 
Israeli's to release the remaining prisoners, then Israel was prepared to do so, but only 
i f  the U.S. requested them to do so. '^  ^ Israel placed tliis onus on the U.S. primarily 
because it exonerated the Israeli govermnent of responsibility. The U.S. opposed this
2  ^William M. Carley, 'Tenor Aloft, Anatomy o f  a Hijacking Is A Tale o f  Misadventure And Anguish for TWA', 
Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1987.
20 TURMOIL, p. 656
2* W illiam L. Chaze, Robert S. Dudney, James N. Wallace, Joseph P. Shapiro, Dennis Mullen, 'Reagan's Hostage 
Crisis', U.S. New s and World Report, July 1, 1985.
22 This was a clear violation o f  The Fourth Geneva Convention dealing with with treatment o f  civilians in 
wartime.
22 Dan Fisher, 'Reagan Warning; Hijackers, Beware Israel May Free Shia Detainees if  U.S. Asks', Los Angeles 
Times, June 17, 1985.
24 Mary Curtius, 'Israel searching for way out o f imapsse, Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1985.
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since 1) such a request would be an outright disownment of their policy, and 2) the 
belief that it could potentially lead to future hostage incidents.25
The U.S. viewpoint was that a concession such as this as placed Americans all 
over the world in danger. This was a clear concern of Reagan's and the underlying 
reason for his position: "[t]he decision isn't so simple as just trading prisoners. The 
decision is, at what point can you pay off the ten*orists without endangering people 
from here on out once they find out that their tactics succeed."26 It was clear that 
neither the U.S. nor IsraeP? wanted to been seen as making a deal with the hijackers. 
So the alternative was to not be seen, which was the wisdom behind the negotiations 
would take place between the U.S. and Israel. An elaborate 'face-saving' manoeuvre 
to maintain the integrity of both nation's 'no concessions' policy.28
5.2.1 The Good and the Bad o f  No Concessions'
The terrorists say to us, “Look, it’s very simple. Change your policy, and no more 
planes are hijacked. Figure out a way to give us what we want and no more children 
will be killed. We 7/ release your hostages if you free our brothers or pay us ransom. 
After all, injustice has made us desperate. ” That’s the con job they try to put over on 
you.^^
There are advantages to a 'no concessions' policy.^o It looks good for a 
government to be able to stand firm to terrorist demands, and comforting for a nation
26 George D. Moffett III and Peter Grier, 'Hijack confronted US and Israel with agonizing choices', Christian  
Science M onitor, hmQ 17, 1985.
26 TURMOIL, p. 656
22 Mary Curtius, ‘Israel searching for way out o f  im passe’, Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1985 
2® 'What Price For the Hostages', U.S. News and World Report, July 8, 1985.
2^ Address by Secretary o f State George P. Schultz to the Anti-Defamation League o f  the B ’nai B ’rith, February 
12, 1988.
1 6 6
to see their government 'unwavering' to a group of radical criminals. By maintaining 
a strong stance, also invites the possibility of support from other like-minded nations 
with similar anti-terrorism policy. Alternatively, negotiating concessions can 
minimize risk, and potentially prevents escalation of a crisis. But these are short-term 
perks, not long-term strategy.
In the long run, the advantages are considerably less for arguing concessions; a 
hard lesson the U.S. learned when it exchanged arms with Iran for the release hostages 
held in Lebanon.^* The hostages were released, then replaced with new hostages, and 
the dealings only provided later embarrassment for the Reagan administration.^^ 
There really is no sustainable argument that by 'not' negotiating concessions may only 
lead to larger groups of hostages taken in the future.43 If  concessions prove 
advantageous for the terrorist, either financially, or in the form of released prisoners, 
then there's nothing to say this would not provide a successful precedent for future 
incidents. Having said this, it seems apparent that the most beneficial long-tenn 
policy would be that of 'no concessions'. A nation, which relents to violent groups, 
only encourages like behaviour in the future.
A 'no-concessions' policy may also suggest the possibility of an armed assault. A 
state unwilling to negotiate will end the crisis on their own tenns even if  it means 
mounting an assault on foreign temtoiy. Wliile this was not a successful option for 
the U.S. in the Achille Lauro incident, it is, for example, a favoured tactic of the
40 For a greater discussion o f  this see: Philip Heyniann, Terrorism and America. A  Commonsense Strategy for a 
Democratic Society. (Cambridge, Massachusetts; The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 40-46. Herinafter, TERRORISM,
4 ’ See; Oliver L. North with William Novak, Under Fire, (New York; Harper Collins Publishers, 1991).
42 Ibid.
167
Israelis, whose mixed-bag policy of no-concessions and negotiation are 'incident-
dependent'.44
It has long been Israeli policy46 toward hostage incidents in other than friendly, 
cooperative states that if there remains a possibility for a rescue attempt, no 
concessions will be made. And they have often mounted successful rescue attempts, 
such as in Entebbe.46 However, if hostages are held in hostile territory, where no 
chance of a rescue operation is possible, then the Israelis will opt for negotiation. 
This has been rare, as it is a generally held belief that if  the terrorist group succeeds 
with such tactics, then future threats will only follow. Which is likely to be true, 
especially in the case of Israel and their problems historically with teiTorism.42
A policy of this sort is not without fonnidable risk. Realistically, only countries 
with the diplomatic and military capabilities to do so, can viably opt to mount a rescue 
operation. It would stand to reason that the U.S. then would be better apt to mount a 
hostage-rescue operation than to secure a 'no concessions' promise fr om a Host State. 
But the cards do not always fall that way. A rescue attempt is not likely to succeed if, 
for example, the Host State is sympathetic to the tenorist cause. Or, if  the Host State 
is 'hostile' toward the U.S. Or, if  the state is a sponsor of terrorism. In such cases, 
more likely than not, trade-offs will be made, especially if  there is just no 'safe' way 
of dealing with the incident. This inherently creates a problem for decision-makers
42 TERRORISM, p. 40.
44 Thomas Friedman, 'The Quandty for Israel', New York Times, June 22, 1985.
46 See: Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism, How Democracies Can Defeat Dom estic and International
TeiTorists, (New York: The Noonday Press, 1995).
46 Anthony Clark Arend & Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use o f  Force, (Routledge, 1993), p. 99
42 Benjamin Netanyahu, FIGHTING TERRORISM, pp. 99-120.
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that must weigh the cost of threaf*^ against the cost of com p lian ce ,49 and ultimately, 
how this effects the potential for future terrorist attack.^® 
5.2.2 The Art o f  the Deal
Reagan was "acting the part o f John Wayne, a lone rider demanding Western 
justice. " Fortunately, he said, "Washington operates on two wave-lengths: one o f 
the president, who says 'Hold firm, ' and the other o f the back-chatmel bureaucracy, 
which is trying to work out a deal.
For U.S. decision-makers, an intricate series of'non-negotiations' took place, only 
to shroud the deal that was 'not supposed to be a deal' at all. The U.S. did not want to
I
give the appearance that the terrorists had succeeded, nor did they want to give the |
impression that targeting Americans could successfully pressure Israel.62 Which
iIwould have been a dangerous message. This was communicated to the Israelis, after j
Israel had made it known that the Shi’ite detainees would only be released if  the U.S. j
Imade a public appeal.62 Israel then brought it’s own policy back into focus, they |
would not release any of the Shi’ite’s even if the U.S. publicly requested they do so .64
4® The problem is actually two-fold, the "threat and the reality. Anyone can threaten any thing... [n]o capacity to 
cany out such a threat is required to make it. To make concessions without knowing if  the capacity or willingness 
are there would invite wholesale repetitions and the cost that would come with them." Ibid. p. 44.
49 "If the threat appears to be real, however, and the risk is catastrophe, it may be necessary to make the 
concessions." Ibid.
50 "[7]he crucial problem is to make sure that the threat cannot be repeated by the same group again and 
again...any concessions should be followed by major steps to make sure that similiar extortion cannot be carried 
out by other groups," Ibid.
6* Quoted from a senior Israeli official during the crisis. See; Russell Watson, 'The Hard Road to Freedom', 
Newsweek, July 8, 1985, p. 20.
62 Ze'ev Chafets, 'Why the U.S. Was a Target', New York Times, July 3, 1985.
62 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Israelis Say U.S. Must Ask If It Wants Shiites Released’, New York Times, June 18, 
1985.
64 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Israel and U.S. Apparently Resolve Some Differences on Hostage Crisis', New York 
Times, iune 22), 1985.
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If the Shi’ite prisoners were released, it would have no connection to the TWA 847 
incident. Further, Israel had no intention of speeding up the timetable for release of 
the hostages as part of a blackmail situation.
The Israeli position was a ‘cat and mouse’ game with their U.S. allies. Jerusalem 
was not about to place themselves in a position where the Reagan administiation 
could publicly maintain their hard-line policy, and privately let Israel be coerced by 
mounting moral pressure to release the prisoners for hostages. This ‘tension’ had 
much to do with the context in which the hijacking occurred. The withdrawal of 
Israel from southern Lebanon, and the recent release of 1,500 Palestinian prisoners for 
thi'ee Israeli soldiers,^^ under Shi’ite pressure had received criticism from the Reagan 
administration. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was now eager to see how his 
U.S. counterpart handled a similar situation. Still, the Israeli’s were not without 
praise for the U.S. on their frnn stance against terrorism.66
Israel and the U.S. both publicly pursue strong counter-terrorism policy, and 
neither side was about to let the press push them into making a deal, then chastise 
them for doing so. Neither party was about to appear as if  they were the one to stand 
down or make concessions. So what both the U.S. and Israel sought to accomplish 
was to keep their ‘public face’ while working privately to find a solution. The 
incident more likely impede any progress to release the Shi’ites. Israel was releasing 
them anyway, then halted after the hijackers demands and a glaring media focus 
placed them in a compromising position. Israel appealed to their own law to
66 Thomas L. Friedman, 'The Quandry for Israel', New York Times, June 22, 1985.
66 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Israelis Say U.S. Must Ask If It Wants Shiites Released', New York Times, June 18, 
1985.
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detennine how to proceed on the matter. Prime Minister Peres infomied the Reagan 
administration:
1. If the hijacking had not taken place, we would have continued with a gradual release 
of the detainees, depending upon developments in southern Lebanon.
2. We have not set a timetable for their release.
3. In view of the hijacking, we are not inclined to do this m a way that would appear to 
give in to the tenorists.
4. Israeli law says that detainees may appeal to a board headed by a district judge.
5. As the result of such an appeal board decision, we have to release some thirty-one 
detainees next week.
It should be noted that one-third of the detainees are not Shiites, but Palestinian members
of terrorist organizations apprehended in Lebanon.^^
This meant very simply, that some would be released, some would not, in accordance 
with Israeli law and as if  the hijacking never took place.
The U.S. had simultaneously been in contact with the Amal leader Nabih Bem,68 
who was involved with the hijackers on the ground and working as a middle man to 
try and end the crisis. Berri wanted to negotiate the release of all 766 Shi’ite 
prisoners,69 clearly not an option for the Israeli’s, but the Israeli’s were not about to 
negotiate with Bern. So the U.S. would relay Israel’s intentions to Berri, who would 
in turn relay Amal’s intentions for the hostages to the U.S.^o Using this method o f
62 t u r m o i l , p. 661
6® Nabhi Berri was the Shiite Moslem Leader o f  the Amal movement who previously had a 'working' relationship 
with the U.S. and national secrutiy affairs advisor Robert McFarlane during the mediation o f  the Lebanese Civil 
War. Berri became the negotiator after receiving a committment from the hijackers that the hostages would not be 
harmed if  their demands were met. Ben i, who was also the Shi'ite Justice Minister, and prominent politician in 
Lebanon, was asked by the hijackers to be the negotiator. See: Nora Boustany, 'Jet Back Again; 31 More 
Released', Washington Post, June 17, 1985; Lou Cannon and Josh M. Goshko, U.S. Officials Pessimistic on Swift 
Release, Washington Post, June 18, 1985. Berri, who also claims part time residence in Deerborne, Michigan, is a 
very 'pro-American' guy - and was probably the best possible option to get the hostages released. See: D oyle  
McManus, 'Ghosts o f  Iranian Hostage Crisis Could Haunt U.S. in Beirut Standoff, Los Angeles Times, June 18, 
1985.
69 Bernard Gwertzman, 'U.S. Is Reported to Be W eighing Shiite Offer on Moving Hostages', New York Times, 
June 27, 1985.
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communicating allowed some form of dialogue to take place without anyone actually 
‘negotiating’ for an outcome.
Reagan also turned to President Assad of Syria^’ to try and put pressure on Berri 
to end the crisis. This was a stretch for Reagan considering recent relations between 
Syria and the U.S. over the civil war in Lebanon^^ and especially since Syria’s policy 
was openly supportive of t e i T o r i s m . ^ ^  Assad in turn sent an envoy to Beirut. The 
participation of Syria became the turning point of the crisis. Assad attempted to 
negotiate a guarantee for the release of all the Lebanese prisoners following the 
release of the TWA passengers. U.S. response was amenable to this as long as there 
was no linkage to the two events.
Secretary of State George Schultz spelled this out in a communication to 
Damascus:
It has been the position o f the U.S. throughout this event that the hijacking and 
hostage talcing is preventing the planned I'elease by Israel o f Atlit prisoners. 
Therefore you may inform the Syrians that the President believes that Syria may be 
confident in expecting the release o f the Lebanese prisoners after the freeing o f the 
passengers o f TWA 847, without arty linkage between the two subjects.
6 ’ Doyle McManus, 'U.S. Wants 7 Beirut Kidnap Victims Released Also', Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1985.
62 For background and discussion and analysis on this see: Joseph Fromm, ‘Showdown With Syria’, U.S. News 
and World Report, December 19, 1983, ‘Lebanese Conflict - a -No-W in Situation for the U .S .’, U.S. News and  
W orld Report, October 10, 1983 and Douglas Watson, ‘In Lebanon, Hatreds Cloud Issues o f  Peace’, Ibid', Rashid 
I. Khalidi, Lebanon in the context o f  regional politics: Palestinian and Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis. 
Third World Quarterly, vol. 7, July 3, 1985; Marius K. Deeb, Lebanon: Prospects fo r  National Reconciliation in 
the M id-1980s, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, no. 2, Spring 1984, P olicy Options in Lebanon, Cuirent Policy 
No. 536, United States Department o f  State, Bureau o f  Public Affairs, January 11, 1984; David M. Kennedy and 
Richard Haass, The Reagan Administration and Lebanon, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case No. 
240, 1994. See also relevant chapters in: Eric Hammek The Root: the Marines in Beirut, (Orlando, Florida: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985); Caspar Weinberger, Fighting For Peace, Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, 
(New York: Warner Books, 1990).
62 Yohan Alexander, Special Report - Syria, The Politics o f  Terror, The World and I, February 1987, p. 16 
64 Ibid. p. 664. Emphasis added.
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Syria’s willingness to paiticipate may have been predicated on the concern of the U.S. 
use of force to secure the prisoners. U.S. warships were looming off the Lebanese 
coast and there was growing speculation from Washington that the U.S. had not ruled 
out the use of force or retaliation.65 Although there was no confimiation of this, 
Washington’s relative silence on the matter was enough to spark some consideration. 
IncuiTing a military attack from the U.S. was not in Syria’s best interest, or in the 
interest of other states in the region.
Assad assured Berri that his requests would be met, if  he sent the hostages to 
Damascus, the Israelis would release the prisoners from Atlit. Serving in this 
capacity, Syria would in effect, resolve the crisis. This also meant that Assad was 
putting himself out on a limb by negotiating with Iran and Hezbollah leaders, which 
could have stung him later on if there was a last minute 'change of heart' for the 
hijackers. Still, the U.S. had technically, not made any deals.
Ultimately, the hostages were rounded up and shuffled to Damascus, where they 
were later r e le a s e d .6 6  Hamadei and his accomplices were allowed to escape. Under 
intense media coverage, Assad basked in worldwide praise for Syria’s role in ending 
the c r is is .6 2  In turn, Israel gradually released the Atlit detainees over several months. 
This was likely more of a stretch than Israel had planned, or than Berri had hoped for, 
but by dragging this out made the end result look like less of a deal.
65 George D. M offett III and Peter Grier, 'Hijack confronted US and Israel with agonizing choices', Christian 
Science Monitor, June 17, 1985. See also: Bill Keller, 'Military Options Held in Reserve', New York Times, July 
2 ,1 9 8 5 .
66 Russell Watson, ‘The Hard Road to Freedom’, Newsweek, July 8, 1985, William Chaze, ‘Time for W eighing 
the Lessons’, U.S. News and World Report, July 2, 1985; Richard Stengel, ‘Sweet Land o f  Liberty’, Time, July 15, 
1985.
62 M aiy Curtius, 'How Syria extracted hostages from power struggle', Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1985.
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But why go tlirough a deal at all? Despite public affinuation of a ‘fiiiu stance 
against terrorism’, both the U.S. and Israel had a history of negotiating with terrorists. 
The recent swap of prisoners for Israeli soldiers and the previous three U.S. 
administrations were examples of this.68 Most of the American public was just happy 
to end the crisis, regardless if  Reagan had made a deal or not. The charade was less 
about accommodation than it was about establishing a pattern of behaviour. It was 
not in U.S. interest to contradict it’s ‘no deals’ policy; nor was it in their long-temi 
interest to bargain. But really, what happened here was that they did bargain, they did 
make a deal, they did abandon their policy, regardless if it wasn’t done publicly. They 
did not resort to force, they did not attempt a rescue, and they did not use political or 
economic pressure. They were not in any position to. Once more, as hindsight shows 
us, the teiTorists were not detened from using the U.S. in the future as a target. And 
in the end, the terrorists went free. Whether or not it would have been to the United 
States advantage to stick to their ‘no deals’ policy is a matter of hindsight as well. A 
standoff, or holding out, could very well have cost the hostages their lives, A rescue 
effort could have proved disastrous. There is no tangible evidence here that says U.S. 
efforts would necessarily preserve U.S. credibility.
What all this shows us is, that context and crisis profoundly affect decision 
making to the extent that states are willing to abandon their way of thinking, at least 
behind closed doors. This is especially true when a country has no clearly established 
strategy for dealing with this type of an incident. What this illusti'ates with regards to 
preventing terrorism is tliat a prolonged campaign can generally bring about a
Rand-St. Andrews Chronology o f  International Terrorism, 1994.
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relatively successful outcome, for the terrorist. In the end, Hamadei was successful. 
If U.S. intentions were to discourage friture use of this type of tactic, then it would 
have to abandon concession making. But to disguise concessions as something else is 
embaiTassing and ultimately ineffective and frirthennore does not necessarily illicit 
cooperation.69 The resolution of this incident had more to do with politically charged 
overarching efforts on a diplomatic level, not law, not strategy, and not force. 
Ultimately, the second half o f this case, Hamadei’s extradition, was not far removed 
from this same idea.
S. 3 The Extradition o f Hamadei
On 13 January 1987, nearly two years after the TWA 847 hijacking, customs 
officials in Frankfurt, West Gemiany arrested a Lebanese man carrying a forged 
passport under the name of Yousef Abdulkusser Rida.20 This was after customs 
inspectors, who were likely tipped off by U.S. intelligence officials,2 ' discovered he 
was carrying methyl nitrate, a substance similar to nitroglycerine, inside of wine 
bottles.22 Fingerprints linked him as one of the suspected hijackers of TWA 847, and 
he was later identified as Mohammed Ali Hamadei, one of the three terrorists named
69 John K. Cooley, ‘Hijacking emphasizes US need for friends in the third world’, Christian Science Monitor, 
June 18, 1985.
20 Hijacking Suspect Arrested in Frankfurt', FBIS, 15 Januaiy 1987.
2 ’ David M. Kennedy, Torsten Stein, Alfred P. Rubin, The Extradition o f  Mohammed Hamadei, Harvard 
International Law Journal vol. 31, 1990, pp. 7-9.
22 The suspect calimed he was unaware the wine bottles contained the explosive material, methyl nitrate - a 
similiar substance to nitroglycerine, that he was transporting them as a gift to a friend. See: Robert McCartney, 
'Hijacking Suspect Airested', Washington Post, January 16, 1987.
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in criminal complaints issued by the U.S. federal court, charged with air piracy and
murder.22
The United States Justice Department immediately drew up a provisional request 
for aiTest, along with a communication to the West Gennan govermnent asking them 
to retain Hamadei until a fomial request for extradition could be issued.24 This was 
sent to the State Department, who wired it to Bonn, Gennany where it was translated 
and delivered to the Foreign Ministry, in accordance with international legal 
procedure. The provisional arrest request formally establishes U.S. interest in 
Hamadei, if  the Germans acted upon this request; it would not be possible to release 
Hamadei, which is exactly what the U.S. wanted. The U.S. inter-agency process 
worked round the clock making sure this was an airtight agreement, which followed 
international legal procedure to the letter. The U.S. even gave their assurance that the 
death penalty would not be sought,^^ thus eliminating any possible reason the West 
Germans might have for refusing extradition.
Under the principle of aiit dedere aiit judicare, West Gennany had the legal right 
to refuse extradition, as is reflected by the West Gennan-US Extradition Treaty.26 
West Gennany also had a case for trying Hamadei under Gennan charges of passport 
fraud and explosives smuggling. Also, under the universal law principle. West
22 Warrants were issued in July 1985 for Mohammed Ali Hamadei, Hassan Izzaldin, and A li Atweh. A  fourth 
man, Imad Mughniyah was also wanted, charged with the mastermind o f  the hijacking, but did not take part in the 
actual events. See: William Tuohy, 'Suspect Seized in Hijacking o f  TWA Jet to Beirut in '85', Los Angeles Times, 
January 16, 1987.
24 Consistent with Article (3) o f  the U.S. W est Gennan Extradition Treaty.
25 'Death Penalty Issue Delays U.S. Extradition o f  Hijack Suspect', Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1987; Howard 
Kurtz, 'U.S. W aives Death For Hijack Suspect', Washington Post, January 19, 1987'; Marlene Cimons, 'Death 
Penalty Ruled Out in Hijack Case - M ove by U.S. Helps Clear Way for Bonn to Extradite Lebanese', Los Angeles 
Times, Januaiy 19, 1987.
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Gennany could try Hamadei for the TWA offences if  it chose to do so. Or, they could 
extradite him to the United States.
Following Hamadei's capture, West Gennan business executive Rudolf Cordes 
was kidnapped from Beimt in apparent retaliation for Hamadei's aiTest.22 Days later a 
second West Gennan businessman, Alfred Schmidt was abducted in Beirut as well 
and held together with Rudolf Cordes.?® The kidnappers, believed to be connected to 
the Hezbollah,?^ demanded an exchange, the release of the prisoners for Hamadei. 
Incredible pressure was now placed on the West Gennan govermnent. Despite 
diplomatic pressure from the United States to extradite,®’ West Gennany, following a 
six-month deliberation, decided to try Hamadei themselves for murder and air 
piracy. ®2
The basis of the West German decision for rejecting the U.S. request for 
extradition o f Mohammed Hamadei was predicated on the safety of the two West
26 The Treaty Concerning Extradition Between the United States and West Germany, June 20, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 
1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785. Hereinafter, EXTRADITION TREATY.
22 Rudolf Cordes was the first W est German to be abducted in Beirut, which first indicated the link between the 
arrest and the kidnapping. Since Hamadei's aixest, four attempts were made to abduct West German citizens in 
Beirut. See: H. Kurtz, 'U.S. W aives Death For Hijack Suspect, German Businessman Kidnaped in Beirut', 
Washington Post, January 19, 1987. See also: W. Tuohy, 'West German Businessman Seized in Beirut', Los 
Angeles Times, January 19, 1987.
2® Abducted 3 days later on Januaiy 20, 1987.
29 'How TWA arrest spurred kidnappings', USA Today, January 26, 1987.
®9 'The terror ante', Albany Knickerbocker News, January 28, 1987; 'Hostage Exchange?', Washington Post, 
January 29, 1987.
®’ 'Hamadei extr adition bogs down', Washington Times, January 23, 1987; 'A test for West Germany',
Philadephia Inquirer, April 6, 1987, 'Less Tenor ism Talk', Kansas City Times, April 16, 1987; 'The Gemians and 
the TWA Killer', Washington Post, May 28, 1987; 'Coordinating appeasement', Washington Times, June 12, 1987; 
William Tuohy, 'Bonn Clarifies Its Stand on Accused Lebanese Terrorist', Los Angeles Times, June 14, 1987.
®2 'Bonn offers deal to Lebanese kidnapper s', Christian Science Monitor, May 26, 1987; Serge Schmemann, 
'Hamadei to Stay in Germany; Bonn to Try Him in Hijacking', New York Times, June 25, 1987. For U.S. r eaction 
see: Leslie Maitland Werner*, 'U.S. Appears to Concede on Effort To Extradite T.W.A. Jet Hijacking', New York
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Gennan hostages,®2 and the fear of further tenorist reprisals.®4 This is a very real 
problem for compliance when it concerns tenorist extradition. One year following the 
TWA incident, and a full year before Hamadei was actually captured, France had 
ignored a U.S. request to hold Hamadei. The U.S. petitioned France to detain and 
prosecute Hamadei after U.S. intelligence officials learned he was planning to enter 
France. French officials allegedly knew Hamadei was a member of a radical 
Palestinian group, but failed to make the anest. This was likely based on France's 
continuing diplomatic efforts to try and secure the release of four French hostages in
Lebanon.®^
West Germany's legal position was if  they were to try Hamadei for explosives 
smuggling the maximum sentence he could serve would be six years, after which he 
would still be available to the U.S. for extradition.®^ If they were to try him for air 
piracy murder, and hostage taking, he would be ineligible for extradition under the 
double jeopardy rule, which disallows a fugitive to be tried twice for the same crime.®^ 
By rejecting the U.S. request, Hamadei would likely face a less hostile trial in West
Times, June 23, 1987; 'Meese, in West Germany, accepts decision on Hamadi', Washington Times, June 24, 1987; 
Steven V. Roberts, "No Deal' for Accused Hijacker, Bonn Assures', Mew York Times, June 25, 1987.
®2 'Aide Says Threat Led Bonn To Bar Hamadei Extradition', Washington Post, Januaiy 27, 1988.
®4 ‘W est Germany’s fear’, Norfolk Virginia P ilot, June 25, 1987, p. 10. ; ‘Lessons from a terrorist’, San D iego  
Union, June 26, 1987, p. B-6; ‘Aide Says Threat Led Bonn To Bar Hamadei Extradition’, Washington Post, 
Januaiy 27, 1988; ‘Bonn Fears Reprisals for Hammadi’, International H erald Tribune, May 19, 1989.
®5 'Paris Reportedly Ignored U.S. Request to Hold Hijacking Suspect', Los Angeles Times, March 15, 1986.
®6 Elizabeth Pond, 'Bonn expected to try Hamadei first, then decide on extradition', Christian Science Monitor, 
February 10, 1987.
®2 W hile dual criminality for the offence must exist for extradition to take place, in the case o f nationals, there is 
not a requirement that would prevent charges from occurring in two separate states under the principle o f  
nationality. There is currently, no existing international rule o f  non bis in idem  or double jeopardy. See: G eoff 
Gilbert, Aspects o f  Extradition Law, (Doerdrecht: Maitinus Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 98-99. As noted by L.C. Green, 
that because different states have different legal systems, however, the plea o f  double jeopardy cannot arise. See: 
L.C. Green, International Crimes and the Legal Process, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 29, p.
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Germany than the United States. This was also politically beneficial for West 
Gennany since the pressure exerted from Beimt was to prevent Hamadei's extradition 
in the first place. This was the best alternative in light of the pressure for a 'hostage 
swap'.®®
The West Gennan decision to try Hamadei was not without merit, in espective of 
the hostage incident. There were also arguments against Hamadei’s extradition 
entirely, which could have been accepted, and his extradition prevented based on 
admissibility of evidence. Foremost of these arguments, was the case for political 
offence.
The political offence exception clause relates to offences, which are either 
‘purely’ or ‘relatively’ political.®9 There need only a tenuous connection of political 
motivation toward an ordinary crime for an offence to qualify for this exemption.^o In 
the absence of a treaty-based definition, the courts are free to develop their own 
interpretation, and supply their own doctrine.^’ The U.S.-West German Extradition
567. The U.S. W. Gennan Extradition treaty, however, does have provisions for double jeporady. See: 
EXTRADITION TREATY, Article (2).
®® Hezbollah tenorists threatened to kill the two W est German hostages if  Hamadei was handed over the U.S..
See: N. Boustany, 'West Germans' Captors Praise M ove by Bonn', Washington Post, July 9, 1987. See also: 
‘Hostage Exchange’, Washington Post, Januaiy 29, 1987.
®9 Extradition Treaty Article (4)
99 See: Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offence Exemption in the Suppression o f  Terrorism, 
Indiana Law Journal, V. 67, No. 3, 1992; G oeff Gilbert, ASPECTS; M.C. Bassiouni, The Political Offence 
Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, Terrorism and Political Crimes no. 398, 1975; M. Kelly, The Political 
Offence Exemption to Extradition: Protecting the Right o f  Rebellion in an Era o f  International Political Violence, 
66 Oregon Law Review 405, 1987
9 ’ Catherine Currin, Extradition Reform and the Statutoiy Definition o f  Political Offence, Virginia Journal o f  
International Law, Vol 24, 1984; Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offence in International Practice, 57 
American Journal o f  International Law 1, 1963; M. Whiteman, Digest o f  International Law, 1968; M. Cher if  
Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offences and the Political Offences Exception in Extradition - A  Proposed 
Juridicial Standard for a Unruly Problem, DePaul Law Review. Vol. 19, no. 2, Winter 1969; Kenneth S. Sternberg 
and David L. Skelding, State Department Determinations o f  Political Offences: Death ICnell for the Political 
Offence Exception in Exti adition Law, Case Western Resei-ve Journal o f  International Law, Vo. 15, 1983; Lora L.
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Treaty supplies no definition of political oftence^^ but allows each state to use 
discretion to apply its own qualification of political offence. Hamadei could easily 
claim the crime was part and parcel of a war of liberation against Israel and it’s 
primary western ally, the United States. That his actions were aimed against foreign 
occupation of Lebanon, and the release of Lebanese nationals. If a Gennan court 
mled the offence ‘political’, there would be no option to extradite. And since there is 
no ‘correct’ definition of what constitutes a political offence, this argument would not 
be unfounded.
How this would be determined, however, would be a case for West Gennan 
domestic law.92 There are ways to ‘limit the scope’ of political offence, for example 
by specifically stating those offences which do not qualify for political exception. 
Under the Extradition Treaty, there exists a clause, which requires that ‘Contracting 
Parties or the Requesting State have the obligation to prosecute by reason of a multi­
lateral international agreement’.94 This would apply specifically to the TWA 847 
incident in tenns of hostage taking.95 In tenns of hijacking, this is also mandated by
Deere, Political Offence in the Law and Practice o f  Extradition, American Journal o f  International Law, vol. 27, 
1933.
92 Article 4(3) only specifies offences, which are not considered to be political, such as murder or ‘willful crime’ 
against “the life or physical integrity o f  a Head o f  State or Head o f  Government o f  one o f  the Conti acting Parties, 
or o f  a member o f  his family”. Also, i f  it is an “offence which the Contracting Parties or the Requesting State 
have the obligation to prosecute by reason o f  a multilateral international agreement.”
92 For analysis o f  issue decided in the domestic Gennan courts see: HARVARD JOURNAL, pps. 22-23: ‘[T]he 
issue in domestic courts has been greatly influenced by the definition in the predecessor to the current IRG, the 
Deutsches Auslieferungsgesetz (DAG) o f  1929.. ..provided that the offence was political if  immediately directed 
against the existence or security o f  a state.. ..[a] related political offence was defined as one meant to support, 
prepare, further, secure, or conceal a political offence.. ..[u]nder both definitions, the motive asserted by the 
defendant in not decisive, but it is a factor to be considered along with the objective nature o f  the offence.’
94 Extradition Treaty, article 4(3)(b). See also, HARVARD JOURNAL at note 98.
95 This would be covered specifically by the Hostages Convention o f  1979. See: International Convention 
Against the Taking o f Hostages, December 17, 1979, Hereinafter, HOSTAGES CONVENTION.
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the Extradition Treaty to not include the political exception clause.96 Whether this 
can in fact be applied to the murder o f Robert Stetham, is a separate case.
It is arguable, that murder is not the same offence as hostage taking, or aircraft 
piracy, but in a separate category from these offences. Even under the Extradition 
Treaty, apart from the attentat clause,9? (which cannot be considered as part o f this 
case anyway), does not cover a provision for murder. Murder, per se, is not an 
offence that either West Gennany or the U.S. have obligation to prosecute under any 
international multilateral agi*eement.9® If Hamadei were successful in his bid for 
political offence, it does not imply that Robert Stetham’s murder would not be 
considered a part of a political crime, however, it does not imply that it cannot be 
considered as such.99
The question is not whether Stetham’s murder was part o f hijacking, but whether 
it was incidental to the h i j a c k i n g .  *90 The latter, would require extradition or 
prosecution under the Montreal Convention for ‘aggravated aircraft p iracy ’.*91 Still,
96 Article 4(3), which also refers to Hostage Taking.
92 The attentat clause is defined as a provision, which covers an attempt on the life o f  a Head o f State, and is not 
considered a political crime for the purpose o f extradition.
9® This exact point is reiterated in the Kennedy, Stein, Rubin, article “The Extradition o f  Mohammed Hamadei”, 
on page 24, 2, in a discussion o f  the West German view o f  the Hamadei case, and the rational behind whether or 
not to extradite.
99 Ibid.
’99 Under both U.S. law and W est German law, provide for wrongful death as a result o f  aircraft piracy. U.S. law  
imposes either life imprisonment or the death penalty for a crime committed where the ‘death o f  another person 
resulted from the commission or attempted commission o f the offence. See: 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)(l)(b), 1982. 
Under West German law, death must be recklessly cause by the offence. See: HARVARD JOURNAL, p. 25, and 
at notes 110-112.
’9 ’ Convention for the Suppression o f  Unlawful Acts Against the Safety o f  Civil Aviation, September 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, at Articles 1-7. Hereinafter, The Montreal Convention. See also HARVARD  
JOURNAL, at p. 24, ‘[DJifficulty arises from the language o f  the Montreal Convention, which leaves to the 
Contracting States the task o f  defining in detail the offences punishable on board an aircraft in flight if  that act is 
likely to endanger the safety o f  that aircraft. Stetham’s murder was undoubtedly an act o f  violence and the aircraft
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in light of the overlapping nature of domestic law -v- international conventions, it 
was open for Hamadei to argue that Stetham’s death was actually an unrelated 
incident to the hijacking, and merely an incidental occuiTence which happened at the 
time of the hijacking. This probably would not have been successful. If the request 
for extradition hinged upon whether or not murder was a political offence, it is more 
likely than not, tliat the act would have been judged as purely criminal since Robert 
Stetham was merely an innocent passenger.
Hamadei also had the option of using the ‘military offence’ provision found in 
the Extradition Treaty. *92 Much like the political offence clause, however, there is no 
real standing definition of a military offence. If the hijacking were to be viewed as 
part of a military act, then extradition would have been barred. However, it is 
unlikely, as a practical matter, this would have occurred under West German 
application of the clause.
Taking all of this into account, there was little chance that the U.S. would 
succeed in a bid for extradition for the murder of Robert Stetham. This is a relevant 
point. On the grounds of speciality,*93 a fugitive is prosecuted only for offences for 
which extradition is granted. If extradition were denied for any one of the charges
was technically ‘in flight’. Nonetheless.. .Stetham was shot while TWA 847 was on the ground in Beirut. It is at 
least arguable that this act did not endanger the safety o f the aircraft.’ And at notes 106-108.
*92 e x t r a d i t i o n  TREATY, Article 5.
*93 The principle o f  speciality is accepted by all states as part o f  the basic ground rules for extradition. As defined 
by G eoff Gilbert:
“a fugitive shall only be tried in the requesting state for those offences for which e was suixendered. Any offence  
not disclosed in the request, which occurred before surrender is, thus, no longer capable o f  prosecution.
Effectively, the fugitive receives immunity through the extradition laws. However, the principle o f  specialty goes 
beyond protecting the fugitive’s rights. W hile it prevents a fugitive being requested for one offence and tried for 
another, it also upholds the contiactual nature o f  the agreement between the tow states in that the requesting state 
has to accept that the asylum state has granted extradition for the specified offences and no others.”
See: Gilbert, ASPECTS, p. 106.
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against Hamadei, then the other charges pending would prove ‘unextraditable’ as well. 
The only exception would be on the charge of hostage taking alone, which under 
convention law, could not be denied.
5.3.1 Hamadei's Legal Status
West Gennany handed down an indictment to try Hamadei, *94 but discrepancy 
regarding his age would determine if he was to be tried in a juvenile court since he 
was allegedly under 21*95 ^t the time the hijacking occuned.*96 The decision was 
predicated on two developments. First was the discrepancy in birth dates. Lawyers 
for Hamadei claimed he was only 16 at the time of the hijacking. Lawyers for the 
prosecution unearthed documentation, which showed Hamadei would have been 21 
on the eve of the hijacking allowing him to be tried as an adult. Under West German 
law, a defendant is considered a juvenile between the ages of 14-18, at which point the 
maximum penalty sentence would be 10 years.*92 From 18-21,*9® the law considers a 
defendant to be a ‘young adult’, which cames a substantially greater amount of 
leniency afforded on behalf of the courts in tenns of sentencing. *99
Second, while the courts rejected the Defendant’s claim to be only 16 years of 
age, it mled that Hamadei was in fact under the age of 21 during the planning phases
*94 'W. Germany Indicts Arab in Fatal 1985 TW A Hijacking', Los Angeles Times, Februaiy 9, 1988.
*95 Serge Schmemann, 'Gemians Send Hijacking Suspect In T.W.A. Case to Juvenile Court, New York Times, 
April 13, 1988.
196 'Hamadi, A ge 23, To Be Tried as Juvenile', Washington Times, April 13, 1988.
*92 Ibid.
198 Peisons between the ages o f  18 and 21 receive special treatment under West German law. See: R.J. 
McCartney, 'Lebanese Accused o f  Killing U.S. Navy Diver to Go on Trial', Washington Post, July 5, 1988.
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of the hijacking. Therefore his actual age at the time the crime was committed was not 
taken into account, rather his age during the premeditation phase of the incident.
Were Hamadei to be found guilty in a juvenile court, the maximum sentence 
imposed would be 15 years, relatively short in comparison to the life sentence which 
his crimes would be punishable for if  tried in an adult court, ^
5.4 Legal Mechanisms in Place
There were several legal mechanisms solidly in place under which extradition 
could have occuned. The U.S.-West German Extradition Treaty, which was the 
primary document refeired to, and the one which has iimnediate precedence. The 
Hague Convention, The Montreal Convention, and the Hostages Convention were 
also applicable to the incident, and which both the United States and West Gennany 
were signatories to. ^  ^
5.4.1 The U.S. — West German Extradition Treaty
The relevant articles under the U.S.-West Gennan Extradition Treaty are viewed 
here as divided into two categories. First, the conditions under which extradition can 
take place. Second, the procedures that are implemented through d i p l o m a c y . *
***^  See; Los Angeles Times, April 13, 1988
* *** S. Schmeinann, 'Germans Send Hijacking Suspect In T.W.A. Case to Juvenile Court', N ew  York Times, April 
13 ,1988.
* * * Moreover, West Germany was the counti-y which had initiated the hostage-taking convention at the U.N.
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5.4.1.1 Obligation
The conditions that govern extradition rely on obligation. Both the obligation of 
the requested state to extradite, and the type of offence which require extradition, are 
subject to the Extradition Treaty. This is established in Article 1 of the Extradition 
Treaty, which agrees that when persons charged with an offence in one state are found 
in the other state, the requested state has an obligation to extradite.*
When the West German govermnent detained Hamadei, the U.S. prepared a 
formal indictment against him as well as the other hijackers on the main charges of 
murder and air piracy, along with several other infractions of U.S. code.**4 On the 
basis of this, the U.S. satisfied the condition of obligation.
Article 2 of the Extradition Treaty defines extraditable offences. Under the 
treaty, the offences described within the Article are punishable by the laws of both
* *^  Mark A. Synnes, The Attempted Extradition o f  Mohammed Hamadei; Discretion and the U.S.-W est German 
Extradition Treaty, W isconsin International Law Journal, 1989, p. 133
* *^  Article 1 o f  the treaty states;
The Contracting Parties agree to extradite each other subject to the provisions described in 
this Treaty persons found in the territoiy o f one o f  the Conti acting Parties who have been charged with an offence  
or are wanted by the other Contracting Party for the enforcement o f  a judicially pronounced penalty or detention 
order for an offence committed within the territory o f  the Requesting State.
When the offence has been committed outside the territoiy o f  the Requesting State, the 
Requested State shall grant extradition subject to the provisions described in this Treaty if  either, 
its laws would provide for the punishment o f  such an offence committed in similar 
circumstances, or
(b) the person whose extradition is requested is a national o f  the Requesting State.
* *“^ Other violations include;
18 U.S.C. § 32(a), 1982; Destmction o f  aircraft or aircraft facilities 
18 U.S.C. §113, 1982; Assaults within maritime and territorial jurisdiction
(a) Assault with intent to commit murder
(b) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except murder or rape
(c) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm and without just cause or excuse
(f) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury
18 U.S.C. § 371,1982; Conspiracy to Commit Offence or Defraud the United States
18 U.S.C § 1111, 1982; Murder
18 U.S.C. § 1203, 1982; Hostage Taking
49UX&Cly\pp. §, 1982
(i) Aircraft Piracy
(j) Interference with flight crew members or flight attendants
(k) Certain crimes aboard aircraft in flight
(1) Cariying weapons, loaded fireanns, and explosives or incendiaiy device aboard aircraft
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contracting parties,* *5 regardless of the category of the offence.* *^  Extradition shall be 
granted in all cases where this applies, or prosecution will take place wherever the 
offence is punishable by both laws of the contracting parties.**^ Extradition must also 
be granted for attempts, conspiracy, or participation in extraditable offences.**^ Once 
extradition is granted for an offence, it is also gianted with regard to any other 
extraditable offence that may not have been considered previously extraditable.**^ 
Article (2) discusses as well, the requirement of a crime must qualify as 
punishable under the laws of hoth contracting parties for a minimum of one year. *20 
Murder and air piracy are both crimes punishable for more than one year in hoth the 
U.S. and West Gennany.
* * ^  Article (2)
(1) Extraditable offences under this Treaty are:
(a) Offences described in the Appendix to this Treaty which are punishable under the laws o f  both Contracting 
Parties;
(b) Offences, whether listed in the Appendix to this Treaty or not, provided they are punishable under the Federal 
laws o f  the United States and the laws o f  the Federal Republic o f  Germany
* *^  Article (2): In this connection it shall not matter whether or not the laws o f  the Contracting Parties place the 
offence within the same category o f  offences or denominate an offence by the same category.
* *2 Article 2(2): Extradition shall be granted in respect o f  an extraditable offence:
For prosecution, if  the offence is punishable under the laws o f  both Contracting Parties by 
deprivation o f  liberty for a maximum period exceeding one year, or
For the enforcement o f  a penalty or a detention order, i f  the duration o f  the penalty or detention 
order still to be served, or when, in the aggregate, several such penalties or detention orders still to be served, 
amount to at least six months.
* *^  Article (3) Subject to the conditions set out in paragiaphs (1) and (2), extradition shall also be granted:
(a) For attempts to commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, an exti aditable offence;
* *  ^Article (4) When extradition has been granted in respect o f  an extraditable offence, it shall also be granted in 
respect o f  any other extraditable offence which would otherwise not be extraditable only by reason o f  the 
operation o f  paragraph (2).
*20 Treaty Article (2)
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Under Article (4), offences cannot qualify under the political offence 
e x c e p tio n .*21 As discussed earlier, under the Extradition Treaty, Hamadei would most 
likely not qualify for political offence.
Article (12) is the death penalty clau se . *22 As with any other extradition treaty, 
the Requested State has a right to refuse extradition if  the death penalty is sought. 
The U.S. went to gi*eat lengths to insure that the death penalty would not be sought 
against H am adei. *23 In addition to which it is a requirement of German domestic law 
to prohibit extradition to any country that seeks to use the death penalty . *24
With regard to the above applicable treaty sections, it was clear that Hamadei 
fiilfilled the conditions of obligation for extradition -  meaning the charges definitely 
qualified as extraditable offences.
5.4.1.2 Procedure
The first step in almost any extradition proceeding, is the request for provisional 
arrest by the Requesting State. *25 This is an interim measure while the formal 
extiadition documents are prepared. Pursuant to Article (16) o f the Extradition 
Treaty, *26 where the guidelines for formal provisional request procedures are outlined.
*2 * Treaty Article (4)
122 Treaty Article (12)
*23 See reference in note 75 in this Chapter. 
124 Ibid.
*26 Treaty Article (16).
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125 Interview with Michael P. Lindeman, Assistant Director, United States Department o f  Justice, Civil Division, |
O ffice o f  Immigration Litigation, June 8, 1996. Hereinafter LINDEMAN-INTERVIEW. I
the U.S. would send a provisional an*est request through diplomatic channels via the 
Department of State and the Department of Justice. *2?
The actual request for extradition can only be made thiough the Department of 
State. All supporting documentation for violation of federal laws is compiled by the 
Department of Justice, and reviewed by the Office of International Affairs, before sent 
on to the State Department where an official extradition package is reviewed on both 
legal and political le v e ls . *2» The actual extradition request is sent via diplomatic 
channels to the U.S. embassy o f the requested state, where along with a diplomatic 
note is forward on to the Foreign Minister of the Requested State. Ultimately, it 
winds up before the Ministry of Justice for review and approval, along with all 
supporting documentation and e v i d e n c e ,  *29 which is exactly the procedure used in the 
Hamadei case.
The final requirement, which must be satisfied, is a wanant for arrest issued by a 
federal judge of the Requesting State, o f the alleged offender. *30 In this case, the 
United States District Court Judge for the D.C. Circuit signed Hamadei's arrest 
warrant. This would also require evidence of the laws of the Requesting State, which 
would demonstrate the severity o f the offences applicable in both States, and which 
would qualify for extradition. *31
*27 LINDEMAN-INTERVIEW  
*28 Ibid.
*29 Ibid.
* 39 Refer to Chapter 1.2.1, Extradition as a Process.
*31 Ibid.
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The final requirement of procedure under the Extradition Treaty is a summary 
statement of the facts o f the case, under Article (3)(b). This was not a part o f the 
Hamadei request, as the summary of the facts were accounted for on the actual arrest 
warrant, which is also pennitted under Aiticle (3)(b).
All of these requirements were quickly satisfied, and a formal extradition package 
delivered to the West German Ministry o f Justice in Bonn, within one week after the 
an*est of Hamadei. The Head of the International Criminal Law Division in the 
Ministry of Justice commented that the conclusion was ‘perfect’ and that ‘[t]here was 
no legal reason not to have a quick d e c is io n .’*32 still the request had to clear federal 
and state levels before a decision for extradition could be reached. The general 
guidelines here are that a state can decline a federal request, and visa versa. Frankfurt, 
in the West Gennan State of Hesse, would review the extradition request in their High 
Regional Court, before making a decision and turning it over to the federal 
government. If the state declines extradition, the federal government can still file a 
request. If the state affiiins extradition, the govermnent can still refuse. In the end, 
the federal goveiiunent will always have the final say, regardless of alternative 
interpretations of the Extradition Treaty.
Following the capture o f the two West Gennan hostages, the extradition 
proceedings were taken over by West Gennan Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. Under 
Article (19) of the Extradition Treaty, which requires prompt communication of the 
decision, a conclusion was not reached on Hamadei for nearly six months. The 
hostage situation had cast a new light on the proceedings, and a special committee
*32 HAMADEI EXTRADITION, note 1 at 6.
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was fomied by Chancellor Kohl, which superceded the extradition proceedings on all 
levels.
The next six moths ensued intense political dialogue between the U.S. and West 
Gennany, followed by intense pressure by the United States on Chancellor Kohl for a 
quick resolution. The U.S. publicly supporting any eventual decision by West 
Germany, although it became clear within this time period, that the U.S. was probably 
not going to succeed in securing the extradition of Hamadei. Still, they were 
reasonably confident that West Gennany was not going to release Hamadei either, but 
likely tried in Gennany under the guidelines specified in Article (10) of the 
Extradition Treaty, the aut dedere aut jiidicare clause.
5.4.2 The Hague Convention
Obligations to extradite under the Hague Convention are covered in Articles (1), 
(4), and Aiticle (8).
Article (1) describes the unlawful seizure of aircraft as an offence, *33 which the 
Hamadei case satisfies since TWA 847 was unlawfully seized by force. Article (2) 
refers to the conditions under which Contracting States makes the offence punishable 
by severe penalties. *34 Both contracting states have enabled this provision into their 
domestic law and therefore satisfy this condition. Article (3) refers to the jurisdiction 
of the aircraft with regard to the state in which it’s registered.*35 Take off and landing
*33 Any person who on board an aircraft in flight;
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form o f  intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that 
aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice o f  a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act.
*34 Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties.
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must occur outside the tenitory in which the aircraft is registered. *36 TWA 847 took 
off in Athens, and landed in Algiers/Beimt. This condition was also therefore 
satisfied. Article (4) requires a State to establish jurisdiction over the offence as 
applicable under the convention.*3? In the Hamadei case, this was actually satisfied 
under Article (3). Article (8) refers to the general condition of law, which the offence 
creates under the convention. The unlawful seizure o f aircraft then, is considered an 
extraditable offence between contracting states that are signatories to the convention.
5.4.3 The Montreal Convention
Under the Montreal Convention, the relevant articles pertaining to extradition 
conditions are (1), (3), (4), (5), and (8).
Article (1) defines the offence with regard to unlawful acts against the safety of 
civilian aircraft. *38 As with the Hague Convention, the Hamadei incident clearly 
satisfied this condition. Article (3) requests that offenders under Article (1) make the
*35 Article (3)§ 1 : For the puipose o f this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time from the
moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any suh door is
opened for disembarkation. In the case o f  a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the |
competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board. ii*36 Article (3) §(3): This Convention shall apply only i f  the place o f  take-off or the place o f  actual landing o f  the |
aircraft on board which the offence is committed is situated outside the territory o f  the State o f  registration o f  that \
aircraft; it shall be immaterial whether the aircraft is engaged in an international or domestic fight. |
* 37 Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the f
offence and any other act o f  violence against passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in connection |
with the offence. j
*38 Any person commits an offence if  he unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) performs an act o f  violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if  that act is likely to endanger the
safety o f that aircraft; or i
(b) desti'oys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable o f  flight or which j 
is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is 
likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable o f  flight, or to cause damage to it 
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, i f  any such act is likely to 
endanger the safety o f  aircraft in flight; or
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crime punishable by severe penalties. *39 Again, similar to The Hague Convention, 
both the U.S. and West Germany satisfied this condition by enabling domestic 
legislation. Article (4), is the jurisdictional issue of the planes landing and take-off 
points,*40 which as established earlier, clearly satisfies this condition. Article (5), 
requests the appropriate jurisdiction over the offence take place, *4* and Article (8) 
requires that the offence be incorporated into the extradition treaty between the two 
contracting states. *42 Almost identical conditions to the Hague Convention, with 
identical results, the conditions all are satisfied under the convention.
5.4.4 The Hostages Convention
Articles relating to the conditions for extradition under the Hostages Convention 
are (1), (2), (5), and (10).
As with The Hague and Montreal Conventions, the Hostages Convention defines 
the offence of hostages taking under Article (1).*43 Hamadei certainly satisfies this
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety o f  an aircraft in flight.
*39 Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offences mentioned in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties.
*40 Article (4) § 2(a); the place o f  take-off or landing, actual or intended, o f  the aircraft is situated outside the 
territory o f  the State o f  registration o f  that aircraft; or
(b) the offence is committed in the teiritoiy o f  a State other than the State o f  registration o f  the aircraft.
*4* Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessaiy to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences in the following cases:
(a) when the offence is committed in the territoiy o f  that State;
(b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that State;
(c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its territoiy with the alleged offender still 
on board;
(d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his 
principal place o f  business or, i f  the lessee has no such place o f  business, his permanent residence, in that State.
*42 The offences shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between 
Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the offences as extraditable offences in eveiy  
exti adition treaty to be concluded between them.
*43 Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person 
(hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international
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condition simply because the hijackers held the passengers and crew of TWA 847 
hostage. Article (2) makes the act punishable by appropriate penalties.*44 Article (5) 
requires the contracting parties involved establishing jurisdiction through enabling 
legislation, *45 which Article (10) also discusses by incoiporating the offence into the 
contracting states extradition treaty. *46
Having satisfied the applicable conditions for extradition under all of the relevant 
treaties, as well as the obligation to extradite under the U.S.-West Gennan Extiadition 
Treaty, Hamadei was legally eligible for extradition.
5.4.5 Procedure under the Conventions
Under Article (6) of all thi'ee Conventions, is the requirement for the state where 
the offender is present, to be taken into custody if  the conditions for extradition are 
satisfied, *47 which they were. The offender may only be taken into custody for as 
long as it takes for an extradition claim or procedure to be implemented, and that the
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group o f  persons, to do or abstain from doing 
any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release o f the hostage commits the offence o f taking hostages 
("hostage-taking") within the meaning o f  this Convention.
*44 Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which take 
into account the grave nature o f  those offences.
*45 Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over any o f  the 
offences set forth in article 1 which are committed:
(a) in its territoiy or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) by any o f  its national or, i f  the State considers it appropriate, by those stateless persons who have their habitual 
residence in its territoiy;
(c) in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or
(d) with respect to a hostage who is a national o f  that State, i f  that State considers it appropriate.
*46 The offences set forth in article 1 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition 
treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in 
eveiy  extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
*47 Ail three Conventions state at Article (6): Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so wanant, any 
Contracting State in the territory o f  which the offender or the alleged offender is present, shall take him into 
custody or take other measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other measures shall be as provided in the
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State owning the registry of the aircraft be notified if  these conditions are met. The 
Hamadei case did, in fact satisfy this condition by taking Hamadei into custody for 
prosecution.
Article (7) under the Hague and Montreal Conventions, and Article (8) under the 
Hostages convention, *4s refer to the aut dedere aut judicare option. If the offender is 
not extradited, the requested state is obligated to try him under their laws ‘without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its tenitory, to 
submit the case to competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.’*49 The West 
German decision to try Hamadei in lieu of extraditing him to the U.S., satisfied this 
condition.
Article (10) under the Hague Convention, and Aiiicle (11) under the Montreal 
and Hostages Convention*50 refer to the mutual assistance in crimmal matters 
obligation. Contracting states to the convention ‘shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of 
the offence. This was satisfied as the U.S. and West Gennany cooperated completely 
throughout the request for extradition proceedings, and later in the criminal 
proceedings.
Still, this was not as clean-cut a decision as it should have been. The taking of 
the two West Gennan hostages, and near six-month wait for a decision, made the
law o f  that State but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition 
proceedings to be instituted.
*48 The Contracting State in the ten itory o f  which the alleged offender is found shall, i f  it does not extradite him, 
be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territoiy, to submit 
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose o f prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in 
the same manner as in the case o f any ordinaiy offence o f a serious nature under the law o f  that State.
149 Ibid.
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process much more difficult than it should have been, especially when as many 
conditions were satisfied under several pieces o f international legislation.
5,5 Conclusion
Unlike the Achille Laura, which was anything but a success, Hamadei was a 
'semi- victory' for the U.S. What the case shows us, is that when the stakes are high 
enough, States will concede to terrorist demands, especially under pressure and 
especially if it exonerates the potential for future attack. And that while domestic 
policy can alleviate diplomatic pressure, it does not solve the problem of teiTorism, 
only holds it in abeyance. For the U.S. to claim victory they would have had to 
gained the opportunity to try Hamadei themselves.
Hamadei was tried and convicted on charges of murder and air piracy and 
received a life sentence,*^* the harshest penalty imposed under German law. When 
states opt to prosecute terrorists in their domestic courts, although it fulfils the states’ 
legal obligation and reduces diplomatic tension, it does not necessarily lessen the 
tlu'eat of terrorism. If the accused teiTorist is facing severe penalties, there remains the 
veiy real possibility of terrorist reprisals against the citizens or the state prosecuting 
the teiTorist. This threat is significantly reduced, if  the prosecuting state can assure the 
terrorist group that harsh penalties will not be imposed, that extradition will be 
avoided, and that in some cases, the terrorist will eventually be released.
Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure o f assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings brought in respect o f  tire offence and other acts mentioned in (Article 4 in the Hague Convention and 
Article 1 in Montreal and Hostages Convention). The law o f  the State shall apply in all cases.
* 51 'Life sentence for hijacker: judge explains background o f  ten or and threats', Franlcfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 
May 18, 1989; 'Hamadei Gets Life for TWA Hijacking, Murder', Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1989; Robert 
McCartney, 'Hammadi Guilty In Hijack Killing O f U.S. Seaman', Washington Post, May 18, 1989.
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International co-operation is not entirely abandoned here, but not entirely fulfilled 
either. Not allowing the tenorist to escape satisfies international legal responsibility, 
maintains good diplomatic ties with the victimized state, and maintains the 
prosecuting state’s credibility within the international community toward thwarting 
terrorism. Allowing the threat o f terrorism to maintain a controlling ami in the 
outcome, however, does international co-operation little good if  it’s merely a front to 
maintain a good behaviour standing. The only thing it accomplishes, really, is a ‘feel­
good’ factor, knowing there was some justice, which is better than no justice at all.
The Hamadei example did not really hinder international co-operation. West 
Germany did hand down a stiff penalty -  eventually. This took far longer than it 
should have for a near-perfect case, and the only reason Hamadei was not extradited 
was due to the hostage dynamic imposed after his arrest. The message clearly was to 
keep Hamadei out of the hands of the U.S. who had a strong desire to try Hamadei 
themselves. And it worked.
International co-operation is not abandoned if compliance is maintained. That’s 
the face-value argument. The underlying ‘thorn’ is not compliance, but the degree of 
compliance, and this is something not easily controlled. While a state may choose the 
option to try, they will not necessarily choose the method or the punishment to fit the 
crime. Although Hamadei was given a life sentence, there still should have been no 
denial of his extradition.
It’s not an easy tiude-off to make, punish terrorists, or, protect your citizens. 
Both are in the interest of the state. But then what does this say about detening 
terrorism? To make the claim ‘we will punish terrorists’ is fine, but if  the terrorist
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controls the extent to which you get to punish him, then it’s an empty threat, and one 
that only politics and diplomacy can provide.
Still there is one final point o f interest regarding Hamadei, and that is the 
environment in which it takes place. Up and to this point, both the Achille Lauro and 
the Hamadei examples deal primarily with Western governments. There is another 
dimension entirely when this issue applies to states that are not liberal democracies, 
that are not part of a bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreement, that are not amenable to 
negotiation; but that are the sponsors of teiTorism. This creates an entirely different 
set of parameters when discussing the possibility of terrorist extradition, and the 
potential for compliance. And, there remain a variety of alternative responses which 
remain available to states as a response to terrorism, which require a more thorough 
examination
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Chapter Six
State Sponsored Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Alternatives for Action and Their 
Impact on Extradition
"Let terrorists be aware that when rules o f  international behavior are violated, our 
policy will be one o f  swift and effective retribution.
"Foreign policy is not therapy. Its purpose is not to fee l good but to do good. "2
6.1 Introduction
Increasingly it is the case that regardless of the amount of international 
cooperation, or absence of political influence, or even the mounting evidence toward a 
particular gioup or individual, it simply may not be possible to achieve justice for acts 
of teiTorism perpetrated. Such is the case, states must look toward alternative means 
of action in order to achieve the justice they so richly desire, and it is worth noting 
that point of justice, is not just about capturing those responsible, it is also about 
punishment.
This chapter is discussed differently from the previous two case studies, because 
it does not actually revolve around a single particular example. Unlike the previous 
case studies, it does not provide a single illustration in which to demonstrate a single 
topic such as Achille Laura, which highlighted the importance of international 
cooperation, and the previous chapter, which underscored the rather poignant impact 
of political influence on extradition. The approach here uses the general topic to
* Excerpt taken from remarks by President Ronald Reagan at the White House, January 28, 1981
2 Remarks by Richard Haass, special assistant for national security affairs to fiiir. President George H.W. Bush, 
and director o f  foreign policy studies at Brookings. Cun ently, Dr. Haass is the Director o f  Policy for the U.S. 
Department o f  State. See his remarks on sanctions in; “Sanctions almost never work”. The Wall Street Journal, 
June 19, 1998.
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illustrate a discussion of alternative legal measures to extradition in response to 
terrorism. Specifically in this case, as it applies to the issue of state sponsored 
teiTorism, by taking into account what alternative measures become available, as a 
potential response to tenorism, which do not include extradition; such as the use of 
military force, sanctions, deportation, and even the possibility of civil action as well 
as the possibility o f recourse to the International Criminal Court, which is no longer 
just an idea but an approaching reality.
State sponsored terrorism adds a new dimension to the problem since it deals 
with teiTorist acts carried out by individuals and groups with the sponsorship and 
blessings of a foreign govermnent which support the action, or with acts carried out 
by agents of the state. This creates problems on many levels, besides the obvious far- 
reaching political implications, it convolutes the effectiveness of legal response and 
draws attention to the possibility for alternate measures.
The prospect of state sponsored teiTorism, however, is not a new problem -  but 
an old tactic. History has demonstrated the advantage of encouraging and supporting 
violence by those rebelling against their enemy. The French supported the Americans 
in their Revolution of Independence against the British.3 Centuries later, America 
would, in turn, provide support and assistance for civil insurgencies against the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War.4 Involvement in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan,^ are
3 See: John R. Alden, A Histoi-y o f  the American Revolution. (Da Capo Press, 1989).
4 See: Donna M. Schlagheck, "The Supeipowers, Foreign Policy, and Tenorism", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr^ 
International Terrorism Characteristics. Causes, Controls. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990), pp. 170-184.
 ^ See: Benjamin B. Fischer “A Cold War Conundrum” History Staff, Center For the Study o f  Intelligence, CIA 
Monograph, 1997; Benjamin B. Fischer, At Cold War’s End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, 1989-1991, CIA Publication, 1999.
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only some examples of how an entire state providing support can become a poweiiul 
ally against an enemy.
Govenunents themselves have also engaged in conduct, clandestine activities, or 
the use of terror, against their enemies. This is nothing new. Adolph Hitler, Joseph 
Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, all mastered the use of oppression for their own political gain, 
and created campaigns which encouraged the destruction of social and legal order. 
This system of tenur for the puipose of political gain has not only transcended these 
regimes, but national borders as well.
The shift obseiwed in teiTorist trends fi'om the 1970’s to the 1980’s went from 
individual terrorism and terrorist attacks toward state sponsorship of terrorism, 
motivated largely by a religious imperative,^ enabling weaker states with a tool to 
wage war against a more powerful enemy. Such exportation of terrorism to sub-state 
groups by providing training, funding, or arms provides the necessary means to 
accomplish violent goals. Whereas trends indicate contemporary terrorist tactics have 
become more inventive; resources more readily available, and acts increasingly lethah 
- the response by states has stayed much the same - a continual struggle to find an 
appropriate response to an extraordinary problem.
This presents a new challenge to states, which must search for ways to effectively 
counter terrorist acts that are state sponsored. As a result, states look to other methods 
o f control, be it economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or flat-out military 
retaliation. The resort to international legal nouns as they pertain to the use of force, 
or ju s ad bellum, creates a paradigmatic shift in the context o f how international law
6 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Victor Gollancz Press, 1998), p. 161
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operates. This has its own separate set o f consequences for the state, for the 
international community, for the rule of law and extradition.
The first part o f this chapter will address the definitional aspects o f state- 
sponsored terrorism, how it acts to undermine the prospects for extradition, the 
options for response exercised by states, specifically in this section, the prospect of 
using force as an alternative for extradition.
The second part will examine the difficulties faced by international law, as 
pertains to state sponsored tenorism, as pertains to the use of force against state 
sponsored tenorism, and refening to specific case examples where this was the 
prefened method of response.
The third part of this chapter will review other alternatives to the use o f force 
not including extradition. The invocation of sanctions, deportation, and the resort to 
civil action, are all alternatives to extiudition.
6.2 Definitional Aspects
The definitions o f  terrorism are almost as prolific as its manifestations. The wags 
simpUstically say "one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter. " While there 
is an unfortunate degree o f  accuracy in this cliché, it does not really define 
terrorism.
The working definition and discussion of tenorism as it pertains to this study, 
was offered in Chapter One. For the purpose of discussion in this chapter, a brief 
examination of state sponsorship and how it adds a new dimension to the phenomenon 
of the problem is addressed. Ostensibly, how does legal response differ when the
2 Ibid. p. 189.
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culprits are not rogue individuals acting in a lawless capacity, but with the blessings 
and support o f an entire government? This section seeks to further the discussion on 
tenorism presented in earlier chapters, by examining specifically how state 
sponsorship engages the problem.
6.2.1 N ature o f  State Sponsored Terrorism
The watershed event which marked the emergence of state sponsored tenorism 
was the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy where fifty-two American hostages were 
held for 444 days by a group of militant Iranian students, who at the time were 
believed to be acting independently.^ The students, as it was later revealed, were part 
o f state-sponsored tenorist campaign directed by the Iranian Khomeini regime against 
the United S t a t e s , an d  which was only the beginning of what would be an extensive 
campaign against the U.S. by the Khomeini regime. This event accomplished two 
things. First, the incident marked the most serious act of modem state sponsored 
tenorism as experienced by the U.S. until that date. Second, it was the inspiration and 
influence for other pariah states to follow. The 1979 hostage crisis provided an 
important lesson to governments looking to expel western influence fi'om the Middle 
East. Essentially, tenorist acts carried out under the sponsorship of foreign 
governments, was a cheap and effective means of waging war against a more powerful 
enemy and could be used covertly. As Bruce Hoffman poignantly observes:
8 Louis G. Fields, Jr., Terrorism & the Rule o f  Law: Society a t The Crossroads, Ohio Northern University Law 
Review , vol. 6 no. 1, January 1979, pp. 52-59,
 ^ Iran Hostage Crisis, The Columbia Encyclopaedia, Sixth Edition, (NY: Columbia University Press, 2001); Scott 
McLeod, ‘Can Iran Be Forgiven?’, Time, August 3, 1998.
*0 Hoffman, INSIDE TERRORISM, p. 186
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"Acts o f  violence, perpetrated by terrorists secretly working fo r  governments, were 
shown to be a relatively inexpensive and, i f  executed properly, potentially risk-free 
means o f  anonymously attacking stronger enemies and thereby avoiding the threat o f  
international punishment or reprisal. " *  *
The lesson learned from 1979 was that state sponsorship could greatly enliance the 
capabilities for smaller terrorist organizations with significantly limited resources by 
placing at their disposal the resources of an entire state.
This has an appeal on many levels. From a militaiy standpoint, the use of 
training facilities, supply of amis and munitions can transfoim an otherwise amateur 
group of insurgents into a well-trained commando unit. Subsequent intelligence and 
logistical assistance are invaluable means for planning operations. Use of diplomatic 
pouches and embassies, government assistance for procurement o f fraudulent 
documents, such as diplomatic passports and visas, assistance in the transport of 
weapons and explosives — elevate significantly the status of any terrorist operation.
Another element to this is fiscal gain. Terrorists who use such resoiirces and act 
in a mercenary capacity aie often well compensated for their work by paiiah states. 
Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, alias “Carlos”, is arguably the most notorious representative 
of such a p r o fe ss io n . *2 Alternatively, such money is utilized in building terrorist 
organizations, turning an otherwise insolvent band of thugs into a highly organized, 
highly trained, well-endowed organization. Several Middle East countiies noted for 
their sponsorship of terrorism * 3 have employed The Abu Nidal Organization (AND), *4
1 1 Ibid.
*2 See; Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, A Pattern O f Violence, (London: Book  
Club Associates, 1977); Colin Smith, Carlos Portrait o f  a Ten orist, (Mandarin Paperbacks, 1995).
*3 Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran are the Middle East Countries named as sponsors for terrorism by the U.S. 
Department o f  State. See: Patterns o f  G lobal Terrorism, U.S. Department o f  State Publication, 2000, hereinafter 
PATTERNS.
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for example, founded by Palestinian Sabri al-Banna, who since 1974 carried out more 
than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 people, 
including the most lethal attacks against Rome and Vienna airports in 1985.*^
The Japanese Red Anny (JRA) is another example of a terrorist organization that 
made millions out of ‘hired gun’ ten'orism.*^ Their splinter faction Anti-Imperialist 
International Brigades (AIIB), the outgrowth of a Qaddafi initiative designed to 
retaliate against the U.S. for the 1986 air raids, was one of their more lucrative deals. 
Qaddafi, fearing further U.S. retaliation, struck a deal with the JRA using AIIB as a 
cover for operations and attacks instigated and executed on Libya’s behalf. And 
between 1986 and 1989, many such attacks were carried out by the AIIB with the 
blessing and support of Muammar Q addafi.
Perhaps the gi*eatest appeal of state sponsorship is, for the teri'orist, besides the 
dramatic increase in operational capabilities, and spectacular financial opportunities, 
there is little need to identify with the ideological or religious imperatives closely 
associated with ten'orism, or even commonality with the sponsor’s cause. Nor are 
they tied in to the local population or public opinion, which could drastically alter 
their need for support. Instead, the ten'orist or mercenary group perfoims a deed for a 
price, and those deeds need match only with the foreign policy objectives of the 
sponsor. For the sponsor, the benefit is obvious; it’s all about mission
*4 The ANO has received considerable support, including safe haven, tiaining, logistic assistance, and financial 
aid fl'om Iraq, Syria (until 1987); continues to receive aid from Libya, in addition to close support for selected 
operations, Ibid.
*3 Ibid. Also; North American Special Operations Group, Intelligence Resource Network, 
http://www.nasog.net/intelligence/terrorists/Abu_Nidal_Organization.htm.
*6 p a t t e r n s
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accomplishment. And the effects are not only bloodier, but also more destructive, and 
entirely more lethal. *8
6.2.2 Level o f  Involvement
The nature of state sponsored teiTorism must not only consider but draw the
connection, or level o f involvement, on behalf of government officials and the
tenorist or terrorist group. By its very nature it is assumed that there exists a
generally close level of involvement on behalf of the government and the group,
which is spawned from a close ideological, religious, or political parallel between the
two. This gives the terrorist group some legitimacy, since the direction of such
support is aimed at funding, supply of weapons, use of land, resources, and
intelligence for training, the tenorist group takes on the status similar to that of a
trained militia, and not just a group of criminals. Such activity is not, by definition,
an act of self-defense, but legally, as an act of aggression.
In their resolution defining aggression, the United Nations reiterates its view
against terrorism in their Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations,*^ wliich states:
Eveiy State has the duty to refrain from  organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts o f  civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission o f  such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph, involve a threat or use o f  
force...Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate
*7 Hoffman INSIDE TERRORISM, p. 192.
*8%W.pp. 197-199.
G.A. Res. 1186 (X I1), 6 U.N. GAOR at 243 (1957), copy found in Ian Brownlie, Basic Documents in 
International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), passage found on pg. 39.
205
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow o f  the 
regime o f  another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.,
This sentiment is echoed in U.S. Congress who suggest that state supported 
terrorism consists of acts which furnish arms, explosives, or lethal substances to 
individuals, groups, or organizations with the likelihood that they will be used in the 
commission of any act of international terrorism; providing direct financial support 
for the commission of any act of international terrorism; providing diplomatic 
facilities intended to aid or abet the commission of any act o f international terrorism; 
or allowing the use of its territory as a sanctuary from extradition or prosecution for 
any act of international terrorism.2* These are merely guidelines for deteimining 
whether or not certain activity can be considered state sponsored, not to be confused 
with actual criteria of what should be considered to be state sponsored.
Modem day state sponsored tenorism is a reality, and attacks have been 
increasingly prevalent in the past decade and a h a lf .22 The watershed attack which 
signified this emergence, and which garnered a significant amount o f attention in the 
early 1980’s was the October 1983 tmck bombing of the U.S. Marine bamacks in 
Lebanon, which killed 241 United States M arines.23 The Islamic Jihad, a Shi’ite 
faction, claimed responsibility for the attack, and was later found to have been flinded
2** Ibid. Annex at 338.
2* S. 333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1979).
22 p a t t e r n s
23 “Suicide terrorist driving truck loaded with 2,500 tons o f  TNT blows up US Marine BaiTacks”, The N ew  York 
Times, October 24, 1983. See also: Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, USMC, Tactical Lessons f o r  Peacekeeping: 
U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984, (DoD publication), 1998. Six months earlier a similar attack had 
been carried out on the U.S. embassy in Beim t killing 69 persons. See: : US Multinational Force [USMNF] 
Lebanon, http://www.fas. org/man/dod-101 /usmnf.htm.
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and supported by the Iranian govemnient.24 Another example, the mid-air explosion 
of Pan-Am flight 103 in December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland that claimed the 
lives of 259 passengers, was linked to two Libyan intelligence agents, and was also 
found to have been bankiolled by Iran.25 Thi'oughout 1990’s, the U.S. Department of 
State designated seven countries as sponsors o f tenorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan,26 and Cuba. These countries remain today on the list o f State sponsors 
o f tenorism, largely because no amount of economic sanctions or military retaliation 
have effected any change in their policies on terrorism.27
It is worth mentioning that while prevalent in the modem age, state sponsored 
tenorism is not a new or emerging trend, as noted earlier, this has all been done 
before. What calls attention to the issue, is when a powei*ful western democracy such 
as the United States falls victim to such activity, for several reasons, foremost being 
that this is actually a hard thing to do to a government such as the U.S. There exists a 
strong presence of law enforcement, intelligence, and defense mechanisms in the 
United States, tenorist actions are not always easy,28 which is why foreign attacks on 
U.S. soil are negligible from a statistical viewpoint.29 Still, it is an attack, a successful 
attack, in most cases, on a fonnidable opponent. Second, state sponsorship is a
24 Stansfield Turner, Terrorism & Democracy, (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1991), p. 165. The Islamic 
Jihad was also responsible for the U.S. embassy attack in April 1983.
25 Refer to discussion o f  Lockerbie in Chapter 1.1.2
26 Sudan was actually added in 1993. See: U.S. Department o f  State, PATTERNS, 1993.
27 Hoffman, INSIDE TERRORISM, p. 191.
28 Discussion with Dr. Arnold Kanter, former U.S. Deputy Undersecretaiy o f  State 1988-1992.
29 Only one documented act o f  international ten orism on U.S. soil, which is the World Trade Center bombing in 
1992.
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legally defined act of aggi*ession, and it must answer: to what end would State 
sponsorship accomplish, or, for what set of foreign objectives^**
Deteimining a level of involvement for state sponsored terrorism, needs to 
accommodate the following: proportionality, was the action of tenorism proportional 
to the response of the state, culpability, o f the state, not the tenorist, and a sense of 
‘burden of proof and confidence that this can be established, that the state, not the 
tenorist is truly culpable of the act. Finally, it must fall into one of the following 
classifications: first, was this merely the actions of a ‘fiee lance’ terrorist. Second, 
was this state sponsored to some degree, e.g. govermnent-supplied munitions, training 
base, or sanctuary? Or, third, was it state directed, meaning was the attack an edict of 
a foreign government.
This last point makes all the difference in detennining real culpability. For a 
state to ‘turn a blind eye’ to terrorist activity, i.e. training camps, smuggling rings, or 
sanctuaiy, does not generate the same response as a state sponsored mandate, even 
though it goes against all internationally accepted definition.3* France is a perfect 
example of this, for years they held a sanctuary doctrine for tenorists. A gentleman’s 
agreement of sorts which was basically understood as: so long as terrorist activity did 
not take place on French soil, against French citizens abroad or members of the 
French government, terrorists would be able to find a safe haven in France, free from 
prosecution or the possibility of extradition.32 While ethically compelling, this 
technically is not the same as supporting and encouraging terrorism.
30 KANTER INTERVIEW. 
3* Ibid.
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6.2.3 Response
When we examine the prospects of response, or the difficulties state sponsorship 
poses to response, there are numerous approaches when applied to the problem of 
terrorism. This is largely due in part to each govermnent agency or organization’s 
attempt to define the problem based on its own mission and p u r p o s e . I n  an effort to 
try and treat the complexities of terrorism by distilling them into a unitary theme and a 
simple, universal symbol, the problem of definition is only e x a c e r b a t e d . ^ ^
To complicate matters further, the language found in international treaties 
contains definitions of certain acts as they pertain to particular crimes, even cases of 
state sponsorship. The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
for example, defines teiTorism as a criminal act directed against a state with the 
intention of creating a ‘state of teiTor’ in particular persons or the general public. 
Whereas, the Hostage Convention, the Montreal, and Tokyo Conventions, for 
example, identify special offences and the judiciaries responsibility for dealing with 
them. But internationally, the problem remains the same as before, whereas these 
attempts to define terrorism only allow for specified actions to be targeted as specific 
c r i me s , a nd  do not solve the definitional problem.
From the U.S. vantage point, different govermnent entities also apply different 
guidelines for targeting what they deem to be a terrorist act, which does not further
See: RAND Monograph publication on-line: Ian O. Lesser, Countering the New Terrorism, Implications fo r  
Strategy, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR989/MR989.Chapt4.pdf
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM, COMMITTEES OF THE JUDICIARY, 99th 
Congress, 1st Session, REPORT ON STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM 19 (Committee Print 1985), at 25. 
This problem is referred to as ‘apparent in governments o f  the free world’.
3^ * R. Cooper, "Terrorism: The Problem o f  the Problem o f  Definition", 26 Chitty's Law Journal 105, 1978, pp. 
106-07.
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explain the ‘state sponsorship’ phenomenon either. For example, the U.S. Department 
of State uses the definition of tenrorism contained in Title 22 of the U.S. Code, that 
"the teiin 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an a u d ie n c e ."36
The FBI definition classifies terrorism as "... the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a govermnent, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."37 
Which is different still from the U.S. Department of Defense definition where 
ten'orism is "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; 
intended to coerce or to intimidate govermnents or societies in the pursuit o f goals 
that are generally political, religious, or ideological."38 These are very general 
definitions, and unhelpful in foiiiiulating guidelines for punishment of terrorist acts. 
Furthennore, they do not pinpoint the types of tenorist acts covered, and against 
whom they are prohibited. And none of them ai*e useful or even remotely helpful 
when applied to the problem of state sponsorship.
By and large terrorist actors, who participate as either individuals or in large 
groups, are generally categorized in terms of their strength of association to the
35 COMMITTEE REPORT, pp. 26-27
36 U.S. Department o f State, 1996 Patterns o f  Global Tenorism Report, Note: The term "noncombatant" is 
inteipreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time are unarmed and/or not on duty. 
Attacks on militaiy installations or on armed militaiy personnel when a state o f  militaiy hostilities does not exist 
at the site (e.g.: Kliobar Towers bombing), are considered acts o f  terrorism by the State Department definition. 
The definition o f  teiTorism contained in U.S. Code, See: Title 22 o f  the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d).
37 U.S. Department o f  Justice, Federal Bureau o f  Investigation Tenorism in the United States, 1997 - Report on 
Counter tenorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit National Security Division.
38 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support Operations - Chapter 8: Combating Terrorism.
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state.39 Wliicli is inevitable in all cases of tenorism whether the state has an active or 
passive r o l e r i ®  specifically state-sponsored tenorism will be categorized here as 
planning, direction, and controM^ on behalf of the state. While this appears as an 
oversimplification of state sponsored terrorism, the idea is to set the bar high enough 
to expose for discussion the degree of difficulty that govermnents’ face as they 
continuously search for ways that effectively counters tenorist acts, and how state 
sponsorship aggravates this.
Definitional ambiguity aside, the one true obstacle to response remains the lack 
of clear and attainable objectives on behalf of the victimized state. Wlien acts o f
3^In his 1989 Law Review article, Professor Antonio Cassese identifies six degrees association between states and 
terrorist actors:
tenorist acts by actual state officials; 
state employment o f  unofficial agents for terrorist acts; 
state supply o f  financial aid or weapons; 
state supply o f  logistical support;
state acquiescence to the presence o f  teiTorist bases within its territory; and 
State provision o f  neither active nor passive help.
See: Antonio Cassese, The International Com munity’s ‘L ega l’ Response to Terrorism, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 38: 598-599, 1989
■^^Professor John M uiphy identifies twelve categories for identifying state involvement in international terrorism 
which he divides into two sub-categories: state support and state sponsorship.
State Terrorism;
Direct Support;
Provision o f  Intelligence Support;
Provision o f  Training (Specialized Tenorist and Basic Military training);
Provision o f  Diplomatic Assets;
Provision o f High Technology;
Provision o f  Weapons and Explosives;
Provision o f  Transportation;
U se o f  Territory;
Financial Support;
Tacit Support; and 
Rhetorical Support.
See: John Murphy, State Support o f International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions, 1989, 
p.5
Professors Anthony Arend and Robert Beck provide a distillation o f  these criteria for state sponsorship and 
state supported terrorism which they reduce to four criteria: 
terrorist actors without state toleration, support for sponsorship; 
terrorist actors with state toleration, but without state support or sponsorship; 
terrorist actors with state support, but without immediate state sponsorship; and 
tenorist actors with state sponsorship
See discussion on comprehensive typologies with reference to Professors Cassese and Murphy in: Anthony Clark 
Arend & Robert J. Beck, International Law and U se o f  Force. (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 139-142.
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terrorism occur, the goals are not as seemingly clear as ‘punish and deter’, ultimately 
the prospects of ‘retaliate and revenge’ ring timer. The goal of any government is to 
protect its citizens; this has been said repeatedly. How they protect their citizens is 
usually a reflection of what the government is protecting them from. As it was quoted 
in the opening chapter of this work, “govermnent is most dangerous when it claims to 
be fighting dangerous enemies”^^  ^ nowhere is that more prevalent than in the face of 
terrorism. State response plays to the heat of the moment, to the politically expedient, 
to the praise of the press and it’s citizens, but rarely ever to a long term, common 
sense, and focused approach to the problem. If there was a clean and simple answer 
or explanation for this, there probably wouldn’t be a need for a thesis, or any of the 
other countless works aimed toward solving the problem. Tenorism is, by design, 
geared toward generating emotion. Tenorist attacks are significant emotional events. 
Response does not divorce itself from emotion either, and in the fury of emotion, we 
look for justice, which is different than looking toward the law. Law has, as we have 
observed painfully through previous chapters, plenty of answers. What we are 
looking for as victims is a way to even the score. Sometimes law vindicates this, if  it 
can be properly applied and enforced. Extradition is one way, but as we’ve seen, only 
if  the terrorist can actually be caught. International cooperation is another, in fact 
mandatory, way of bringing a terrorist to justice, especially if  it involves an 
extradition case, but there are more facets to this, and the problem is not as cut and 
dry. States also respond by fighting ‘dirty’, or as they may see it, ‘fighting back’. 
This becomes a particularly desirable option if  it is couched as a pre-emptive strike or
‘'■^Philip B. Heymann, TeiTorism and America A  Commonsense Strategy for A Democratic Society, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. xi-xii.
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an act of self-defense, technically justifiable under international law and mles of 
engagement, and aimed at the real enemy, which sometimes is not the tenorist, but the 
state that harbors them.
63  The Challenge to International Law
’’This will be a long ongoing stmggle between freedom and fanaticism...betw>een the 
rule o f  law and terrorism
As it has been examined in previous chapters, difficulties arise even with 
countries with whom extradition treaties exist, and in the case of terrorism, no case is 
ever considered cut and dry. The assumption to this point has been that governments 
share a common ideology in fighting tenorism and common legal ties when bringing 
tenorists to justice, it has not yet been discussed what would happen if  they did not. 
If the tenorist escapes to a state with no such bonds, and consequently no extradition 
or mutual legal assistance treaties, then cooperation will depend largely on the 
harbouring states attitude toward the group or individual seeking refuge. If the state 
providing sanctuaiy to the terrorist is a supporter of the group or sponsor of the action, 
then response for the victim state becomes increasingly difficult and presents 
challenges to international law.
In a 1984 speech before the Jonathan Institute, Secretary of State George Shultz 
made the assertion that although passive measures were necessary, even helpful, in the 
prevention o f terrorism, the time had come to “think long, hard, and seriously about 
more active means of defense.. .through appropriate preventive or preemptive actions
‘^ 3president Clinton’s address to the nation following the bombings on Sudan and Afghanistan, August 20, 1998.
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against tenorist groups before they strike.’"^ Similar sentiment echoed by President 
Ronald Reagan in his speech a year later, to the American Bar Association, where he 
asserted that countries which sponsor tenorism were committing “acts of war against 
the government and people of the United States”^^  ^ and that “under international law 
any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself’ri^  
Presidential rhetoric aside, the concept dubbed the “Shultz Doctrine”, espoused the 
scholarship of use of force as self defense against terrorism, and chronicled it as a 
right of international law. “[B]y providing material support to tenorist groups which 
attack U.S. citizens”, Reagan argued in a 1986 news conference, “Libya has engaged 
in anned aggression against the United States under established principles of 
international law, just as it had used it’s own aimed fbrces.”^^^
International law concerning the use of force partly derives from treaties, partly 
from custom and practice and partly from the UN Charter and from multilateral 
conventions and agreements such as with aims control and disarmament agreements. 
The United Nations Charter established more than just an institution for an 
international organization whose mission is to manage international conflict -  it 
established an international legal framework. Beyond “institution creating” it was 
“nonn creating” and set out specific mles governing specific behaviour including the 
role of states as it pertains to the use of force.
Secretaiy o f  State George Shultz, ‘'’Terrorism: The Challenge to the D em ocracies”, address before the Jonathan 
Institute’s second annual Conference on International Terrorism, June 24, 1984, printed in D epartm ent o f  State 
Bulletin, August 1984 issue, p. 33.
President Reagan’s Remarks at the Annual Convention o f  the American Bar Association, July 8, 1985
46 Ibid.
47 President Reagan’s News Conference, January 7, 1986
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Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is the general prohibition on the use of 
force and provides:
All members [o f the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use o f  force against the territorial integrity or political
independence o f  any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes o f  
the UnitedNations.’^ '^
The proscriptions established by Article 2(4) prohibits use of force or threat of the use 
of force as it pertains to another states tenitorial integrity or political independence 
and specifically as it falls within the parameters of interest within the United Nations. 
This also would prohibit use of force ‘short of war’ if  they were inconsistent with the 
puiposes of the United Nations.49 Article 2(4) allows for several exceptions to the 
Moratorium on force, and which follow the prohibition of the use of force except in 
cases where:
• Force is used in se lf-d efen se^ ^
• Force is authorized by the United Nations Security CounciU^
Force is undertaken by the five major powers before the Security Council is 
functionaU^
48 UN Charter 2(4)
49 See: Arend, FORCE at note 5, p. 30
56 Article 51 refers to individual and collective se lf defense and provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right o f  individual or collective self-defense if  an anned 
attack occurs against a Member o f  the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessaiy to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise o f  this right o f  self-defense  
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility o f  the security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
5^  Chapter VII, specifically Articles 39-51 refer to Action with Respect to Threats o f  Peace, Breaches o f  the 
Peace, and Acts o f  Aggression. Article 39 specifically empowers the Security Council to determine the “existence  
o f  threat, breach o f  the peace or act o f  aggression”. If detennined so, the Council under Article 42 may order 
members o f  the United Nations to use force against the state.
52 Article 106 refers to the collective use o f  force before the Security Council is functional and provides:
Pending the coming into force o f  special agreements referred to in Article 4 3 ... as in the opinion o f  the Security 
Council enable it to begin the exercise o f  its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation 
Declaration [U.S., Britain, U.S.S.R, China] and France, shall... consult with one another and as occasion requires
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• Force is undertaken against the enemy of states of the Second World War/3 
To appreciate what this means, it is significant to first remember what the United 
Nations Charter and Article 2(4) were meant to do in the first place, which was to 
transfomi the post WWII world by readvocating what the tolerable levels of force 
would be acceptable to the international community. This was not designed to 
include the tln eat of terrorism, but the use of force by states.
Methods of violence against states or foreign nationals propagated by either
individuals or organized groups for advancing a particular political purpose were
never part of the original design, nor did the charter design frilly provide the tools for
the legal accountability for terrorists or tenorist acts. If overt acts of tenorism are to
be considered equivalent to anned insurrection in temis of response, then they must be
grounded by a legal status. This is not the case. There are no solid international
remedies for tenorism, and international law has many gaps on paper and in practice
often giants immunity to tenorists, and as observed by Victoria Toensing:
The United Nations cannot enforce peace; it can only lessen hostilities. It possesses 
no mechanism fo r  controlling terrorism... [n]o international body deals effectively or 
comprehensively with terrorism. As soon as we accept that proposition, we can 
consider forming another type o f  alliance where states opposing terrorist violence
can reach agreements when an incident occurs.^^
with other Members o f  the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf o f  the Organization as many 
be necessaiy for the purpose o f  maintaining international peace and security.
33 Articles 107 and 53 pertain to force against enemy states, with relevance to the enemy states o f  WWII. Article 
107 maintains;
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second 
World War has been an enemy o f  any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result o f  that war 
by the Governments having responsibility for such action.
Under Article 53, the Security Council does not need to authorize any members against an enemy state and: 
Provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional anangements directed against renewal o f  aggressive policy on 
the part o f  any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request o f  the Governments concerned, be 
charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression.
34 Victoria Toensing, The Legal Case fo r  Using Force, in Neil C. Livingstone and Ten ell E. Arnold eds.. 
Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism. (Lexington Books, 1986), p. 149.
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The alternative for victim states is to redefine the problem, not as tenorism, but as an 
act of aggression. The response then becomes not a resort to legal interpretation or 
legal remedies, but an act o f self defense, which are precluded in the politics and 
purpose of the United Nations interpretation of allowing self defense to be constmed 
to include the historical notions of that tenu. The UN position is and has always been 
that ‘violence begets violence’ and reaction by force would only perpetuate that 
violence. This is not entirely wrong; however, those who are in the business o f 
terrorism are unchecked, and operate outside this system. As a result, violence will 
almost certainly continue, but in all likelihood it will be the tenorist who perpetuates 
it.
6.3.1 Legitimizing Use o f  Force
Nunquam decurritur ad extraordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium -  Never resort to
the extraordinary until the ordinary fails.
The use of force for self-defense may at times be the only possibility available to 
states. By definition, tenorism is something conducted from the shadows, by an 
enemy difficult to identify, and harder still to catch - not in the spotlight. However, it 
is a different situation altogether when the enemy fires visible warning shots with a 
promise to follow-up with even more violence. In this instance, the case for a 
decision to use force is necessarily predicated on the question: ‘what threshold of 
evidence must be established before a counterattack is justifiable?’ One illustration of 
this are threats which affect the safety of all American citizens, such as the case with
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Osama bin Laden, who openly declared war on all Americans and Jews, and that he 
would not distinguish “between those dressed in militaiy uniforms and c iv ilia n s”35^  in 
order to dissuade Western influence from the region. The fatwa issued by Bin Laden 
openly expresses that the U.S. “will leave when the bodies of American soldiers and 
civilians are sent home in wooden boxes and c o f f in s ” ,36 and makes no secret of goals 
or methods, rather it is an open declaration o f war by an organization dedicated to 
killing American citizens. When Bin Laden exercised this philosophy by bombing the 
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it is not far fetched to understand and even 
offer legitimacy to the response, which was “we have an obligation to hit them, and if 
necessary to keep hitting them, until they lose all of their ability to hurt A m e r ic a n s .” ?^
The use of force as pure retaliation, however, has a different meaning. 
Retaliatory force sends a message, a strong one that says, “you hit -  and weTl hit back 
-  no matter where”. For countries such as Israel where the stakes are high, an “eye- 
for-eye” policy is caiwed more so out of a need for survival and credibility than it is 
for mere saber rattling or politicking. For a superpower such as the U.S., tenorist 
attacks take on a different face than those waged against Israel, or other nations for 
that matter, and retaliation may not serve well as a deterrent.
As history has shown, retaliation does little more than perpetuate the justification 
of tenorism to tenorist organizations, or the states which sponsor them. Does this 
justify military retaliation in some cases and not others? Not necessarily, but it can 
not be completely discounted either.
53 “In Self-Defense”, The Washington Post, August 21, 1998, p. A22.
56 Ibid.
57 See comments o f  Speaker Newt Gingrich, Ibid.
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There are problems that go along with using force, foremost being the target. 
Tenorist engaged in choosing targets do not necessarily discriminate between military 
or civilian targets, but retaliatory strikes do. It’s a fundamental understanding that 
military force is not used against civilian targets even if  you declare war, as it is 
against the Geneva Conventions to do so. A ‘war on tenorism’ notwithstanding, 
mainly targets militaiy-type training installations or those installations which promote 
or perpetuate terrorist means or activity. And although targeting military installations 
is the mission in most cases, the distinctive line between military and non-military 
targets is quick to blur, either by accident or by design.
There is also a question of legitimacy or burden of proof toward using force. 
Attacks used as retaliation are subject in part to timing as much as evidence. Rarely, 
if  ever, is there an opportunity to retaliate against a terrorist attack ‘in progress’, the 
Achille Lauro incident notwithstanding. So retaliation is then based on evidence of 
terrorist activity or sponsorship, and which is assumed will be used against citizens of 
the state launching the retaliating attack. Another temi for this is pre-emptive sti'ike, 
and it’s a huge leap -  legally - from self-defense. Retaliation must be founded on fact, 
which means standards of evidence are relatively high. Tenorism, however, is a very 
different kind of fight from traditional rules of engagement on warfare -  it is an 
increasingly irregular war, where nihilism replaces politics and sponsorship has 
become more and more hidden. This is by design, and this changes the rules of 
engagement. So naturally the rules of retaliation and burden of proof are equally 
questioned as to whether or not they are fair standard bearers. Should the rules be 
changed and the standards lowered when the objective is terrorism? Rules are placed 
for a reason. And if  the rules are changed, or standards lowered, then it must be
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observed that way for all that participate by way of law in the international 
community, not just those players who are strong enough to carry out the fight. It’s a 
dangerous precedent otherwise.
Bearing in mind that whether or not force is used is not as important as what it is 
used it for. Meaning, is there a real objective? Self-defense or intervention to protect 
nationals, are all challenges to fundamental international law, but arguably justifiable 
under certain circumstances, but they are not real objectives. For the use of force to 
be justified as legitimate counter response depends not only on the circumstance, but 
compelling evidence supporting the effort, the amount of force used, the target, and 
what hopes to be achieved, for it to be a compelling case for legal and ethical 
justification. The use of force to defeat terrorism is not an overall compelling 
argument for the use of force. Sadly, nor would it work.
Lastly, it should not be discounted that these things do fail, and on many levels. 
As in any game of hardball, participants should refrain from involvement unless they 
are willing to lose, and lose big. And occasionally, they do. The 1979 failed Iranian- 
hostage rescue attempt on behalf of the United States is one rather poignant example. 
But the spring of 1996 when Israel launched major air, sea, and artillery attacks on 
Lebanon in retaliation for Katyusha rocked attacks and in an aim to force Syria to 
restrain Hezbollah guerrillas is probably a more accurate one. A targeting mistake 
tragically killed over a hundred Lebanese women and children seeking refuge in a UN 
base. The death and destruction did nothing more than garnish further support for the 
Hezbollah, create outrage amongst the international community as well as Israel’s 
allies. Had Israel launched a direct strike at Syria, it would have been an act of war
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unjustifiable based on Syria’s support of Hezbollah actions in Lebanon. But to launch 
an indirect strike did nothing more than weaken Israel’s position and credibility.
As there is no clear indicator of winning by using military force, it makes it 
nearly impossible to define success. A militarily successful attack is not necessarily a 
battle won, it is considerably more politically, and morally, complicated than that, and 
there are many others areas where loss is incurred. Often times retaliation risks the 
lives of innocent people in order to make a point with their leaders. In the process, 
manage to generate powerful opposition as well as fear. From a purely definitional 
standpoint, retaliation is not much different than tenorism. Hence the need for a 
clearly defined end game to what specifically the use of force for retaliation is meant 
to achieve, otherwise, it’s an arbitrary, objective less, and often unilateral, show of 
force, but nothing more. Consider the following examples;
• Libya -  Operation El Dorado Canyon
On April 14,1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan ordered a military attack on 
Libyan president Colonel. Momar Qaddafi -  Operation El Dorado Canyon - as 
retaliation for Libya’s involvement in a terrorist attack on a West Berlin nightclub 
which served as a popular hangout for American servicemen, and which had 
killed two persons and wounded 2 0 0  o th ers.38  The two U.S. air raids and the 
subsequent bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi resulted with thirty-seven fatalities, 
including Qaddafi’s two-year-old stepdaughter, and ninety-thi'ee injured, 
including two of Qaddafi’s sons. The attack was cleai'ly aimed with the objective
38 See news reports: http://www.libyanet.coin/0401nwsc.htm; P assport to Terrorism in the M iddle East, 
http://www.mrdowling.com/608-terrorism.html.
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“get Qaddafi”, moreover, it was the first clear message that the U.S. was willing 
to retaliate against terrorism, with force if necessary.
President Reagan explained these actions as a result o f ‘direct proof of 
Libyan involvement in the West Berlin attack. Furthermore, the U.S. possessed 
‘solid evidence’ that Colonel Qaddafi was planning other attacks against the U.S. 
installations and citizens. “Self defense”, explained President Reagan, “is not 
only our right, it is our duty .”39
The result was negligible. Despite rhetoric that Libya had learned it’s lesson 
and Qaddafi was now silenced -  just the opposite was true. Less inclined to be 
open about what activities Libya actually took part in, an effort to deter future 
retaliation, Qaddafi’s entire operation took on a more clandestine firont while 
continuing to support terrorism.^o In addition, there was almost universal 
criticism of the U.S. for the attack by friends and foes alike. Ultimately the UN 
General Assembly issued a condemnatory resolution against U.S. actions.61
• 1973 and 1986 Israeli Aircraft Interceptions
On August 10, 1973, Israeli militaiy aircraft intercepted a Middle East 
Airlines flight canying ninety persons en route firom Beirut to Baghdad, and 
forced it to land at an Israeli military base. Israeli authorities claimed they had 
reason to believe there were Palestinian terrorists aboard, and had subsequently
39 Ronald Reagan’s speech as reprinted in US Department o f  State Bureau o f  Public Affairs Special Report No. 
24, 1986, vol. 1.
60 Turner, DEMOCRACY
6^  See; New York Times articles on April 16 and 22, 1986.
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disembarked and questioned all the passengers. Once the Israelis were satisfied 
there were no such ten*orists aboard, they allowed the flight to leave.
Again, in 1986 the Israeli’s launched another attempt under the same modus 
operandi. On Febmary 4, 1986, Israeli fighters intercepted a civilian aircraft 
bound from Libya to Damascus, forcing it to land in Israel. After again 
questioning the passengers, it was determined that the terrorists they sought were 
not on board. Again, they allowed the flight to leave.
The UN Security Council condemned both actions. Each time the Israeli 
delegate defended Israel’s right to use forcible action as a pennissible form of 
s e lf -d e fe n s e ,62 and the inherent right to protect its citizens from a terrorist attack63 
-making the case that acting outside the parameters of the law is acceptable when 
you’re dealing with individuals or groups which operate outside these parameters 
as well. Both times, the international community expressed profound 
d isapp roval.64  Except for the United States, who interestingly enough changed its 
position from 197365 to 1986.66
62 See both: UN SCOR, 178th Mtg., 35 UN Doc. S/PV.1738 (1973), and UN Doc. S/PV. 2651, February 4, 1986.
63 The Israeli’s argument was that in the age o f terrorism the term se lf defense must be applicable when a nation is 
attacked by tenorists even if  it means using pre-emptive action. See: Ibid\ 1986.
64 In 1973, the international community unilaterally condemned these actions. In 1986 -  the Security Council 
debated adopting a resolution condemning Israel. Ibid, 1973 & 1986.
65 The U.S. position in 1973 as voiced by Ambassador John Scali, who argued that the commitment to the rule o f  
law in the international community must be upheld. That Israel’s action was entirely unjustified and could only 
bring about further tenorist strikes. Ibid, 1973.
66 The U.S. position had changed dramatically by 1986. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Vernon Walters 
argued that while Israel’s actions were “legally impermissible” due to unsubstantiated evidence, there exist 
exceptional circumstances where such actions are justified. That such state action is an inherent right o f  self- 
defense. The U.S. subsequently, was the only member o f  the Security Council to support Israel. See: Ibid., 1986. 
One contributing factor toward this change in position may likely be the fact that the U.S. was not a target o f  any 
real terrorist attacks in 1973 and had no real policy or position with regard to terrorism. This had changed 
completely by 1986 when the U.S. certainly became a target o f  terrorist attacks.
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• 1985 Israeli Tunis Raid
On October 1, 1985, Israel launched an air strike on PLO headquarters in the 
Borj Cedria suburb of Tunis, which killed or injured more than a hundred 
people.67 This was mostly in retaliation for an attack, which came one-week 
earlier when Palestinian teiTorists killed thiee Israelis in Larnaca, Cyprus.^s 
Israel’s justification for the attack was to strike at the heart of the PLO, 
specifically “those who make the decisions, plan and cany out tenorist 
activities.”69 The argument followed that since Tunisia had allowed it’s tenitoiy 
to used as a home base for tenorist training and operations, they were a legitimate 
target for anned action equivalent to the same extent of damage, and potential 
damage to that inflicted upon Israel by the tenoristsjo
Not surprisingly, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 573 condemning 
Israel’s use o f anned aggression, supported Tunisia’s right to reparations and 
demanded Israel refrain from further such acts7^ The United States abstained 
from voting, but did not entirely condemn the act noting that the U.S. recognized 
Israel’s action as a legitimate response of se lf-d e fe n se .22 Less than a week later, 
Palestinian terrorists hijacked the cmise liner Achille Lauro, a result of a botched
67 “Israeli Planes Attack PLO in Tunis, Killing at least 30, Raid ‘Legitimate’, US says”, N ew  York Times, October 
2, 1985.
68 ‘Three Israelis Slain by Palestinians in Cyprus’, N ew  York Times, September 26, 1985.
69 ‘Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Tenorists’, N ew  York Times, October 2, 1985.
70 Ibid.
71 UN Doc. S/PV.2615 (1985)
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attempt at a raid on an Israeli port, but nevertheless ending in the death of an 
American citizen, Leon K linghoffer.73
• U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan
On August 20, 1998, American cmise missiles struck targets in Afghanistan 
and Sudan.74 The target in Afghanistan was identified as an extensive terrorism 
training com plex.75 U.S. officials said that the United States had convincing 
evidence that the organization of Osama Bin Laden, the Saudi bom financier of a 
network of Islamic terrorists, and self proclaimed leader of a holy war against the 
U.S. was responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania on August 7, 1998.76 And that a meeting of members of an 
international terrorist network he supported was imminent at the Afghan site 
when the missile attack occun ed.
The Sudan target, was a factory that American officials said made a precursor 
element used in the production of VX, a potent nerve gas. Sudanese officials 
denied this stating that it was merely a pharmaceutical plant.
22 Ibid. See remarks from 40^ ^^  meeting.
73 The result also included the U .S. taking a page from the Israeli’s book on use o f  force, when U.S. Tomcat 
fighters forced down an Egyptian airliner onto Italian territory in an attempt to abduct the tenorists.
74 More than 60 Tomahawk m issiles were fired at Afghanistan. See also: ‘U.S. Attacks Based on Strong 
Evidence Against Bin Laden Group’, New York Times, August 21, 1998.
75 ‘Afghanistan: Report Profiles Afghan ‘T enor’ Camps’, Paris: Al-Watan Al- 'Arabi translated from  Arabic, 28 
August 1998 pp. 22-28; ‘U.S. Sees Bin Laden as Ringleader o f  Tenorist Network’, New York Times, August 21, 
1998.
76 ‘After the Attacks: in Sudan For This Islamic Tactician, Battle With U.S. Has Begun’, New York Times, 
August 24, 1998.
77 ‘Possible Benign Use Is Seen for Chemical at Factory in Sudan’, New York Times, August 27, 1998; ‘U.S. Says 
Iraq Aided Production o f  Chemical Weapons in Sudan’, New York Times, August 25, 1998.
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Bill Richardson, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, claimed the 
attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts had been made to convince the 
Sudanese govenunent and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan to cease their 
cooperation with the Bin Laden organization.^^ In his national television 
appearance President Clinton described the acts as self-defense and retribution for 
the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, attributed as the work of 
Bin Laden, and that these targets were “associated with the Bin Laden network”. 
“Afghanistan and Sudan”, he continued, “have been warned for years to stop 
harboring and supporting these terrorist groups. But these countries that 
persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe h aven s.”?^
The larger result of U.S. actions did nothing to deter Bin Laden, disrupt his 
network, his following, or the sanctuary status he enjoys in Afghanistan. What it 
did manage to do -  was turn an entire nation of Afghans against the U.S. Much 
of the population who had no opinion either way about U.S.-Afghanistan relations 
or U.S. regional influence, were now more so inclined to side with Bin Laden 
“against U.S. aggression”, than against Bin Laden himself. The attack was 
certainly meant to be personal. It was designed to get Bin Laden -  but it failed. 
To drum up support in Bin Laden’s favour and turn the public opinion and 
support is not the way to deter terrorism, and in hindsight the attack was viewed 
by many as not the most prudent choice.^®
78 ‘Cruise M issile Strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan’, American Society o f  International Law  -  Insight, August
1998.
79 ‘President Swears to U se ‘All T ools’ Against Tenorism ’, New York Times, August 23, 1998 
8® ‘A  Moderate Thinks U.S. Shot Itself in the Foot’, New York Times, August 25 1998.
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The point of these case examples is to demonstrate how overt uses o f force are 
applied as a response to terrorism. It is also meant to demonstrate that there are not a 
lot of positives that come from the overt use of force against states which sponsor or 
harbour terrorists, no matter how good the argument for ju s ad bellum. This is why 
there must be a clearly defined, supported, and arguable end game to using force. 
Once response goes down this path, it is very hard to defend the reasons, and the 
damage within the international community often cannot be readily undone.
From a practical standpoint, often the use of force produces negligible results. 
Often it results in ftirther retaliatory attacks, groups responding through the use of 
covert activity, international condemnation, reversal of public opinion, or just going 
horribly wrong. Very rarely if ever, can the case be made that terrorism was halted 
due to a successftil and well-placed overt and legitimate use of force. This does not 
seem to detract, however, from the almost irrefutable sense this type of deterrence 
makes to some policy makers who somehow assume a few well placed, low grade, 
bombing runs will somehow lessen or deter the problem. As Bruce Hoffman 
pointedly notes “we should have realistic expectations. We are not going to achieve a 
spectacular victory overnight, if  we even achieve a victory at all.”8i History has not 
been an alibi in this area, and if it has shown anything, it has shown that while doing 
nothing may be a worse policy, military retaliation does not necessaiily the win the 
war on teiTorism, and if  it does anything at all, does more for domestic political gain 
than toward solving the problem of t e i T o r i s m . 8 2
8  ^ Peter Grier, ‘N ew  Rules in N ew  Kind o f War’, The Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 1998.
82 Scott Peterson, ‘Arabs Relate to Tit for Tat, but Doubt U.S. M otive’, The Christian Science M onitor, August 
24, 1998.
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It’s relevant to point out as well that terrorist attacks send a clear message. 
Retaliatory strikes do not always manage to accomplish the same. Unless there are no 
other options were to remain, unilateral military action should only be considered as a 
last possible resort, against a specific target, for a very specific reason, which can be 
evidenced and accepted by both citizens and allies of the retaliating state. No nation, 
regardless of status, likes to be rendered powerless, despite the consequences, and as 
observed by fomier U.S. President George H.W. Bush, “A president has to look at the 
vital national security of his country and in doing so act decisively in where and when 
to commit force.”83
In light of this, it is worth noting that there is not always a lot o f opportunity for 
militaiy retaliation to take place, and often diplomacy bears the better option. This is 
best explained historically over 200 years ago when U.S. President General George 
Washington took office while Barbary pirates were holding American hostages. 
Instead of using force, he negotiated a treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate, which paid 
ransom for the hostages and continued to pay them off so they would refrain from 
taking any fiirther hostages. This was actually precedent setting in many ways. 
There are often times when leaders, even leaders who are strongly in favour of using 
military retaliation, find themselves in a position where negotiation is if  not 
inevitable, the prefened choice, and they wind up caving in. This is not necessarily a 
reflection of leadership and politics as much as it is the indelible nature of society, 
which is to stay the course when the path charted, provides the least amount of 
friction.
83 George H.W. Bush’s comments from a panel discussion American Perspectives -  Anniversary o f  the G tilf
War given at Texas A&M University, February 23, 2001.
228
6.4 Alternatives to Force
The inability to exact the law, the near certainty of civilian casualties, or the 
doubtful success of deteiTence, creates a strong case for the alternatives. Economic 
sanctions to punish states that sponsor tenorism are an attractive option. Generally, 
economic sanctions are defined as “coercive measures taken against one or more 
countries to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country’s opinion 
about the other’s policies.”84 The crux of the argument for sanctions makes the case 
that sanctions are effective because they reduce the target country’s economic welfare 
and thereby force that government’s regime to give in and abandon a particular policy 
often found objectionable.85 They are imposed in the fomi o f trade embargoes, 
restrictions on imports/exports, and denials of foreign assistance such as loans, the 
freezing of foreign assets, tariff increases, prohibitions on credit, and the prohibition 
of economic transactions.86 They can be defined through political and military 
penalties as well, such as the withdrawal o f diplomatic relations, visa denials, arms 
embargoes, or revocation of Most Favored Nation status.8? Sanctions are inflicted one 
o f thi'ee ways,88 first, as imposed by a single country or gioup of nations against 
another country whose actions thieaten the economy, or security of the sanctioning
84 Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Economic Sanctions to 
Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to CuiTcnt Law, 1997.
85 W illiam H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, International Economic Sanctions: A  Public Choice 
Perspective (The Political Economy o f  Global Interdependence), (W estview Press, 1992), p. 161. See also: 
Richard Haass, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, (The Brookings Institute, July 
2000).
86 Alan Einisman, Ineffectiveness a t Its Best: Fighting Terrorism with Economic Sanctions, Minnesota Journal o f  
Global Trade, vol. 9 no. 299, Winter 2000, pp. 302-303.
87 Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too Much o f  a Bad Thing, Brookings Policy Brief #34, June 1998, p.
1 .
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nations. Second, when a sanctioning countiy attempts to foist its ideology upon the 
sanctioned countiy. These first two are deployed mainly as tools to fight tenorism, 
whereas a third option, sanctions as a tool of trade policy or trade relations, would be 
utilized largely as economic policy between trading partners, but not effective toward 
tenorism as they lack the security or ideological reasons behind using sanctions.
Sanctions, as a method to implement U.S. foreign policy goals are the tool of 
choice on anything from human rights to terrorism to dmgs; the use of sanctions has 
increasingly become the answer.89 In fact, the U.S. has invoked sanctions 115 times 
since World War I, more than half that number (61 to be exact), have been invoked 
since 1995,9^ and over 75 countries with over two-thirds of the worlds population are 
subject to U.S. economic sanctions.9' The reason for this is attractive, economic 
sanctions play a central role in the politics of American diplomacy and foreign policy 
in order to attain national, strategic, and economic goals. They provide a response to 
a challenge without impairing vital interests, they signify official displeasure with 
certain types of behaviour, they can reinforce a commitment toward a particular nonn; 
and, as Haass notes, they “offer U.S. policymakers and members of Congress an 
attractive compromise between doing nothing and sending in the M a r i n e s . ” 92 The use 
o f sanctions, however, can also impede America’s economic interest, which is where a
88 Einisman, INEFFECTIVENESS, pp. 302-303.
89 Richard N. Haass, ‘Sanctions -  With Care’, The Washington Post, July 27, 1997
96 David S. Broder, ‘Sanctions Addicts’, The Washington Post, June 24, 1998, p. A 17.
91 Richard N, Haass, ‘Sanctions Almost Never Work’, The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1998.
92 Einisman, INEFFECTIVENESS, pp. 302-303.
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delicate balance must be struck, between U.S. economic interest and U.S. desire to 
defeat terrorism.93
State sponsored teiTorism is viewed by many policymakers as nothing more than 
a fonn of low intensity conflict against the West.94 The most glaring example of this 
is Libya, alleged to have sponsored numerous attacks throughout the 1980’s, as well 
as committing resources to the attacks in Vienna and Rome airports, the West Berlin 
discotheque, and Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Then U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan ordered an embargo of Libya, arguing that support of teiTorist groups that 
attack U.S. citizens is the equivalent of anned aggiession.95 While there is merit to 
the belief that sanctions, unlike use of overt force, are a much more peaceful means of 
achieving change tlirough the action of committing to ‘bear the burden at all cost’ in 
support of a particular position.96 There is also the belief that by sanctioning the state 
accomplishes very little as the terrorist groups become self sufficient, and that by 
embargoing the state has a negligible effect on the states ability to sponsor terrorism.^? 
Sanctions do not impose nearly the kind of economic hardsliip that is necessaiy to do 
real economic damage. This is largely due to an increasingly more efficient world 
market, where alternate suppliers of goods can be found in an alternative location.
93 Thomas W. Lippman, ‘Negotiations on Sanctions Open on Hill: Administration Seeks Broader Discretion on 
Imposition o f  Penalties’, The Washington Post, September 9, 1998, p. A24.
94 Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vanderbilt Journal o f  Transnational 
Law, 1987,
95 Ibid. See President Reagan’s remarks from p. 304-305.
!
96/6fW. p. 303. j
97 Ibid. p. 305. j
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The leading drawback of sanctions is that every time sanctions are imposed, there 
is a backlash felt on the economy of the government issuing the sanctions. In the case 
o f Syria, for example, there are clear economic costs to the United States at the price 
of some $250 million a year in lost exports.98 That’s a costly fight in the name of 
terrorism. Some studies show that perhaps as much as $15-$ 19 billion USD in 
reduced exports overall, affecting the job market, and tax revenues, but U.S. 
businesses which will bear the bmnt of sanctions, losing a competitive advantage in 
those lost markets.99 If there is any effect, it is largely felt by the oppressed 
population, not the govermnent, which often prevents their citizens from obtaining 
food and essential medicines, reverting the resources to the military -  not the mass 
populace. *60 The result, however, has proven little in results that would affect 
terrorism. Although former Secretary of State Madeline Albright noted that while 
state sponsored tenorism is in fact on the decline, “progress has been countered by the 
rise of terrorist groups that are less directly dependent on states,”*o* such statistics do 
not effectively support the case for using sanctions as an adequate means of 
combating terrorism.
6.4.1 Exclusion and Deportation
^^Ibid at note 95.
99/6/W at note 94. See discussion o f  Institute for International Economics Study, p. 310.
*66 Two o f  the most popular offenders o f  this are Iraq and North Korea, both o f  which have been the subject o f  
numerous media articles. See: David MacIntyre, ‘M issiles With a Message: W hile North Koreans Starve, Kim  
Jong II Shows O ff His N ew  Technology’, Time, September 14, 1998; Bruce W. Nelan, ‘The Politics o f  Famine 
M illions in North Korea Face Starvation’, Time, August 25, 1997; Mark Hosenball & Sarah Van Boveii, ‘The 
Battle in the Aisles: A Black Market in Baby Formula in Iraq Leads to a Scam That Has Crack Addicts 
Shoplifting in Middle America’, Newsweek, December 8, 1997. Also, remarks by General Norman Schwartzkoff 
regarding Iraqi oppression o f  its people while Saddam builds new palaces, fi'om the discussion American 
P erspectives -  lO^h Anniversary o f  the G u lf War given at Texas A&M University, February 23, 2001.
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Beyond the prospect of sanctions, another alternate fonn of rendition other than 
extradition is- that of exclusion and deportation. The distinction between the two is 
defined much more simplistically than they are executed in practice. Exclusion refers 
to persons who are seeking to enter the United States, and deportation, applies to 
persons already in the United States. It is a line that is commonly blurred as it often 
depends on the point which detemiines exactly “when” a person is officially in the 
United States, e.g.: crossed the border but not yet reported to a customs official. The 
distinction is especially significant as deportation hearings can afford more protection 
under the law as opposed to simple exclusion, which does not guarantee equal 
protection under the law as they are not officially in the country. *62
Although both involve established procedures, they were not originally designed 
for the puipose of cooperation or the furthering of the international criminal justice 
system; but designed for the purpose of immigration control. Exclusion and 
deportation are informal processes, which rarely if ever involve a fonnal request on 
behalf of the state seeking the return o f an alleged offender; rather they are enacted at 
the insistence of the territorial state. They are civil processes, and therefore do not 
apply the same standards of criminal justice with respect to state interest or to the 
protection of the accused. *63
*6* ‘Embassy attacks fuel record toll o f  terrorism’, Minneapolis Star Tribune, May 1, 1999, p. A4.
*62 Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy, eds. Legal Aspects o f International Terrorism. (Lexington, MA; 
Lexington Books, 1978).
*63 John Muiphy, Punishing International Terrorists, The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives, (Rowman & 
Allanheld), 1986, pp. 81-82, herinafter as MURPHY -  PUNISHING.
233
The relevant international legal treaties that apply to exclusion and deportation 
are the Convention Relating to the Status of R e f u g e e s *^^ 4 and the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugeesd^^ The qualifying test for r e f u g e e u n d e r  these protocols is 
what determines whether an individual can be excluded or deported, and imposes 
limitations on the state of refuge if in fact the person does qualify for refugee status. 
Of equal consideration, are cases of exclusion and deportation where if the accused 
can show that the likelihood of persecution in the state of destination, he/she may be 
able to bar his rendition. However, regardless of how refugee Conventions and 
other instruments of international law subject legal norms to the issue of exclusion 
and deportation, the domestic law of the country of refuge largely governs these 
methods of rendition.
Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, effective April 22, 1955.
105 Protocol Relating to the Status o f  Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267, effective October 4, 1967. The protocol revises the convention making it applicable to events 
occuning after 1/1/51. See; Preamble in Article 1, paragraph 2.
Refugee is defined under the Convention as:
[a] person who owing to well-founded fear o f  being prosecuted for reasons o f  race, religion, nationality, 
membership o f  a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country o f  his nationality and is unable 
or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him self to the protection o f  that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the countiy o f  his former habitual residence as a result o f  such events, is unable, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Art. 1 § A, T12, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, as printed in Linda A. Malone, Smiths Review o f  International Law, (NY: 
Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc., 1995).
107 /Article 31, f  /:  The Conhacting States shall not impose penalties, on account o f  their illegal entry or presence, 
on refugees who, coming directly from a ten itory where tlieir life or freedom was threatened in the sense o f  article 
1, enter or are present in their territoiy without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to 
the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entiy.
A rticle  3 2 ^ 1 :  The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds o f  
national security or public order.
A rticle  33  ^ /: No Contracting States shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers o f  territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account o f  his race, religion, nationality, 
membership o f  a particular social group or political opinion.
See: Ibid.
108 MURPHY - PUNISHING p. 85
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There are drawbacks to using these alternative methods to extradition. Exclusion 
for example allows for the return o f a fugitive only to the country from which he/she 
came from. It does not allow a fugitive to be returned to a country, which has an 
outstanding warrant for criminal activity, exclusion in that instance would be barred. 
Deportation as an alternative to extradition is significantly more difficult in the U.S., 
as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment directly applies to deportation 
hearings. 109 U.S. statutory law provides that the govermiient must establish 
deportability through “clear and convincing evidence” and that the decision to deport 
must be based on “reasonable, substantive, and probative evidence.”no Even if the 
fugitive were found deportable, he/she would have a say in choosing the country to be 
deported to, and, if  that country were to accept him/her it would likely not be the 
country seeking their return, thereby undermining the effectiveness of deportation as 
an alternative to extradition.in
6.4.2 International Criminal Court
199 The Fifth Amendment o f  the U.S. Constitution holds that: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment o f  a Grand Juiy, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time o f  War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy o f  life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived o f  life, liberty, or property, without due process o f  law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” See: Article 5, The Constitution o f  the 
United States o f America, in Ellen Aldennan and Caroline Kennedy, In Our Defense The Bill o f  Rights in Action, 
(New York; William M onow  and Co. Inc., 1991).
1^9 8 U.S.C. § 1252
* 11 MURPHY -  PUNISHING, p. 86
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The concept for an International Criminal Court is not a new oned^^ 
Theoretically, this notion of an international court would include judges from various 
countries with a variety of political backgrounds. The advantage, ostensibly, would 
be the ability to tiy a fugitive only for a common element of a particular crime, and 
punishment would be absent of tlie political prejudices inherent in a single state’s 
judiciary.^ An added benefit to this would be the extra pressure placed on those 
states which granted asylum, and in the case of terrorism, this could prove to be 
beneficial, and since it would be a court representative of various countries, it could 
potentially be a truly international response to the problem. In theoiy, it could 
conceivably even address issues such as political offence, a predominant issue in 
many tenorist cases. And potentially, it could lead to some assimilation of 
international criminal law with regard to ideologically or politically motivated 
offenders. Unlike the cuiTent divergent reasoning toward this issue, political 
offenders could be treated the same way regardless of v e n u e ,
The problem is largely state cooperation, required if  the court is to be effective. 
Two immediate issues born out of this are first, states will not readily sunender 
sovereignty in criminal matters, and second, some states will not wish to be 
subservient to an international institution.
* The Proposals o f  M Laval to the League o f  Nations for the establishment o f  an International Permanent 
Tribunal in criminal matters, 21 Transactions o f  the Grotius Society 77, 1921: Hudson The Proposed International 
Criminal Court, 32 American Journal o f  International Law 549, 1938; Bridge, The Case for an International Court 
o f  Criminal Justice and the formulation o f  International Criminal Law, 13 International & Comparative Law \
Quarterly 1255, 1964. t
G eoff Gilbert, Aspects o f  Extradition Law, (Dordrecht, Martinus N ijhoff Publishers, 1991), p. 156.
* Ibid. p. 156.
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The U.S. in particular is a proponent of such thinking. After several years o f 
negotiating an attempt to establish a pennanent international criminal court to try 
people suspected of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity -  several 
countr ies^led by the U.S. objected to the possibility of such a court having too much 
power. The major issues considered in the June 15, 1998 meeting of countries in 
Rome sought to resolve five major issues; first is states consent, which already grants 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes and genocide, so those accused could be tried in 
any jurisdiction. The contention was arose that states should be allowed to deny 
consent to the ICC, and review on a case-by-case basis, which advocates contend 
could paralyse the court.
Second, was the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council, 
which could potentially endanger peacekeeping operations. The U.S. contention was 
that peacekeepers could potentially be subject to the ICC for operations beyond the 
scope of their control -  not an unfounded fear if the circumstance arose where an 
ambitious prosecutor were to specifically target Americans -  or any nationality for 
that matter. The fear of a ‘witch hunt’ could significantly alter the ability of the 
Security Council to broker peacekeeping agreements if the court were to go after 
politicians or officials involved in the c o n f l i c t . ^ U.S. negotiator at Rome, 
ambassador-at-large David Sheffer appearing before a subcommittee in the U.S. 
Congress testified that;
 ^ This group led by the U.S. and France, supported by Russia and China, claims that the powers o f such a court 
must be restricted to respect national sovereignties. A smaller group, consisting o f  India, M exico, and Egypt -  
were reluctant to allow the court any ‘real’ power at all. See: ‘The UN and War Criminals, How Strong a Court?’ 
The Economist, June 13, 1998.
 ^ ‘A  new world court’. The Economist, June 13, 1998.
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Multinational peacekeeping forces operating in a country that has joined the treaty^  
can be exposed to the court’s jurisdiction even i f  the country o f the individual 
peacekeeper has not joined the treaty. Thus, the treaty purports to establish an 
arrangement whereby U.S. armed forces operating overseas could conceivably be 
prosecuted by the international court even i f  the United States has not agreed to be 
bound by the treaty.^
This is a concept which contradicts even the most fundamental principles o f treaty 
law.
The third issue on the table in Rome, and most contentious issue between the 
U.S. and the ICC, however, lies in the power of the prosecutor. Within the blueprints 
o f the text, there are no limitations on the prosecutor’s freedom of action, and no 
amendments that would have established full Security Council control over the 
prosecutor. The U.S. position does not want free-lance prosecution without a 
complaint from the state; whereas backers of the system claim that a strong court must 
have the power to investigate cases brought to his attention by anyone. Yet, the office 
of the prosecutor will be accountable to no one, subject to few of the checks and 
balances that restrain law enforcement in a democracy and virtually empowered to 
enact punishment on individuals who have no control over its operation.
Fourth is the issue of complimenting the national courts, not replacing the 
national courts. The purpose of an international criminal court would be to act where 
the national courts have failed to act, lost credibility, or collapsed. Proponents o f this 
believe the court and only the court can make this decision. The problem with this, is 
besides the obvious sovereignty infringements, is that there remains the possibility of
 ^ See David Slieffer’s comments in ‘Why the U.S. Objects to a World Criminal Court’, The Washington Post, 
July 26, 1998.
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an unaccountable body with the power to override national judgments, even those 
judgments that were arrived at democratically.
Finally, is the issue of defining crimes. It was never argued otherwise that the 
court should deal with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined 
by national treaties; however, several countries want it to include aggression, drug 
trafficking, and terrorism. Since little can be defined within these topic areas, it is 
largely contended that it should be left up to the national courts, however, it is not 
outside the realm of possibility that it could someday evolve to include these topic 
areas.
The treaty to create the court has been endorsed in principle by 139 signatory 
nations and 37 ratifications, and will enter into force with 60 ratifications. The Rome 
conference had 160 nations that agreed collectively to the U.S. demand that until 
highly detailed rules o f evidence and procedure were established and agreed to, the 
treaty cannot p r o g r e s s , a n d  it stands to reason the court would be significantly 
weakened without the assistance of U.S. funds, which may ultimately be a bargaining 
chip for the U.S. Yet the first order of business after Rome for then U.S. Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright, was a review of the existing extradition treaties, and Statute 
o f Forces agreements to ensure that they specified no U.S. citizens would ever be 
delivered to tlie jurisdiction of such a court. Which is, subsequently spelled out in all 
existing extradition treaties, the right of a State to deny the rendition o f their own 
citizens.
N8 Betsy Pisilc, ‘U.S. Seeks changes to accept international criminal court’, The Washington Times, Februaiy 29,
1999.
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It is not unreasonable to designate the international community to step in from 
time to time in the prosecution of War Criminals, such as the Nuremburg Tribunals, 
which brought Nazi leaders to justice, and the temporary tribunals on Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda created by the U.N. Security Council. But the creation of this new court 
would bestow the right to go after individuals, not states, and unlike the existing court 
in the Hague, will not be a part of the U.N. or answerable to it. It is the U.N. Charter 
which is charged with “primary maintenance of international peace and security”, and 
it should retain this role.
6.5 Conclusion
State sponsorship of terrorism does, invariably provide unique circumstances 
affecting a state’s ability to respond within the confines of accepted internationally 
agi'eed upon behaviour. Depending on the level of culpability, it will force the hand 
of response either in the fonn of aggiessive overt retaliation, or more quietly using 
diplomatic or economic sanctions. Extradition will not be a firm possibility here, 
since the very nature of state sponsored terrorism indicates a low, if at all existent, 
level of legal cooperation. Also, in all likelihood, the existence of political 
relationships, or diplomatic overtures would not exist, unless o f course they were 
managed by a third party, but still would potentially not be effective in securing any 
kind of cooperation, much less a solution. The very nature o f the problem dictates 
othei*wise, and forces a necessity for alternative action.
Striking back, or use of force as a reprisal might temporarily deter if only for a 
short time period, reminding the sponsoring states the cost of supporting teiTorism, 
but it will not provide a long temi solution, and can potentially only worsen the
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problem. Yet, the demoralizing feeling of helplessness felt by the victim state is 
enough to fuel this type of reaction, if  for no other reason than to signal to its allies 
and teiTorists alike, that they are not rendered powerless or vulnerable. The greatest 
problem with this, o f course, is the ability to provide evidence against the accused 
state of sponsorship. By its very nature, retaliation is not a dish best served cold, and 
once an attack is past, evidence collected, and the accused charged -  the significant 
amount of time past does not warrant, under international law, under moral 
imperative, or in the court of public opinion, a mandate for self defense. This is, by 
far, the most difficult alternative to mount.
The possibility of more benign alternatives, such as sanctions, must also have 
limits. The force of economic or diplomatic imperatives bear a heavy burden not only 
on the sanctioned state, but on the state issuing the sanction. Sanctions require not 
just unilateral action, but group support. The ability to reign in allies to support a case 
against a particular state for supporting teiTorism also requires that they too, take on 
an economic loss. Assurance that all parties will stay the course of these sanctions is 
no guarantee, and cracks in the alliance ultimately provide for their downfall. 
Sanctions are meaningful in some cases, but largely do not readily provide a solution 
to the problem, nor do they deter teiTorism.
Alternate methods, such as deportation or exclusion, are real possibilities, and 
potentially effective, but face real problems in terms of legality. These are often 
difficult to implement, and do not necessarily offer a viable alternative to extradition, 
rather a last ditch effort to execute the law.
The one future prospect that remains of interest is that of the International 
Criminal Court, which is ever closer to moving from a 50-year old concept, to
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becoming a reality. Whether or not differences can be ironed out, and proposed 
amendments compromised remains yet to be seen.
What this demonstrates are the growing pains associated with response to 
teiTorism. Specifically, what happens when states are part o f the problem, and not 
part of the solution, and how that affects not just the legal options of response, but 
response in general. What this shows us as well is the need for a different kind of 
system. One that doesn’t just deal with on hierarchical levels of diplomacy and 
executive response, but on more integrated, more cooperative, more common ground 
levels, such as those found in the community of law enforcement or intelligence. 
There remain options other than the one’s discussed here, that fall within the 
boundaries of legal choice, and which offer a viable alternative to extradition
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Chapter Seven 
The Evolution of U.S. Terrorist Extradition From 1985 - Present
“A new era o f terrorism has begun, with a potential to be both bloodier and more 
destructive than any experienced before. The challenge the United States faces is to 
avoid the fate o f the apocryphal French generals who were always preparing to fight 
the last war. The emergence o f this new breed of adversary means nothing less than 
a sea change in thinking and counter terrorism policies will be required. Indeed, too 
often in the past, we lulled ourselves into believing that terrorism was among the 
least serious o f complex security issues affecting this country. We surely can no 
longer afford to continue to do that.
7.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the final aspect of extradition present for discussion, 
specifically, the additional methods of bringing tenorists to justice that exist within 
the legal pai*ameters of international law, but outside the formal obligation presented 
by extradition. Also, how the methodology of extradition has evolved fiom its 
treatment a decade and a half ago, to the present. It is meant to demonstrate the 
evolution of how the problem of capturing terrorists has changed fiom executive sabre 
rattling to a lower level, and much less public, aiTangement consisting of a network 
web of law enforcement. This evolution in how capturing teiTorists has changed fiom 
the early 1980’s when the problem of terrorism came to the forefront for the United 
States -  to the present day, represents a signalling not only in how the U.S. uses the 
law of extradition, but how their dependency on international cooperation has marked 
a significant increase.
In 1985, U.S. Vice-President George H.W. Bush’s Task Force on Terrorism 
produced findings which acted as the basis for President Reagan to formalize National
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Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 207, the first actual U.S. Counter-terrorism 
policy, and which reaffirmed and institutionalised federal jurisdiction over teiTorism 
in two categories. First, the Department of Justice through the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation would have legal jurisdiction over, and investigate, all incidents of 
domestic terrorism. Second, the U.S. Department of State would have legal 
jurisdiction over and lead-agency status on all incidents of international ten'orism. 
This was a sensible anungement since it was cleanly in step with the mission of the 
respective agencies. It also made sense because of the nature of terrorist activity. 
Terrorism could often be tied to state sponsorship, Libya or Iran, for example, two 
major contributors who could often be even tenuously linked with events. The 
sponsorship of mercenaries, either financially or thi'ough safe harbour is yet another 
example, but the point is that for quite some time, there was a readily obvious enemy. 
What the international community witnessed in the 1980’s was a relatively dramatic 
incident, followed by an executive member of govermnent, usually a U.S. President, 
standing before the televised world shaking his fist, warning terrorists not to cross the 
line again. This type reaction was often the result of a crisis, such as the earlier 
discussed case examples; often when there were casualties; and it often never worked 
as a deteiTent of any sort.
What has been demonstrated up to this point in the study by way of case example 
has been some of the growing pains the U.S. has experienced in the process of 
establishing a legal methodology toward the successful suiTender and trial of 
terrorists. The importance of international cooperation, the sway of political
* Bruce Hoffman, ‘The N ew  Tenorist: Mute, Unnamed, Bloodthirsty’, Los Angeles Times, August 16, 1998, p. 
M l.
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influence, and the alternatives when extradition is abandoned altogether, have forced 
the U.S. to undertake a process o f learning how to deal effectively with the problem of 
teiTorist extradition, sometimes without ever having to use extradition at all.
Maii'ied to this concept is the changing nature of the opponent -  the teiTorist. No 
longer can it be assumed that he/she is a discernable enemy; the changing nature of 
teiTorism itself has largely impacted the way it is dealt with in ternis of law 
enforcement and response. This change has largely been a result of the terrorist’s 
learning curve as well, where not only have they found a way to be increasingly 
undetectable and elusive, but increasingly lethal as well.
The overall aim of this chapter is to illuminate these changes as they apply to 
both the changing nature of teiTorism and changing nature of response, tlirough recent 
case study examples, to analyse these cases, and relate this to the evolving concept of 
extradition and law enforcement.
The first part of this study will be to discuss the changing threat that terrorism has 
presented over the past decade and a half. The tactics and trends employed, which 
have changed significantly since the early to mid 1980’s to the present day, have called 
for important modifications in the roles of intelligence, law enforcement, and 
extradition or its alternatives.
The second part of this chapter will examine two recent case examples involving 
both extradition and an alternative -  rendition, which will also be discussed and 
addressed in the third part o f this chapter to more detail. The World Trade Center 
bombing, and the extradition / rendition of its suspects abroad for trial, is the first case 
study example. The U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 
extradition / rendition of the suspects, is the second. Both of these case studies have
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been dissected to highlight the meaningful facts only about the incident and 
investigation, not a blow-by-blow account of all details, as the focus is intended to 
illuminate the extradition or rendition of the suspects, not the exhaustive minutiae of 
the entire case.
The third part of this chapter will deal with the concept of rendition as an 
alternative to extradition. What is rendition? How and when is it used? Why? Are 
questions, which will be discussed and applied to the larger example of the case 
studies. In addition, remains the question of whether or not rendition weakens the 
integrity of the law by acting as an alternative to extradition. The relationship these 
two legal principles share toward the common goal of justice against teiTorism will be 
explored as well.
7.2 The Changing Nature of Terrorism and Its Impact on Law Enforcement
Up to this point the treatment of terrorism in this study has been a discussion of 
earlier teri'orist incidents and tactics, cold war style terrorist causes and state 
sponsored acts of violence. The detention and killing of American citizens abroad, 
such as the Achille Laura incident and the TWA 847, incident were highly publicized 
occurrences perpetrated by politically motivated groups, operating under an 
established ideology, in an identifiable organization. The PLF, the splinter faction to 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization which claimed responsibility for the Achille 
Lauro incident,^ and the Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese Shiite group responsible for
 ^ See Chapter 4.4 The Achille Lauro Case.
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TWA 847^, are both groups with a defined set of objectives, and which usually take 
credit for their actions. Regardless of whether or not the rationale was pleasing to the 
international community, or society on balance, these groups would convey 
understandable objectives, which at the very least could potentially draw sympathy if  
not dramatic attention to their cause. Such groups were relatively clearly linked to 
their connection of a foreign government, either by actions earned out at the behest of 
their sponsor, or by direct control.^ This has changed in the past decade, and as the 
trend has evolved from attacks driven by social and economic imperatives toward 
amoi-phous religious aims with “vehemently anti-government forms of populism 
reflect far-fetched conspiracy notions,”  ^ and consisting of an agenda largely 
predicated upon revenge and mass destruction.
Previous trends for political teiTorist attacks typically sought to achieve their 
political or economic goals tlu*ough carefully calibrated violence.^ Excessive 
violence, would deny them the opportunity to bargain for the legitimacy they were so 
desperately seeking, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation under the leadership of 
Yasir Arafat is a perfect example of this. Among the more dangerous current trends 
in international terrorism have been Islamic Fundamentalist attacks, directed more
 ^ See Chapter 5.2 The Hamadei Case.
 ^ Hoffrnan observes: “In the past, terrorist groups were recognizable mostly as collections o f  individuals 
belonging to an organization with a well-defined command and control apparatus, who had been previously 
trained (in however rudimentary a fashion) in the techniques and tactics o f  ten or ism, were engaged in conspiracy 
as full-time avocation, living underground while constantly planning and plotting terrorist attacks, and who at 
times were under the direct control, or operated at the express behest, o f  a foreign government.” See: Bruce 
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.), 1998, pg. 197. INSIDE TERRORISM.
 ^ See: B m ce Hoffman’s comment in ‘The N ew  Terrorism’, The Economist, August 15, 1998, p. 17.
 ^ See: Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities, Paper presented at the Seminar 
on Technology and Terrorism at St. Andrews University, Scotland, August 24-27, 1992, on pp. 3 and 5. See also: 
Rod Nordland and Ray W ilkinson, ‘Inside Teiror, Inc’, Newsweek, April 7, 1986, “Legitimizing Terror”, 
Washington Times, July 6, 1987.
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toward achieving spectacular incidents with a greater number o f causalities, and 
motivated by a world view designating them as the “vanguard of a divinely ordained 
battle to liberate Muslim lands.”'^  Terrorists who align themselves with the likes of 
Osama bin Laden, for example, are less concerned with acceptance and are not 
looking for the bargaining table to achieve legitimacy. They are less concerned with 
the secular political concerns of their predecessors, their objective is to kill, and in 
large numbers.
The U.S. Department of Defence 1997 Annual Defence Report, identified five 
factors which identified this increasingly lethal shift in trends: the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, changing ten'orist motivations, proliferation of technologies of mass 
destruction,^ increased access to information and information technologies, and 
accelerated centralization of vital components of the national infr astructure, which has 
increased their vulnerability to teiTorist attack.^ DoD predictions also place terrorism 
as the new ‘weapon of choice’ with the majority of terrorism directed toward the U.S. 
targets as tied to etlinic and religious conflicts, often urban in nature, and more likely
in capital c i t i e s .  ^9
 ^ See: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, ‘The N ew  Face o f  TetTorism’, The N ew  York Times, January 4, 2000, 
p. 19, col. 1.
 ^ While much has been written on this, technologies o f  mass destruction have not yet been used, baring the one 
exception o f the sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 carried out by Aum Shinrikyo. For 
discussion on this topic see: Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, Bradley A. Thayer, America’s A chilles’ 
Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical TeiTorism and Covert Attack. (MIT Press, 1998).
9 U.S. Department o f  Defense, 1997 Annual Defense Report, Chapter 9: Tenorism: A Phenomenon In 
Transition.
10 Ibid.
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Thi’eats from non-state actors with no ties to government, such as the al-Qaida^ ^
network, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo,*^ and the FARC in C o l o m b i a , which have their
own funding networks thiough narcotrafficking, private business, local financial
support, charities, or their own independent wealth, as is the case with Saudi financier
Osama Bin Ladin’*^, continue to pose dangers. These actors can independently recruit
new members from local areas, and often in areas where local conflicts can assist in
recmitment, such as in Chechnya, or A lbania. Some gi'oups, such as Hamas and
Hezbollah often create rival institutions to public services, such as schools, and
healthcare. The infusion of money, services, and training into an already conflict-
ridden society, make for an increasingly volatile situation, agitating existing contempt
against Western society. As Ambassador Sheehan contends, in his recent remarks on
Post-Millennium TeiTorism at the Brookings Institute:
"Especially since the end o f the Cold War, a number o f terrorist groups have 
portrayed their cause in religious and cultural terms. This is often a transparent 
tactic designed to conceal political goals, generate popular support, and silence 
potential opposition. It feeds upon the resentments and suffering o f the people who 
feel forgotten or marginalized in today’s rapidly globalizing society.
 ^  ^ See: U.S. Departm ent o f  State, Patterns o f  G lobal Terrorism 1999, U.S. Department o f  State Publication, April
2000. Hereinafter PATTERNS. For a copy o f  the report see the U.S. Department o f State website at: 
httiy/:www.state.gov/www.global/terrorism/annual_reports.html
2^ Ibid.
Ibid.
14 Ibid.
13 Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Speech at the Brookings Institute, 
Washington, D.C., February 10, 2000. See transcripts p. 5.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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It is these emerging non-state actors which have exhibited considerably less 
constraint that their earlier state sponsored counterparts in past decades, and many 
have actively sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction to increase the lethality 
of their attacks, seeking the psychological impact of a ‘body count’. This change of 
mission reflects largely the change of the type of attacker, which resemble less the 
more insular, tight-knit trained units; but a more spontaneous group sharing in a 
common philosophy which come together for a ‘one o ff  strike, only to vanish again 
into the same obscurity from which they came. The entire operation, designed, 
planned, reconnaissanced, and implemented to hide the identity of the attackers as 
well as their sponsor. In this absence of a command structure, the terrorist attackers 
enjoy an aura o f anonymity, which encourages more indiscriminate, lethal, operations. 
This new brand of nihilism presents another disturbing, emerging trend: the inability 
to connect the act with the perpetrator, which is worrying when the effect is 
potentially the use of weapons of mass destruction by a seemingly invisible enemy.
The ability to identify presents the most significant challenge to governments 
who seek to counter these groups, and these non-state transitory teiTorist entities that 
leave few footprints of identifiable teiTorist organizations, making it difficult for law 
enforcement investigators to identify the peipetrators of the attack, and actually 
apprehend the attacker. Although there have been cases where perpetrators of this 
‘new terrorism’ have been caught and convicted, the case of Ramzi Yousef to name 
just one example, the ability to accomplish this is extraordinary. The problem has 
only been exacerbated by the ending of the cold war, making it easier for teiTorists to 
operate independently without the need for government help. In addition there exist a 
vast amount of weapons and explosives, which find their way to the black market
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every year as a result o f the break-up of the former Soviet arsenal. *9 While the 
United States presently identifies seven states which currently act as sponsors of 
terrorism,29 they caveat that not all o f them are ‘active’ sponsors of terrorism, such as 
Cuba for example.21
The new challenge to law enforcement, and the inherent problems it creates for 
legal response must also take into account the line between domestic and foreign 
issues, which is often bluiTed, if at all existent. As easily as people can move through 
borders, so do drugs, weapons, explosives, and ultimately crime. Tenorist 
organizations can more easily engage in simultaneous operations both domestically 
and internationally, foreign banks and businesses can own and operate banks or 
businesses in the United States while at the same time funding illegal activities. Even 
multinational companies can more easily violate laws which apply to the transfer of 
special technology. These examples, and more, not only help make it easier on the 
tenorist, but ultimately undennine the separation of powers for law en forcem en t .22 
Those agencies that were initially charged by charter with domestic operations only, 
such as the FBI, or the DEA (Dmg Enforcement Agency), or Immigiation, have found 
themselves with increasing responsibility and jurisdiction for investigations beyond 
the waters edge. Those agencies, whose charter defines the sphere of responsibility 
abroad, such as the CIA, or Diplomatic Security, often find these distinctions bluiTed 
when confronted with an investigation of both domestic and transnational importance.
*9 Ibid. at note 8, p. 18.
29 Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, and Syria ar e listed as the seven major sponsors o f  terrorism, 
source: PATTERNS p. 2.
21 Ibid.
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The concern over which has priority regardless of venue or whether or not foreign 
policy concerns trump that priority has caused a major restructuring of many of the 
way law enforcement agencies do business. Much of this was addressed in a 
Congressional report conducted by The National Commission on Terrorism in 1999, 
assessing the cuixent U.S. practices against terrorism. As a result, some inter-agency 
jurisdictional lines were redrawn, and reassessed in terms of overlap. The FBI’s 
extended power in overseas operations and investigations due to their primary ability 
to conduct criminal investigations by default o f their training and primary function, is 
one example, but perhaps the most poignant example of the adaptation of law 
enforcement has had to make toward the evolving problem of teiTorisni, and tenorist 
threat.
7.3 Case Examples
The following case studies demonstrate recent examples in terrorist extradition as 
well as an alternative method of extradition not yet covered -  rendition. From 1993 
until 1999, there have been 13 cases involving bringing suspects of tenorist crime to 
the United States.23 Actually, only four of these cases involved extradition, the 
remainder involved rendition of the fugitive offenders to the U.S.,24 a process that will 
involve a more in-depth discussion further on. However, for the purpose of this brief 
case study section, understanding the semantics between the two will not be wholly
22 Making Intelligence Smarter -  The Future o f  U.S. Intelligence, Report o f  an Independent Task Force, 
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard N. Haass, Project Director, July 1998.
23 PATTERNS
24 Ibid
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necessary, but should be viewed as similar in tenns of their result, which is the return 
of frigitives to the United States for the purpose of trial.
7.3.1 The World Trade Center
On February 26, 1993,25 an explosion went off in the underground parking garage 
o f The World Trade Center, New York City’s largest t o w e r , 2 6  which was designed to 
topple the tower into the twin building on its flank, bringing them both crashing to the 
ground amid a cloud of cyanide gas.2? Had the attack gone as planned, over 250,000 
people would have perished, producing the single largest terrorist attack in history -  
instead, one tower did not fall into the next, the cyanide gas rather than vaporizing 
into the atmosphere, burnt up in the e x p l o s i o n , 28 and ultimately six people perished as 
a result.
The tme scale of the destmctive nature of this attack was not widely publicized, 
and the key architect behind the attack whom had entered the U.S. on an Iraqi passport 
under the name of Ramzi Yousef, was two years later a p p r e h e n d e d 2 9  just before the 
execution of another spectacular bombing conspiracy. In January of 1995, Yousef 
had planned, in one day, to blow up eleven commercial U.S. aircraft using liquid
25 This date held a particular significance, as it was the second anniversary o f  the end o f  the G ulf War.
26 Dave Williams, ‘The Bombing o f  the World Trade Center in New York City’, International Criminal Police  
Review  -  No. 469-471 (1998). See also: Ralph Blumenthal, ‘Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in 
Trade Center Blast’, New York Times, October 28, 1993.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 ‘Cracking the Case How fugitive bomb suspect was captured’. The Star-Ledger, February 10, 1995; Lauri 
Mylroie, ‘The World Trade Center Bomb: W ho is Ramzi Yousef? And Why it Matters’, The National Interest, 
Winter 1995/6.
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explosives undetectable by airport metal detectors.^o Foitunately, he was careless in 
mixing the concision in his Manila apartment and started a fire. Forced to flee, he left 
behind his computer,3i unencrypted,32 which contained all the valuable information 
which led to his arrest one month later in Pakistan. After a brief interrogation by 
Pakistani law enforcement, he was immediately handed over to U.S. law enforcement 
officials, and extradited to the United States to stand trial.33
The World Trade Center attack signified two things to the United States; first, 
that despite all prior held beliefs that “it can’t happen here” -  it did, and that the U.S. 
shores were no longer impenetrable to foreign terrorist attack. Second, that despite 
the U.S. arsenal of anti-teiTorist, and counter-terrorist intelligence centers,34 and 
multiple government agencies charged with securing the nations borders -  the attack 
forced thinking about the potential for future terrorist attacks at home, especially the 
possibility of the potential for attacks involving WMD, nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons, and Americans were now faced with the question of how much 
freedom they are willing to trade for more security.35
39 See: Charles P. Wallace, ‘Foiled tenorist plot reveals deadly day of rage at U .S .’, The Fresno Bee, 5/28/95, p. 
AI ; Charles Wallace, ‘Web o f  tenorism targeted U.S. jets Foiled plan would have blown up 11 planes in one day’, 
The Toronto Star, 5/28/95, p. A4; ‘Terrorists plotted to blow up 11 U.S. jumbo jets’. The Baltim ore Sun, 5/28/95.
3 * Charles Wallace, ‘Web o f  tenorism targeted U.S. jets Foiled plan would have blown up 11 planes in one day’, 
The Toronto Star, 5/28/95, p. A4
32 According to one unattributable source: This was obviously an accident, and an accident that was pure luck for 
investigators since it could have taken a considerably longer amount o f  time to decipher that information -  it was 
a “lucky break” for law enforcement.
33 ‘World Trade Center Bombing Suspect Apprehended in Pakistan’, Reuters News Wire, February 8, 1995.
34 There is in fact a distinction between the two -  in U.S. Government definitions; anti-terrorism pertains 
specifically to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability o f  individuals and property to terrorist acts. 
Whereas counter-terrorism refers specifically to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to 
tenorism. See: D oD  Annual Defense Report, \99%.
35 Richard Lacayo, ‘How Safe is Safe’, Time, May 1, 1995.
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Yousef fled the U.S. shortly after the bombing on February 26, 1993, and 
remained on the FBI’s Most Wanted List for close to two years, offering a $2 million 
reward was offered for infonnation leading to his capture. The events leading up to 
his capture and extradition were largely the result o f close coordination with 
American, foreign intelligence agencies, and law enforcement agencies. The 
investigation began with the December 1994 explosion aboard Philippine Airlines 
flight 434, killing one passenger and wounding 10 others. After an emergency 
landing in Okinawa, Japan, a radical Muslim guemlla group claimed responsibility, 
but because the bomb making materials and construction, specifically the use of nitro­
glycerine, U.S. authorities suspected Yousef as the possible architect o f the bombing. 
Weeks later, Philippine police arrested two men in connection with a potential plot to 
kill the Pope, and discovered many of the same bomb making materials present in the 
World Trade Center bombing, as well as a fingerprint, which they passed along to 
U.S. authorities.
Yousef, evading anest in Manila, fled to Bangkok, but was spotted by authorities 
before he managed to secure another flight to Islamabad. U.S. Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security Officials notified law enforcement in Pakistan before his aiTival, where they 
were waiting for him. After two days of surveillance led by a joint effort o f U.S. and 
Pakistani law enforcement officials, they were able to confirm his identity, at which 
point Pakistani officials anested him.
Pakistani officials briefly interrogated Yousef, where he confessed to his role in 
the Trade Center bombing, he was quickly released to the custody of U.S. law 
enforcement, and extradited to the U.S. to stand trial. The aiTangement agreed upon 
at the time between U.S. and Pakistani law enforcement authorities, was that a general
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agreement and pledge on behalf of the U.S. to share all flirther intelligence 
infonnation regarding tenorism it learned from Yousef. This special relationship was 
not wholly without some legal basis, the extradition treaty between the U.S. and 
Pakistan was established December 22, 1931, and ratified eleven years later on March 
9, 1942.36 There was prior, an established legal basis for the extradition, but this 
relationship was only strengthened by the ability of law enforcement to cooperate on a 
variety of network levels, which led to the capture of the ringleader of the bombing.
Another man affiliated with the bombing, Mahmoud Abu H a l i m a , 3 7  a taxi driver, 
originally suspected as the mastermind of the bombing, was arrested in Egypt and 
extradited to the Untied States in March 1 9 9 3 . 3 8  The U.S.-Egypt extradition treaty 
was signed into law in 1 8 7 4 ,  ratified in 1 8 7 5 , 3 9  ^nd more than provides a basis of 
legal merit for extradition. But the basis for Halima’s extradition was more than just 
grounded in treaty law, it was part of a larger anti-Islamist alliance between Egypt and 
America which was only strengthened by Halima’s extradition. Egypt’s difficulties 
with Islamic militants stem firom the 1 9 8 1  murder of Anwar Sadat, and have been part 
and parcel of a battle between Islamic militants and Islam itself, the distinction being 
non-Muslims who do not separate Islamic beliefs from Islamic radicalism. The 
extradition of Halima to the U.S. was part of this crackdown on the part of Egypt, and 
one that was welcomed by U.S. authorities.
36 47 Stat.2122
37 ‘The Afghan Connection. (Muslims in Afghanistan and the Bombing o f  the World Trade Center)’, The 
Economist, April 10, 1993, p. 49.
38 ‘Fifth suspect in World Trade Center bombing surrenders’, Agence France-Presse, March 25, 1993.
39 19Stat. 572
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Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim, linked to the bombing through phone calls and 
fingerprints, and accused of acting as part of the planning and execution stages, 
specifically the transportation of the bomb, was the third teiTorist extradited to the 
U.S. from Jordan, in August of 1995.40 The extradition treaty between the two 
countries, U.S. and Jordan, was only signed into law of March of that year, and 
ratified July 29, 1995,4i less than a week before Najim’s extradition on August 3, 
1995.
7.3.2 African Embassy Bombings
On August 7, 1998, at 10:40 am local time a car bomb exploded outside the U.S. 
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. At the same moment, some 450 miles away, another car 
bomb exploded outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, the capital of 
neighbouring Tanzania.42 Together, both bombs killed at least 263 people and injured 
more than 5,000 others,43 among those dead were twelve Americans.44
Hours later, a grim U.S. President Clinton stood before reporters and promised: 
“These acts of terrorist violence are abhorrent, they ai e inliuman. We will use all the 
means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how
40 ‘Defense and Diplomacy -  Man Pleads Not Guilty In New York Bomb Plot’, Washington Post, August 4,
1995, p. A20; “Bombing Suspect Extradited”, The Guardian, August 4, 1995.
4  ^ N o corresponding U.S. citation.
42 For a news account o f  the bombings see; Karl Vick and Stephen Buckley, ‘Base! Base! Terrorism! |
Terrorism!’, The Washington Post, August 13, 1998; Alan Cooperman, “Terror Strikes Again” U.S. News and  4
World Report, August 24, 1998. j
!
43 Robin Allen and Carola Hoyos, ‘Millionaire, terrorist, fugitive’. Financial Times Weekend, April 14-15 2001. I
44 Stephen Buckley, ‘Bomb Vehicle Was Turned A w ay’, Washington Post, August 10, 1998, p. A l,
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long it takes.”45 As national security and law enforcement officials mobilized to make 
good on the President’s promise, there was mounting skepticism in the U.S. as the all 
too familiar echo’s of his predecessors from previous promises after previous attacks 
reminded Americans that success was often elusive in such cases.46 Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright pleaded with Americans to be patient while investigators sought to 
learn the identity o f the bombers, and suggested that America would retaliate against 
them, or their sponsors, if  necessary.47 And within days, over 375 FBI Agents and 
criminal experts poured into East Afi*ica4s for what would become the FBI’s largest 
overseas investigation -  which afterwards would widely be judged as a success.
FBI and Criminal Investigative Divisions in both Kenya and Tanzania, shared the 
tedious and often grisly work of combing through rubble collecting bomb fragments, 
traces o f explosives, often found in the fragments of human remains, and a myriad of 
other evidence, which was shipped back the FBI labs for analysis. They concluded 
the crudely designed bombs each contained over 2,000 pounds of TNT, detonated by 
blasting caps laced with RDX, a plastic explosive, in addition to oxygen acetylene
45 President Clinton’s comments, see; ‘The Search for the Culprits’, Financial Times, August 8 /  August 9, 1998.
46 Stephen J. Hedges, ‘U.S. Better at Promising to Nab Tenorists Than It Is At Doing So’, Chicago Tribune, 
August 10, 1998; Tim Weiner, ‘Experts Starting Search for Clues in Kenya Bombing’ The New York Times, 
August 10, 1998, p. A l;  Kenneth R. Timmennan, ‘Who Bombed the Embassies?’, The Wall Street Journal, 
August 11, 1998
47 Ibid at note 45; Richard W olffe, Michela Wrong, Roula Khalaf, ‘FBI agents to probe embassy blasts’. 
Financial Times, August 10, 1998.
48 ‘Bombings Put Focus on Saudi Patron o f Terror’, The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1998; Robert Block, 
‘Loss o f  Clues Feared in Nairobi Bombing’, The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1998.
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tanks, a trademark of Middle East teiTorists who believe that they enhance an 
explosion, which they do not.^9
On the ground in Kenya and Tanzania, FBI teamed up with the local police 
running leads across the city, which turned up Rashed Daoud al Owhali, who later 
would be discovered to have driven the truck bomb into the embassy in Kenya, but the 
most serendipitous catch, however, was a thousand miles away by an immigration 
officer thi'ough a passport fraud case in Karachi, Pakistan. For thiee days, Pakistani 
authorities questioned Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, who eventually after intense 
interrogation claimed to have a role in the bombings. Pakistani authorities then 
contacted U.S. law enforcement officials. Odeh, escorted back to Nairobi by the 
American Central Intelligence Agents, stonewalled FBI investigators until the Kenyan 
police turned up evidence he had stashed in his home, at which point he confessed. 
This breakthrough eventually led to the identification, and arrest of three additional 
terrorists implicated in the bombing,^^ and successfully identified the group 
responsible -  Al Qaeda, and its ringleader Osama bin Laden.
The success of the investigation was due entirely to the level of cooperation 
shared between the FBI, the Criminal Investigative Division in Kenya, and local 
police on the ground in both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, a lesson the U.S. learned
David E. Kaplan, ‘On terrorism’s trail -  How the FBI unravelled the Africa embassy bombings’, L/.S. News and  
World Report, November 23, 1998, p. 31.
Investigators ra id  Nairobi hotel where bomb reportedly w as made, CNN New s story, 
http://www.cnn.eom/W orld/africa/9808/l9/africa.02/; Susan Linnee, ‘Islamic Groups Warn o f  More Attacks’, AP 
Headlines, August 19, 1998.
Thomas W. Lippman, ‘Albright Chides Afghan Rulers’, The Washington Post, August 19, 1998, p. A24; The 
Charges Against International Ten or 1st Usama bin Laden, http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/eastafrica.summai-y.htm; 
and http://www.fbi.gOv/contact/fo/nyfo/l I04I998.htm.
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from their stonewalled investigation of the Kliobar Towers bombing which fizzled 
due to poor communication between U.S. and Saudi authorities.^^
Although the original U.S.-Kenyan extradition treaty, established on December 
22, 1931, and ratified June 24, 1934^^ was updated again in August 19, 1965,^ ^^  both 
Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, and Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, who were retained 
in U.S. custody in Kenya, were rendered, not extradited, to the U.S. to stand trial.^^ 
Another implicated in the bombing, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, was extradited in 
December 1998 from Geiinany, without incident under the U.S.- German extradition 
treaty.^^ Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who played a direct role in the bombing, was 
responsible for arranging the bombing, and finding a place for the bomb to be 
assembled,^^ was deported in October 1999 from South Africa.
The rendition of the later individual, Klialfan Khamis Mohamed, caused some 
controversy with the South African govermnent. Shortly following the indictment o f 
Mohamed, in May 2001 on all 302 counts of conspiracy, murder, and perjury; South 
Africa’s highest court ruled that the ‘extradition’ of Mohamed was ‘unlawfuT. 
Mohamed’s rights were allegedly violated when he was extradited to the U.S. in 
October 1999 without an assurance that prosecutors would not pursue capital 
punishment. The punishment which the U.S. jury was urged to consider following the
Ibid at note 52.
47  Stat2122
54 16U ST  1866
55 ‘More embassy bombing suspects to be sent to U .S .’, Reuters, August 31, 1998.
56 Signed June 20, 1978; ratified August 29, 1980; 32 UST 1485.
5^ Phil Hirschkorn, ‘Prosecution leaves jury with mounds o f  evidence to ponder’, CNN N ew York, 
http://www.cnn.eom/2001/LAW /trials.and.cases/case.files/0012/embassy/index.htm
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trial conviction, was death by lethal injection, the maximum penalty the conviction 
would carry. The South African court ruled the extradition “infringed on Mohamed’s 
right to human dignity, to life, and not to be treated or punished in a cruel or 
inhumane or degrading way.”^^
Inherent in almost every extradition treaty or multilateral agi eement, is the option 
to refuse extradition to a requesting state where the death penalty would be an option 
for punishment. South Africa, having abolished the death penalty in 1995, now has 
laws which prohibit exposing anyone to the risk of execution through extradition or 
deportation. Mohamed, was actually deported, not extradited, but the same mles 
apply under South African law.
After the bombing Khalfan Khamis Mohamed fled to South Africa and applied 
for political asylum under an alias. He retained a temporary residence peiinit, and 
supported himself as a short order cook. By the time of his aiTest in October 1999, 
police had traced a fake Tanzanian passport application to his South African 
residence, and when Mohamed attempted to renew his immigration papers, the South 
African police arrested him for entering the country under false pretences, then 
initiated deportation, and turned him over to the U.S. authorities for interrogation, 
Mohamed was not given an attorney when FBI Agents interrogated him, but had 
requested deportation to the U.S. given the choice between the U.S. and Tanzania. 
Technically, deportation is a return to your country of origin. Although fake, 
Mohammed had carried a Tanzanian passport, and should have been deported back to 
Tanzania, which he was not. The South African court acknowledged they had made a
5  ^Phil Hirschkorn, ‘South Africa court says convicted bomber’s rights violated’, CNN N ew  York, 
http://www.cnn.eom/2001/LAW /05/29/bombings.south.africa.index.html
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grave constitutional en*or after the incident had taken place, but could not undo the 
situation since Mohammed was already out of the country and on trial in the U.S. The 
South African court rendered their decision and sent it along to the U.S. district court, 
and while it is unlikely to have any effect either on the proceedings or the outcome of 
the case, it could potentially have an effect on extraditions in the future.59 Countries 
whose constitution outlaws the death penalty, may find it difficult to cooperate on 
unofficial levels where rendition or deportation is an option, with countries where the 
death penalty could potentially be a part of the punishment. Constitutionally, the 
asylum state would not be able to engage in matters of unofficial or interagency 
cooperation if it meant a violation of the law of the land, and would potentially hinder 
future collaborative efforts.
7.3.3 Mir Aimal Kansi
In January 25 1993, a Pakistani refugee positioned himself outside the front 
driveway entrance of Central Intelligence Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and 
randomly shot at CIA employees heading to work that morning. After killing two 
people, he then fled the country.
Mir Aimal Kansi, had entered the United States in 1990 on a B-1 tourist visa 
issued in Karachi, Pakistan. In 1992, he applied for political asylum in the United 
States, and as routine dictates, was released with a work permit. Intelligence records 
on Mr. Kansi indicated that he had previously been involved in anti-U.S. 
demonstrations in Pakistan, and he had been able to purchase a semi-automatic AK47
5^ Roger Cossack, ‘Bombing trial could complicate extraditions’, 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/05/30/cossack.bombing.exti'adition/index.html
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assault rifle with his Virginia driver’s license -  which he was able to secure having 
obtained his work peiinit. There was no evidence to indicate, however, that Kansi 
was sponsored by another terrorist organization, he was not an agent of a foreign 
government, nor was he part of a larger plot; he was, apparently one individual acting 
out on his own accord.
At 4:00am June 15, 1997, five FBI agents sneaked into a hostel in the border 
region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and where Afghan infoiinants had told 
them they would find Kansi.60 After taking Kansi captive, they brought him thiough 
Pakistan to an undisclosed airbase, boarded a military C-130 aircraft, and brought 
back to the U.S.^i On June 18, he was brought before a federal judge in Virginia 
where he was ordered held without bond and eventually convicted for the murder of 
two CIA employees.
This was the second time that the Pakistani govermnent had complied, through 
unofficial channels with U.S. government in an operation to secure a wanted fugitive 
from within their borders. When Yousef was captured for the World Trade Center 
bombing, the unofficial word was that Pakistan wanted to restore the special security 
relationship it once had with the U.S., and that there was some speculation that 
Pakistan was near to being added to the ‘U.S. Department of State countries which 
sponsor teiTorism’ list.62 Kansi was every bit a continuation of this thinking.
The people of Pakistan, however, were not willing to be as compliant. The 
govermnent of Pakistan received mounting lawsuits from protesters to the extradition
60 Vew York Times, June 19, 1997.
6  ^ Bob Djurdjevic, ‘The Long Reach o f  Uncle Sam’, The Washington Times, June 29, 1997.
62 ‘Cracking the Case, How fugitive bomb suspect was captured’. The Star-Ledger, Febixiaiy 10, 1995
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of Kansi. The fornier director of Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency, (ISI), as well as the 
Pakistani Institute of Human Rights were two of the organisations which claimed that 
the extradition of Kansi was unlawful, because it broke the laws of Pakistan. They 
argued that no lawful surrender of Kansi took place; rather it was the kidnapping of a 
Pakistani citizen.63 The U.S. government reaction on the other hand, was victorious. 
The morning of June 18, 1997, press spokesmen stood defiantly before a Washington 
press coi*ps and touted “we got him, and that's all you need to Icnow right /îow!”64 
When the announcement was broadcast across the CIA building in Langley, VA, CIA 
Agents actually gave the FBI a standing ovation, a first in interagency h istory .65
Kansi himself engaged in its own legal skirmishes with the U.S. courts, over his 
legal representation. The U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment guarantees equal 
protection under the law, although as discussed later on there is precedent for some 
levity to this, still a judge had to order prosecutors to provide layers for Kansi, as well 
as witness’s descriptions of the killer following the shootings.66
Interestingly enough regarding Kansi’s capture, was the fact that it took so long 
to apprehend him at all. He had never left Pakistan, but is from an area of Pakistan 
considered ‘lawless’, the Western border along the Afghan border, which is governed 
largely by tribes. Kansi’s family is a rich, powerful tribe, and in that area of Pakistan, 
they are the law, with Pakistani authorities relatively unable to penetrate this region.
63 ‘Pak Govt faces lawsuits for deporting Kansi’, Associated Press, June 25, 1997
64 Channel 8 news report, June 18, 1997
65 From an Online Newshour interview with Elaine Shannon, a Time magazine coirespondent, in a segment called 
‘Facing Justice’, which aired on June 18, 1997.
66 ‘Pakistani wins legal skirmish with U .S .’, http://cgi.cnn.eom/US/9708/05/briefs.pm/kansi/
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His lai'ge, extended family, and their allies in the area had protected Kansi.67 
Following his capture and return to the U.S., he would be arraigned under Virginia 
State law, not Federal law even though his crimes were punishable under Federal 
statues. The reason for this is because the Federal statues did not include the death 
penalty for his crimes which took place in 1993, which was before the provisions took 
effect. Kansi was charged with two counts of murder, tliree counts of assault with the 
intent to commit murder, and various weapons charges, which would make him 
eligible for the death penalty under Virginia law, and this is what the Prosecutors were 
looking for.68 There was some fallout from this, as allegations that a group 
sympathetic to Kansi claimed responsibility for killing four American oil workers 
slain in Karachi, Pakistan, vowing more slayings if Kansi were sentenced to die. A 
claim that U.S. embassy officials in Pakistan, as well as Pakistan’s interior minister 
downplayed immediately.^^
Kansi was convicted in 1997 of two counts of murder, and three counts of 
malicious wounding, and after seven hours o f deliberation, a jury recommended him 
for the death sentence.^o
An interesting side note to this case worth mentioning is the use of the death 
penalty. Present in international law, remains the right to refuse extradition to 
countries which may invoke the death penalty as a system of punisliment.
67 Online Newshour, FACING JUSTICE
68 Ibid.
69 ‘Jury: Murderer o f  CIA workers deserves death’, November 14, 1997, 
http://www.cnn.com /US/9711/cia. verdict, wrap/index.html
79 ‘Jui-y recommends death for CIA shooter’, November 14, 1997 
http://cnn.com/US/9711/14/cia.verdict.index.html
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Technically, Kansi was not a fonnal extradition case; however, the use of the death 
penalty by the U.S. still has some interesting implications for future potential co­
operation.
Kansi’s crimes took place in 1993, at which time there was no federal statute for 
the death penalty, which was why he was charged in the State of Virginia making him 
eligible for the death penalty. However, in 1996, spurred by the events in Oklahoma 
City and the World Trade Center, the U.S. passed the AntiteiTorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996. In sum, this document is an amalgamation of various 
legislative efforts toward teiTorism, consisting of several sources from the major 
comprehensive teiTorism bills passed in the U.S. Congress.?^ The significant 
highlights of the bill accomplish reforms in the following areas: habeas corpus
refonn,72 justice for victims,^^ international terrorism prohibitions,74 tenorist and 
criminal alien removal and exclusion,75 nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
7^  141 Cong. Rec. S2503 (daily edition Februaiy 10, 1995)
72 Act to amend federal habeas corpus law as it applies to both state and federal prisoners. Amendments include: 
bar on federal habeas corpus reconsideration o f  legal/factual issues previously ruled by state courts; 1 year statute 
o f  limitations for habeas corpus petitions; 6 month statue o f  limitations in death penalty cases; state appointed 
counsel for inmates during habeas hearings; appellate court approval for repeated habeas petitions. See:
Summary report o f  the Act by Senior Specialist Charles Doyle, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty A ct o f  
1996: A Summary, American Law Division, June 3, 1996, pp. 4-5.
73 This recasts federal law concerning restitution, and expands the circumstances under which foreign 
governments which sponsor/support terrorism may be sued for resulting injuries, as well as increases the 
assistance and compensation available to the victims o f  ten orist acts. Ibid. p. 9
74 Designed to sever the ties between terrorists and their sources o f  financial or material support. It enlarges 
proscriptions against assisting in the commission o f  terrorist crimes, and it authorizes the regulation o f  fundraising 
by foreign organizations associated with terrorist activities. Ibid. p. 14
75 Divided into four main parts: The rem oval o f  alien terrorists, addresses how to reconcile the need to remove 
alien terrorists from the U.S. on the basis o f  classified information while still protecting the confidentiality o f  that 
information. Exclusion o f  m embers and representatives o f  terrorist organizations, establishes that membership or 
representation o f  a terrorist organization as a grounds for denying alien entiy in the U.S. under title 8 U.S.C. 1182. 
A modification to asylum procedures, precludes asylum granted by the U.S. Attorney General for any alien 
terrorist unless determined there is no reason to consider the alien a threat to national security. Finally, criminal 
alien procedural improvements, which authorize disclosure o f  certain confidential information concerning alien 
legalizations, the creation o f  a criminal alien tracking station, the creation o f  a criminal alien ID system, and the 
expanding o f  immigration offences to the RICO statutes. The final pait also expands U.S. extradition law to
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restrictions,76 implementation of a plastic explosives convention,77 criminal law 
modifications to counter teiTorism,78 and assistance to law enforcement.79 However, 
what would have been the most applicable to Kansi’s case, if  the agreement had been 
in force the time of his crimes, and perhaps the most significant in tenns of potential 
cooperation, is Title VII -  Criminal Law Modifications to Counter Terrorism. This 
specific section of the bill, essentially allows for the use of the death penalty as 
punishment for homicide as a result o f terrorist crimes,89 and extends the statute of 
limitations in which to bring charges.81
There were, and still are, appeals over Kansi’s sentence. However, the larger 
issue here is that the use of punishment such as the death penalty could provide a real 
deterrent not only to extradition attempts, but, to the other forms of low-level inter­
agency co-operation used as alternatives to extradition. It is entirely feasible; that 
some countries would be reluctant to participate in these co-operative operations if 
they knew the accused would face the death penalty. In a case such as Kansi’s, or
penult the U.S. to surrender, in the absence o f an applicable treaty, foreign nationals charged with crimes o f  
violence committed against Americans overseas in cases where political offence is not applicable, and that the 
offence would constitute a crime in the U.S. Ibid  pp. 18-24.
76 Adjusts the restrictions on possession and use o f  materials capable o f  producing catastrophic damage in the 
hands o f  a terrorist. Ibid. p. 24.
77 Provides for implementing legislation for the Convention on the Marking o f  Plastic Explosives for the Purpose 
o f  Detection, negotiated in Montreal, March 1, 1991. The Convention would become effective when ratified by at 
least 5 explosives producing nations. Ibid  p. 25
78 Changes the existing federal law and procedure by expanding the reach o f  federal law and increasing penalties 
to more effectively combat terrorism. It makes it a federal crime to kill, kidnap or assault any federal officer or 
employee, to conspire in the U.S. to commit crimes o f  violence overseas, or to commit a crime o f violence within 
the U .S. related to conspiracy occum ng overseas. Ibid. p. 26.
79 Authorizes the appropriation o f  an additional $ 1 billion to fund anti-terrorism law enforcement efforts, overseas 
law enforcement training, and parking bans around federal buildings in Washington D.C. Ibid. p. 34
89 Title VII, Subtitle A, Sec. 702
81 Statue raised from 5 years to 8 years, Ibid.
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even the Fawaz Yunis case mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4, where rendition more 
closely resembled kidnapping, the asylum state’s government would have legitimate 
domestic concerns to consider. Offering up an accused, especially if the accused is a 
citizen, would potentially result in some significant fall-out. In addition to which, not 
all states are in line with the U.S. policy o f sending criminals to death row. As the 
reaction from the more recent execution of U.S. terrorist Timothy McVeigh is any 
gauge, even the most liberal democratic western allies to the U.S. do not approve. 
Potentially, the U.S. use of the death penalty for teiTorists could provide some friction 
in cases involving terrorist extradition, or rendition operations.
7.4 Extradition -vs. -  Rendition
The suiTender o f a fugitive by means agreed to by both states is referred to as 
informal rendition. It occurs when the official of the state of refuge acts “outside the 
framework of a formal process or without authority to facilitate the abduction or cause 
the surrender of the fu g itiv e .” ^^  Unlike extradition practices which bring the matter to 
the attention of the judiciary, rendition is the result o f an arrangement between two 
opposing state governmental a g en c ie s .83 These cooperative undertakings are less 
reflective of the omission of due process than they are o f the suggestion of 
cooperation and friendship between two states. Of course, this implies that the 
rendition process is agreed upon by the superiors of respective states, their knowledge, 
approval, and consent all prerequisites for this to transpire -  and not merely an
82 Cherif M. Bassiouni, International Teirorism and Political Crimes. (Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 
1975), p. 352.
83 See: Paul O ’Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 British Yearbook o f  International Law. 
pps. 279-280.
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undertaking of a personal nature without prior consent or knowledge in an effort to 
thwart a foimal process. There are advantages to this; first, it removes much of the 
bureaucratic red tape from the fonnal extradition process. Second, it signals strong 
relations between two countries, which are not only willing to bypass the fonnalities 
of the extradition process, but due to the nature of their common response toward a 
particular crime, in this case terrorism, there exists an agreement of the crime as a 
tenorist act, not prevalent in all countries, and a common goal toward bringing the 
tenorist to justice. Granted, some countries may just be content with removing the 
culprit from their jurisdiction, allowing another state to try them removes some 
culpability as well toward future reprisals, and bypassing the fonnal anangement may 
be the official line to their unofficial involvement, but nevertheless still signals the 
desire to cooperate and not look for an alternative which might not allow any form of 
rendition to take place at all, such as the case with both the Achille Lauro and TWA 
847 cases. Finally, and perhaps the most important advantage, is that it strengthen ties 
for cooperation amongst law enforcement. Such was the case in Yousef, when he was 
released to authorities with the proviso that future intelligence regarding teiTorism be 
shared between the two countries. Rendition, an entirely less fonnal process, creates 
bonds of tmst between law enforcement agencies which can potentially be relied upon 
for future inquiries, in future cases or investigations. It is perhaps the best weapon for 
intelligence, for law enforcement, and for government in its persistent fight against 
these elusive groups and individuals in an ever increasingly mobile society. When 
used in this light, with this goal in mind, it does not weaken the integrity of the law or 
the obligation of extradition, rather the opposite, allowing the judicial process to be 
strengthened through mutually assured goals and ideas between the two countries
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which have established through process an agreed understanding on a common 
problem. However, often the line of such informalities is stretched, and couched as 
law enforcement, when in truth they are incidents which violate the sovereign borders 
of another tenitoiy, it weakens not only the integrity of the law and due process of 
law, but weakens the relationship between states, between govermnent agencies, and 
the potential for further trust and cooperation between law enforcement. Such cases 
include abductions or unlawful seizure, when agents of one state act in the teiiitory of 
another,84 and as explained by John Murphy, involves three distinct violations of law; 
first, disruption of public order; second, infringement on the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of another state; and third, violation of human rights.85 This type 
o f response has a home in legal precedent in the U.S., known as the TCer-Frisbie 
doctrine’, based on two U.S. Supreme Court cases. It holds that due process under the 
U.S. Constitutional Fifth Amendment which guarantees rights to due process under 
the law and a right to a fair trial, is limited in scope and does not necessarily apply to 
the method used to bring the accused into custody.86
Such incidents which occur, such as the case of Humberto Alvarez Machain, for 
example, demonstrate how the rendition principle is stretched further than intended. 
Dr. Machain was accused of injecting painkillers into a captured agent from the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency, as traffickers from the Guadalajara dmg cartel were 
torturing him, aiming to keep him alive longer for questioning. Five years later.
84 John F. Muiphy, Punishing International Terrorists, The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives, (Totowa, N.J. 
Rowman & Allanheld, 1985).
85 Ibid. p. 90.
86 K er v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1888) and Frisbie  v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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Mexican bounty hunters posing as members of the Mexican Judicial Police, and 
bankrolled by the U.S. Government, kidnapped him from his office in Guadalajara, 
and flew him to El Paso, Texas where he was apprehended by U.S. authorities for 
trial. A U.S. Federal Judge ruled the case dismissed on the grounds that it violated the 
Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico, and ordered Machain to be 
repatriated.87 The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the decision that since the U.S. had 
authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested on the 
gi'ounds of treaty violation -  and therefore jurisdiction was improper,88 but it reversed 
the opinion of the lower court as a violation of the U.S. Mexican Extradition Treaty.
The court held the contention that the fact of respondent’s forcible abduction 
does not prohibit the defendant’s trial in a U.S. court for violations of U.S. criminal 
laws, that a defendant may not be prosecuted in a court for violation of the tenns of an 
extradition treaty.89 However, using the ‘Ker-Frisbie’ test, in the event a treaty has 
not been invoked, or if  Mexico had not challenged, then the court may exercise 
jurisdiction even though the defendant was procured by means of forcible abduction.99 
The court ruled; “[t]he Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States 
and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territoiy of the 
other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if  such an abduction occurs.”
87 U.S. Supreme Court, No. 91-712, U.S. Petitioner v. Humberto AIvarez-Machain, June 15, 1992.
88 “The Court o f  Appeals deemed it essential, in order for the individual defendant to assert a right under the 
Treaty, that ath affected foreign government had registered a protest...Respondent agrees that the right exercised  
by the individual is derivative o f  the nation’s right under the Treaty, since nations are authorized, notwithstanding 
the tenns o f  an extradition treaty, to voluntarily render an individual to the other country on terms completely 
outside o f  those provided in the Treaty. The formal protest, therefore, ensures that the offended nation actually 
objects to the abduction and has not in som e way voluntarily rendered the individual for prosecution.” Ibid.
89 Ibid pps. 3-15 dissent. For prior case law precedent refer to: United States v. Rausclier, 119 U.S. 407.
99 Case law precedent Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436.
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Since the intent written into the treaty was applicable to crimes, including m urder,91
committed both before and after the treaty was ratified, the natural conclusion was
that intent was for the treaty to be mandatory for those offences regardless of when the
treaty came into force.92 The court concluded that:
“the decision of whether respondent shoidd be returned to Mexico, as a matter 
outside o f the Treaty:, is a matter for the Executive Branch. We conclude, however, 
that respondent’s abduction was not in violation o f the Extradition Treaty between 
the United States and Mexico... "93
Although the general sources of international law provide censure of abductions, 
the court ruled that individual rights are subordinate to the Nation’s right under the 
Treaty. Previous U.S. Supreme Court rulings have evidenced that, foreigners are not 
entitled to the same constitutional protections offered to U.S. citizens, which apply to 
search and seizure. Therefore, in the absence of such constitutional dialogue, treaty 
law and legal precedent are the only salient factors to be considered, while remedy in 
these instances would be matters of foreign policy to be determined by the Executive 
branch of government.
Often, the request for extradition becomes mired in formal proceedings and 
delay, even between two states that share amicable relations. It is important to 
remember that there is exclusive dependence on the decision making process of the 
requested state, which are often frustrated by treaty rhetoric, statutory procedures, and 
lengthy court decisions, and often leave the requesting state little choice but to seek
91 31 U.S.T. at 5073-5074. 
92Article22.
93 Ibid. at 64.
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alternative measures to secure the return of a fugitive. And, as observed by Professor 
Bassiouni:
“Cooperation in all these cases was between law enforcement authorities who 
avoided and evaded judicial and legal processes. These cases may point to a trend 
in extradition practices where police work out their own arrangements to obtain 
rendition o f individuals irrespective o f what the legal system reqinres, and in 
avoidance o f the judicial authorities altogether. This creates, o f course, serious 
problems for the integrity o f the legal process, even though it may be a manifestation 
o f the frustration o f law enforcement authorities with their inability to make the 
extradition system work with the speed and satisfaction they desire "94
This was certainly the case with Machain, and later on, with Kansi, and arguably,
Mohammed. It will not be a methodology easily ignored or abandoned by law
enforcement, instead will remain an alternative tool toward the apprehension of
fugitive terrorists, and one that is widely accepted, if  not embraced within the law
enforcement community.95
Acknowledged, of course, is the realization that often it is not the judiciary or the
legal process which entertains the prospect of extradition, as not all states are open, or
willing to cooperate if  given the option, and that there are states which sponsor, and
governments, which reinforce teiTorist activity and behaviour, such as discussed in
Chapter Six, and which reduce if  not eliminate the potential for extradition or
rendition. When the possibility for extradition or informal rendition is denied without
other recourse, the resort to the alternatives also becomes more likely.
94 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice Edition, (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana, 1987), at V.
95 From a discussion with a U.S. Government Official who worked the Middle East desk during both the Achille  
Lauro and TW A 847. It has been requested that their comments remain unattributable, however, expressed 
passionately that the “grab and snatch” operations were the only way to go i f  you have a shot at it, and that it is far 
too frustrating to watch the ‘bad guys’ get away time after time, even though we know where they are. It’s just as
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7.5 Conclusions
In 1979, the United States was introduced to what their European counterparts 
had already dealt with for years, violence which would directly impact the safety of 
their citizens, test the boundaries of their legal reach, and question their ability to 
maintain their composure in the international community, all from an enemy that was 
largely unseen. While historically, this was not a new concept for the U.S., it was fast 
becoming a new priority for America both at home and abroad. The 1983 bombings 
o f the U.S. Embassy (twice), and the U.S. Marine barracks in Beii-ut, forced the issue 
onto the agenda both domestically and abroad -  but up to that point, the problem 
remained abroad.
The Achille Lauro incident brought new growing pains in temis o f testing the 
limits our neighbours in the international community who were not willing to tolerate 
such bold steps to secure the custody of fugitive terrorists, the assumption that all U.S. 
interests necessarily align with the interest of our allies is not always the case, and that 
perhaps bully-politics and calling in the aircraft fighters was perhaps not the best way 
to try and solve the problem. Lesson learned: international cooperation is important 
for success.
Such lessons were taken into account during the apprehension of Hamadi two 
years later. Every legal loophole was threaded, ‘i ’s were dotted and ‘t ’s were crossed. 
Still only a partial victory was savoured, and the battle never gained home field 
advantage due largely to the hostage dynamic imposed during the trial. Lesson
easy to just get in there and get our guy, or pay someone to do it for us, as long as w e get him, and that’s the most 
important thing. Let the politicians work out the rest. Source Unattributable, Washington, D.C., August 1998.
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learned; the process of extradition can and sometimes will open up alternative options 
available under treaty law, especially if  it presents the more pmdent political option, 
and this falls well within the boundaries of compliance and obligation imposed by 
international law. Only recently, the international community has witnessed a similar 
case to this, Lockerbie, in which Libya was denied U.S. and British custody of the two 
citizens indicted for the bombing and instead brought to a third party. While not the 
option of choice, the decision to hold the trial in a third country (the Netherlands), 
certainly fell neatly within the boundaries imposed by international obligation.
Wliile alternatives such as the use of force, sanctions, deportation, have not been 
abandoned, they have not been a wholly convincing alternative. None of the major 
architects of terrorism have been successfrilly apprehended or brought to trial, and 
even with sanctions, states are largely dependent on the ability to rally other 
influential allies for broad based allied support. Lesson learned: there are times when 
the best the U.S. can do is to encourage other states to work together in dealing with 
the common threat of terrorism, especially with states who would otherwise choose to 
remain neutral.
There are difficulties incuned by fonnal cooperation, such as extradition, so it is 
not at all surprising that states have developed and often turned to methods of 
informal cooperation. The United States has developed more forms of police-to- 
police cooperation than perhaps any other country based on a system of 
transgovernmental values that transcends politics between govern m en ts.96 The 
dramatic increase of FBI offices abroad, their ability to deal effectively with foreign
96 Ethan Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization o f  U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement, 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 200-201
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police agencies significantly increase the ability of law enforcement to deal with 
international crime.97 This is not limited to the FBI, either; DBA and Immigration 
officials have increased their powers in the past decade, by contradicting the 
limitations of their original jurisdiction imposed by charter, and dramatically 
increasing their presence overseas with their own cache of police-to-police contacts 
and levels o f cooperation and involvement not only with native police forces, but with 
other U.S. agencies at home and abroad. This type of cooperation was instrumental in 
tracking and apprehending Yousef for his role in the World Trade Center bombing.
It is to the teiTorists’ advantage to place themselves outside the parameter of U.S. 
jurisdiction, making it increasingly difficult to conduct investigations, collect 
intelligence, develop evidence, in order to create a case. The U.S. must increasingly 
rely on international cooperation from their foreign counterparts in order to 
compensate for this jurisdictional gap. The ability to create the legal groundwork long 
before the incident actually happens, will only benefit law enforcement when an 
incident arises, while at the same time allow our allies to protect their own interests, 
which may not always be consistent with the U.S. But this problem can be overcome 
by invoking discretionary loopholes, such as rendition, on occasion without 
abandoning extradition treaties or agreements for mutual assistance, but through 
diplomacy, foreign policy, and increased intelligence efforts which can substantially 
increase the ability to bring fugitives to justice.
97 Ibid.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion: The Politics of Extradition and the Future o f Its Effectiveness Against 
Terrorism
Histofy is not a cookbook o f presented recipes. It teaches by analogy, not by 
maxims. It can illuminate the consequences o f actions in comparable situations, yet 
each generation must discover for itself what situations are in fact comparable.
8.1 Introduction
It was intended that each chapter in the study would be presented as its own 
individual argument with its own conclusions, which draw upon the lessons regarding 
terrorist extradition implicit in each discussion. Therefore, a synopsis of the study on 
whole, rehashing those conclusions, would be repetitive. Prior discussion has already 
dealt with the major points; the importance of cooperation, the influence of politics, 
the alternatives to traditional bilateral interstate extradition, and the giowing pains 
associated with these aspects. Instead, this final chapter intends to distil the various 
themes and issues raised thi'oughout all of the previous discussions, and which 
highlight the fundamental issues, which surround U.S. extradition policy. It is an 
effort to bring out the ‘sub-themes’ which have not been overtly discussed, but which 
have been prevalent thi'oughout the discussion. Specifically, it will discuss four main 
themes:
• What is the political relationship between extradition and terrorism?
What are the key issues and problems suiTOunding the adoption and 
implementation of U.S. extradition treaties?
98 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (New York: Simon & Schuester, 1979).
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Wliat are appropriate alternative responses to international terrorism, where 
extradition is not a possibility?
• How valuable is extradition as a tool in combating terrorism?
This survey does not introduce new questions sunounding extradition, rather it re­
addresses the initial concepts introduced in the early chapters, and examined thi'ough 
empirical evidence. This last chapter is intended as a summation, or ‘closing 
argument’, not a recap.
8.2 The Politics of Extradition
It has been mentioned earlier, but it is necessary to reiterate, that this is not a 
study in the legal analyses of extradition. This is not a study meant to be classified 
under ‘international law’, but international relations. Granted, much time was spent in 
earlier chapters focusing on the amalgamation of these two disciplines for the purpose 
of the study, which encompasses aspects of both. This was unavoidable, and intended 
to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about the process of extradition. 
Extradition is not a purely legal concept. The methods by which it is invoked involve 
strong political influences, which are measured in tenns of the level o f compliance to 
treaty law, and international cooperation. Moreover, the context, or international 
environment, which suiTounds the legal decision to extradite, is as much a part of the 
process as the law itself. Therefore, to understand the political relationship between 
extradition and ten orism is equally if  not more important than understanding its legal 
underpinnings, which are preseiwed in American law, case by case.
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8.2.1 Political Offence - Revisited
It is treaties, customaiy law, and the national laws of states, which provide the 
basis for international cooperation. Many international agreements are based on aut 
dedere aut judicare, the state’s duty to extradite or prosecute the alleged offender. It 
imposes a duty on the state as a method to control violence, and failure to cany out 
this obligation, can only weaken the effectiveness of international cooperation. 
Therefore, the ability to adhere to this duty is a significant factor when assessing 
domestic and international deterrence toward any crime prevention, and in particular, 
toward terrorism. As discussed in earlier chapters, a significant impediment toward 
this is the political offence ex cep tio n ,99 which is extremely pertinent toward tenorist 
extradition. Not all acts of terrorism are committed with the intent of achieving 
political recognition, or power, as an outcome. There are certain acts of ten'orisni, 
which are committed out of necessity, or out of self-defense, which is why political 
offence exists at all. However, political offence becomes especially problematic with 
cases involving terrorism, as the test of political offence occasionally, and 
imprecisely, is the applied standard by the c o u r t ,  There is legal precedent 
suiTounding such an issue, such as the cases involving the IRA and matters of 
extradition between the U.S. and the U.K., two democratic states with very strong 
relations and history of cooperation. These case precedents as well as the timefiame 
they appeared in, ultimately prompted a change in legislation and extradition treaties
99 See Chapter 3.3.3 for discussion o f  teiTorism and political offence.
100 pqj. a discussion in greater depth o f  the legal proceedings, arguments, and court decisions sun ounding cases 
involving political offence and the U.S. experience see; John Muiphy, Punishing International Terrorists, The 
Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives, (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986), under Extiadition; 
The United States, pps. 61-72; and John Murphy, The Future o f  M ultilateralism and Efforts to Combat 
International Terrorism, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, 25:35, 1986, pps. 63-70.
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within the U.S., even between the U.S. and its strongest allies. Bear in mind, this was 
an ‘indoctrination’ period for the U.S., when terrorism and tenorist attacks against its 
citizens was increasingly on the rise, as evidenced in the prior case study discussions 
in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. There was increasingly a call for the U.S. govermnent to act. 
The four cases discussed below, are one example of how the U.S. extradition laws are 
refonned and policy changed due to the pressure of political influence.
The first case was initially discussed in Chapter 3: in the 1979 case o f In re 
McMullen, where Peter McMullen the IRA terrorist accused of bombing British Army 
Banacks had fled to the United S t a t e s , and avoided extradition under the political 
offence clause. McMullen subsequently later turned against the IRA and became an 
informant, and the first to allege Gerry Adams was the chief of the IRA.
A similar case happened again, in 1981, in the case of In re Mackin. Desmond 
Mackin allegedly shot a British policeman in Northern Ireland, and fled to the U.S. 
where he avoided extiadition under the political offence clause in the U.S.-U.K 
extradition t r e a t y . *9 2  The U.S. government reaction to the court’s decision in Mackin 
was an attempt to override the courts by arguing that political offence was ultimately a 
decision for executive d i s c r e t i o n ,  ^93 hut their attempt failed. Mackin was never 
extradited, but was later found to be an illegal alien and deported to D u b l i n .  9^4
*91 Chapter 3.3.3 Terrorism and Political Offence
*92 United States magistrate for the Southern District o f  N ew  York, Magistrate No. 80, Cr. Misc. 1, August 13, 
1981.
*93 Mackin v. Grant, 66SF. 2d 122, 2nd circuit, 1981.
*94 Michael Fan el I ‘Senate Wobbles Over Law to Extradite Irish’, The New Statesman, August 30, 1985.
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A third case, Quinn v. Robinsoff^^ was a habeas corpus action in the Northern 
District Court of California, where the court ordered the release from jail of Liam 
Quinn, an IRA member accused of killing a London police officer in 1975, and 
conspiring to send mail bombs to Catholic bishops and British judges, and a news 
media executive. He allegedly placed bombs at railroad stations and two restaurants, 
which exploded causing numerous serious injuries. The Northern District Court ruled 
that these actions were canied out under the political offence clause.
The matter went before the Appellate Court, Ninth Circuit which reversed the 
decision. *96 The court contended that the question of political offence was reviewable 
because the larger issue was whether the extradition treaty covered the offence. *97 
The court found that Quinn’s acts did not constitute political offence, based on a) 
Quinn’s acts took place outside of the territory of uprising, and therefore political 
offence was inapplicable*98; b) political offence does not apply to the “indiscriminate 
bombing of civilian population”*99; and c) Quinn was eligible to be extradited on a 
murder charge. * *9
A final example. In re Doherty^^^, involved members of the IRA. Doherty was 
involved in an attack on a patrol of British soldiers in Northern Ireland. The attack
*95 Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983)
*96 783 F. 2d 776, 9*h Circuit, cert, denied  107 S. Ct. 271, 1986 
*97 Ibid.
*98 Ibid at 807 (Judge Reinhardt).
*99ibid at 818 (Judge Duniway). Judge Duniway used the Eain test, where Eain killed two young Jewish males 
by placing an explosive in a trash bin. See discussion in Chapter 3.
**9 Ibid at 819 (Judge Fletcher).
* ** 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 
(S.D .N .Y ., 1985), 786 F. 2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
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resulted in the death of one o f the British soldiers. Doherty was aiTested, charged,
incarcerated in prison in Northern Ireland, and tried for this crime and several others.
Following the trial, but before a decision could be handed down by the court; Doherty
escaped from prison, and fled to New York. He was convicted in absentia, of murder,
attempted murder, illegal possession of fireaiins and ammunition and of belonging to
the IRA. Following his aiTest in New York City, the British government filed a
request for his extradition. Doherty claimed that his crimes had constituted political
offences, to which the court agreed. In his dissenting opinion. District Judge Sprizzo,
of the Southern District Court of New York wrote:
“the facts o f  this case present the assertion o f  the political offence exception in its 
most classic form. The death o f  Captain Westmacott, while a most tragic event, 
occurred in the context o f  an attempted ambush o f  a British army patrol. It was the 
British arm y’s response to that action that gave rise to Captain Westmacott’s death.
Had this conduct occurred during the course o f  more traditional militaiy hostilities, 
there could be little doubt that it would fa ll within the political offence exception.^^^
Judge Sprizzo went on to contend that while it would not be beneficial to extend the
benefit of political exception to all groups, or fanatical individuals with loosely j
I
defined political objectives, the IRA “has an organization, discipline, and command |
iI
structure that distinguishes it from more amoiphous groups.”* *3 j
The U.S. government tried to intervene, by filing on behalf of the British 1
!Government, an action for a declaratory judgment that Doherty was extraditable. The |
Southern District court dismissed this action because it failed to “state a claim upon j
which relief could be granted”. **4 The appellate court, which confimied that the j
* *2 Ibid. at 276
**3 Ibid.
* *4 U.S. V. Doherty, 615 Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 786 F. 2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
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government is not in a position to bring declaratory judgment, upheld this and 
subsequent requests for extradition would have to be re-filed as a new case to an 
extradition magistrate.**5 The courts ruled in the end that the stmggle ongoing in 
Northern Ireland was legitimate, subsequently, Doherty was never extradited.
This series of cases caused strong reaction on behalf of the U.S. government, who 
had failed to reverse the decision of political offence as a matter of executive decision. 
In all of these cases, it was the courts which had the final say, and the only say, in 
spite of government objection. These judgments were highly embarrassing to then 
U.S. President Ronald Regan and his administration. The U.S. Department of State 
feared that such mlings to deny extradition could damage relations with Great Britain, 
with the potential to extend to other countries with strong national policies against 
ten*orism.**6 As a result, o f McMullen and Mackin, the U.S. government concluded a 
new bilateral extradition treaty with specific provisions requiring the executive 
authority of the U.S. to have the power to detennine whether an offence for which 
extradition is requested is applicable for the political offence exception. **7 This was 
in an effort to close this gap of political offence in terrorist cases, and remove this 
power from the courts. Legislation was introduced into the Senate, granting the 
govermnent and the accused the right of appeal of a magistrate’s decision regarding 
matters of extradition, and transferring the powers of decision making to the executive 
branch. However, Senate hearings concluded, that while the government and the
* * 5  <7.5. V. Doherty, 786 F. 2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986) i
* *6 Farrell, SENATE WOBBLES.
* *7 The extradition treaty between the U.S. and M exico, mentioned earlier in Chapter 7 in U.S. v. Machain, is one
example, refer to U .S.-M exico, article X, 1,31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, ratified January 25, 1980.
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accused have the right o f appeal, transferring the decision making authority from the 
courts to the Secretary of State would in effect undennine the very purpose of political 
offence to protect individuals hom  govermnent oppress ion.^Ext radi t ion is a 
sensitive issue for Irish-Americans, America has given asylum to generations of Irish 
fugitives, and no one has ever been handed back to the British. Even the most 
moderate Irish- Americans see the extradition of fugitives as taking the British side. 
As evidenced by some of the commentary which took place in the debate hom  the 
Irish-American Senators, such as U.S. Senator John Keny who commented “why is 
the Administration posing such a treaty with Britain and not Nicaragua?” In addition, 
to which U.S. Senator Pell supported by posing the IRA as “much less of a terrorist 
threat than the Contras in Nicaragua.” *^^
There is also the sensitive issue of due legal process. Trial by juiy is a 
fundamental principle to the U.S. legal system. The Diplock court system in Northern 
Ireland was another point of contention with the U.S. Senate. As noted by U.S. 
Senator Joseph Biden: “If  we sign this treaty we will have to arrive at the conclusion 
... that the present judicial system in Northern Ireland is, in fact one that is basically 
fair -  a notion that I reject totally.
The U.S. then turned to the existing treaty legislation, and began an initiative to 
eliminate the political offence exception entirely through concluding supplementaiy 
bilateral extradition treaties with friendly states. As a prototype, it used the
 ^ Extradition Act o f  1981 : Hearing on S. 1639 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary o f  the 97*^  ^
Congress, i^t Session, 1981.
Ibid.
120 Ibid.
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Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, originally signed June
25, 1985, in an effort to close the loopholes of political offence. The UK
Supplementaiy Treaty provides that “none of the following offences shall be regarded
as an offence of a political character”, listing the offences also identified in The
Hague, Montreal, and Tokyo, and Protected Persons Conventions. The original draft
treatyi2i continued to provide a list of additional offences, which would not classify
under political c h a r a c t e r .  122 The U.S. Senate amended this draft due to serious
concerns that such a draft would go too far in the other direction, denying the validity
of political offence.’23 The test for amending the treaty was the detennination that
IRA members would in fact be able to receive a fair trail in Northern Ireland. And, as
John Murphy points out;
“[I]t is highly debatable whether the judiciaiy should defer to the Executive Branch 
in cases involving claims o f political persecution upon return. Without intending to 
impugn the integrity or good faith o f officials in the Executive Branch, it is simply 
inconceivable that, as a political matter, the Department o f State would decline to
’2 ’ The treaty was amended following Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings, dropping the possession  
o f  fireamas and conspiracy to commit any o f the other offences, and a new article was added permitting judges to 
deny extradition i f  the accused can demonstrate “by a preponderance o f evidence” that he would be denied a fair 
tiial. See Senate amendments in 132 Congressional Record S9119-20, July 16, 1986.
’22 Subparagraphs (e)-(l) o f  the Supplementaiy Treaty found in 24 International Legal M aterials 1104 add:
(e) murder; 
manslaughter
m aliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including the taking o f  a hostage 
the following offences relating to explosives:
the causing o f  an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious damage to property; 
conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
the making or possession o f  an explosive substance by a person who intends either him self or through another 
person to endanger life or cause serious damage to property; 
the following offences relating to firearms or ammunition:
the possession o f  a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either him self or trough another person to 
endanger life; or
the use o f  a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or detention o f  him self or another person 
damaging propeity with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as to whether the life o f  another would 
thereby be endangered;
an attempt to commit any o f  the foregoing offences.
’23 Supra at note 20
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extradite a person to the United Kingdom on the ground that he was being sought for 
the purpose ofpersecution or that he coidd not get a fair trial
The point being that it is tricky business for the U.S. government to pass 
judgment on the legal systems of other countries, and especially ones with which they 
share good relations. The political implications alone of that would prove to be 
potentially damaging. There is also the expectation that the Executive branch would 
somehow be responsible for the underlying ‘humanitarian’ chord behind political 
offence, which is not something the executive branch is designed to adjudicate. It is 
the courts which have the final say, and one that the Executive branch is obliged to 
uphold. On June 17, 1986, The Supplemental Treaty on Extradition [revised] was 
passed by the Senate.’25
8.2.2 The Role o f  the Executive in Matters o f  Extradition
With deference given to the above discussion, this short section is to briefly 
discuss exactly what the powers of the Executive are, in matters o f extradition.
Under U.S. law, the federal government under the constitutional power o f the 
United States exclusively controls matters of extradition, which allows it to engage in 
matters of foreign relations and to make treaties. In the absence of a treaty obligation, 
international law does not impose a duty to deliver a person who has sought haven 
within its b o u n d a r i e s . ’26 Under the constitution of the U.S., the Fifth Amendment,
’24 John Murphy, The Future o f  M ultilateralism A nd Efforts to Combat International Terrorism, Columbia 
Journal o f  Transnational Law, 25:35, 1986, p. 76.
’25 ‘Senate Signs Extradition Treaty’, International H erald Tribune, July 18, 1986
’26 Lasa Oppenheim, International Law A Treatise, Third Edition, (NY: Longman Green & Co, 1920).
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which is the guarantor of due process, and equal protection under the law, prohibits 
the surrender of such an individual to a requesting country except under the discretion 
of Congress. Fuithemiore, it is the Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the 
President, who is authorized to surrender a fugitive, but only in the presence o f a 
treaty .’27 As noted in the above case example, the power of the Executive enjoys 
limited discretion over the courts; still, the Secretary of State may also refuse to 
extradite based on the detennination that the ti'eaty did not require extrad ition .’28
There are other circumstances where the Executive can exercise discretion; such 
as in matters of double crim in a lity ,’29 where the fugitive’s actions are criminal under 
the laws of both the requesting state, and the asylum state. Matters of insufficient 
evidence, or tlie requested extradition of nationals, are also matters of executive 
discretion. Political Offence, as discussed in greater length above, is the one area 
where the hands of the executive are tied, if  the crime committed is part of, and in 
furtherance to, a political uprising. Even if  the act is not directly comiected with 
political activity, it is the issue of motivation that is brought forward for review. 
Constitutionally, where the political offence defense is proven the Executive would be 
without the power to surrender the fugitive.
NOTE: Executive D iscretion in Extradition, Columbia Law Review, vol. 62: 1313, 1962, p. 1314.
’28 Ibid. p. 1316
’29 For greater discussion on these principles see: M.N. Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Cherief M. Bassiouni and Edward W ise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1996); Michael Akehurst, Modern Introduction to International Law Seventh Revised Edition, (London: 
Routledge Press, 1997)
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s, 3 A Matter o f Reciprocity
It is a fundamental understanding not to be overlooked is that extradition is a 
matter of reciprocity, a ‘two way street’ in tenns of cooperation. Wliile this may be 
readily apparent for the U.S. when dealing with close allies, with deep historical ties, 
and a pattern of cooperation, this is not usually where the problem becomes an issue. 
Recall the case of Achille Laura in Chapter 4, where Abu Abbas fled fram Italy to 
Yugoslavia, and eventually to freedom. Yugoslavia refused extradition largely on the 
grounds of the U.S. failure to extradite Aurotvik, wanted for genocide and war crimes 
in Yugoslavia, and enjoying political immunity in the United S tates . ’20 The U.S. and 
Yugoslavia had a valid extradition treaty, and Abbas could and should have been 
sunendered, despite the fact that Yugoslavia felt ignored by the U.S. on a matter of 
importance to them. It is very much a reciprocation effort, which is why the U.S. 
immediately aiTanged for the extradition of Aurotvik following the Abbas incident, 
but it was an afterthought, and Yugoslavia responded in kind by letting Abbas escape.
For the most part, the U.S. does not have the worst record on extradition; it does 
not have the best one either. Now, there is no real way of qualifying this because 
there currently is not a system in place to monitor extradition. There cuiTently are no 
statistics on the total number of extradition cases brought before magistrate’s in the 
U.S., and there is no way of tracking the total number of extradition requests still 
pending or ones that have been fulfilled.’2’ Many of the NGO’s which are issue-
’56 Chapter 4.4.1.
’5 ’ There does not appear to be any ‘global’ report on extradition, unlike other issues such as the ‘UN Global 
Report on Trafficking’ or Human Rights reports. Som e individual countries do, however, report on extradition 
reform. Canada, for example, tiacks legislation on extradition reform, proposed legislation on extradition, and its 
impact. To view this table, compiled by the Canadian Department o f  Justice, see: 
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/1998/extrt.html,
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specific, such as human rights organizations, have their own tracking statistics, but 
they are, again, issue specific, and do not reflect the big picture o f  the record o f  
extradition in the U.S. This has brought calls for refonn on extradition by members of 
Congress. H.R. 3212, for example, supported by Congressman Dan Miller, which 
would call for the U.S. Department of State to monitor extiadition, track the amount 
of requests, and no later than January 1 each year, submit an annual report on 
extradition to C o n g r e s s . ’ 52 As of now, there is now such system in place.
It is feasible to say, however, without the need for too much evidence, that the 
U.S. does have a selective record on extradition. Like any country with a large 
agenda, the U.S. tends to focus on those matters, which are significant and have 
impact on their political agenda, and this is especially true in matters of national 
security. An excellent example of this is the U.S. “war on drugs”.
Drug trafficking is a business that necessitates a high degree of international 
movement of commodities, money, and personnel. This has spearheaded an 
increasing number of bilateral extradition treaties, either newly created, or radically 
reformed, in Central American and Caribbean countries regarded by the Dmg 
Enforcement Agency (DBA) as either drug producing or drug transiting. This effort is 
mainly an attempt to remove some of the wiggle room for previously imposed 
limitations by explicitly stating that all drug offences are extraditable. However, the 
problem is not with the bi-lateral anangements, but with the individual goveiiunents 
themselves.
’52 For a complete understanding o f  what this bill does, as well as highlights and excerpts o f  H.R. 3212, see  
Congressman Dan M iller’s Extradition Refomi Web Site at: http://www.house.gov/danmiller/ieea.html.
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Take for example the case of Colombia. Colombia and the U.S. had close to a 
10-year gap in extradition, especially in cases involving drug-related offences. One 
reason for this, ostensibly, is fear on behalf of the drug lords of the stiff penalties 
imposed on them in the U.S. That ‘fear’ fuelled a wave of bombings and 
assassinations that were blamed on the drug lords, resulting in a national ban on 
extradition in 1991.’53
In 1997, under pressure from the U.S., Colombia reinstated extradition. One 
reason for this was money. The caiTot, was millions of U.S. dollars which would be 
poured into Colombia for assistance in the drug w a r .’54 Colombia’s Chamber of 
Representatives passed a ‘watered-down’ extradition bill, reducing the chances that 
powerful Colombian drug traffickers will be extradited to the U.S. for tr ia l.’55 The 
bill, which passed 119-38, mandates that no Colombian may be extradited for crimes 
committed before the new law was passed. This means, that the heads of the Cali 
drug cartel will serve less than 15 years in Colombian prisons, as opposed to a life 
sentence if extradited to the United States. Amidst speculation, was the fact that cartel 
leaders allegedly contributed heavily to President Ernesto Samper’s 1994 election 
ca m p a ig n .’56 The weak bill, an attempt to pacify both the U.S. and the drug 
traffickers, instead strained relations between the two countries.
’55‘Drug Lords Feared Tough Sentences’, November 25, 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/W ORLD/americas/99 Il/25/drugs.colom bia.02/.
’54 100 million dollars in U.S. assistance was provided to Colombia in 1998. See: Background Notes, U.S. 
Department o f  State, January 1999, www.state.gov/www/background_notes/colombia_0199_bgn.html.
’55 Steven Ambrus, ‘Colombia gives final ok to weak extradition law’, Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition), 
November 26, 1997, p. A2, Reuters Press, ‘Colombia to extradite for future Crimes’, Washington Times, 
November 26, 1997, p. A16.
’56 ‘Colombian House Absolves President Ernesto Samper, U.S. Revokes His V isa’, Newsbriefs, Summer, 1996.
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In 1999, however, in spite o f two bombings that occuiTed in Bogota, Colombia, 
Colombian President Andres Pastrana signed the extradition order for two major 
members of the Cali drug cartel who were extradited to the U.S. Jamie Orlando Lara, 
extradited in November 1999, was the first Colombian extradited to the U.S. since 
1990; and Fernando Jose Flores, extradited less than a week later, also in November 
1 9 9 9  137 As a result. President Clinton praised Pastrana’s courage and pledged to 
work with Congress on a major aid package to Colombia the following year.’58
Drug war extradition cases provide an interesting example of how the U.S. is able 
to use extradition, and its political influence to encourage extradition, with its south of 
the border neighbours which pose a real threat to border security o f the U.S. It is a 
good example of political influence and the relationship between politics and 
extradition. Still, this is a thesis about extradition and teiTorism, and the latter is a 
threat to U.S. national security, and a high priority on the U.S. agenda, which as 
evidenced tlnoughout the previous case studies in this work. Teii'orism cases provide 
their own unique challenges to extradition.
It is necessary to address that not all difficulties with extradition are U.S.-centric 
requests for extradition, and that difficulties arise when the U.S. is a requested state as 
well. Even countries with whom the U.S. has good relations, there remain significant 
challenges. Take for example the case o f Israel, and the extradition o f leading Hamas 
figure Mousa Abu Marzook.
’57 Colombia exti'adites another alleged drug lord to U.S., 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9911 /25/drugs.colombia. 02/
’58 Ibid.
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U.S. immigration apprehended Marzook as he arrived in Kennedy Aiiport, New 
York from the United Arab Emirates. His name appeared on a terrorist watch list as 
he proceeded through customs, and he was detained under a law banning people with 
known or suspected ties to terrorist activities.’59 Described by U.S. authorities as the 
head of the political bureau of Hamas, which opposes the peace process between the 
PLO and Israel, and is responsible for orchestrating terrorist attacks against Israeli 
citizens. Marzook, maintained that he was a businessman only, and the extent of his 
activities were to raise money in the U.S. that he transfeiTed to the Middle East and 
received money from abroad which was invested in overseas clients. He did not deny 
his involvement in the social service activities of Hamas, or gioups like Hamas, but 
denied all involvement in terrorism.
There was a general inquiry as to how Marzook actually entered the country, and 
whether or not he was truthful about his involvement with terrorist organizations.’46 
Providing false information to immigi'ation authorities is not a federal offence, but it 
is a deportable one. As a holding technique, the U.S. began exclusion proceedings 
against Marzook, but Marzook was a permanent resident alien, and exclusion is 
technically not applicable to green card holders. Also, under U.S. law, it is not illegal 
to raise funds in the United States for social services groups abroad, but it is against 
Federal terrorism statutes to support activities of international ten orism. These lines 
can be blurry, especially for a group like Hamas, which claims responsibility for
’59 Ian Brodie, ‘Hamas suspect held in U S’, The New York Times, July 29, 1995
146 David Johnston, ‘U.S. Opens Broad Investigation o f  Hamas Political Leader Being Detained in N ew  York’ 
The New York Times, August 4, 1995.
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numerous terrorist activities throughout Israel, but also finances and operates social 
service programs in Palestinian areas such as Gaza and the West Bank.
Israel, upon learning of Marzook’s detention in the U.S., began the proceedings 
for extradition on July 31, 1995. Israel claimed that Marzook helped to found Hamas 
in 1989, that he had committed vicariously 10 acts of violence under a conspiracy 
theory between 1990 and 1994.’4i
On August 7, 1995, Israel filed a provisional complaint for extradition charging 
that as one of the group’s senior leaders, Marzook led the political aim responsible for 
terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens.’42 Under the U.S.-Israeli extradition treaty, 
Israel has 60 days to request extradition of a fugitive, but must present detailed 
evidence to sustain the charges.’43 Realizing that ‘conspiracy’ is not an extraditable 
offence under the U.S.-Israeli extradition treaty, simply because ‘conspiracy’ lacks 
actual criminality, the Israeli govermnent ultimately filed a new complaint which was 
titled the “Request for Extradition”, on September 28, 1995. However, nothing 
happened on either side, and Marzook sat for 20 months incarcerated without ever 
being charged.
At the opening of Marzook’s extradition hearing in New York, U.S., Federal 
Prosecutors asserted that Marzook had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for 
Hamas, and authorized much of that money to spend on w e a p o n s .’44 The complaint
’4 ’ Richard Curtiss, ‘An American Dreyfus Affair; The Case o f  Mousa Abu Marzook’, Washington Report on 
M iddle E ast Ajfairs, April/May 1997.
’42 Joel Greenberg, ‘Israel to Seek Extradition o f  Reputed Islamic Militant Leader’, The N ew  York Times, July 31, 
1995.
’43 U.S.-Israel Treaty o f  Extradition, see: http://www.state.gov/ww/global/legal affairs/tiflndex.html.
’44 James C. M cKinley Jr., ‘U.S. Charges A  Palestinian In Terror Case, Detained Leader Tied to Hamas Fund’, 
The N ew York Times, August 9, 1995.
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charged further, that Marzook had ‘overseen the recruitment and training of teiTorists 
who were planning to travel to Israel to fight in the holy war’,’45 and was linked to 
some 13 different tenorist attacks. On August 7, 1995, the same day Israel filed its 
provisional complaint, the U.S. issued its own first wan'ant for his aixest, but made no 
allegations that Marzook had committed individual o ffe n c e s .’46
The decision to seek an aiTest warrant for Marzook was not a product of the 
Israeli Criminal Justice system, but was decided in the cabinet o f then-Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin, who was under intense pressure from his own party, of being 
unable to cope with the teiTorist threat, and providing adequate safety for his 
people.’47 This was not a legal decision, but a political one. In fact, the legal 
authorities in Israel discounted the possibility of extradition as they could not produce 
evidence actually linking Marzook to these teiTorist attacks, nor could they effectively 
establish charges to the contraiy.’48
By May 1996, New York Federal Judge Kevin Duffy ruled that Marzook could 
legally be extradited to Israel, under charges for murder and terrorism, but that he 
would be held in detention until a final detennination could be made about turning 
him over to Israeli authorities.’49 Under U.S. law, the case would now go to the
’45 Ibid.
’46 Ibid  at note 40  
’47 Ibid.
’48 Barton Gellman, ‘Israel Drops Its Request to U.S. for Extradition of Leading Hamas Figure’, International 
H erald Tribune, April 4, 1996.
’49 John M. Goshko, ‘Judge Says Detained Hammas Politician Can Be Extradited’, The Washington Post, May 
10, 1996, p. 3
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Secretary of State who would then sign the extradition order to send Marzook back to 
Israel.
Israel, now feared intense reprisals and that trying Marzook would provoke new 
waves of retributive violence, decided ultimately that they really did not want him at 
all. 150 This now left both the Clinton administration and the new Netanyahu 
administration to find a face-saving retreat. The problem was solved when King 
Hussein of Jordan, ‘invited’ Marzook back to Amman, where the U.S. deported him 
to Jordan under the Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.C. §§ 1182 on May 5, 
1997.151
It’s fitting to note, that two years later, in 1999 during King Abdullah of Jordan’s 
new policy of cracking down on Hamas operations in Jordan, 22 high ranking 
members of Hamas operating out of offices Amman were aiTested; one o f detainee’s 
was Abu Marzook. All of the members arrested carrying Jordanian passports were 
jailed and charged with membership to an illegal organization, except Marzook who, 
travelling on a Yemeni passport, was deported to Dubai, and flew on to Damascus 
where he remains today.’52
Evidence of political influence on extradition is apparent not only in countries 
with which we have good, or amicable relations, but in countries where no 
relationship exits at all. Ostensibly, these are not only the most challenging forms of 
attempted extradition, but the most exigent forms of diplomacy, and they often fail.
’ 50 McKinley, U.S. CHARGES
151 Terrorism in the United States 1997, FBI Report, p. 6 
’52 Lisa Beyer, ‘Nowhere to loin’. Time, October 11, 1999
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Take the case for example, of the hijacking of Kuwaiti Flight 221 to Tehian and the 
attempted U.S. extradition o f the hijackers from Iran.
On December 4, 1984, four Hezbollah g u n m en ’53 hijacked a Kuwaiti jetliner with 
155 people on board and forced the plane, shortly after take-off from the United Arab 
Emirates, to fly to Tehi*an.’54 Tehran, not eager to accept the plane, denied permission 
to land, but reversed its decision after the pilot claimed a fuel e m erg en cy .’55 The 
hijackers killed one passenger upon landing, and thi*ew his body on the tarmac in 
Tehran, but later in the day released 44 passengers, mostly women and ch ild ren .’56
The hijacking of the Kuwaiti target was in response to the recent tough stance of 
punishing teiTorists who hit American targets, in Kuwait. Earlier that year, Kuwaiti 
officials brought to trial 17 teiTorists, who were sentenced to death or long prison 
terms. The hijacking was in the hope of forcing Kuwait to release the imprisoned 
ten*orists.’57
For six days, the jetliner stood on the tarmac in Tehian. Its passengers were 
beaten, tortured, and tied to their s e a t s . ’58 A second victim, a U .S .  AID worker, was 
shot six times in front of Iranian television cameras, his body thrown to the tarmac by
’53 Claude van England, ‘Who are the terrorists behind planning, execution o f Kuwaiti airliner hijacking?’, !
Christian Science Monitor, December 10, 1984; ‘Behind the Teheran hijack’. Foreign Report, December 13, 1984 |
i
’54 ‘ 155 On a Jetliner Hijacked To Iran’, The New York Times, December 5, 1984. |
1
’55 John Kohan, ‘Horror Aboard Flight 221’, Time, December 17, 1984 ;
’56 Los Angeles Times, December 5, 1984 |
’57 David Ottaway, ‘Hijack Called Part o f Plot to End Support for Iraq’, Washington Post, December 15, 1984, iI
’58 John Kifner, ‘Ex-Hostages on Airliner Tell o f  Six Days o f  H ell’, New York Times, December 11, 1984; I
Charles P. Wallace, ‘Hostages Describe 6 Days o f  Torture’, Los Angeles Times, December 11, 1984; United Press |
International, ‘Hostages Accuse Jet’s Hijackers o f  Using Torture’, International H erald Tribune, December 11, 1
1984. ;
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one of the g u n m e n . ’ 59 Before the hijackers could detonate the explosive-rigged plane, 
Iranian guards stormed the plane and ended the h i j a c k i n g . B y  the time the ordeal 
was over, there would be four victims, two of them Americans.’6’
Throughout the ordeal, there had been U.S. accusations of Iranian complicity’62 
toward the hijacking, criticism of Iran’s handling of the crisis’63, even allegations of 
encouragement and assistance to the hijackers.’64 Now that the incident was over, the 
rhetoric quieted down to U.S. ‘patience’ with Iran for one very important reason. Iran 
had custody of the hijackers.’65
Since the hostage crisis in 1979, the U.S. has severed all diplomatic relations with 
Iran, and to charge the atmosphere a little more, in 1984, for the first time since 1967, 
the U.S. had established formal diplomatic relations with Iraq. This is rather poignant 
due to the context, remember, which was in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war.’66 The 
U.S. was now looking to extradite four members of the Hezbollah from Iran, a 
country known for their state support of ten'orism, to the U.S. for trial. There was no 
treaty. There were no diplomatic relations. There was not a very good chance for
’59 The Associated Press, ‘Hijackers Threaten More Killings After 4 Are Slain at Iran Aiiport’, The N ew  York 
Times, December 8, 1984.
’66 John Kifner, ‘Plane Is Reported Stormed In Iran; 9 Hostages Freed’, The New York Times, December 10,
1984; Charles P. Wallace, ‘Iranians Rush Jet, Free Last Captives’, Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1984.
’6 ’ The Associated Press, ‘Hijackers In Iran Reported To Kill Two More on Jet’, New York Times, D ecem ber 1,
1984. I
’62 David Ottaway ‘Americans Saw No Iranian Complicity’, Washington Post, December 12, 1984. |
’63 Terence Smith, ‘Reagan Criticizes Iran on Hijacking’, The N ew York Times, December 8, 1984.
’64 Terence Smith, ‘U.S. Charges Iran With Encouraging Hijackers o f  Jet’, December 12, 1984.
165 Doyle McManus, ‘U.S. Being Patient -  So Far -  on Iran’s M oves on Hijackers’, Los Angeles Times, 
December 14, 1984.
’66 For discussion and general, basic, information on the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, see: The Columbia 
Encyclopedia, 6’h Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
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success, and success never happened. Iran adamantly refused to extradite the 
hijackers, and the Iranian Press quoted the Prime Minister saying, “If  handing over the 
hijackers was lawful, they should hand over the teiTorists who have martyred 
hundreds inside Iran and who are now continuing their activities with support of the 
Americans and the French.” ’^ ? This was a direct reference to several Iranian 
dissidents whose leaders live in France, who were charged by Iran of having 
instigated a series of hijackings against Iranian airliners, and who were never 
extradited. In fact, Iran was quick to point out that “no countiy has so far extradited 
to Iran hijackers of Iranian airliners”.’6» Kuwait, which had also requested the 
hijacker’s extradition, to which the Iranian public prosecutor Hojatolislam Emadi 
replied to an Iranian news agency “such irrational requests will not be accepted.”’69 
Iran instead, claimed they would try the hijackers themselves, in accordance with 
Islamic law, which technically they are entitled to do. There was widespread 
speculation, however, that the offer to try the hijackers was largely a ruse to counter 
criticism that Iranian authorities may have been in collusion with the hijackers. The 
U.S. Department of State, soon after this announcement verbalized hopes for an ‘open 
trial’, spokesman Alan Romberg noting that “An open trial obviously is the greatest 
assurance that the world coimmnity will have that Iran is dealing seriously with these 
murderers.”’™
’67 The Associated Press, Tran Is Adamant On The Hijackers, Premier Quoted as Indicating They W on’t B e  
Extradited’, The New York Times, December 13, 1984.
’68 ‘Iranians Say Four Hijackers Will Be Tried’, The New York Times, December 23, 1984.
’69 Times Wire Service, ‘Trial Planned for Captured Hijackers, Iran Says’, Los Angeles Times, December 19, 
1984.
’™ Smith, REGAN CRITICIZES.
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The point of all this is that extradition cannot be a one-sided affair, and there are 
issues that influence the success of extradition regardless of whether or not the legal 
basis exists. What this discussion illuminates, is that largely, there is evidence of 
political influence, intervention, or interference, in various stages of implementation 
of the extradition process. This is apparent from the treaty implementation phase, 
through the request phase, and even in cases where no relationship exists at all. As 
evidenced in previous case studies in the preceding chapters, irrespective of the legal 
obligation of extradition that is often pre-existing, there are several challenges that can 
undennine its compliance. However, like the example o f Abu Abbas in the Achille 
Lauro incident, where surely international cooperation was the important lesson 
learned, the failure of that incident rested more on the political inability to advance a 
relationship of extradition with Yugoslavia, than it did on Italian compliance.
In the case of the TWA 847 and the trial of Mohammed Ali Hamadei, there were 
strong political overtones, even where an existing treaty had influence, and although 
his extradition never transpired, Hamadei was still tried, and convicted. This is far 
from justice never being served at all, but the extent of his punishment was driven by 
political fear, which is not much different that the Colombian dmg lord examples of 
political interference. The point being, however, that in order for the U.S. to expect 
legal compliance to extradition laws, there are and will be instances where the ability 
to achieve this will depend directly on the amount of political ‘give’. This, in a 
democratic society, where democratic values largely are implicit in the constitution 
and in the courts, can prove tricky especially in cases where there is a distinct gap in 
political values. However, as previous discussion has also demonstrated, there still 
remain alternatives even beyond the politically influenced boundaries of extradition.
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8.4 The Viable Alternatives
In maintaining the original objectives o f this Chapter, which are ‘summation’ not 
‘synopsis’, this section will briefly consider some of the themes of alternative 
response as they relate to the overall discussion involving the value of extradition as 
means against terrorism,
8.4.1 Strengthening Intelligence-Law Enforcement Cooperation
There is a general belief around the law enforcement community that for every 
trial and prosecution of a temorist, there represents a failure of intelligence to stop the 
act from happening in the first place. This thinking is not without some merit, 
although indicative o f the larger ‘blame game’ obvious throughout U.S. government 
agencies. In 1999, Congress established The National Commission on Terrorism to 
evaluate the laws, policies, and practices for preventing and punishing tenorism 
directed at American c i t i z e n s . T h e  Commission concluded that while they believed 
that U.S. policy was generally on the right track, one of the first recommendations 
was to use the full scope of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities 
intelligence collection methods regarding terrorist plans and operations. ’22 This is 
easier said than done: it requires sharing, something that U.S. govermnent agencies 
no matter how much they say they want to cooperate do not really wish to do. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, some lines of power have been redrawn; the FBI for example, 
which now enjoys a recent extension of jurisdictional powers, allowing them the
’2 ’ The National Committee on Terrorism Report, Countering the Changing Threat o f  International Terrorism, is 
available at: http://www.fas.org/iip/threat/commission.html
’22 Ibid. p.3
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ability to perfonn investigations o v e r s e a s . ’23 This causes some overlap in 
investigations and information with other agencies with similar jurisdiction, such as 
the CIA or Diplomatic Security, but the important thing to remember is that the 
mission of law enforcement is vei*y different from that of an intelligence analyst. 
Analysts concern themselves with trends, tactics, and, obviously, analysis. Law 
enforcement’s mission is to ‘identify, deter, and disrupt’; their very mission is that of 
a trained criminal investigator, which is why the investigative expertise of an agency 
such as the FBI is so genuinely indispensable.’24
There is no reason to be fatalistic about this; interagency cooperation happens all 
the time, everyday in the govermnent, as evidenced in the Kansi case discussion in 
Chapter 7.’25 This is not a foreign concept. However, continued, greater cooperation, 
like that discussed in the Kansi case, is invaluable for prevention, investigation, or as 
a supplier of evidence in a potential extradition hearing or request. While this may 
not entirely qualify as an alternative to extradition, it certainly provides it a good first 
line of defense.’26
8.4.2 Sanctions
Another recommendation by the Coimnission’s report was that of continued 
support of the use of sanctions, not only toward countries that support tenorism, but
’23 See: Chapter 1. 2 The Changing Nature o f  Ten or ism and Its Impact on Law Enforcement 
’ 24 Interview with Robert Jenkins, Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Department o f State, June 13, 2001. 
’25 Kansi case study Chapter 7.3.3
’26 See Chapter 7.3.1 for World Trade Center bombing case and rendition o f  Ramzi Yousef.
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also toward those that do not do enough to prevent terrorism. *2? Interestingly enough, 
Pakistan was one of the suggested candidates for this type o f ‘Not Cooperating Fully’ 
responses. Pakistan is actually an interesting case, notwithstanding the role of 
Pakistan in the apprehension of Ramzi Yousef, or Amir Kansi’28, which was an effort 
on behalf of Pakistan to stay off such a list. But take for example, the role o f Pakistan 
as a supporter of teiTorism and in particular, its relationship with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan over the protection of Osama bin Laden.
Pakistan is generally inconsistent in its record of cooperation in matters of 
counter terrorism. They provide a safe haven, transit points, moral, political, and even 
diplomatic sympathy to several groups that engage in terrorist activity.’29 in the case 
of bin Laden, he is in some regions of Pakistan, a hero. In Pakistan’s oldest and 
largest religious school, near the Afghanistan border, there is a poster of Bin Laden 
calling him a holy warrior. The school, every year sends hundreds o f its graduates to 
support Bin Laden’s allies in Afghanistan.’86 There has even been evidence of 
collusion between bin Laden and members of Pakistani leadership against India.’8’
Pakistan and the Taliban, however, remain potentially the only possibility for bin 
Laden’s extradition. Afghanistan’s Taliban government has stated repeatedly that it 
intends to cooperate with the international community to combat terrorism in the
122 “The President should impose sanctions on countries that, while not director sponsors o f  terrorism, are 
nevertheless not cooperating fully on counter terrorism.” COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM REPORT, p. 2
’28 Ibid.
’29 COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM REPORT, p. 15
186 Tim Weiner, Tn Islamic World, Osama bin Laden’s Esteem Rises’, Health and Energy, February 8, 1999, 
’8 ’ Raja Asghar, ‘Bin Laden sparks Pakistan duel’, M iddle East Times, issue 98-36
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‘vested interests in the name of I s l a m ’ , ’ 82 yet they have not attempted to curb bin 
Laden’s activities, and have repeatedly refused requests for his extradition. Pakistan 
remains the vital regional player, for both the U.S. and for Afghanistan. Pressure in 
the fomi of sanctions on Pakistan could potentially have a spillover effect in the 
region, pushing Afghanistan to squeeze Bin Laden out of his sanctuary.
As an overall method of deterrence, however, and as discussed in greater length 
in Chapter 6’83, sanctions camiot be a unilateral force, or they are useless. As a matter 
o f policy, they should be applied cautiously with specific goals in mind, and not just 
as an arbitrary, alternative response.
8,4.3 The International Criminal Court
The recent extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the U.N. war crimes tribunal in 
June 2001 was a historical first. Never before has a fonner head of state faced the 
court for crimes against h u m an ity .’84 The popularity of the idea of a central court or 
International Criminal Court (ICC) that tries war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide, has increased substantially in recent yea rs,’85 and is coming ever closer to 
becoming a rea lity .’86 Although there has not been a consensus toward the idea, there
’82 ‘Osama bin Laden Hunt Intensifies’ ,Stratfor G lobal Intelligence Update, October 12, 1999, 
http://www.stratfor,com/SERVICES/GIU/101299ASP
’83 See discussion. Chapter 6.4
’84 Anthony Deutsche, ‘M ilosevic in Hague to Face Tribunal’, Associated Press, June 28, 2001.
’85 ‘Toward an Effective International Criminal Court, Meeting the Challenge’, International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development, Paper, September 1, 1998.
’86 See discussion Chapter 6.4.2.
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exists the possibility that serious crimes of international terrorism could become 
included as part of the overall remit of the ICC.
As an alternative to interstate extradition, the idea of an international court is not 
beyond the realm of possibility. It involves the process of extradition to the court, but 
this may not be more difficult in typical cases than the task of traditional bilateral 
interstate exti'adition. By redrawing the jurisdictional lines, it has the potential to 
address issues such as state sponsorship and harbouring of terrorists. Take for 
example the case o f Lockerbie, which appear ed for years as a hopeless case, until the 
extradition of the two men Abdel Basel Ali Mohamed al Megrahi, and Lamen Khalifa 
Fhimah, who were extradited to Scottish jurisdiction in the Netherlands. Obviously, 
this was not the first choice of solutions for either the U.S. or the U.K., but given the 
options between that or nothing; something is and always will be better than nothing.
8.5 The Answer Is ...
With respect to the four main themes of the work which were presented in 
Chapter 1, and readdressed at the beginning of this Chapter, the following conclusion 
can be drawn:
• What is the political relationship between extradition and terrorism?
The political relationship between extradition and teiTorism rests not only in 
the obligation set forth in treaty law, but in the execution of the treaty, the 
prosecution of the case, and the compliance to international law. As it has been 
demonstrated repeatedly thioughout the case studies and discussions in this study, 
extradition is not about the law alone, but the political influences, which 
accompany the decision to invoke the law, and the two are inextricably linked.
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• What are the key issues and problems surrounding the adoption and 
implementation o f  U.S. extradition treaties?
As the work has demonstrated, there are many levels to this aspect of 
extradition. They stem from the obvious legal, constitutional, and value-based 
political issues, to the more obscure ‘tit-for-tat’ issues of reciprocity, and the 
deeper issues of international cooperation. Exti'adition is a matter of process, 
decided upon by the U.S. courts, and executed tlii'ough the Executive, but in 
democracies it is often the courts that will have the final say. Matters such as 
political offence, will always be an issue, as long as there continue to be liberal |
democracies that value the benefit of this exception.
• What are appropriate alternative responses to international terrorism, where ! 
extradition is not a possibility?
The successful use of rendition as an alternative to extradition has meaningful {
!possibilities. Nine out of thirteen high profile U.S. trials of foreign terrorists |
1Ibetween the years of 1993 and 1999’87 have been thiough methods of rendition. I
!
As demonstrated, exclusion and deportation are also potential means for i
removing terrorists from their safe havens. These methods may prove to be |
meaningful in many future cases involving fugitive terrorists, as bonds of 
international cooperation are become stronger against international crime, and the 
use of lower level, inter-agency cooperation on law enforcement levels is 
becoming the preferred method of choice. A recent example of this is the 
indictment of the 13 Saudis and one Lebanese national on 46 counts including 
conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destmction
’ 87 Refer to Appendix A for chart.
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in the Khobar Towers bombing incident.’88 The basis of success was not the 
‘unwavering pursuit o f the investigation’, but the ability for the U.S. and the 
Saudi govermnent to cooperate on the criminal matter of terrorism.
As discussed, smartly applied sanctions with direction and purpose have a 
distinct appeal; and the possibilities of extradition to an International Criminal 
Court may have the potential to reach those cases that at present still manage to 
slip through the net. Reason being is that more countries are likely to see the ICC 
as a legitimate mechanism, which could develop special expertise in this type of 
crime, similar to their handling o f war crimes. The use of an ICC could 
potentially mean extradition to an international body, in lieu of tradition bilateral 
interstate extradition. There are advantages to this: it would be seen as a
legitimate authority, backed by the UN, which could make it more acceptable as 
an alternative than extradition to a superpower like the U.S. Courts o f a smaller 
country would be more likely to proceed with a trial of a sensitive case, such as in 
the Hamadei example, since there would be a considerably less likelihood of 
states thieatened by reprisals from terrorists. Of greater significance, however, 
would be the universal message that there is no hiding place under this new sense 
of universal jurisdiction. However, in order for this to actually take place, the 
ICC’s remit would require widening its scope in order to include tenorism, which 
presently it does not.
In addition, there remains the final possibility of convergence o f laws. This 
would essentially provide the final prong as part of a ‘law -  international measures
’88 'Indictments in Khobar Towers Bombing’, http://www.ABCNEW S.com June 22, 2001.
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-  convergence’ multi-tiered legal approach toward punishing terrorists. However, 
this final point is crucial if terrorists are truly to be without a place to hide.
• How valuable is extradition as a tool in combating terrorism?
Extradition alone cannot win the war on tenorism. However, extradition 
acting in concert with other alternatives cannot be discounted as a powerful 
option. It is not just extradition that is being argued for here, but the mle of law, 
and compliance to the rule of law. Granted this may not always be a part of the 
first line of defense in the war against tenorism, but it can not, and should not, be 
discounted as a fair and effective method for bringing terrorists to justice; nor 
should it be sidelined as being of secondary importance. The rule of law is the 
one thing that binds our well-ordered society together; it is the last word on issues 
o f fairness, and the first response when seeking justice. There are no issues of 
policy, security, or defense that escape the rule of law. It is an integral part of our 
society, our system of values, and the international community as a whole. In 
matters o f terrorism, it deserves its place as a deterrent not just in cases of 
extradition, but also as having the potential to accomplish more than the mere 
documentation of international cooperation.
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fAppendix
Extraditions and Renditions of Terrorists to the United States, 1993-1999
Patterns of Global Terrorism -2000
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
April 2001
iDate Name Extraditionor
Rendition
From
March 1993
Mahmoud Abu Halima
[February 1993 World Trade Center
bombing)
Extradition
July 1993
Mohammed AN Rezaq
(November 1985 hijacking of Egyptair :
648)
Rendition Nigeria
February 1995
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef 
(January 1995 Far East bomb plot, 
February 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing)
Extradition Pakistan
April 1995 Abdul Hakim Murad(January 1995 Far East bomb plot) Rendition : Philippines
August 1995
Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim 
(February 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing) ]
Extradition Jordan
December
1995
Wall Khan Amin Shah 
(January 1995 Far East bomb plot) Rendition
*
September
1996
Tsutomu Shirosaki
(May 1986 attack on US Embassy,
Jakarta)
Rendition *
June 1997
Mir Aimal Kansi
(January 1993 shooting outside CIA 
headquarters)
Rendition
June 1998 Mohammed Rashid(August 1982 Pan Am bombing) Rendition
: August 1998
Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali 
(August 1998 US Embassy bombing in 
Kenya)
Rendition Kenya
August 1998
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh
(August 1998 US Embassy bombing in
Kenya)
Rendition Kenya
December
1998
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim 
(August 1998 East Africa bombings) Extradition Germany
October 1999
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed
(August 1998 US Embassy bombing in
Tanzania)
Rendition South Africa
* Country not disclosed
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